Although many external observers such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) endorsed the results of Zimbabwe's last election, Robert Mugabe's 2013 victory was marred by accusations of manipulation and fraud. Nevertheless, Mugabe was sworn in once again as the president of a country that he has ruled since independence in 1980.

After its defeat, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) raised its voice to fight for a recount or a rerun. Left without external support and even abandoned by traditional key players such the SADC and the AU, Morgan Tsvangirai's party had to carefully plan its strategy.

Gone were the frontal attacks, however. Now, the party keeps a low profile of hot-button issues such as Zimbabwe's corrupt institutions. While MDC still does not completely refrain from public accusations of the country’s leaders, its strategy is now more linked to an issue that will dramatically affect Zimbabwe’s future: Mugabe's succession.

ZANU-PF's Internal Struggle

An ongoing internal dispute between moderate and hard-liner factions within the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) could influence future MDC actions. If the moderate wing takes over, a possibility for cooperation between ZANU-PF and MDC would arise.

If, however, the hard-liners win, MDC will have to struggle for its survival. Although Tsvangirai’s party must carefully choose its strategy, a potential division among ZANU-PF's elite could be the starting point for rebuilding MDC's fortune.

Debates over Zimbabwe's economy continue to remain important. In its five years of power-sharing, Zimbabwe experienced stable growth: inflation decreased and some optimism returned to Harare.

Mugabe’s most recent victory, with his plans for an indigenization program, has been seen by many stakeholders as the "kiss of death" for the economy. In reality, however, the Zimbabwean economy is in limbo due to inaction.

In a recent report, Business Monitor International (BMI) forecasted Zimbabwe's economy to . This differs immensely from the government's forecast of a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 6.1% this year, driven by the mining, agriculture and tourism sectors.

The discrepancy between these two figures may stem from Zimbabwe's lack of important investments, near-empty coffers, and huge external debt in addition to slow industrial productivity and infrastructure deficits. Zimbabweans are still suffering hardships, while the constant threat of famine plagues the countryside.

Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is far from the disastrous years prior to 2008 when the economy appeared to be deteriorating. The economy, therefore, does not seem to be crucial for ZANU-PF's agenda at this time. Similar to MDC, their main concern is Mugabe's succession.

Who Will Follow Mugabe?

Mugabe's power is likely to wane in the near future, due to either health problems or an attempt to orchestrate a transition before his death. ZANU-PF will have to face the difficult task of appointing a successor at the annual Congress, which is to be held in December.

The main battle for power is between representatives of the two dominant factions of ZANU-PF: Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa. The first is a popular figure who identifies as a moderate; the second is a hard-liner with powerful links to the military and security establishment.

Vice President Mujuru represents a wing of the party that is wary of the years of stagnation and has grown tired of ZANU-PF's lack of ideas. They favor a moderate approach to resolve disputes with the opposition. They also have strong support among the grassroots members of ZANU-PF, who are far away from the privileges of the party's elite.

This bloc advocates an open-market and reviving relations with the international community, including Western powers. Mujuru increased her chances of becoming Mugabe's successor by winning nine out of ten provinces in the party's provincial elections last December.

The provincial chairpersons and their executives play a central role in electing the party's national chairperson, two vice-presidents, and future presidential nominee.

But Mujuru's victory may not be enough, mainly because party allegiances could change easily, especially due to concerns over widespread corruption. Additionally, Mujuru's camp is not a united front, while it also lacks ideological cohesion as well as support in key state institutions. The moderate coalition has little control over the police, army and judiciary — the main foundations of Mugabe's longstanding power.

Mnangagwa, a powerful, feared and questionable figure, presides over the so-called "hard-liners" or "old guards." Having played a strong and dominant role in Zimbabwe's history, the  voice of this powerful group will no doubt carry a great deal of weight in the succession struggle. Mugabe's long reign of power would not have been ensured without the support from this formidable repression apparatus that is seeking to maintain its privileges.

Mugabe's strategy of putting the military and security sector in command, in a way that resembles the North Korean "military first strategy," has guaranteed his power. It has also made him the only man in the country capable of controlling these forces. Observers fear that once Mugabe leaves office, this powerful group will break loose and act independently, thus breaking a fragile equilibrium between ZANU–PF and Zimbabwe's society.

Although Mnangagwa does not have support from the party's base level, he has established strong ties with the intelligence and military, partly through his previous role as defense minister.

However, like Mujuru, Mnangagwa is not powerful enough to win outright; the absence of popular support and the fear of a turn toward authoritarianism could play a role in undermining his chances.

At the moment, the two contenders stand neck and neck in the race for future supremacy. For one of them to break ahead, either Mujuru or Mnangagwa needs a final push: an endorsement from Mugabe.

Who Does Mugabe Favor?

Until now, Mugabe has used all his political prowess to keep the party under his feet. By splitting, appeasing and blocking different factions, he has preserved unity and avoided military rebellions, civil unrest or challenges to his leadership.

Mugabe has manipulated Mujuru's rise to the ranks to please not only MDC, but also the international community and internal supporters. At the same time, he has opened political doors for Mnangagwa by assigning important government ministries to the up-and-comer, including state security, home affairs, defense and justice.

It seems as if the signs point to Mnangagwa as Mugabe's successor, a prospect that has both positive and negative implications. He could ensure continuity of power and, therefore, keep foreign powers and opposition parties at bay. However, there is a risk that Mnangagwa could become too strong and plunge Zimbabwe into a military dictatorship.

Mujuru, on the other hand, could bring economic stability and rebuild Zimbabwe’s image. But she is seen as politically weak and not powerful enough to resist the pressure from internal hard-liners, the opposition or the international community.

Mugabe's choice, therefore, is not only between moderates and hard-liners or between Mujuru and Mnangagwa, but it is also between national and personal interests. If Mugabe is really the father of Zimbabwe, he will have to ensure that the transition will bring stability, growth and security.

In this sense, Mujuru's leadership backed by hardliners could be seen as preferential; thus opening the county while keeping in mind the party's orthodoxy. If personal interests prevail, however, Mnangagwa will become the heir apparent.

