360˚ Context: How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

READ MORE

After 20 years of the doctrine in action, which saw the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq that further ignited regional instability, President Joe Biden has withdrawn US troops from Afghanistan and is determined to end the in Iraq by the end of the year. Without concluding whether two decades of aggression succeeded in defeating terrorism, it can be said that the war on terror opened a new area of influence for one of the axis of evil, namely Iran in Iraq.

Opening the Gates

Thanks to its Shia population, Iraq has been a significant target of Iranian foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Due to both geographic and sectarian proximity, Iran, which sees Washington as an enemy and a source of instability in the region, was suspicious of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

Deeming Baathist Iraq as a major threat to its national security, the regime in Tehran has meddled in its neighbor’s internal politics and strategic tendencies ever since coming to power. With the US toppling of Saddam Hussein, however, Iran succeeded in courting Iraq’s Shia population by taking advantage of its shared border and cultural, religious and economic ties.

The fact that significant Shia figures opposed to the Iraqi regime took refuge in Iran in the early 1980s strengthened Tehran’s relations with these groups in the post-invasion period. During this time, the Shia population has become influential in the Iraqi state and society. For example, Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of the Badr Organization militia, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the recently deceased vice president of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), count among some of the most prominent pro-Iranian figures in the current Iraqi political and military establishments.

The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shia resistance group headed by Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim hoping to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, was established in Iran in 1982. It became a pioneer organization for various Shia militias and political groups with connections to Tehran, incorporating the Badr Organization, then known as the Badr Brigades.

While Iran benefitted from the support of Iraqi militias during the inconclusive war with Iraq in the 1980s, Tehran redirected this mobilization against the US forces following the 2003 invasion. The Iraqi militia group Kataib Hezbollah was in early 2007, followed by Asaib Ahl al-Haq, as part of the campaign by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force against US forces.

Iran’s presence in Iraq came to light when the Americans several Iranian operatives in 2006 and 2007, among them of the IRGC. Asaib Ahl al-Haq kidnapped and killed five US soldiers in January 2007, but two months later, captured the militia’s leader, Qais al-Khazali, alongside an operative of Hezbollah, Tehran’s proxy in Lebanon, Ali Musa Daqduq. It is well known that the Jaish al-Mahdi militias led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who still has distant dealings with Iran, received intensive Iranian support to fight against the United States.

The disbanding the Iraqi army and establishing the interim government by the US after 2003 provided Iran with new opportunities to secure many significant positions in the bureaucracy. In this process, many members of the Badr Brigades were integrated into the new army and police forces, their political connections winning many rapid promotions. Today, Badr is still one of the most active groups within the police, the army and the Ministry of Interior.

Consolidation of Iranian Power

The Baghdad government was formed along ethnic and sectarian quotas. As per the country’s 2005 constitution, the presidency was allocated to the Kurds, the prime minister’s office to the Shia and the position of parliament’s speaker to the Sunnis. The allocation of the executive position to Shia leaders strengthened Iran’s elbow room in Iraqi politics.

The sectarian policies of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who held office between 2006 and 2014, the Sunni society further. In addition to the fact that the Shia occupied a central position in the administrative system, the American inability to understand Sunni expectations has marginalized Sunni society. Radicalization led to the resurgence of al-Qaeda and later the formation of the even more extreme Islamic State (IS) group in the Sunni regions of Iraq.

After capturing Mosul in June 2014, IS has taken control of almost a third of Iraqi territory. All Shia groups fighting against the new threat were under the banner of the Popular Mobilization Units — an umbrella organization controlled mainly by pro-Iran armed groups — after Iraq’s top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, called for all those able to carry a weapon to take up arms.

The PMU militias were provided with American and Iranian-made weapons during their fight against IS. Pro-Iranian militias such as the Badr Organization, Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq dominated the PMU. Active support by the IRGC provided to Iraqi militias and the presence of Qassem Soleimani, a Quds Force commander, at the front lines pointed to Iran’s effectiveness in the field.

Integrating the PMU as a of the Iraqi security mechanism in 2016 further legitimized Iranian influence in the political and military establishments. For instance, almost $1.7 billion was to the PMU, which consists of some 100,000 militants, from the $90-billion Iraqi budget in 2021.  

Defeating the Islamic State

After the declaration of victory against IS in 2017, tensions between Iran and the US, placed on the back burner during the campaign, reignited. While US officials argued that the PMU completed their mission and should be , pro-Iranian groups reassumed their anti-American tone.

