In early December 2016, the Russian Federation published its new foreign policy doctrine. The previous update was in 2013, at the threshold of the Ukrainian crisis. Since then, it has been interesting to see how the Kremlin changes its view of the world and shapes its new foreign policy.

The most radical innovation is the new assumed choice of using military force when other diplomacy tools fail. As wrote in a column on the new Russian foreign policy, “Russia is no longer gun-shy. It is gung-ho.” , chairman of the board of the Valdai Club Foundation, noticed that the return of force in international relations is confirmed. He considers it as a��more efficient way to counter��Daesh��(Islamic State) and international terrorism.

Since 2013, Russia has become increasingly confident about its ability to dominate the geopolitical agenda. In Syria, Ukraine or the Baltic, observers closely examine Russian decisions. The most important demonstration of power is in Syria, where Russians have definitively been playing a leading role since its involvement in the conflict. From the to the , President Vladimir Putin has made Russia an unavoidable part of the conflict—whether as a solution or as a problem.

Moreover, Putin asserts that Russia has a coherent and predictable foreign policy. The destruction of��Daesh��is an unlikely priority, but Russia shows its full support to its ally—the Syrian state—through the Assad regime. Russia looks more determined and able to defend its principles and interests than the West, which looks fickle and unpredictable.

France had bet on a quick collapse of the regime and has had to reconsider its position by providing grudging support to the rebels. America lost its credibility with its “red line” on the use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces, as notably explained by the .

Putin Rising

Putin’s authoritarian regime could be an advantage in the definition of foreign policy. With fewer, or altogether nonexistent, constraints of parliament, Putin is more reactive on geopolitical issues than the Western democracies—especially the United States where the president often faces a hostile Congress. Moreover, Putin does not really care about Russian public opinion, which in any case is largely favorable toward him and his actions.

This popularity is not only amongst Russians, but is seen as rising all over Europe. , many political figures like François Fillon (center-right presidential candidate and former prime minister), Marine Le Pen (leader of the far-right Front National) or Jean-Luc Mélenchon (far-left leader) have developed a profound respect for Putin. The people also view the Russian president with rising admiration, and Western audiences of Russian media like the government-sponsored RT (formerly Russia Today) is increasing. The recent widely-viewed of a Canadian journalist criticizing Western media coverage of the Syrian war published by RT was evidence of that fact.

In an opinion column in the French daily Le Monde, the leader of the liberals in the European Parliament, , called for resistance against the hybrid war with Russia. He emphasized the new dimension of the Russian strategy, tackling Russia’s meddling in the US presidential election and Russian propaganda in the media and on social networks. In November 2016, a resolution was approved at the European Parliament to . The resolution tackled both Islamic groups and Russia, in both substance and form.

As Julian Nocetti from the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) noticed, to the West, yet Europe is still more focused on the economic issues of the digital single market than its impact on diplomacy and strategy. It should be made a diplomatic priority with Russia, as it��has fully grasped��the potential for the use of informational and cyber tools in a context of a hybrid war.

The ideological war is an important component of Putin’s strategy, where media plays an essential role. The Russian president wants to break the supposed monopoly of the Western control of the international system, promoting a real multipolar world. The demise of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991 was the “major geopolitical disaster of the century” for the Kremlin, and it undermined the balance of power.

But Russia still wants to be an empire, perhaps not in a sense of returning to the structure of the USSR, but reclaiming its place as the heart of Eurasia in a multipolar world of regional universalism. This theory is especially promoted by Alexander Dugin, nicknamed by Western media, in his blog, —instead of liberalism, communism and fascism. The priority is the fight against Western values, which are considered as the embodiment of decline and decadence, and the release of Europeans from American ideology. This should result in the unification of Eurasia through political, cultural economic and social ways.

Dugin’s ideas are not falling on deaf ears. In its annual report, the Levada Center—an independent polling and sociological research organization based in Russia—showed how most Russians have negative opinions about the West. In February 2015, of the 1,600 respondents, 44% considered the West as “a different civilization, a strange world” and 25% viewed it as “states or political forces, which [will] always be hostile” to Russia. In September 2015, only 30% of the 800 respondents had a positive opinion of the “Western way of life” compared to 46% back in 2008.

But ultimately, how strong is Russia?

Questioning Russian Capability

According to French expert on international relations , Putin is part of the powerful leaders club, but he is not as influential as Chinese President Xi Jinping. Like Putin, Xi is very popular amongst his voters and has made “China great again” on the international scene. But Russia, contrary to China, cannot be considered a great power capable of competing with the US. Russia represents less than 10% of the American gross domestic product (GDP), and this economic weakness has consequences on its policies, both domestic and international.