The days of Mugabe's divide et impera strategy may be numbered. The months leading up to December will be tense. A recent false rumor about his death sparked an uncomfortable silence and disbelief around Zimbabwe, leading the public to question what will happen to a country identified with a "one man" power. Such an incident is only an omen of things to come.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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The victory of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF — although challenged in court by MDC and marred by suspicions of fraud and illegal practice — represents a political step of extraordinary importance. It seems as if cheating was not the only reason the old leadership won at the ballot box, as there was still considerable support for Mugabe throughout the country. So fraud allegations aside, how can this victory be explained and what consequences are likely for Zimbabwe, Mugabe, and ZANU-PF?

Changing Realities

Throughout the previous power-sharing agreement, the last term of Mugabe and ZANU-PF was anticipated. This optimistic view, however, was contrasted by Zimbabwe’s political reality and shifts in allegiances during these five years. Even before July 31, Mugabe was in the lead — although the margin was considered narrow. This was a surprise, given the election results of 2008.

However, Mugabe and ZANU-PF kept a grip on power sources such as the army, police, popular militias, judicial system and media. This apparatus guaranteed control over information and served as a tool of intimidation. The power-sharing and its minor reforms did not touch Mugabe’s power circle, therefore allowing him to maintain a clear advantage. He made sure his voice would always be heard in the political process.

ZANU-PF maintained a strong grip in the countryside, where policies of land redistribution brought some benefits to poor peasants. By using powerful propaganda and policies designed around the proposed “indigenization,” Mugabe mixed old Marxist and anti-colonialist rhetoric with a nationalist agenda, thus maintaining this strong core of supporters. Moreover, the party penetrated opposition strongholds in urban areas, where the link between MDC and Western powers was stronger and where ZANU-PF’s nationalist campaign found easy targets. This conquest was also possible because of MDC’s internal divisions and a decline in support that followed claims of corruption, sexual scandals, and the connivance of many MDC officials with ZANU-PF's abuse of power privileges — ultimately distancing them from common Zimbabweans.

In fact, the power-sharing damaged MDC more than ZANU-PF. The so-called “marriage of convenience,” better known as a “pact with the devil,” turned out to be a difficult road for Morgan Tsvangirai. Mugabe, who openly admitted to hating this agreement, learned quickly how to adapt and made sure that the experiment would be sent to the dustbin of history. Tsvangirai appeared to be passive or not strong enough to resist authoritarian tendencies of the old leader. Whilst accusations of corruption and abuses of power are common and not new to Mugabe or his party, they destroyed the image of an upright and uncompromised Tsvangirai and MDC. Zimbabweans changed their perceptions as a result of crude political calculations — citizens were presented with two questionable leaders, in terms of experience, expertise and the capacity to hold Zimbabwe together.

Challenges Ahead

What consequences does this victory bring and what are the main challenges for Mugabe and ZANU-PF?

First comes the economy which, in recent years, recovered from the abyss of hyperinflation and economic fallout. Slow progress and a renaissance of investments have generated optimism with a GDP growth of over four percent in recent years.

Nevertheless, this trend slowed down recently, signaling that there are still uncertainties in the future. Mugabe’s indigenization project, by which foreign companies will have to pass 51 percent control to locals, is not only a powerful propaganda tool, but also a real economic program. The policy could backfire if applied without caution, and Mugabe could lose the opportunity to open the market to powers that have an interest to invest in Zimbabwe, such as China and Russia.

In foreign policy, Mugabe has turned the table since 2008, when he was isolated by everyone. Except from Botswana, he managed to reconcile all traditional allies and garner support from Austral African powers as well as from other developing countries. Recent turmoil such the Arab Spring has contributed to this change. The “two standard policy” amongst Western powers is more obvious than ever, and has made the world look differently at issues such as humanitarian intervention. Mugabe is still seen as a hero of the struggle against white minority rule — the last of the anti-colonial fighters. He is a figure that has grown with the increasing divide between western powers and Russia, China and the developing world. This is a critical time for Mugabe’s "divide et impera" strategy and, this time, he will not be isolated.

Mugabe’s relationship with the opposition, though, is what will put his leadership to the test. As already mentioned, Mugabe openly detested the power-sharing agreement. He even made a public pledge that it would not happen again. Signs are that Mugabe, backed by an internationally acknowledged victory, has apparently left the opposition with only two choices: turning to the courts or conducting frontal attacks. In either situation, Mugabe will be victorious. It is therefore most likely that he will continue his isolation strategy towards the MDC, exacerbating tension and pushing them towards irresponsible actions in order to legitimize repression.

Nevertheless, there is not only good news for Mugabe. There is one big challenge that will lead to an internal crisis for Mugabe and ZANU-PF: the problem of succession. Many observers question whether the 89-year-old leader will be able to complete his term. In recent years, rumors about his leadership being challenged internally have become louder. Many are concerned that a military wing will take advantage of an ageing Mugabe. Especially in the absence of a clear succession policy, there is fear of a possible authoritarian turn once the president leaves power. Until now, no official testaments or designation have been made, and the signals from Mugabe are ambiguous at best.

On one side is Joyce Mujuru, considered a reformist. On the other side is Emmerson Mnangagwa, defense minister and a hardliner. Whilst Mugabe has already endorsed Mujuru as a likely successor, in all public and official appearances, only Mnangagwa is on his side among higher army officers.

Mugabe could be playing the same "divide et impera" strategy used in his foreign policy. By weakening both wings of the party — reformist and militant — Mugabe guarantees his grip on power. At the same time, as the army, police and state militias have been unchallenged by the reforms, and as the reformist wing has not been granted a voice by Mugabe, there is the risk that the party may collapse in the near future.

The elections therefore may have given ZANU-PF a victory in the short term, but could turn out to be the “kiss of death” in the long run. This, however, may also present a third option to MDC that might be more feasible than legal or violent clashes: avoid their own isolation by contributing to a split in ZANU-PF.

ZANU-PF is not a monolithic party anymore; the central democratic principle that animated the Leninist conception of the party is long gone. In this situation, as with other one-state parties, ZANU-PF can only exist as long as its ruthless leader is the glue for two sides that are otherwise incompatible. MDC will need to use a smart policy in seeking a future partner when Mugabe leaves power, and they must make sure that the reformist wing is strong enough to avoid Zimbabwe following the pattern of other African countries that are hostages to ruthless military establishments.

The elections may have defeated the MDC and assigned a clear victory to Mugabe, but in the long term, Zimbabwe’s future is less certain than five years ago.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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The overwhelming victory of Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF came as a shock. Zimbabwe now has to deal with a Mugabe in full power and with a parliamentary majority that allows him to change the constitution at will. His reelection of a 61% majority, with the party obtaining 160 out of 210 seats, is questionable.

