Flashpoint America: What the Hell Is Happening?

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Much has been written about the radicalization of QAnon adherents since the coup attempt, and there is an available body of work for anyone brave enough to wade into this conspiracy pool. There have also been extensive attempts to dissect the QAnon mindset since President Biden’s inauguration, given Donald Trump’s failure to deliver on the promises made by Q.

Turbulence Ahead

While some are taking a certain satisfaction in watching the QAnon worldview crumble, the situation is poised to grow even more complex. This presents an even deeper challenge to the long-term social and political health of the United States. Observers who are commenting on the disillusionment of QAnon communities now that Biden’s presidency has become a reality are missing the point, since reality was never the point to begin with. The point has always been escapism — absconding into a world of fan fiction where the entanglements of our political and economic lives can be distilled down to memes, anonymous “transmissions” and a binary choice between good and evil, filled with legions of heroes and villains. None of this will be abandoned any time soon, let alone gracefully.

Because of this, there is deep turbulence ahead, namely what to do with potentially millions of people who now adhere to an untethered ideology. These digital communities are not going to vanish, nor are they simply going to recognize the absurdity of their ways and come back to the mainstream. Doing so would undermine the investment they have made in the conspiracy that has consumed them, forcing them to acknowledge that their estrangement from family, friends and colleagues is actually of their own making. There is also another dimension, one that goes even deeper. Letting go of the conspiracy and admitting that their beliefs are misplaced is to also acknowledge that they allowed themselves to be deceived and manipulated.

Having this expectation is a heavy lift and one that cannot be expected without programs or mechanisms that support personal disengagement. Arab countries battling extremism have pioneered these kinds of programs and have been running them for years. Unfortunately, programs like this that are currently available in the US do not exist on the scale needed to be effective. What we are left with is much more rudimentary and reactive, allowing us to only assess the pathways these individuals are taking and how their digital communities are supporting their radicalization.

There are five main QAnon archetypes currently in play. Each has a role in either disrupting or scaling the radicalization behind the next version of the conspiracy. The first group are those who can be reached. These will be individuals who understand they unwittingly fell into something and are looking for a way back to their lives pre-QAnon with a minimal amount of embarrassment. The second group are those still consuming the conspiracy but who are negotiating their belief system within it as Biden settles into his presidency. The cracks have started to form for these individuals, and it could go one of two ways: Either they are reached and brought back into normative political and social life or they will evolve in the direction of the new conspiracy.

The third group are the enablers who are still committed to trafficking in conspiracy regardless of the form it might be taking. They are the content creators, communicators, logistical planners and recruiters. They have influence within their digital communities, which they will protect by espousing whatever version of the conspiracy keeps them most relevant.

The fourth group are the ideological drivers of the conspiracy, those not only with the most followers and content but those capable of articulating the most radical aspects of the conspiracy. Many of the previous ideological leaders of QAnon have dropped out due to a loss of legitimacy within these digital communities. But in doing so, they have left behind a vacuum. This space is now being filled by opportunists who need to make even more outlandish claims as a way of establishing their bona fides to the millions of followers looking for what comes next, accelerating the potential for radicalization.

Turn to Anger

The fifth group is the most worrisome and where intelligence gatherers and federal law enforcement will need to be most focused. These are individuals who recognize the conspiracy was a lie, but still maintain all of their underlying resentments, specifically white grievance. This will turn to anger, which can be easily exploited, not just because they realize QAnon was a lie, but because they believe they were abandoned by the same politicians who told them the election was stolen. These individuals will be looking for new digital communities that are less keen on fan fiction and more prone to direct action as a way of exercising their grievances. They will be for white supremacist groups and militias who are looking to recruit, plan and engage in violent action. The recalibration of these relationships is already ongoing.