Thanks to their active role in the fight against IS, Iran-backed militias secured their position in the military bureaucracy and were able to establish themselves politically. The Fatah Alliance, under the leadership of Hadi al-Amiri and backed by pro-Iranian militias, gained victory in the 2018 election, becoming the second-largest group in the Iraqi parliament. Iran has thus become one of the decision-makers in post-IS Iraq.

Tensions increased in 2018 after President Donald Trump decided to unilaterally withdraw the United States from the nuclear deal with Iran. Pro-Iranian forces began to attack US forces on the ground in Iraq. While Iran seemed to want to punish the US via the Iraqi militias, these attacks also aimed at forcing Americans to withdraw from Iraq. The situation has come to an apogee with the killing of Soleimani and Muhandis in the in Baghdad on January 3, 2020.

The assassinations shifted the tensions to the political arena. On January 5, under the leadership of pro-Iranian groups, a was passed in Iraq’s parliament to call on the government to expel foreign troops from the country. In addition to political pressures, as a result of ongoing attacks by pro-Iranian militias on American bases and soldiers in Iraq, the US many of its bases in the country. As a result of strategic dialogue negotiations with Baghdad, Washington decided to withdraw its combat forces and retain only consultant support. To a large degree, Iran managed to get what it wanted — to drive the US out and reassert its own influence in the region.

Pro-Iranian militias, already active in the Shia regions, started to show their presence in Sunni-dominated areas such as Mosul, Anbar and Saladin after the defeat of IS. Furthermore, Iran-backed groups pursue a long-term strategy to seize control of disputed areas between the central government and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Iran-backed groups, including the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Imam Ali, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Saraya al-Khorasani, have been active in the disputed territories since 2014.

At the same time, these militias under the PMU umbrella reject control by Baghdad and threaten the central government. So much so that Abu Ali Askari, a spokesman for Kataib Hezbollah, was that “the time is appropriate to cut his ears as the ears of a goat are cut,” referring to Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, while militias were able to against the government in the streets of Baghdad amid tensions leading up to the anniversary of Soleimani’s assassination.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Aiming to limit US influence, Iran has been gradually reshaping Iraq‘s internal and security policy since 2003. While millions are still paying the price of the war on terror in Iraq, which resulted in the collapse of the political and economic systems followed by a campaign of terror by the Islamic State, Iran continues to consolidate its power, both in military and political spheres.

After an 18-year-long story of invasion and with the US poised to withdraw its combat forces, Iran’s hegemony over Iraq will inevitably come to fruition. The sectarian and ethnic emphasis within the framework of the government quota system not only prevents the formation of independent Iraqi identity but also keeps fragile social fault lines dynamic, an opportunity that Iran will, without doubt, continue to exploit.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The War on Terror Drove Iraq Into Iran’s Orbit appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Narratives About Turkish Military Interventions

READ MORE

The Bashiqa attack, however, is yet to be claimed. According to a by the deputy governor of Mosul, Rafet Simo, the rocket launchpads targeting the base were found in the area controlled by the 30^th brigade of Hashd al-Shaabi, indicating a link. Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who places emphasis on sovereignty as essential for national recovery, wants to develop relations with regional actors and curb Iran’s influence in the country. In this context, as Turkey and Iran try to expand their economic and political footprint in Iraq, they also face various security issues.

Tensions Over Sinjar

Ankara has been conducting drone attacks in Sinjar, in northern Iraq, against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the US, the UK and Turkey designate as a terrorist organization. In its support for the Sinjar agreement signed in October 2020 between Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with the aim to remove the PKK and Hashd al-Shaabi from the area, Turkey has repeatedly stated that it will not allow Sinjar to become a second Qandil, referring to the PKK’s strongholds in the northern Iraqi mountains.

On February 10, �ճܰ�����’s military operation on Gare mountain, northeast of Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan, against the PKK was considered to be a warning of a potential operation in Sinjar. Following the events in Gare, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , “We may come there overnight, all of a sudden,” referring to Sinjar.