So whilst Mugabe and ZANU-PF hailed the victory as a historic achievement, the MDC and Morgan Tsvangirai denounced it as a farce. A list of allegations was quickly brought up that accused Mugabe of "monumental fraud." One of the main points was the electoral register that was published only a day before the elections. It was made available to the MDC as a hard copy but no electronic copies have been produced. The MDC claimed the register was based on a copy from 1985, and contains 838,000 duplicate entries with the same name, address and date of birth; 350,000 people aged over 85; and 109,000 aged over 100.

In addition, according to the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), at least 1 million voters were turned away from polling stations, especially in urban areas. Furthermore, the MDC accused ZANU-PF of using the authority of traditional rulers in rural areas to intimidate voters and "force" them to vote for Mugabe's party.

Abuse of assisted voting was also reported. In fact, this facility is intended to help the illiterate or disabled to cast their ballots, but Zimbabwe has a level of literacy well above 90% and African Union (AU) observers expressed concern over its wide use around the country. On top of that, the unilateral campaign orchestrated by state-run media in favor of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, was condemned both by the AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The Monitoring Groups

While the elections were monitored by the AU, SADC and ZESN, Western monitoring groups were not invited; or in simple words they were banned. The AU and SADC declared the election free and fair, without violence, but with a huge turnout and no signs of evident fraud. Nevertheless, they both agreed that there were some irregularities that must be investigated. Although, Olusegun Obasanjo, the AU mission chief, declared that these irregularities were not significant enough to affect the overall result of the vote. The ZESN was the only group which openly accused ZANU-PF and Mugabe of fraud and unlawful practice.

As Obasanjo explained, every election is far from perfect and the one in Zimbabwe was even more peculiar. Compared to previous elections, as well as the pre-election tension, the calm and orderly manner of the recent election was surprising. Long queues and an absence of violence were seen as a clear sign that Zimbabweans as a whole were exercising their free will and citizen rights.

Conflicting Evidence

Nevertheless, when analyzing the accusations, it appears the claims are not easy to assess and they could either support or nullify the allegations of electoral fraud.

Accusing local villages’ chiefs of using their authority to force locals into voting for ZANU-PF candidates is not farfetched. However, one could also wonder why coercion was supposedly used in ZANU-PF’s strongholds in rural towns.

Moreover, when looking at the claim that voters were turned away from polling stations, the picture becomes even less clear than it already is. AU and SADC observers expressed some concerns but they were far from following the ZESN’s accusations. Under ZESN reports, voters were turned away in over 80% of stations in urban areas and less than 40% in rural ones — indeed, it appears strange that AU and SADC observers were unaware of such occurences. These observers were outnumbered by the ZESN, but they targeted key areas such as Harare or Bulawayo which are considered to be the MDC’s fertile grounds. If the deterring voters was mainly aimed at thwarting the opposition, it is difficult to believe that observers do not have any proof to confirm accusations by the ZESN.

The issue is, did such incidents really influence the final result? The ZESN said the total number of voters turned away was 1 million, which is the exact difference in votes received by Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Indeed, it is far from clear to conclude that all these voters were supporters of the MDC. Foreign correspondents noted, for example, that voters were actually turned away as MDC and ZANU-PF parties’ officials pressured station poll agents to contact the ZEC for a register check.

This raises an important and rather uneasy issue: How free were monitoring agencies, especially the foreign ones? We should remember that the AU and SADC were skeptical about the elections and suggested postponing them.

So collusion with the Mugabe regime seems rather unlikely, which means there is only one logic conclusion: monitoring agencies were caught up in an orchestrated plan by Mugabe. By presenting what appeared to be a flawless and violence-free election, Mugabe has divided what was once a monolithic bloc that linked the MDC to the international community, and especially to its African part. The Zimbabwe president has regained consensus from African partners and isolated the MDC with its international sponsors: the US and the UK.

The Electoral Register

What about the (in)famous electoral register? Conflicting information regarding the register is widely available and for close observers, the only chance to shed some light on the issue would be if someone managed to get their hands on the actual document. Unfortunately, the hunt for the electoral register has become like the search for the Holy Grail — for whoever owns it will be granted eternal life. Ironically, it seems this “lucky” man is Mugabe.

ZANU-PF claims it doesn't have a copy and the ZEC, which was responsible for publishing the register before the vote, refuses to give anyone reading access.

It is claimed the MDC had proof that the register was fraudulent even before the elections, but restricted public access to it.. Without a freely available copy for independent analysts, Zimbabwe's elections are not transparent enough for a fair assessment.

No Easy Conclusion

All the points made above are a starting point for anyone who questions the credibility of Zimbabwe's elections. On the other hand, however, contradictions weaken the case of those who shout fraud.

This analysis, therefore, is back to one fundamental point: Did Zimbabwe experience a moment of monumental fraud or simply an irregular process, similar as seen before in other African countries?

The second option seems more likely. Zimbabwe, as with other African countries, is a dysfunctional republic where whoever is in power has disproportionate access to resources, guaranteeing loyalty and success. This is even truer in the case of Mugabe, whose circle of power has been untouched for years. Mugabe, who probably led the race before the vote but who was far from winning at the first round, might have obtained some kind of assistance to make it a clear cut victory. By doing so, he did not only secure his access to power, but also pushed the opposition over the edge.

Mugabe is an experienced and clever politician, able to adapt like a chameleon. The events of 2008 were something to avoid this time and it will be left to the opposition to take action — either through courts controlled by ZANU-PF loyalists, or through frontal attacks that could backfire by allowing Mugabe to justify repression.

So if these elections are not a moment of monumental fraud, they can most appropriately be defined as a surgical intervention to remove obstacles to victory, by using systems and people at the limit of legality, surrounded by a complex network of illegal actions whose ties are impossible to link with the surgeon. In other words, this was a "schizophrenic election" in which legal and illegal actions coexisted — a mirror of Zimbabwe’s leader and a masterpiece of cunning techniques.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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Zimbabwe is back in the news. Amid allegations of fraud, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced the country's election results. Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF won 61 percent of the vote, with Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC claiming 34 percent. In terms of voters this means 2.1 million people voted for Mugabe and only 1.1 million for Tsvangirai. Therefore, the composition of Zimbabwe's new parliament is as follows: out of 210 seats, ZANU-PF won 160 and MDC were allocated 49, with the last remaining seat awarded to an independent candidate.