Believing the followers of QAnon have lost faith in the conspiracy in any meaningful way is naive. Their reality is flexible. Spend a few minutes in any QAnon Telegram channel, and you can see that the unreality of their beliefs is only accelerating. A is already claiming that Trump will become president again on March 4 under a “restored republic,” which links to a belief that the US was dissolved in the 19^th century. Individuals who have retreated from normative social and political life into their conspiracy-driven digital communities will continue to find ways to thrive because they have no other choice. Their emotional investment in the conspiracy has become their personal identity. This is only going to make the conspiracy more dangerous and the radicalization stronger. 

The FBI cannot arrest its way out of this problem, nor can the tech companies be counted on to regulate their own platforms in a way that addresses the complexity of these vast challenges. While radicalization is nothing new, it is new in the American context. This is a knowledge frontier in its infancy and one we are wholly unprepared for — for all the reasons that led us to this place to begin with. If left unaddressed, we might soon find ourselves in a position where our unreality has indeed become our reality.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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From there, we develop baselines that hypothetically stress these conditions, indicating the potential for instability. When these conditions exist in prolonged disparity, indicators and warnings start to present themselves. Sometimes, they are glaring and obvious; other times, they are subtle and nuanced. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the indicators and warnings have been flashing red for some time in the United States.

A Perspective on America’s Imperfect Democracy

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This is not to say that domestic intelligence and policy professionals spread across federal and local law enforcement were completely oblivious to them but rather that self-assessment is the hardest form of assessment. Americans typically lack the ability to reflect inward and analyze their own biases, prejudices and subjectivity against the prevailing political, security and economic conditions, especially at home. The January 6 attack on the US Capitol proved this.

Knowing this — even when we won’t admit it — what are we looking for as we assess this new political and security reality? Nothing has changed the underlying conditions between the storming of US Congress and today, and with a of Trump voters claiming sympathy with the attempted coup, we’re in for a rough road ahead. Assessing this situation as strategic intelligence and foreign policy professionals, however, gives us some insight to help structure our thinking for what might come next.

Political Intractability

Countries manifesting instability have moved past the point of political entrenchment into the realm of political intractability. The former is used by politicians seeking to legislate by obstruction, while the latter is driven by underlying grievances that have become too extreme to resolve. With millions of Trump loyalists and Republican lawmakers still beholden to a president who refuses to concede his defeat in a fair election, there are not many opportunities to seek effective political resolution — especially when one side refuses to accept the legitimacy of the incoming administration.

Democrats, on the other hand, are completely resolute in their plans to impeach Trump and remove him from office with little more than a week to go before his term officially ends. Neither party is willing to back down, and there is no mechanism at any level seeking meaningful de-escalation. This means tensions will remain elevated, grievances solidified and positions hardened, giving leaders on both sides an inordinate amount of power to antagonize around their own political goals and objectives. As we saw last week, the destructive power of this can be harnessed and directed with relative ease. 

Law Enforcement Failures

One of the measurements we always gauge stability against is the competency of the security forces, including law enforcement and the military. There were so many law-enforcement and intelligence failures last week, that it is almost impossible to pick a starting point. In fact, one could make the argument that the failures were so extreme as to suggest complicity, which might prove true in time.

As we now know, intelligence was discarded and ignored. In just one example, an FBI field office in Virginia issued an internal memo on January 5, warning that radicalized extremists were headed to the capital to commit “war.” As The Washington Post , “Yet even with that information in hand, the report’s unidentified author expressed concern that the FBI might be encroaching on free speech rights.” The shocking implicit bias inherent in the author’s assessment points to the absolute failure in accurately identifying contemporary threats of this nature.

In addition, there are now currently two Capitol Police officers suspended and 10 more under investigation. We have all seen the videos of cops taking selfies with the rioters, opening gates and providing assistance in the halls of Congress. This failure is not just tactical. It would be naive to believe that the same politics that powered the events of January 6 are not working their way through law enforcement agencies across the country — more so since Trump has unreservedly backed the police during the Black Lives Matter protests this summer. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that cops from , and are currently under investigation for being part of the Capitol Hill insurrection.