A ��was concluded between Glencore—an Anglo-Swiss multinational commodity-trading and mining company—and a Qatari investment fund to buy an $11 billion stake in Rosneft, where Russia’s state is the largest shareholder. It could be interpreted as a sign of Russia’s��business appeal despite sanctions. But it can also be seen as a��consequence of sanctions and of the fall of oil prices, where Russia needs to sell the state’s “family jewels” to boost public finances.

Since the fall of Aleppo to the Assad regime, the Russian government has called for a political solution to the conflict. Russia cannot apply the same model used in Chechnya in Syria: first destroy, then rebuild. . Russia and Iran do not have the financial capacity for the reconstruction of Syria. A that involves the international community, or at least the neighboring countries, cannot be avoided to end the war and move toward peace and stability in the Middle East.

However, . Nobody really knows what the long-term strategy of Putin in Syria is and how Russia will manage the .

The Wild Cards

But after eight years of Barack Obama’s presidency, a new man is set to enter the White House. Donald Trump has a reputation as being pro-Russian, and as secretary of state seems to be paving the way for engaging Russia. On January 11, during his first ��since July 2016, the president-elect asserted that complicity with Putin is “an asset, not a liability” and that “Russia will have much greater respect for our country” now that Trump is leading it. However, the incoming US president’s foreign policy is unpredictable and may be full of surprises and changing positions.

In the old world, 2017 is a year of elections and it is difficult to imagine what France’s foreign policy after its presidential election will be, or indeed in Germany after the federal election. Britain, too, is still not giving many signs of what direction it is heading after Brexit.

Globally, this period of democratic transition is favorable to Putin because most great decisions in the West are postponed. is just one example of his waiting out until the next administration and not pursuing what he has dismissed as “kitchen diplomacy.”

Russia is a colossus with feet of clay. But no head of state seems ready or strong-willed to challenge Putin right now. Europe has still no real common diplomacy, and the US has entered a phase of uncertainty. On the contrary, Russia is “,” to quote Putin’s foreign policy advisor, Sergey Karaganov. And it is the first step of success in international diplomacy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The United States and Saudi Arabia have a long-standing alliance, sealed in oil since the 1930s. Even though this relationship has experienced ups and downs – due to the oil embargo in 1973 and 9/11 – Saudi Arabia is still the cornerstone of Washington’s strategy in the Middle-East.

Recently, however — especially under the Obama administration — there has been a feeling in Saudi Arabia about a widening gap between the two countries when it comes to foreign policy. Despite his renowned ��in Cairo, Barack Obama has failed to make his mark in the Middle East, and has been at a deadlock on several issues: Palestinian statehood; the 2014 Afghanistan withdrawal; the Iraq War; and now the Syrian crisis.

��by Washington’s unwillingness to back a crackdown on Bahrain’s Shiite rebellion — the latter is ruled by a Sunni monarchy and is an ally of the kingdom. In another development, the US recently suspended part of its financial assistance to Egypt, while Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have pledged ��with roughly $12 billion in financial aid.

The major disagreement, however, revolves around two countries: Syria and Iran. Linked with the Sunni-Shiite conflict, the Saudis are wary of diplomatic developments between the US and Shiite-majority countries – first and foremost Iran – which could put into question the regional balance of power. While all elements indicated a likely attack on Syria after the use of chemical weapons in August 2013, Obama decided not to intervene, to the great displeasure of the Riyadh.

Furthermore, the Saudis are worried about the current negotiations between Iran and the US over Tehran’s nuclear program, which may end Iran’s isolation in the international arena. In fact, Saudi Arabia is perceived as the main US proxy in the region whereas Iran has chosen – and in part was forced to choose – a more independent foreign policy path since the 1979 Revolution.

Iran also has a rooted military culture, reinforced by a nuclear program, whereas the Saudis usually rely on external assistance. Saudi military weakness was made evident by the recent difficulties the kingdom encountered in putting down the Houthi rebellion in Yemen. The kingdom’s rulers do not want a return to the Shah’s era, when Iran was the main ally of the “twin pillar” strategy of the US in the Middle East throughout the 1970s.

A Symbolic Decision or a Real Foreign Policy Shift?

Saudi Arabia’s unprecedented ��on October 18, 2013, to decline their non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) came as a big surprise to many. Indeed, over the last two years, Saudi Arabia had been ardently lobbying to obtain this seat as a non-permanent member.