Considering the fact that Hashd al-Shaabi has employed local PKK militias within its cadres, any threat coming from Turkey to the PKK’s existence in the region closely affects the intense relationship the two groups have forged in Sinjar. The Gare operation is thus a concern both for the PKK and Iran-backed militias. After Turkey escalated its warnings of a potential operation in Sinjar, Iran-backed militia groups also have adopted a more threatening tone toward Ankara. Qais al-Ghazali, the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, stated that a Turkish deployment in Iraq would be more threatening than a continued US presence, adding that if Ankara intervenes in Sinjar, the group would pick up arms.

The threats from Iran-backed militant groups against Turkey match Tehran’s stance on the issue. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, strongly �ճܰ�����’s military presence in Iraq and its policy in Sinjar, and has demanded that Ankara withdraw troops from the country.

Less than a week after the attack, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Hashd al-Shaabi for the Bashiqa attack but without mentioning the PMF directly: “We know who is behind those who carried out these attacks. Those who carried out these attacks are the militias supporting the PKK, which cooperates with the PKK in the Sinjar region.” The attack indicates that Shia militias have augmented their verbal threats against Turkey to concrete actions. This may be a way to force Ankara into a military conflict with official Iraqi forces in an attempt to further complicate Turkish military existence in Iraq.

In addition, the Bashiqa attack is a warning that if Turkey attempted to gain control of any region below the KRG-controlled area, such as Sinjar, this would be a red line for the militias. The attack also coincided with the upcoming reopening of �ճܰ�����’s Mosul consulate. It would not be far-fetched to say that Iranian-backed militias might have indicated to Ankara that Mosul would not be a safe place for its geopolitical ambitions.

Common Message

The timing of the Bashiqa and Erbil attacks may indicate the militias’ dissatisfaction with the growing understanding between Ankara and the KRG, given that the two sides are demanding the implementation of the Sinjar agreement by urging the PKK and Hasd-al Shaabi to leave the region. In addition, the latest diplomatic developments in the Middle East have seemingly made Iran feel left out in the region. It is no secret that Iran is concerned about the normalization steps between its two long-standing rivals, Israel and the Gulf monarchies, as well as Iraq’s increasing diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan.

Also of concern for Tehran is the rapprochement between Turkey, , Saudi Arabia, the UAE and alongside the allegations that Turkey is helping the Saudi war against the Iran-backed Ansar Allah (Houthis) in .

A day before the twin attacks, news circulated in the Iranian media that a base in Erbil belonging to Israeli intelligence was targeted, without mentioning who the attackers were. Both the attack and the existence of an Israeli base in Erbil were firmly rejected by Kurdish officials; Israel has not commented on the allegations. However, Iran-backed militias in Iraq have several times the government of Iraqi Kurdistan for its relationship with Tel Aviv and for hosting Israeli bases within its borders, particularly after the 2017 independence referendum that was . The attack on an alleged Israeli base came after the strike against Iran’s on April 12 that Tehran blamed on Tel Aviv.

In January, with explosives-laden drones from Iraqi territory against the Saudi royal palace in Riyadh. The latest attacks on the airport in Erbil, which hosts US coalition forces, the Turkish military base in Bashiqa and a possible attack on a suspected Israeli base suggests that militia groups will target any actor who they think operates against Iran’s interests in Iraq. Instrumentalized by Iran, Iraqi militias’ increasing attacks on foreign actors will no doubt negatively influence relations between Iran and the countries being targeted, drawing them closer together in an anti-Iran bond.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Iraq’s Militias Send a Warning to Turkey appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdel Mahdi, who was forced to resign on November 29 in the face of continued protests, that the security forces used live rounds against the demonstrators. A statement by the Iraqi Defense Minister Najah al-Shammari, which placed the blame for the deaths on November 15 on a “,” stirred even more controversy. Even though the government has not provided a satisfactory explanation on the assassinations of activists and journalists, eyes turned toward Iran, which is notorious for its treatment of opposition journalists and activists at home.

As Iraq Burns, World Leaders Stay Silent

READ MORE

Given the role played by the Iranian-backed militia groups in the protests and their past record of interference in Iraqi affairs, there is a possibility that Tehran could be behind the assassinations in order to protect its political power in Iraq.

Exporting Oppression

According to the , Iran is ranked 170 out of 180 countries around the world. It is already known that the Iranian intelligence, the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other state apparatuses have subjected journalists to harassment, arbitrary arrests and long prison sentences to suppress information that goes against the regime narrative. Indeed, RSF claims that at least 860 journalists and citizen-journalists have been imprisoned or executed since 1979, making Iran one of the most dangerous countries for journalists in the last 40 years.