Reality Deficits

Communications and the media, especially when it comes to social networking platforms, are the forward edge of all modern conflict dynamics and play a key role in the stability of a nation in crisis, either reassuring anxious citizens or agitating the same population into action. We are now locked into an endless cycle of misinformation, disinformation and propaganda, pushed by media channels and social networks that are fueling vast conspiracy theories such as QAnon. These so-called have become so extreme that they have distorted reality, compelled radicalization and created an echo-chamber lifestyle for those who feel politically disposed of.

Politicians openly supporting QAnon have been into office. One such politician has even been of tweeting the exact location of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi during the storming of Congress. Unfortunately, as we learned during the propaganda war with the Islamic State, the advantage is always with the home team. While shutting down social media channels is a temporary solution, it does not address the root causes of radicalization and only increases the sense of grievance, forcing these networks into new digital spaces that are harder to monitor. Indeed, since last Wednesday, extremists have already moved to encrypted messaging like Telegram to plan new actions ahead of Joe Biden’s inauguration next week.

White Supremacy

Assessing ideologies unique to specific countries and regions is an important tool in measuring stability. Here in the US, there is no more malignant and pervasive ideology than white supremacy. There is a reason why newly elected Republican Representative Mary Miller, one day before the coup, felt comfortable giving a speech on the steps of Congress positively Adolf Hitler.

Everything that cascades from white supremacy, including white grievance, remains the single largest threat the US currently faces. In a from October, the Department of Homeland Security said that white supremacists “remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the homeland.” In November, the Center for Strategic and International Studies published a identifying that 41 of 61 terrorist plots and attacks recorded in the first eight months of this year were perpetrated by white supremacists. All of this indicates that right-wing extremists continue to have the motivation to plan and execute acts of violence.

Since President Donald Trump is heavily invested in the politics of white supremacy and, given the intersection it shares with conspiracy theories over his election loss, there is nothing to suggest that this kind of extremist violence will abate any time soon. Furthermore, law enforcement does not have a particularly strong track record in disrupting threats that originate with white supremacist groups, even going back to the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville in 2017. This is in stark contrast to the nearly of police violence against the Black Lives Matter protesters just last summer, indicating a heavy bias in assessing threats from groups such as these.

Economic Hardship

Economic anxiety is a potent motivator in driving instability, if not its single most important indicator. It is important to remember that the events on Capitol Hill took place against the backdrop of the pandemic, economic hardship and a government paralyzed by intractability. Almost 22 million Americans have their jobs due to COVID-19, and the Pew Research Center at the end of September that half of those people still remain unemployed.

While the coronavirus remains politically neutral, the economic messaging between the two sides has been deeply partisan and tribal, casting both as victims of the other. Nothing raises the stakes for instability like people believing their lost livelihood is the fault of another group. Combine this with the government’s horrifying mismanagement of the pandemic, a nonsensical economic assistance package and ongoing conspiracies surrounding the virus, and you have all of the ingredients for continued tensions and hostility among different factions of the political spectrum.

There are traditions and customs that have proven effective against future instability. These include the military acknowledging the rightful transition of power, the courts upholding the rule of law and election officials not succumbing to executive pressure to alter election results. But these safeguards are only as good as the people behind them, and without any national platform to de-escalate and with tensions at this level, the potential for overreach and miscalculation is unavoidable. Should there be another spectacular event like the coup attempt of January 6, then groups on both sides will retreat deeper into fringe positions where their only recourse will be more violence as a means of perceived self-protection.