In a , the foreign ministry explained that Saudi Arabia had no other option but to turn down Security Council membership “until the body is reformed and enabled, effectively and practically, to carry out its duties and responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security.”

Beyond the initial surprise, Riyadh’s decision was applauded in several places. The UNSC’s perceived incapability on reaching a consensus over the Syrian war has been criticized by many countries. , ��and ��claimed to understand the Saudi standpoint. Many Arab countries and the ��have saluted the decision.

However, beyond the symbolism of the act, is there a real possibility for a different Saudi foreign policy, marked by less reliance on the Americans? As explained by : “My sense is that they are still committed to US security assistance. What are their other options?”

With regards to Syria, Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, director general of the Saudi Intelligence Agency, has been lobbying the Russians for months to let go of Bashar al-Assad. First, he offered $15 billion in weapon contracts. Then, he proposed a great deal between Russia and the OPEC countries. But Russian President Vladimir Putin did not want to interrupt his support for Assad.

Seeing that his endeavors have failed, according to media reports, Bandar had the audacity to ��with regards to the security of Russia’s 2014 Sochi Olympics, implying that Chechen groups acted more or less under Saudi guidance. However, that was a dramatically exaggerated claim, and former KGB spymaster Putin did not fall for it. Consequently, Saudi-Russian discussions have reached a stalemate.

European Support

The hypothesis of obtaining support from several European countries on Syria through military intervention is thus more likely, as ��openly supported military action after the recent chemical weapons attack. The controversial NSA spying allegations prompted tensions between the United States and EU countries, particularly with France and Germany.

However, it is doubtful that European countries would intervene in Syria without American and Russian approval. The 1956 Suez War humiliation – when the US and the Soviet Union pressured France and the UK to withdraw their forces – is still present in the minds of European politicians. Even if French President Francois Hollande favors a military operation, he is more a Mollet than a de Gaulle, known for his strong and independent foreign policy and “politique de grandeur.”

Thus, the Saudis can probably count on official support from different European countries in the realm of public discourse, but not for a military intervention in Syria. In practice, Saudi Arabia would be more likely to obtain endorsement from EU countries, for example, regarding a reform of the UNSC than explicit support with regards to the Syrian crisis.

Can Saudi Arabia Demarcate Itself From America’s Stand?

Most US analysts are skeptical about the depth of the current tensions. Saudi Arabia needs American military support as there is little chance of finding an alternative ally in the region which is as strong and reliable as the US has been. Some that Saudi Arabia could cause trouble to the US in the Middle East��through a number of ways: by applying pressure on the oil market, encouraging Bahrain to shut US bases in Manama, and voicing support for popular unrest in Palestinian territories.��Currently, ��to put pressure on the White House — if Iran does not put an end to its nuclear program.

Americans know they have to reassure the Saudis about Iran and Syria. US Secretary of State John Kerry ��the US’ inflexibility about Iran’s nuclear program, considered as a key concern to Riyadh. In his most recent visit to the country on November 4, Kery as being: “…very, very important to all of us. The Saudis are really the senior player in the Arab world together with Egypt.”

Moreover, both countries have strong economic links which are difficult to break. The US is Saudi Arabia’s ��and Saudi represents a key US export market in the Middle East. In mid-October, the ��announced that it was planning to sell weaponry worth $10.8 billion to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. ��argued in this context: “Saudi State entities and large companies prefer to deal with firms they know. It is not easy to suddenly change… in response to short-term political considerations.”

The strong business links extend to many areas, including nuclear energy. A Saudi official : “This is just a political rift and doesn’t mean that it will affect the private or public business.” Most of the rulers have been educated in the United States, which further strengthens ties between businessmen and statesmen from both countries.

It could be a dangerous game for Saudi Arabia to distance itself from the US. They are a strong ally in protecting the kingdom from intrusion in its internal affairs. If the United States decides to criticize Saudi Arabia more firmly on its human rights record, as several countries did at the , the stability of the Gulf monarchies could be seriously undermined.

In his most recent book, , Christopher M. Davidson offers an insight into the predicaments that Gulf states will have to face in the foreseeable future. He argues these countries have solely bought time with petrodollars and prominent investments in welfare and the public sector, but that this is not sustainable. The repressive response to social protest cannot be indefinitely covered up, especially since the Arab Uprisings.

It is better for Saudi Arabia to maintain good relations with the US which does not challenge the kingdom on its repressive state policies and human rights abuses. This is realpolitik: It is not easy to replace a long-term ally like the United States.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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