Although the ZEC’s announcement was long awaited, its results are less surprising. Since Thursday morning, rumors of a landslide Mugabe-ZANU victory kept circulating and statements such as “we have buried the MDC” were heard. Soon, there was a realization that these rumors were not merely propaganda, but something real was happening.

Doing the Math

Mathematics, it is said, is not a matter of opinion. However, one could question the exact procedures and operations that led to the election's outcome in Zimbabwe. What is striking about the ZEC’s official data is the unexpected difference in votes between the two candidates. Mugabe's victory appears for many as too clear cut, even for a leader whose opponent has been losing ground as of late. Such a straight win for Mugabe was not expected, with projections predicting around 50 percent for ZANU-PF.

Mugabe’s strongholds in rural areas delivered the expected results. But what came as a surprise, or a shock, was the total defeat of Tsvangirai and the MDC in Harare and other urban areas, where there have also been the most alleged attempts at election fraud.

From the final election statistics, it also seems to be unusual — although it might be a coincidence — that the difference in votes between the two rivals is exactly 1 million — the same number of people that, according to the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), were turned away from polling stations because they were not registered.  

Emerging Divisions

The Zimbabwe elections created a clear division within the international community. Western observers were banned and forced to comment from the window, whilst on the ground there were fellow African monitors of the South African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), as well as the monitoring body ZESN with over 7,000 observers.

The SADC and AU are on the same line, applauding Zimbabwe’s orderly and peaceful elections, whilst the ZESN denounce it as “seriously compromised.” The regional power, South Africa, however, has officially recognized the results.

The SADC and AU have expressed some concerns over alleged fraud, but it seems as if they are far from denouncing it as vehemently as in 2008. Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian president and head of the AU observer mission, stated that accusations of fraud and irregularities were not significant enough to change the results, sparking even more furious reactions from the opposition.

This essentially left the ZESN alone, with the MDC, Tsvangirai, the EU, the US, and the UK in what is now starting to resemble a smart plan to divide the camp on the same old lines: Africa on one side and imperialists on the other. Choosing one side for support can seriously damage the opposition and play into the hands of Mugabe, because colonial rhetoric and perceived imperialist threats are still a powerful propaganda tool.

Questions Yet to be Answered

Nevertheless, even the SADC and AU acknowledged that some allegations should be investigated. Apart from turning voters away, especially in urban areas, the accusations mainly revolved around the electoral register which was not accessible until the day before the vote. The register is also based on a 1985 copy, with over 2 million names of dead voters, unaccounted for persons, or Zimbabweans over the age of 100. Additionally, the MDC accuses ZANU-PF of having used the authority of traditional rulers in rural areas to intimidate voters and “force” them to vote for ZANU-PF. All these points need to  be investigated, but thinking that any real proof will be found is elusive as, for example, no one seems to have a copy of the “(in)famous” electoral register.

Although Zimbabwe's elections delivered a clear result, the aftermath has generated many questions that will require a profound analysis of all aspects. Simply put, are we witnessing monumental fraud? Is this the end of the MDC and Tsvangirai? Will they resort to violence or will, as announced, a “Gandhi style” disobedience prevail?

From July 31 to August 3, Zimbabweans participated in their country's electoral process and hoped to be part of something to remember. Instead, today, to paraphrase a famous book by John Reed, these can be defined as the days that shook Zimbabwe and beyond. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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The initial optimism surrounding Zimbabwe's election is now fading. 

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Zimbabwe is approaching the historic date that will mark a new era for the country. On July 31, the last chapter of the power sharing saga will come to an end with the long awaited presidential and parliamentary elections taking place. Everything has been said, analyzed and debated about power sharing and Zimbabwe's course in these last five years, and it is now time for Zimbabweans to use their right to decide their own destiny.

Although alarming signals are emerging, such as a dispute over the electoral voters roll, harassment from security forces, or an ongoing ban on media, it is imperative to offer a preview of what is at stake for Zimbabwe.

The Candidates

Candidates include President Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF); Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); Welshman Ncube, the current industry and commerce minister and leader of an MDC breakaway party; and Dumiso Dabengwa, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu), a former Zanu-PF rival that merged with it in 1987 but broke away again in 2008. Kisinoti Munodei Mukwazhe, who represents the small Zimbabwe Development Party (ZDP), withdrew his candidacy.The main contenders were once enemies and then partners in the Mugabe and Tsvangirai government. 

Mugabe's Time

Robert Mugabe, 89-years-old, is one of the longest serving heads of state. Seen as a hero in the long armed struggle against white minority rule in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, Mugabe was then considered the father of the new nation. His party, ZANU, has been in power ever since. However, political tensions turned into open repression of the other strong liberation movement, ZAPU, in the 1980s.

During his time, Mugabe survived internal turmoil, the end of the Cold War, and the changing political scenario in austral Africa with the end of the Apartheid. However, under his rule, the economy soon plummeted and Zimbabwe saw its worst era with hyperinflation, rising corruption and famine.

In this election, Mugabe is running for another mandate, with a constitution that would even allow for another mandate. But how likely is this for the president at nearly 90-years-old?

Politically, Mugabe can claim sucess for transforming the education system and for having (reluctantly) accepted a coalition government to save the country from internal destruction. He is also planning on transferring full control over the economy to black Zimbabweans. However, most importantly, Mugabe can still count on sectors such as the army, judiciary, security forces and the media. In case of a victory, Mugabe will need to ensure economic growth, continuing the country's recovery and give way to reforms for the liberalization of society.

But the main task will be finding his successor. Zanu-PF officials and the army are closely watching a frail leader. With no successor, their privileges could be at stake very soon, thus leaving more questions than answers in case of a Mugabe win. 

The Opponent

Morgan Tsvangirai, 61-years-old, is the powerful opposition leader. His MDC party won the elections in 2008 and soon after had been forced by violence to enter a “marriage of convenience” to save the country.

After five years in power with Mugabe, Zimbabwe and Tsvangirai’s MDC have changed. The party seems to have lost the spark it once had to stimulate and capture the hearts and minds of millions of Zimbabweans. People started questioning the party after rumors and accusations of corruption concerning MDC officials. Tsvangirai himself has been at the center of scandals involving women and his private life — which, as a result, have damaged his popularity.