In addition, the Committee to Protect Journalists singled out Iran as one of the countries with the highest number of journalists under arrest, with 11 imprisoned in .

In post-revolution Iran, assassinations and executions have become the most effective methods of repression. The regime in Tehran, which crushes all domestic opposition, has been increasingly expanding its oppression methods to the diaspora and to countries where it wields influence, like Iraq. The high number of journalists and activists who have been killed during the protests since October 1 in Iraq, which ranked 156 in 180 countries in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index, indicates the dangerous reality on the ground.

Iran-backed militias are used to harass activists and journalists who may pose a potential threat to Iran’s interests in the country. The Iranian-backed Shia militia group, the Popular Mobilization Forces — the PMF, known in Arabic as Hashd al-Shaabi — has already gained a considerable strength in the Iraqi security bureaucracy and an ability to act independently of the Iraqi authorities. Considering the open involvement of the PMF in the protests, it is likely that the group might be behind the assassinations and kidnappings.

The protesters chanted “Iran out,” demanding the scaling down of Iranian influence in Iraq. Furthermore, Iranian consulate buildings in Najaf and Karbala — two cities considered holy by the Shia — were set on fire several times, along with the buildings of the Iranian-backed militia and political parties. The , with some 460 killed and a further 25,000 wounded during the protests, has been attributed to the use of sniper fire by the PMF.

The out under the leadership of the minister of planning, Nuri al-Dulaimi, regarding the killing of 157 people who lost their lives in the first wave of protests, found that 70% of the civilian deaths were caused by bullets that hit the head and chest. The claim that the snipers were organized by the PMF was confirmed by the detention of a sniper from Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, the 14^th brigade of the PMF. On October 10, the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights stated 300 protesters are missing, while the public believes they are kept in the PMF’s secret prisons.

Turning Instability into Opportunity

The attacks on six television channels broadcasting in Baghdad by the Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Saraya al-Khorasani militia groups — both of which operate under the umbrella of the PMF — highlights the role of the PMF in suppressing the media. Falih al-Fayyadh, the national security adviser and the head of the PMF, that group was ready to implement government orders to prevent “a coup d’etat or a rebellion,” marking the role of Iran and the PMF in suppressing the protests.

The claim that the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia affiliated with the PMF killed a large number of protesters in Maysan, a governorate in southeastern Iraq, also validated that Iran-backed organizations may be behind the deaths. In this context, Iran’s involvement in the protests in Iraq is a part of Tehran’s strategy of turning instability across the Middle East into an opportunity for itself. It can also be interpreted as an attempt to destabilize the Iraqi government.

Although the PMF denies any involvement in the protests and attacks on activists, its past actions have reinforced suspicions. On February 2, 2019, 51-year-old Iraqi Shia activist and novelist Alaa Mashzub was assassinated in Karbala. Mashzoub was killed in a hail of bullets just two weeks after he criticized the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, via his social . On February 8, , the leader of Shia militia group known as the Brigade of Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas was arrested by the PMF militias after he appeared on a local television channel to talk about Mashzoub’s assassination, suggesting it was carried out by those who defend Tehran’s interests in Iraq.

Tehran has a record of targeting Iranian figures in Iraq who are critical of the Iranian government. The exiled activist and former journalist Ruhollah Zam, for example, was captured by the Iraqi National Intelligence Service and handed over to Iranian agents. Asaib Ehlil al-Hak, one of the groups in the PMF, was claimed to have an active role in the process of capturing Zam because of his criticism of Iran in his work. This is a proof that Iranian influence is not merely confined to the militias in Iraq but has already spread to the Iraqi security forces.

The claims that the assassinations of activists and journalists in Iraq were carried out by Iran with the motivation to preserve its political power and influence in the country gains substance given its past record. Iraq has an undesirable history of assassinating journalists: The that more than 400 have been killed since 2003. More attention has to be given to the protection of the integrity and the future of journalism and political activism in Iraq. Iran, as one of the influential powers in Iraq, has to be curtailed to prevent further deaths, especially given its involvement in the recent events.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Who Is Targeting Journalists and Activists in Iraq? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This new vision of Iraq’s foreign policy, which aims to prioritize the country’s interests, reminds of �ճܰ�����’s “” approach, which has been implemented since the end of 2002 until the Syrian uprising in 2011. The domestic and regional political developments, however, lead many to ask whether Iraq’s new foreign policy venture is viable.

