The election process faces many challenges. In terms of security, the Taliban has increased its presence across the country, especially in rural areas. Over forces are assigned to protect 5,000 voting stations. In Ghazni, in the southeast of the country, where the Taliban launched massive attacks concurrently in recent years, only some districts would be safe enough to open polling centers. In the Taliban western stronghold, in Farah province, where only 600,000 registered to vote in the October 2018 parliamentary election, it is now believed that as few as 10,000 would come out on election day. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) last month that some  nationwide will remain closed due to safety concerns.

Economic Woes

Both the previous and current Afghan governments appear to disregard the importance of free and fair elections and political stability for bringing investment into the country and stimulating economic growth. A recent report by the shows that Afghanistan’s economic growth was slow, at just 2% in 2018, despite positive improvements in economic policies, leading to a rise in poverty and deterioration in living standards across the country. The reports points to conflict, drought and political uncertainty as the main factors negatively impacting economic growth, the slowest in the South Asia region. Another report, by the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment survey, shows the poverty rate has from 38% in 2011-12 to 55% in 2016-17.  

The Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) had stepped in and tried to turn the economy around. For example, according to the World Bank, during 2017, the cost of starting a business reduced significantly, from 82.3% of income per capita to only 6.4%. The time needed by businesses to pay their taxes in 2017 was reduced to 270 hours, down from the regional average of 275 hours. In 2018, on the heels of the reforms around obtaining credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes and resolving insolvency, Afghanistan has improved its from 183 to 167 in terms of ease of doing business.

In 2018, regional projects like the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipe line, which will transfer gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, and the Lapis Lazuli corridor that will create jobs and increase regional connectivity as part of the old Silk Road route, were inaugurated. Confidence was gradually restored, and the economy picked up momentum. Real went up from a low of 1.5% in 2015 to 2.3% in 2016, reaching 2.7% in 2017.

Despite these initiatives that may stimulate the economy, however, the factor of political stability is palpably missing when it comes to promoting long-term economic growth. A World Bank released just before the 2018 parliamentary elections warned that economic recovery is at risk, citing election-related violence as one of most important factors. The same report cautiously at 2.4% in 2019, with a risk of a further decrease given the political instability around the parliamentary and presidential elections.

Political Instability

According to the economist , free and fair elections are considered an important factor for boosting the economy. Free and fair elections make the government accountable to its people and, as a result, encourage economic reform that benefits the voters. Any election that lacks transparency usually creates uncertainty and puts political stability at risk. Investors see free and fair elections as a signal that governments respect democracy and the rule of law, and are used by investors to monitor political risks for doing business in a country.

Since 2001, when the US-led invasion toppled the Taliban regime, consecutive Afghan governments have failed to fulfil the country’s hope for a transparent political process. During the 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections, there were allegations of mass voter fraud. Afghans remained hopeful, reasoning that those elections were conducted by weak and newly established institutions following years of civil war. Then came the 2009 presidential election, characterized by widespread ballot stuffing and mass electoral fraud. The same scenario carried on into the 2010 parliamentary election, which saw many warlords and strongmen enter the new parliament.

In 2014, the country experienced another fraudulent presidential election that brought the country to the brink of civil war. At the end of controversial election, the two frontrunners could not agree on the result, with then-US secretary of state, John Kerry, stepping in to persuade both candidates to form the National Unity Government, with Ghani as president and Abdullah in a specially created position of the chief executive.    

As a result of these election crises, the country has witnessed enormous economic shocks, especially post-2014, following the drawing down of international troops — from a high of 150,000 in in 2011 to a low of 17,000 NATO and 14,000 US forces in an in 2019 — and significant decline in foreign aid. Household and private investment , leading to lower domestic demand, economic growth slowed from an average of 11.5% between 2009 and 2012 to 1.8% between 2013 and 2016. Weak economic performance and lower imports in 2014 resulted in a 9%-decline in fiscal revenue. The poverty rate has increased dramatically, from 38% in 2011-12 to 55% in 2016-17.

A perception conducted annually by the Asia Foundation shows national optimism decreased significantly post-2014. For example, in 2013, some 58% of Afghans thought the country is moving in the right direction, while in 2015 only 37% held this opinion. In 2014, according to the same survey, election fraud was mentioned by 9% of respondents as one of main reasons for being pessimistic about the country’s future.