His plan to reform society by initiating political reforms and a free market will be nothing compared to the main task: to demolish and rebuild state institutions built on a “one party state” system. In case of victory, Tsvangirai will need to act as a skilled surgeon, dressed as a diplomat. He may find himself in power, surrounded by Zanu-PF officials in key state sectors, by an army not ready to abandon its privileges, and with corruption difficult to tackle on the weak side of power instructions. Reforms will be necessary, but vengeance or a rushed “cleaning” would mean taking a dangerous road which might be similar to the one that led President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt to be overthrown.

Over the past five years, Zimbabweans endured every difficulty, but they look to Wednesday with hope. They hope that July 31 will be a historic date like their independence day. A day to remember for every Zimbabwean with joy. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Court, the highest court in the country, has ruled that presidential and parliamentary elections must be held by July 31. The announcement was rejected by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, while President Robert Mugabe hailed the news as the conclusion of a long political process that began in 2008.

The elections will determine a new president and parliament, under the provision of the new constitution  — approved in March 2013 by referendum and signed into law in June. Organising fresh elections was seen as the last and most important step to end the power sharing agreement, which started in 2008. During these five years, there was an unprecedented collaboration between the ruling party ZANU-PF and the major opposition party MDC, with the aim to restore economic stability, draft and approve a new constitution, and set new elections and avoid the disaster and violence of 2008.

During this time, whilst Zimbabweans have seen their economy recover from the abyss of hyperinflation and famine,  the political process has not been as smooth as desired. The “marriage of convenience” between the two parties did not dissipate tension and suspicion, while Zimbabwean society is still in the grip of Mugabe’s state control.

Is Zimbabwe Ready?

Zimbabweans are, therefore, trapped in a paradox: while they are cherishing the new economic climate and diligently welcoming the new constitution, uneasiness is growing as the crucial vote draws near. The reasons are not difficult to assess: Mugabe still holds the key sectors responsible for controlling information and security. The army, police, and popular militias are still loyal to the president, untouched by reforms, and the people fear them as they did in 2008. Opposition supporters still accuse police of a heavy handed approach and intimidation, whilst Mugabe enjoys total control over the media and an unchallenged hold over the judiciary system, either directly or by using his influence.

It is, therefore, not difficult to understand why Prime Minister Tsvangirai rejected the announcement. The PM accused his rival of breaching the constitution and the power sharing agreement by taking a unilateral decision of pivotal importance. Tsvangirai considers the country not to be ready for this early election which, in his party's opinion, cannot be held before August 25. The MDC fears that the lack of preparation, combined with the absence of reforms in the judicial, military, and media system, will not guarantee free and fair elections. One of their main points is that a code of conduct for the army and police needs to be established, as to ensure no interference with the democratic process. This point is also shared by the international community.

President Mugabe, on the other hand, accused his opponents of seeking a delay only to mask the fear of a defeat. Mugabe did not enjoy the power sharing agreement, and tried by any means to create hurdles for a new constitution and reforms. The new constution was approved only this year — after  a year-long delay — and it is the clear result of a compromise with Mugabe retaining strong control over the army, police, judiciary, and media. ZANU-PF officials have rejected any call for reforms on media and security, branding them as an “unnecessary” request by the MDC.

Criticism From Abroad

Following this already incandescent situation, even regional powers did not hide their criticism. At the summit of the 15-nation Southern African Development Community (SADC), held in the Mozambican capital Maputo on June 15, the southern African leaders invited Zimbabwe to review its decision to hold the vote, and to ask its courts to seek an extension to the July 31 deadline. The SADC consider the short time to be a major obstacle from an operational point of view, both in terms of financial and material organisation. In addition, they share the MDC's worries about the role of the military and the police in a possible intervention to influence the results. The SADC fears that rushed elections will likely produce court challenges and a consequent political crisis, which could ultimately lead to civil unrest. In 2008, hundreds of Zimbabweans, mostly Tsvangirai's supporters, were harrassed and killed, which led to a refugee stream into neighbouring countries.

Nevertheless, Zimbabweans are starting to register for the election. In their hearts is the wish to close a dark page of history as soon as possible, and to consolidate the progress witnessed over these five years of a power sharing agreement that, although questionable, ensured stability. We can already guess that no result will be easy, as both candidates appear to share a sort of “love-hate relationship” with their population; the main concern will be to ensure that all parties accept the outcome, whatever it may look like.

Many Players and an Unknown Outcome

Tsvangirai, who in 2008 was clearly in the lead, this time appears to have lost some support, and many believe his party has been corrupted by the power sharing agreement. Nevertheless, by many Zimbabweans, he is still considered the better option compared to another five years with Mugabe. Mugabe, on the other hand, regained support in recent years, mainly due to his consent on the agreement (although reluctantly given) and the country's economic growth. However, his victory cannot not be guaranteed, and with 88 years of age, questions about his successor are rising.

Under these circumstances, the military and the security establishment, entrenched with party officials, could play a role in the country's politics. If an MDC victory is seen as a major setback, even Mugabe’s re-election will not ease their main concern, which is maintaining their privileges and powers accumulated since the 1980s.

While Zimbabweans and the international community await further development on these already contested elections, it is the absence of civil guarantees that is casting a dark shadow over this historic moment.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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Zimbabweans approved a new constitution making another step toward normalization. The new constitution was an important part of the 2008 power sharing agreement between President Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, and its approval now officially allows for the preparation of general elections. Feelings and analysis of the vote are mixed and sometimes contradictory, as expected in this troubled country, but no one can deny the historic significance of this event and its consequences.

The referendum was held on the 16^th and 17^th March 2013 and approved the new constitution with 94% agreement. 3.3 million Zimbabweans voted, out of the six million eligible, making a turnout well above the expectations and surprising even the international observers. Queues were registered at every poll station and the vote was generally peaceful, prompting the EU and other monitoring organizations to judge the election free and fair.

The new constitution had a difficult birth, marked by constant accusations between Zanu-PF and MDC, and President Mugabe refusing any proposals directed to erode his power. Zimbabweans even started to think that they would never see a new constitution and that Mugabe was trying to postpone new elections indefinitely.