Over the past few months, Saleh and Mahdi have gone on numerous diplomatic visits across the region, as well as individual visits to Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. In this context, an agreement was reached between Iraq and Jordan regarding the installation of an oil pipeline from Basra to Aqaba Port. Jordan, Iraq and Egypt signed agreements to improve cooperation in the fields of economy, trade and energy. In addition, signed 13 agreements in areas such as security, trade, energy and political cooperation. The border crossing of Arar between the two countries is expected to officially reopen for the first time since it was closed following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Triggering Failure

In addition, Iraqi officials stated that they were ready to build a with Iran, suggesting that multilateral diplomacy would be conducted regardless of the potential issues that might affect relations between both countries. It should be noted that Iraq has also provided positive support to the debate on the return of Syria to the Arab League. Syria was expelled from the organization because of its violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in 2011, which eventually erupted in the ongoing civil war.

While Iraq is trying to develop its economic and diplomatic assets with neighboring countries, its new foreign policy vision, unlike , remains unclear in terms of an apparent framework. At the end of 2002, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, Ankara sought to reduce conflict with neighboring countries while focusing on domestic issues, creating a safe haven for foreign investment and promoting its position on the international stage. Moreover, while Turkey attempted again to resolve the Cyprus issue, end hostility with Syria and normalize its relations with Armenia, it also tried to strengthen its existing ties with emerging key players such as Asia, Latin America and Africa.

However, this zero-problem approach, which conceives a multidimensional foreign policy and a soft power, proactive regional policy vision, has lost its relevance in 2011, as the Arab Spring morphed into war, and the Kurds achieved a territorial formation in Syria.

Iraq, which has been in a state of economic crisis ever since its 1980-1988 war against Iran, has not been able to regain stability following the 2003 US-led invasion. The post-invasion chaos has provided fertile ground for radicalization and terrorism, with the growing influence of armed groups like al-Qaeda and then the Islamic State (IS). Furthermore, Iraq itself has become a conflict zone between the US and Iran owing to the two adversaries’ power struggle for control in the region. Iran-backed Iraqi Shia political groups have obtained political power and marginalized Sunni factions from the political scene, which has given rise to grievances among sectarian groups and further fueled terrorist recruitment.

Iraqi Kurds, who have been fighting the central government since the First World War, have not felt as a genuine part of post-2003 Iraq, once again coming to the edge of war with Baghdad following Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) 2017 independence referendum. Iraq, which is both directly and indirectly affected by instability in neighboring countries like Syria, does not seem to have the capacity to carry out its new foreign policy vision due to its ongoing ethnic, political, economic and terrorism-related problems. The ongoing mass protests, which have shaken the government to the core, show that Iraq’s domestic problems still overwhelm the functioning of the government.

Bad Neighbors

Iran’s political, economic and military influence limits Iraq’s internal and external mobility. Iraq’s border with Iran stretches for approximately 1,500 kilometers, and annual between the two countries is worth approximately $12 billion. Almost 40% of Iraq’s electricity needs are covered by Iranian gas. Last year’s protests against electricity cuts in southern Iraq left the Baghdad administration helpless, showing just one element of Tehran’s significant impact on the country.

During the struggle against the Islamic State, Iran provided equipment and training support to Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and succeeded in translating this support to the political stage during Iraq’s 2018 general election. The , led by Hadi al-Amiri — the head of the Badr Organization, which is part the PMF known for its proximity to Iran — became part of the government coalition. This type of influence prevents Baghdad from taking independent decisions.

On the other hand, the American invasion of Iraq has had an important impact on the decision-making process in Baghdad. Under an informal US-led agreement between political groups, the presidency is reserved for the Kurds, the premiership for Shia Arabs, and the post of speaker of parliament for Sunni Arabs. This has damaged Iraqi national identity and disrupted the bureaucracy.

While the US seeks to consolidate its influence over sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq, Iran continues to increase its hegemony within the country through Shia political groups. It is, therefore, inevitable that Iraq is one of the countries most affected by the recent increase of tensions between the US and Iran, which has a potential turn into war. Following the introduction of sanctions on Iran, the US imposed sanctions on the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias in order to weaken Tehran’s influence on the ground.