Important Lessons

The disputed presidential election of 2014 could have provided important lessons to all stakeholders, and first of all the Afghan government, about the importance of a stable political process for a country with a fluctuating economy heavily dependent on foreign aid. However, last year’s parliamentary elections indicated that this was not the case. Many doubted the to deliver democratic elections. Ronald E. Neumann, the US ambassador to Afghanistan between 2005 and 2007, wrote that “Despite four years to from President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the administration of the elections was a disaster. The administration of the Independent Election Commission was a shamble.”

Some polling stations haven’t opened at all, some opened late. In some voting centers, election materials arrived late, and election staff didn’t know how to work the newly introduced biometric machines. The shortcomings and problems didn’t end there: The announcement of results was delayed multiple times, and Kabul election results were considered invalid at first, and then called after months of delay.

The credibility and inclusivity of the upcoming presidential election is a major concern. The opponents of President Ghani accuse the government of interfering in and engineering elections. Supporters of his main challenger, Abullah Abdullah, that polling centers in areas where, based on past data, people were more likely to vote for Abdullah are being closed. Arif Rahmani, a member of parliament from Ghazni, this was happening in some of the safer districts of Ghazni province, dominated by ethnic minority Hazaras, where “they are closing the stations because they know Dr. Ghani will not get votes, and in some insecure places where he has support, they are leaving them open. The whole thing is upside down.”

by a local news agency shows that a presidential candidate, Farmarz Tamana, whose mother-in-law is the head of the IEC, has influence over the commission decisions. The report adds that through his influence on senior election body officials, Tamana appointed many of his supporters to positions within the entity.

A report by the Afghanistan Analysis Network shows that, with 75% of the country living in rural areas, voting will be heavily due to attacks by the Taliban and polling stations remaining closed due to security issues. The Afghan Free and Fair Election Foundation around security issues, difficulty of hiring observers and providing election materials, which all increases chances of fraud and places the validity of the election into question.          

The presidential election is an important opportunity for Afghanistan to avoid further political uncertainty and demonstrate to national and international investors that there is a democracy and a legitimate government, accountable to its citizens, that respects property rights, works on economic reforms, reducing corruption and poverty. Only then can real recovery take root in a nation ravaged by decades of war and political turmoil.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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With the US stating its intention to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, the doors have opened for political settlement to end more than 17 years of war. Prominent Afghan political leaders, a document by the and the all call for an interim government as a political settlement to end the conflict. With an interim government now a possible solution, what are the preconditions for its establishment, and how feasible is it in current situation?

To answer these questions, Dr. Omar Sadr, of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Kabul, has undertaken a , Political Settlement of the Afghanistan Conflict, using the existing literature and conducting interviews with Afghans from various constituencies who have sufficient knowledge of the Taliban. Since many argue for a political settlement as a solution to the Afghan conflict, Sadr’s research aims to explain four forms of institutional mechanisms for such a settlement: participation of the Taliban in the elections, decentralization of power, a power sharing arrangement and an interim government.

Some suggest an as a viable political solution because the Taliban, having fought the government for 17 years, is not interested in sharing power with its adversary. The Afghan government has violated and suspended the constitution multiple times since its formation in 2014, and the October 2018 parliamentary election was a disaster, showcasing that Kabul is unable to conduct transparent and fair elections due to mismanagement, a lack of funds and widespread insecurity across the country. Through an interim government, however, the Taliban can be incorporated into the Afghan political system.

Preconditions for an Interim Government    

Based on Sadr’s research findings, five preconditions need to be in place for the formation of an interim government. First, this setup is recommended in places where the state has not collapsed and institutions have remained largely intact. Today, most of the Afghan state institutions are functioning, and any peace agreement should empower them further.

Second, the government must not be delegitimized and must have a high level of control over the means of violence and other state institutions. Sadly, this is not the case in Afghanistan, as the Taliban has multiple times declined the Afghan government’s proposal for direct negotiations. Recently, representatives of popular political parties bypassed Ashraf Ghani’s administration and in direct talks with the Taliban in Moscow in February.