The key points of the new constitution can be summarized below:

• Presidency limited to two five-year terms
• Legislation can no longer be vetoed by the president
• Devolves power to 10 provinces
• Establishes peace and reconciliation commission
• Creates independent prosecuting authority, anti-corruption commission, and guarantees independent electoral commission
• Includes a bill of rights which stipulates freedom of expression and a free media
• Allows dual citizenship
• Seizure of farms under the land reform programme can no longer be legally contested; president appoints land commission to carry out national audit

Zimbabweans have several reasons to be satisfied after this vote: the country is recovering from the economic disaster of five years ago and the days of widespread violence at the poll stations seem far away. Many Zimbabweans are confident about the future of the economy with shops back in business, new investments and the end of food shortages. However, as tated the almost unchallenged optimism about the economy cannot be observed for politics.  The paradox is the following: the more Zimbabwe is approaching the elections that finally will bring back the country to normality, the more its people feel uneasy. There is a desire to see a better future, but at the same time there is fear that elections will bring back the obscurity from the past.

The new constitution limits presidential power, favors decentralization and establishes independent electoral bodies. However, some points are clearly the fruit of a necessary compromise with Mugabe’s party: land seizures cannot be contested in court, de facto recognizing the government’s past controversial actions; also the limit of two presidential terms is not retroactive meaning that Mugabe can still run as Zanu-PF presidential candidate at the next election and eventually be elected for another term after that. This would make another 10 years in office possible for him. The establishment of independent bodies does not touch the core power of Zanu-PF such as the repressive apparatus represented by the police, militias and the army, which still appear unchallenged.

Even in the weeks preceding the referendum, intimidation of human rights activists and opposition supporters intensified. listed a couple of incidents, accusing the regime and Zanu-PF to encourage and even order civil society repression.

On March 17, the same date of the referendum, police arrested prominent human rights lawyer Beatrice Mtetwa in Harare and charged her with obstructing the course of justice after she intervened in a raid on the offices of Mr Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). During which, three computers are alleged to have gone missing. Four MDC members were also arrested during the raid. Mtetwa has now been released on bail. In a previous incident, on February 13 and 14, police in Harare and Bulawayo dispersed a protest organized by 190 members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA). The police arrested, detained, and in some cases beat protestors with batons. The arrested members were released without charge following the intervention of lawyers.

The above incidents, and others similar, occurred in the weeks preceding the referendum clearly instill in the Zimbabweans’ minds that the new elections will not be easy and the violence of 2008 may be repeated. The EU lifted sanctions on 81 of 91 prominent figures and eight firms, but is still keeping sanctions on 10 other people, including Mugabe, and on two of the closest regime’s firms. The EU action shows recognition of the country’s work on its “programme of rehabilitation”, and will also benefit the economy enormously. However, the confirmation of sanctions against Mugabe and his closest circle is also a clear sign that it will take more than an election to change history.

Zimbabweans, nevertheless, can be cheerful today, especially when they look around the continent. Military operations are taking place in Mali, elections are challenged in Kenya, terrorist attacks are increasing in Nigeria and West Africa, and the recent military rebellion in the Central African Republic shows how weakness of governments and military interference is a common issue for every fellow African country.

The effect of this referendum and its aftermath can be better described by paraphrasing Neil Armstrong famous quote: “a small step toward democracy, a giant leap for Zimbabweans morale”.

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Economy: From Disaster to an Unbalanced Growth                                                           

Four years ago Zimbabwe reached the lowest point in its economic disaster, due to international isolation and internal ill-pondered measures. Starting in 2000 Mugabe ordered the seizure of white farmers’ land, justified as reparation for abuses during the Rhodesian-UDI years. Along with human tragedy, this also disrupted production which lead to food shortage and ultimately a famine. Whilst foreign powers introduced sanctions in response to the violence, many Zimbabweans decided to leave the country. As a result, the GDP fell to -17.7% in 2008 and a hyperinflation rendered Zimbabwean Dollar notes useless.

Since 2008, a timid progress has been seen with fall in retail prices starting and US Dollar replacing the defunct currency. There is a new sense of optimism, on the economic level, in Harare: projects are starting, new roads are being built, money is circulating and shops are full of products. The GDP in these four years registered a constant growth, 9% in 2010 and a predicted 5.1% in 2013; inflation is now stabilising to a modest rate of 6.7%. Although the pace is slowing down, due also to international instability and Dollar fluctuations, it is clear that the situation is better than four years ago.

Nevertheless, this growth is widening the gap between rich and poor, and international sanctions are still affecting the economy. Calls for an end are coming not only from the ruling party ZANU-PF officials but also from UN human rights commissioner Navi Pillay and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai.

Recently the EU eased some sanctions  on prominent Mugabe supporters  but retained the travel restrictions and the freeze on the assets of President Mugabe.

International Relations: Is There Anybody Out There?

Zimbabwe has had difficult relationships with western powers. During the Rhodesian years, western support to the anti-communist guerrillas of UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique was contrasted by ZANU and ZAPU Marxist guerrillas supporting MPLA and FRELIMO, including Austral Africa in the wider scenario of the Cold War. US, UK and France were seen as hostile to progress and independent politics and the end of the Cold War did not improve the relations.

Bush administration named the country as one of the world's six "outposts of tyranny"; the UK and EU adopted strong sanctions. In 2003 Mugabe announced the withdrawal of the country from the Commonwealth after its suspension a year before. In 2008 a US-UK resolution to the UNSC for a military intervention was sunk by the joint Russian-Chinese veto.

Four years later, Zimbabwe disappeared from western media, the power-sharing agreement led to a total abandon, as the US and their allies have shifted their interest to the Middle East and North Africa.

Russia restarted to support Zimbabwe after recovering from the decadence of the 90’s While China has always been a strong supporter; along with political aid, came economic support that ensured Mugabe staying afloat despite western sanctions.

In Africa, Zimbabwe has seen a deterioration of its relations  as compared to four years ago.

Angola and Mozambique which used to be close friends of ZANU-PF, started to foster new relations with the West. Nigeria has been a strong supporter of liberation in Austral Africa but today’s relations are cooling down. Botswana and Zambia became hostile towards Zimbabwe following several disputes in recent years: influx of refugees, accusations by state media of human right abuses against Zimbabweans in Botswana and Zambia and accusation of supporting opposition. Both countries did not deny their desire to see the fall of Mugabe. A strong supporter was Muammar Gaddafi, mainly due to their common anti-western policy and consequently  Zimbabwe does not recognise the new Libyan leadership. Zimbabwe shared with Namibia and South Africa a common struggle against white minority rule and during the political crisis, the ex-president Thabo Mbeki mediated with the MDC and ZANU-PF. However, many disputed the fairness and loyalty of the South African president as he often remained silent on the issues in Zimbabwe. The new leadership of President Zuma has been more pragmatic and chose the same strategy as the West: ignoring the neighbour.