Each of these indicators and their subsequent warnings alone would be enough to raise the worry levels of a strategic intelligence or foreign policy professional assessing a volatile situation abroad. Unfortunately for us, this time, the turbulence is not in some faraway place, but at home.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Fifty nine dead, 527 wounded. Those , as tends to be the rule governing mass casualty attacks like the one in Las Vegas on October 1, which is now being reported as the deadliest in recent US history. There are no words that can adequately articulate this senseless loss of life, even though attacks like these have become woven into the everyday fabric of life throughout the US. Controversial as this may sound, these kinds of mass casualty attacks are one of the things that we, as Americans, all experience equally, regardless of the discord that constantly divides us as a country.

And, for the most part, these attacks are indiscriminate. There are exceptions, of course, but at a concert, inside a movie theater or in a school hallway we all become targets of opportunity for whatever derangement the gunman has conjured up to justify his actions.

Equally as important is that we call these attacks for what they are: attacks. “Shooting” implies something far less menacing, a onetime occurrence that is unique to a particular set of circumstances; not something we experience regularly and on a scale proportionate to the number of casualties usually produced, like an attack that leaves 59 people dead and 527 wounded. Implying differently sends a certain message that downplays the gravity of what we collectively experience as Americans every time an attack like this occurs.

Since we are all potential victims of this kind of attack, events like these ultimately become an assault on the fundamental freedoms we are supposed to enjoy as part of the social contract we share with our government — a social contract that should ideally allow us to live in relative safety, away from the threat of a mass casualty attack driven by people who have unlimited access to weapons of war. While freedoms continue to be extended to this group, those very same freedoms are stripped from the rest of us who continue to be victimized by attacks such as these. This is the paradox by which we live our lives as Americans.

Severity of the Problem

This latest mass casualty event should come as no surprise to any of us. In fact, it is never a matter of “if” there is going to be another attack, only “when” it will happen. The tactics of the shooter should come as little surprise either, only diverging at the point of detail. When you have access to weapons of war, which can fire automatic bursts of 5.56 rounds through a drum magazine that can hold 100 bullets, sighted through optics that can zero in on a target at 500 meters, you don’t have to be a Navy SEAL to inflict the damage the shooter did.

So what can we do?

At this point, nothing. Not when accessibility to weapons of war is so easily obtained for those who would use them in this manner. It’s cynical, but true. There is no profile that law enforcement or domestic intelligence agencies can create to mitigate the risk posed by a lone gunman, such as the shooter in Las Vegas. We need to stop thinking in these terms.

, there have been 1,518 mass casualty attacks since Sandy Hook in December 2012, resulting in 1,715 people killed and another 6,089 wounded. To put this in greater perspective, since the start of the war in Afghanistan, there have been , of which only around 1,800 were due to hostile action. Put another way, the violence directed toward our soldiers in Afghanistan is analogous to the violence perpetuated by gunmen in the US, but only since 2012. This is the severity of the problem.

What we do have is well-wishers and the usual litany of prayers that comes from the political class. In a statement befitting the status quo, , “To the families of the victims, we are praying for you and we are here for you and we ask God to help see you through this very dark period.” Or we have the hackneyed words of , who so eloquently said: “Praying for those lost, wounded & waiting for news from loved ones.” Little else can be offered to the American people as solace, other than prayers to God.

While politicians continue to pray, they still fail to conjure fresh solutions or suggest safeguards that will protect us from the next attack. All we have is the response time of law enforcement agencies that are hopefully up to the task. This is no longer a political or a partisan issue, but a human rights issue over the social contract we share with our government — one that our government has consistently failed to honor. As a result, we are held hostage to a status quo that allows these attacks to continue in perpetuity.

Semantics

In this respect, the conversation over guns needs to move from control to disarmament. This is the only sensible dialogue we can have with one another at this point. According to the , there are currently 88.8 guns per 100 people in the US, which roughly translates into 310 million guns total. Controlling future sales of guns, the kinds of guns you can purchase or limiting the size of magazines is not going to change anything. A proficient weapons handler will know how to cycle a weapon effectively, be it a 30-round magazine or a 100-round magazine. At this point the argument over “control” is just about semantics and little else.