Israel, which adopts Washington’s anti-Iran policy, may also be pushing against the Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq. It was that the airstrikes on the PMF’s ammunition depot and bases near Baghdad were carried out by Israel between 19 July-25 August this year. Additionally, the bases of the Shia militias in Iraq have been subjected to since then. In fact, some claim that the airstrikes were launched from the Kurdish-controlled region in Syria with the financial support and assistance from Saudi Arabia.

In addition, while the US forced Iraq to abide by its sanctions imposed on Iran, Iran-backed Shia militia groups reinforce their power in the political sphere in Iraq. Moreover, Iran-backed political blocs in Iraq are forcing US troops out of the country, stressing that they will show defiance to US forces in case of an attack on Iran. The fact is that this situation threatens the fragile structure of the government in Baghdad. It also accentuates the possibility of Iran’s regional rivalry with Saudi Arabia, which would deepen the political deadlock Iraq finds itself in.

Shia Houthi militias in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attacks against the facilities of Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company, , on September 14, but allegedly the attacks were launched from the PMF bases in Iraq. Yet another claim was linked to PMF’s desire to avenge Riyadh for attacks on their bases in Iraq. In the meantime, being eager to mediate the tension between Tehran and Washington, Baghdad aims to get out of the crisis with minimum damage as a part of its new foreign policy strategy.

Problems and Vulnerabilities

While the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq is a serious trigger for internal instability, it also has a direct negative impact on Iraq’s relations with its neighboring countries. Although Baghdad has declared a victory against the terror group in 2017, according to the study conducted by the , it still carries out low-intensity attacks. These attacks have increased recently, especially in disputed areas between the KRG and Iraq such as Kirkuk. In this respect, it does not seem possible to completely defeat IS as long as the grievances among Sunni groups persist.

Also, the location of the headquarters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union and Turkey, in Iraq’s Qandil mountains, as well as the PKK’s terrorist activity in Turkey, have become a longstanding issue between Baghdad and Ankara. This issue has been further escalated due to Turkey’s cross-border operations and airstrikes against the PKK in Iraq, which does not designate the group as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the strengthening of the PKK’s dominance in the Sinjar region deepens the lack of trust between the two countries. Although there has been a limited consensus between Iraq and Turkey in the fight against the PKK in the recent period, the failure to make it sustainable is damaging the relations between Baghdad and Ankara.

Almost one year after taking office, Prime Minister Mahdi still faces serious problems and vulnerabilities. Iraq’s health minister, Alaa al-Alwan, publicly announced his resignation on September 15, citing opponents within the ministry who sought to hinder its development through “.” Although the Islah wel Bina coalition, led by Muqtada al-Sadr and former Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, and the Bina coalition, led by Hadi al-Amiri and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, have co-founded the present government, the continuation of disagreements between parties on many issues, like Iranian influence in the country and the political and military role of the Iranian-backed PMF in Iraq’s future, prevents Baghdad from focusing fully on its pending problems.

One should underline that at the beginning of September, Sadr — the Shia cleric and former leader of the powerful militia that fought against al-Qaeda during the Iraq War — announced that he would withdraw his support from the current government unless reforms take place. On October 27, Sadr stated that his bloc, Sairoon, would go into until the demands of the anti-government protesters were met. The representative of the Iraqi Supreme Authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Lebanon, Hamid al-Haffaf, declared that Mahdi was not the body’s preferred candidate for the post of prime minister, but there was no objection to it. These developments only exacerbate the fragility of the coalition government.

In addition to the disagreements between political groups, the continued impact of the destruction caused by the Islamic State is one of the important issues faced by the government. Although it has been two years since the announced defeat of IS, there are still approximately in Iraq. Almost 8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, and the delay in the reconstruction of 150,000 houses and infrastructure destroyed across seven provinces deepens the problems. Undoubtedly, the government’s foreign policy moves will be affected by the humanitarian crisis because its whole focus and efforts have to be directed toward solving these domestic issues.

Given the current geopolitical problems Iraq faces, the best way to strengthen its foreign policy would be by getting a non-divisive and an inclusive policy to minimize the divisions between the opposition groups within the country and uniting them under a joint foreign policy strategy. However, Iraq’s balanced foreign policy approach is being constrained by escalating domestic issues unfolding against the backdrop of the power struggle between the US and Iran. The ongoing mass protests, which have claimed an estimated to date, indicate that Baghdad has to first address its internal problems before embarking on a new foreign policy venture.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can Iraq’s New Foreign Policy Approach Succeed? appeared first on 51�Թ�.