Politics: Is Mugabe’s Era Coming To An End?

The two main points of the power sharing agreement, a new constitution and elections to create a stable government, are both in delay – due to President Mugabe and ZANU-PF.

The party and its leader are continuously postponing the final draft of the new constitution under the pretext that it does not satisfy their views or is simply not acceptable. The elections, which were scheduled for this year, have now been postponed to next year. The elections are widely seen as a crucial test to Zimbabwe’s political stability. At the same time, it is both desired and feared by the population – on one hand there is hope to move forward and on the other fear of violence as in 2008 exists. In either case a question is arising: is Mugabe’s era coming to an end?

When Tsvangirai was sworn in as Prime Minister in February 2009 he pledged to end the human rights abuses, political violence and to do all in his power to help alleviate the suffering of Zimbabweans. But in the past four years the MDC and Tsvangirai have lost some support and impetuous that conquered Zimbabweans. Four years in shared power have had their effect, with rumours of corruption involving members of the party and scandals involving the PM’s personal life. Some MDC party officials are enjoying the new social status deriving from the recovery and the distance with the poor is increasing. The agreement that was seen as a “marriage of convenience” is for many a “pact with the devil” that ultimately destroys ones soul. Nevertheless, MDC is still seen as preferable to another Mugabe reign of terror, but Zimbabweans are starting to question whether Tsvangirai is still the right candidate.

Another element undermining MDC strength is the control over police/armed forces by ZANU-PF. Before the power sharing agreement Tsvangirai had faced intimidation, treason charges, and physical assault and at one stage was charged with plotting to kill Mugabe. He was cleared from these accusations, but the intimidation and violence against MDC supporters have  not disappeared. There are still opposition members in prison and 29 of them have been jailed recently, allegedly for having murdered a policeman.

The ruling party also maintains a strong control over the media. All broadcasters, radio included, transmitting from Zimbabwe, are controlled by the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). Private radios, especially those transmitting from outside the country, are subject to deliberate interference.

Four years after the power sharing agreement, Robert Mugabe is not the same leader he was in the past; he is now 88 years old, his appearances in public are shorter and less frequent, speeches are cut and his figure appears fragile. However, ZANU-PF still controls key sectors such the army, police, electoral commission, justice courts and media. Mugabe, to say the least, is not over yet, but it is also true that he is not alone. Although Zimbabweans see an old and tired leader, they also know that the real players are the generals and officials standing beside him on any public occasion. The optimism embraced in economic matters  is completely absent when talking to Zimbabweans about politics and elections.

When Mugabe ensured his control over the army four years ago, the act was seen as power consolidation and control over ruthless and turbulent figures. They still hold, as ZANU-PF officials, a control over economy and privileges that unlikely will be shared or abandoned. Four years later, the relation between Mugabe and the Army has changed to something different where the military are at the window, uneasy and nervous about the future. They are aware that Mugabe leadership is reaching the end, and even a re-election will soon put forward the question of succession; worst of all, a victory of MDC will strip power and privileges from a cast that used to dominate for 32 years.

With ZANU-PF and MDC both not strong enough to strike a decisive punch, many Zimbabweans believe that even if a new constitution is approved, and election held, the military will never renounce their power. MDC will have to act diplomatically in case of victory as a frontal impact with the military will lead to a civil war, whilst an appeasement like the sort seen in post-military rule Argentina, Chile or Nigeria will create dissatisfaction among the population and radical opposition.

Zimbabwe’s political future appears to be linked to the military establishment, thus bringing the country back to the usual and common African political malaise: interventionism. Depending on electoral results, the military will try to pressure the parties for a more incisive role in politics, and in Africa this has always happened in two ways: by force or by military officials wearing civilian clothes.

Paradoxically the power sharing weakened both parties and unchanged the military strength.

To best describe the armed forces role it is worth mentioning one of the first military officials who put into practice the doctrine of interventionism and, although not being Zimbabwean, his words very aptly summarise their role in politics. Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, following the  military coup in Nigeria in 1966 , said: “We would stay behind them (politicians and civilians) with our fingers on our trigger”. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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When Barack Obama was elected in 2008, expressions of joy were seen across the world, especially in Africa. His origins, the first black American president, created among Africans the expectation that finally the continent would be placed at the top of the agenda. The years 2008-2012, instead brought turmoil, disillusionment and even some sort of rancorous reflection on Obama’s African legacy. What is the reality and how to assess Obama’s policy?

In June 2012, Obama unveiled the new , outlining achievements and defining new strategic points for the next years.

Stability and Security: Few Doors Left Ajar, Many Others Opening

The major achievements during the last four years are outlined in the document as follows:

1. Success in consolidating power in Ivory Coast, following the civil war and President Gagbo’s arrest;

2. Increased efforts in Somalia to reduce piracy and to counter al-Shabaab militancy;

3. At least 100 military advisers have been sent to Uganda to assist the army in hunting the LRA’s leader Joseph Kony;

4. The US has been a great sponsor for the establishment of the new state of South Sudan.

The list, although impressive at first sight, in reality hides several shortcomings and paved the way for new tensions and conflicts.

At a closer look, there is a general decrease in security and governments’ abilities to guarantee effective control. A couple of African states seem unable to control their borders or to ensure security against major terrorist organisations. Tribal and religious sects are responsible for turmoil and atrocities that often make the news.

Ivory Coast is recovering from the destructive war that changed the face of a country seen as a model of stability. Still, it needs to build solid institutions to face internal tensions with the military and ethnic rivalries.

The establishment of South Sudan was seen as the cure to all illnesses in the Sudan case, but it is now becoming the incubator for a potentially bloody war between the two countries as well as internal ethnic and tribal conflict. This was an ill-considered action that discarded the African Union which traditionally opposes any change of the borders inherited by the colonial powers. This example constitutes a dangerous historical precedent in a continent where nearly all countries have a minority group ready to secede or start a war of “liberation”. South Sudan’s independence can be seen as a temporary solution. A new war with Sudan could erupt at any time, due to tension on the oil rich border or due to internal tensions between tribes and ethnic groups that comprise the new state.