There are examples of disarmament globally, however, and the UK, Australia, Japan and Germany have all successfully followed a similar model. These are the precedents we should be looking to for guidance in how to stem these attacks throughout the US. In almost every incident where disarmament took place, the rates of gun violence dropped precipitously. The political class in the US should move to suspend the commercial sale of all guns, ammunition and military kit that is used to wage war abroad (not recreational firearms). There is a reason , former commander of US forces in Afghanistan, once said: “I spent a career carrying typically either an M16 or an M4 Carbine. … That’s what our soldiers ought to carry. I personally don’t think there’s any need for that kind of weaponry on the streets and particularly around the schools in America.”

From there, a national buy-back program should be implemented, like those conducted in Australia after the Port Arthur incident that left 35 dead in 1996. Two of these programs saw almost a , and along with it the rate of gun violence was nearly halved.

The mythos surrounding guns and gun ownership continues to be a corrosive force throughout the US, and the rights of a few can no longer outweigh the needs of the majority. Those who insist that weapons of war are needed to preserve some idea of America need to start having a long conversation with themselves. Because, in the end, the tyranny they think they are preventing is the exact same kind of tyranny they are imposing on everyone else.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Now that the is only a mere 291 days away from maturity, we must content ourselves with the inevitable salvo of attack ads, over the top rhetoric and fearmongering—all of which will be linked to the interminable foreign policy debate that is helping shape the 2016 election. Naturally, the Middle East will remain the most hallowed territory, as each candidate squabbles over the most climacteric and esoteric foreign policy challenges since World War II. Or as the esteemed P.G. Wodehouse might surmise, “Hell’s foundations have begun quivering.”

As consumers of politics then, our challenge not only becomes making sense of the arguments that have already been presented, but anticipating those that might develop in response to the rapid pace of events throughout the Middle East. This is essential because the intensity of rhetoric will only confuse our understanding of the situation as the countdown to the first primaries in Iowa and New Hampshire start to get closer.

So, how do we evaluate the universe of competing narratives that are shaping the foreign policy landscape on the campaign trail?

For starters, we should expect the candidates to bring forward ideas that are interdependent on three things: diplomatic objectives, security strategies and economic outputs. Or in my own caustic vocabulary, the “unholy trifecta” since foreign policy cannot really succeed without these three things maintaining some sense of equilibrium.

As a result, any foreign policy advanced by the presidential candidates must also be robust enough to integrate these things into broad strategies that can account for nuance, singularity and complexity—each of which are deeply present in the modern Middle East.

Unfortunately, this is not happening in large doses, and the debate (for the most part) is being compelled by bombastic oratory in the Republican camp and conformity to the status quo in the Democratic camp. Yet neither side has brought forward comprehensive policy solutions that are novel in their approach or address the root causes of instability and conflict in the region.

What we do have are solutions that will either revive or prolong the conditions that have led to the very same conflict and instability in the first place.

Nevertheless, as consumers of politics, we must understand our purchasing power and what we are buying. So let’s take a look at some of the more overt foreign policy themes that are driving the debate during this election cycle.

A Very Republican State of Affairs

There is no doubt that the Republican candidates are maintaining some fringe foreign policy positions that exist in a very special place far removed from the realities of planet Earth—candidates like , Ted Cruz, Ben Carson and Chris Christie are leading this charge. However, once the volume is turned down a notch (from eleven), there have been some very reasonable debates over the role of regime change, nation-building and the promotion of democracy by Rand Paul, Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush and John Kasich.

The problem with most of the candidates’ foreign policy in a complex region like the Middle East is that it is instinctively reactive. They address the symptoms and outcome of conflict, but not the underlying causes such as endemic sectarianism, corruption or legacy issues surrounding US intervention(s). Sidestepping these issues, furthermore, allows the candidates to shirk their own party’s faults and miscalculations by heaping blame on President Barack Obama, while at the same time supporting strategies that are not overly dissimilar from his own—especially in the fight against the (IS).