Third, foreign or international parties involved in the conflict must show a desire to end the fighting. In a complex conflict like Afghanistan there are multiple patrons. The United States and NATO are two major guarantors of the Afghan government. On the other side, Russia, Iran, China and especially Pakistan have significant influence over the Taliban. At present, evidence indicates that there is lack of consensus and trust between regional and international stakeholders. Iran doesn’t trust the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Saudi and Emirati intelligence for attacks in Iran, alleging that US intelligence spies on Iran from Afghan territory.

India and Pakistan, the two major regional players, both compete for influence in Afghanistan. Just recently, the between the two nuclear powers escalated following a suicide attack in India-administered Kashmir. Delhi blamed Pakistan, and Indian fighter jets carried out bombing raids inside Pakistan in retaliation.

Fourth, parties actively involved in the war must opt for democratic solutions, and their foreign patrons should encourage them in this. The Afghan state and numerous political parties are willing to accommodate the Taliban in a democratic process, but the group has so far refused to take part. The Taliban also President Ghani’s offer to take part in last year’s election, claiming that major political decisions are taken by foreigners. The fear of taking power through elections may also come from a lack of sympathy for the Taliban among the general public. According to a nationwide survey conducted in 2018 by the , over 82% of Afghans reported “no sympathy at all” with the armed group.

Finally, there has to be a symbolic figure who is widely respected by rival factions and most of the population — someone who can help to facilitate contacts and communication. If not impossible, it seems very challenging to find such a figure in Afghanistan today.

On top of this, the Asia Foundation finding show that the country is divided along . Pashtuns are most likely to have higher opinion (32%) toward their member of parliament than other major ethnic groups such as the Tajiks (21%), Uzbeks (19%) and Hazaras (17%).  According to the survey, some 42% of Afghans think peace with the Taliban is impossible. By ethnicity, the differences are significant: Some 64% of (who dominate the Taliban) reported that peace is possible compared to just 51% of Tajiks, 43% of Hazaras and only 39% of Uzbeks.

With some of the above conditions not in place, one can conclude that the interim government is not a feasible political solution for Afghanistan at the moment. Aside from the necessary preconditions not being met, some view the Taliban’s motives for seeking peace with suspicion. After all, if the Taliban really wants peace, why has it intensified its fight with the Afghan government? For example, on April 4, a on a government compound killed 20 Afghan soldiers in western province of Badghis. With the continuation of attacks, many think the group may the government if foreign troops leave the country.

There are also widespread doubts about the Taliban’s ability to abide by democratic values such as freedom of speech, gender equality and free elections — all of which Afghanistan achieved after the Taliban was forced out of Kabul in 2001.

Lessons from the Past

Based on the Sadr’s findings, there are lessons to learn from the Bonn Conference if there is to be a lasting peace in Afghanistan. The conference was held in December 2001 in Germany with the intention to regenerate the Afghan state after US-led military intervention toppled the Taliban. The conference was hastily organized, and participants did not represent all of the key constituencies of Afghanistan. For example the Taliban, one of the main parties to the conflict, was not invited.

Peace talks are a time-consuming process, especially when one party rejects sitting down at the negotiating table, like the Taliban is currently refusing to do with the Ghani administration. Any call for a rush peace agreement would not end the conflict, but would most likely produce further grievances that may potentially escalate the war.

The next criticism is that the Bonn process failed to accommodate the changes in the socio-political landscape of Afghanistan that came into being through the resistance against the Soviet invasion and against the Taliban. Likewise, a peace agreement with the Taliban should not negate the social transformation Afghanistan has undergone in past 17 years in terms of proliferation of modern democratic norms, a generational shift and the devolution of power.

In the current scenario, multiple rounds of peace talks have made progress, especially over the course of 16 days in March when the Taliban and the US on counterterrorism assurance and a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The level of optimism is at its highest for reaching a political settlement. However, any political settlement should be arranged cautiously and with patience given the lack of regional consensus and a roadmap for what happens post-NATO withdrawal.

It is important that any peace deal should further legitimize the current state, strengthen the post-2001 democratization process, include all the involved parties and contribute to state building and the stabilization of Afghanistan.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can an Interim Government Provide a Peaceful Solution to the War in Afghanistan? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In 2018, Afghanistan witnessed rapid changes in the ongoing peace process. In early February, President Ashraf Ghani extended an unconditional peace offer to the Taliban. The war on terror in Afghanistan has continued for the past 17 years, at a cost of an estimated , with some killed between 2015 and 2018 alone, and, by 2018, a for the United States. In June 2018, a three-day ceasefire has been announced across the country for the first time since 2001, when the Taliban was toppled by the US-led invasion.