Ugandan military operations to capture LRA’s leader Joseph Kony have been unfruitful. Despite military assistance, and increased investments in technology, LRA is still able to operate. Observers in Africa are sceptical that Kony will be captured anytime soon.

Somalia is still threatened both by piracy on one side, and Islamic terrorism on the other; the choice to limit UN support has been replaced by a new strategy with the involvement of Kenyan military. This policy, however, is not totally new as the Bush administration assisted Ethiopia when it invaded Somalia. In either case the result has been the same, al-Shabaab is still able to attack, allthough some successes have been reported in the cities, rural areas and regions affected by the recent famines. They are under control of the Islamic group which opposes any humanitarian assistance from outside. The fall of Mubarak’s and Gaddafi’s regimes in Egypt and Libya have paved the way for Islamic movements to abandon their underground activities and benefit influx of militants and weapons and Al Shabaab was able to take advantage of.

Another area of criticism is Zimbabwe, which has practically disappeared from the news and US attention, whilst it used to be a central point in the Bush administration’s fight against “evil and dictatorship”. The US also failed to build strong links with an emerging economy such as Angola, where historical rivalries, due to American support to UNITA during the civil war, have been not yet forgotten by the leadership of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, in power since 1975 following independence from Portugal (the US and China used to support UNITA against MPLA, backed by Soviet Union and Cuba).

To conclude, the Democratic Republic of Congo is still under threat of military mutineers, ethnic violence and poor governance.

A Judgement on the African Policy: Not a Failure, a Strategy Gone Wrong

Judgements on Obama’s foreign policy toward Africa range from neglect and disinterest, to ineptitude or abandonment. It was clear from the start that the African continent was never going to be a main theatre for US operations. This was due to the American engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan, special operations in Pakistan – specifically the one that lead to the assassination of Osama bin Laden – developments in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, tensions with Iran, North Korea and a bitter relationship with Russia. These situations all formed the vast mosaic of threats that Obama faced.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to think of Obama’s African policy as a neglected one or judge it a total failure. It can be described as a disengagement or constructive policy of maintenance. US policymakers in the Obama administration, conscious of the impossibility of an active engagement in Africa, opt for a policy of limited intervention, reducing expenditures whilst ensuring that control of the ground was not abandoned completely. Instead of direct intervention, third party action was encouraged, for example in Somalia, where the US also supported Kenyan military actions. It needs support to be maintained from traditional allies.

What made this policy make the wrong turn is a combination of internal US factors, internal African weaknesses and external influences on Africa.

Internal US factors related to the financial crisis have forced the administration to reduce the support and shift financial resources to more immediate issues, such as the Afghan-Iraqi area or to support the Arab Uprisings in North Africa and in the Middle East. The budget for investment has been reduced to supporting direct action of regional forces like in Somalia or Uganda. In both cases, the actions are limited by troops of African countries. Even those that compose the UN peacekeeping or ECOWAS forces are easily targeted by hostile groups, the result is that the liberators become aggressors as soon as they cross the border.

Internal African factors, such as corruption of the political classes, are a historical limit that undermines any investments or ensuring transparency in the democratic process. Political weakness is often balanced by military actions, with soldiers intervening in politics considering themselves the only credible alternative to corrupt elites. The risk for the US is that strengthening their military support could undermine civilian governments shifting the balance towards the military establishment. US policies have been affected by the constant tribal/ethnic tensions affecting most African countries. This had made it impossible to mediate or find alternatives to a simple split of a country, as happened in Sudan.

The main factor that affected US policy in Africa was their direct action in other geographical areas. The indirect effects of Western powers actions in North Africa had disastrous effects for Sub-Saharan Africa, with the change of geopolitical equilibrium following the Arab Uprisings. Notably, by supporting Libyan civil war, the seed of instability were sown that freed Islamic movements from repressive regimes, assured a flow of weapons, and weakened already poor governments. Therefore, it is not surprising that the area that suffered most is the Sahel.

Mali experienced a coup that dismantled the civilian government accused of inactivity towards the Tuareg rebellion – Ansar al Dine, an al Qaida affiliated group, has strengthened its position. Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is now a major threat to the US in Africa, and the rise in activity and power of Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia completes the spectrum of Islamic terrorist insurgences.

New Sub-Saharan Strategy

According to the U.S. Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa, US actions in the region during the next years will be based on the following four principles:

1. Strengthen democratic institutions
2. Spur economic growth, trade, and investment
3. Advance peace and security
4. Promote opportunity and development.

The new policy abandons the maintenance strategy and more incisive action will be required. The reason for this change is to protect US interests when it comes to geopolitical equilibrium and security.

The US is conscious of the Chinese expansion, not only in Asia but also in areas that are core interest for the US: Latin America and Africa. The Chinese evolution continues with military renovation and will undermine US interests, if left unchallenged. This led Obama to unveil the new Pacific Ocean strategy in 2011. The US, however, cannot stay idle elsewhere as demonstrated by the rapidity with which the Chinese filled the void in Sub-Saharan Africa or strengthening relations in South America.

The other main reason for change is the growing terrorism threat represented by AQIM and the galaxy of groups inspired by Jihadism and Mahdism. Inactivity in the Sahel could prove disastrous, especially if two factors convene: Arab Uprisings spreading to the Maghreb and collapse of Nigeria.

The eventual turmoil in Morocco could open new fronts in the Western Sahara and Mauritania; along with traditional fighters of the Polisario and the Tuaregs, AQIM would have the opportunity to strengthen its positions against already fragile West African states. Algeria represents an area where in the past a bloody civil war was fought and where, even now, the government does not have total control over the southern regions.

US action is needed especially in West Africa and Nigeria. Nigeria’s government needs urgent assistance to oppose Boko Haram as they are not a simple and usual Islamic Nigerian movement. Their dangerous activities and capacity of hitting core federal interests have been proved by the attacks carried against the once powerful and untouchable Nigerian Secret Service. President Jonathan Goodluck needs assistance in building an effective deterrent to protect the federal state not only against Boko Haram, but also from military adventures leading to a coup. The President is facing the biggest challenge since civilian rule was restored in Nigeria in 1999.

US inactivity and indifference could lead to the collapse of the Nigerian pillar and with it of the roof upon which Western Africa security is built. Obama and the US cannot afford to imagine what kind of society could emerge from the ruins underneath.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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