This is a sleight of hand political maneuver that voters need to be aware of when assessing their own foreign policy positions. (But more on this later.)

The most stark foreign policy positions continue to coalesce around the , which was ratified in July 2015. While rapprochement is paying diplomatic dividends, there is still a general feeling of malaise and dread that is pervasive between the GOP candidates.

Other differences exist over Russia, Turkey and support for Israel, but any position on Iran is almost unanimous in its condemnation. Nonetheless, this opposition is becoming harder to maintain, since the benchmarks set forward in the nuclear deal are now coming to fruition and Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is getting dismantled. As a result, the sanctions are being lifted (cue volume back to eleven) and the process of normalization remains ongoing.

All of which is bad for Republican candidates’ foreign policy brand, since they have led us to believe that this will be a doomsday scenario of biblical proportions, and yet the exact opposite appears to be happening.

In the end, there is not vast daylight between the two parties on foreign policy in the Middle East, since both sides are developing positions that are becoming uniquely similar, given the realities on the ground.

The leading candidates will inevitably maintain this position of hostility, but there is almost no recourse to scrap the deal or reconstitute sanctions—regardless of what they might hypothesize. Not without a serious breach of etiquette on behalf of the Iranians or the risk of isolating the US from other international partnerships on IS, Iraq and Syria, which are currently under negotiation. Suggestions to the contrary are little more than specious subterfuge that is being used to motivate the base of the Republican Party.

But let’s get back to the Islamic State and the candidates’ sleight of hand.

In a recent article I wrote for 51�Թ�, titled “,” I wagered that most foreign policy positions on IS will soon start to resemble one another. This is because the options available to the US are actually quite limited. The thematic points the candidates are rallying around—enhanced intelligence, airstrikes, regional coalition building and special forces deployments—are already being done in places where IS militants are active and where the US can reach them.

There are a few notable exceptions, such as arming the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq or a no-fly zone in Syria, but the Republican candidates are not unified around these proposals. Nor are they particularly pragmatic. Yet despite this, they are being used to amplify a certain perspective that is about style, not substance. Remember the unholy trifecta of international relations—diplomacy, security and economy? This is where these things start to intersect, since arming factions independent of the central government and implementing no-fly zones in crowded airspace only undermines the potential for diplomacy while locking the US into intractable security positions.

Alternatively, the Republican foreign policy debate has highlighted some incredibly substantive issues, such as the role of nation-building, regime change and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East. Conversations such as these are essential in understanding how the next president might project influence abroad and gets to the very core of how most Americans assess their place in the world.

Hillary Clinton © Shutterstock

This is a conversation that is essential in how we develop our views and vote on foreign policy. How these concepts have been previously translated and acted (or not acted) on has set the tempo for most US strategy in the region—look no further than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and ongoing issues in Syria, Yemen and Libya.

On Democrats, Doctrine and Dogma

The foreign policy debate on the Democratic side is much less interesting and far more contained, given the lack of candidates and self-assured magniloquence of the Republican ticket, but here we are nonetheless.

Given the immense amount of experience Hillary Clinton has on the international circuit, the Democratic foreign policy debate has naturally been shaped around her role as the former secretary of state. Additionally, the Democratic National Committee has only graced us with a lackluster total of four debates (compared to the Republican six) and, by default, foreign policy issues have become reactive to her worldview.

In real terms, though, neither of the candidates is likely to stray far from the president’s current strategy in the Middle East. Obama has played a careful long game, which is making incremental gains and, as a result, he has coopted most of the available strategic and tactical space to fight IS, which is now steadily losing ground in Iraq. Moreover, the nuclear deal and relative détente with Iran is proving advantageous, as are negotiations with the various world and regional powers over Syria.