The United States brought in Zalmay Khalilzad, former US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the UN, as a for peace in Afghanistan to end America’s longest war. On November 9, 2018, Russia hosted a peace conference, with representatives from both the Afghan government and the Taliban attending a meeting at a luxury hotel in Moscow.

Dr. Omar Sadr, senior researcher at the Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies, has conducted a of the people’s perceptions and attitudes toward the peace efforts. The study used both qualitative and quantitative research methods and analyzed the peace efforts historically post 2001. In order to investigate the level of awareness, opinions about the current peace process and the attitudes toward the Taliban’s tactics, policies and popularity, a nationwide survey was conducted, with 2,026 respondents interviewed.

Lack of Consensus

Based on Sadr’s findings, there seems to be a lack of consensus among Afghans when it comes to the peace process. The author believes that in order to achieve enduring peace, in addition to a high-level political settlement, mid-level and community-level consultations are needed to end complex conflicts such as Afghanistan’s. He adds that although there is consensus on the necessity of political process to end the conflict, disagreement remains regarding approaches. Opinions differ when it comes to the multiple peace models proposed by Afghan politicians and the sentiments on the nature and character of the Taliban. The author provides four peace models proposed by Afghan politicians to highlight this lack of a unified approach.

The first model proposes a power-sharing arrangement between the Afghan government and the Taliban., attempted by Afghanistan’s former president, Hamid Karzai, when he offered central government positions to the Taliban. The second model, peace in exchange for territory, has been proposed by different Afghan political leaders — including the former warlord-turned-politician who served as prime minister of Afghanistan twice in the 1990s, , and the federalist Abdul Latif Pedram. According to this model, local autonomy should be granted to the Taliban in certain regions and provinces designated as secure regions.

The third model, peace in exchange for recognition of rights and democracy, is proposed by Tajik (one of major ethnic groups in the country) political figures. Based on this model, a program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should be applied to the Taliban. As a result, if the group accepts democracy and human rights and recognizes the 2004 constitution, then the Taliban would be identified as a legitimate political party. The fourth model of reconfiguration of democratic political order is offered by the Taliban and consists of two steps. First, negotiations with international forces, mainly the United States, need to take place. Second, reconfiguration of the post-2001 political order and the current constitution, and establishing an Islamic-based government, are a requirement.

Significant Differences

These differences showcase the need for long-term, patient efforts to negotiate and resolve the disagreements between the Afghans themselves. But disagreement and lack of consensus when it comes to the peace efforts can be seen in how international players, Afghan political leaders and ethnic groups refer to the Taliban. The study mentions the disparity between a 2002 US executive order that addressed the group as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity,” while Afghanistan’s ex-president Hamid Karzai referred to the Taliban “dissatisfied brothers.” Among the local population, 6.4% of Pashtuns call the Taliban terrorists, while over half of non-Pashtun (27% Hazaras, 16% Uzbeks and 15% Tajiks) respondents refer to the group as terrorists. The author suggests that understanding public opinion of the Taliban can help gage the level of legitimacy the group enjoys in the eyes of ordinary Afghans.

Moreover, Sadr’s findings reveal that Afghans are not sufficiently knowledgeable of the ongoing peace process, with just 33.9% of respondents indicating awareness of it, 51.6% reporting little awareness, and 14.5% saying they have no awareness at all. Significant gender differences are present, with women less likely to say they know about the peace process. According to research from the when women participate in the peace process, the resulting agreement is 35% more likely to last. A 2018 by the Asia Foundation shows that women have more fear of the Taliban and are pessimistic of peace talks with the group.

The fear and pessimism no doubt reflect fear of returning to the dark days of Taliban rule, when women lacked even the most basic freedom and rights — executed and stoned in public, beaten if seen without a burqa, not allowed to leave the house without a male companion or attend school. The author concludes that a lack of awareness on political issues like the peace efforts means the current political culture in Afghanistan is parochial one. It hints that the peace talks aren’t inclusive, and when this is the case in countries undergoing conflict like Afghanistan, the chances of a are high.

Who Do You Talk To?

The research also discusses two different perspectives regarding the structure of the Taliban. According to the first perspective, the Taliban’s government-in-waiting is defined as a well-organized structure with its own provincial and district governors, and military and civilian commissions. The second perspective introduces the Taliban, post-2001, as a fragmented, mainly decentralized and network-based terrorist organization. The study provides evidence of the power struggle following the death of its leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, in a 2016 US drone strike, between the group’s senior figures — Haibatullah Akhunzada, Mullah Mansour’s cousin Obaidullah Ishaqzai, and his deputy Sirajuddin Haqqani.

If the second perspective is more reflective of reality on the ground, then it makes the peace talks more complex and conveys two messages. First, it is unclear which faction within the fragmented Taliban would represent the group during peace negotiations. Second, the Taliban itself would face difficulty in coming to a unified decision regarding the peace settlement due to a lack of consensus within the group. These disagreements would mean that the peace effort should be inclusive and not rushed, if it were to endure.

In addition, the study suggests that over 63% of Afghans believe that past peace efforts have failed. According to the respondents, the reasons for past failures are attributed to the government’s weakness, destructive interventions by neighboring countries (such as, Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia and China), a lack of transparency during negotiations and the High Peace Council’s ineffectiveness. At the same time, only 7% of respondents think that the Taliban has a chance of winning in this conflict.

A Possibility of Peace

Sadr draws an ambiguous conclusion regarding the possibility of peace in Afghanistan. Ordinary Afghans think that the chances of a Taliban victory are low, and the public is suspicious of not only the Taliban, but the Afghan government’s and international players’ motives in peacemaking. The doubt and mistrust may have different origins. There is between the Afghan government and the US special envoy for peace. Reports indicate that Zalmay Khalilzad has given the peace negotiations a six-month timeframe, while the Afghan government, at a conference in Geneva in late 2018, declared peace talks to be a long-term effort that needs at least five years. Also, Afghans see the , not ready to accept the democratic gains achieved after its fall in 2001, such as freedom of speech, a right to vote and respect for women’s rights.

However, President Ghani presented the peace 2016 agreement with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party, the Hezb-e Islami, as a success and allocated a lot of financial resources for it. Hekmatyar was one of the most influential leaders in the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and was accused of war crimes during the civil war in the 1990s. The peace deal resulted in his return from a 20-year-long self-imposed exile, granting him amnesty for past offenses as well as future political rights. According to Sadr, 50% of Afghans believe that the peace deal didn’t have a positive impact on their local area’s security.

The study found that a majority of respondents were in favor of peaceful approaches such as negotiation (37.6%), mediation (17.0%) and reconciliation (56.3%) toward conflict resolution, and only a quarter (24.5%) of the respondents were in favor of military confrontation with the Taliban. However, 60% of respondents supported increasing pressure on the Taliban in case it rejects the peace offer. Another important finding is that despite public support for peace with the Taliban, Afghans also support preconditions such as respect for human rights, women’s rights, relinquishing violence, respect for the constitution and the enforcement of a ceasefire.

The author very smartly gives evidence to point out that reintegrating the Taliban, with its fundamentalist understanding of religion, would be another challenge to be considered. As the conflict in Afghanistan has international stakeholders, respondents believe direct talks should be conducted between Pakistan and Afghanistan to resolve the dispute over Afghanistan’s southern border. Respondents think pressure should be intensified on the Taliban through international organizations, and majority of those interviewed think the US has a great deal of influence on the peace process. The study findings reveal, however, that 56.5% of Afghans are in favor of Afghanistan as a location to host the peace talks, and from the author’s point of view Afghans prefer to avoid the influence foreign countries. But the peace talks are hosted in different locations, such as Moscow and Doha.

The research is valuable and unique in its kind. First, it is one of the very few published on the history of the peace process with the Taliban. Secondly, most of the earlier literature and research on the subject had been undertaken by foreign scholars, making this study one of a kind.

Recently, interest in the peace negotiations and demands for peace among regional and international has been steadily growing. But a rushed deal that lacks inclusivity will not endure for long. Peace talks are usually long-term endeavors that need patience. The Afghan and US governments, and even the Taliban, should consider the findings of this study when it comes to policy and negotiations. Moreover, the role of women — who suffered the most under Taliban rule — in a lasting peace agreement is crucial, and they should be granted a place at the talks.

Finally, given the momentous divisions within the country itself, peace can’t be achieved by any outside party, but through a long-term, Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive process.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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