These accomplishments have satiated the Democratic base, and each of the candidates will attempt to ride the coat-tails of these perceived successes, taking credit for them where they can. A good balance has also been struck between diplomacy and security for US foreign policy (two out of the three components of the unholy trifecta isn’t bad), and none of the three candidates will want to shift away from this.

Discrepancies do exist over certain policy positions, however, but these divergences originate from practical standpoints, not from ideological posturing that assumes the US is no longer an effective superpower (as the Republicans would suggest). For Democrats, this has manifested over plans to defeat the Islamic State, engagement with Iran, and what kinds of interventions are appropriate expressions of US foreign policy. Each of these three points is being used as a cudgel to either defend, promote or assail each of the candidates’ foreign policy credentials in the Middle East.

This has turned the foreign policy debate on the Democratic side into point-counter-point, exacerbating the rhetoric over Clinton’s support for the Iraq War and Bernie Sanders’ plan to normalize relations with Iran. All this has done is regrettably detract from the fundamental conversation on how to promote stability and end conflict in the Middle East. These are two things that voters need to be desperately conscious of as incidents of terrorism increase globally and conflict in the region grinds on.

Republicans vs. Democrats: Tomato, Tomato

In the end, there is not vast daylight between the two parties on foreign policy in the Middle East, since both sides are developing positions that are becoming uniquely similar, given the realities on the ground. Tone and presentation will continue to vary, of course, as will fringe positions on carpet bombing IS-controlled cities, dog fighting Russian warplanes over Syria and seizing Iraq’s oil. But these are not serious proposals and, for our sake, did not warrant critical examination.

What voters need to be aware of in this election cycle is that the total sum of US foreign policy since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has led us to a point where the best that can be expected is the maintenance of whatever status quo is prevalent. Being an interventionist or an internationalist is hardly relevant anymore, since the best options currently available for the US to defeat the Islamic State, repair stability and end conflict in the Middle East remain quite limited.

Until creative, non-traditional strategies are expanded and candidates—on both sides—can develop solutions that are not based on how the Middle East used to be but on how it is reshaping our foreign policy, a vote in 2016 will likely be a vote for more of the same.

That is unless Donald Trump becomes president and Sarah Palin our new secretary of defense, then we would truly have something remarkable to write about. Cast your vote accordingly, America.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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There have not been many epochs in recent memory that come close to the confusion, complexity and chaos that have defined the modern in 2015.

In the past year alone, we have seen an acceleration of the conflict with the (IS) on multiple fronts in Iraq, Syria, France, Tunisia, Turkey and Lebanon, among others; the largest refugee migration since World War II; Russian military intervention in Syria; more US boots on the ground inside Iraq; a brutal war in Yemen being led by Saudi Arabia; a potential unity government in Libya; and, of course, there was the signing of a landmark nuclear deal with Iran.

Did I forget something?

Almost assuredly so, however, it is time to have a look at what 2016 might have in store for the Middle East. Are we expecting more of the same? Or will 2016 be the pinnacle year by which the endemic cycle of violence is finally broken in favor of pragmatic political solutions that might accommodate the complex challenges of a region in crisis?

That might be a tad bit optimistic, but let’s evaluate where the Middle East is taking us from the view of some key players in the region, and what might happen from a national and international perspective.

This is all deliciously complex, so please bear with me.

The Islamic State of Hysteria

The Islamic State has suffered some serious upsets in 2015, which have included an aerial campaign gratis of France, the US, Jordan, Britain, Russia, Canada, Turkey and even the United Arab Emirates. There have also been some battlefield successes in Iraq that have chipped away at the territorial integrity of the group’s so-called caliphate in places like Tikrit, Baiji and now Ramadi.

Nevertheless, IS must be defeated on four military fronts for any victory to be sustainable: as a conventional combat force; as a terrorist network; as an insurgent movement; and, most importantly, as a political and religious ideology. And so far, we have only managed to succeed in targeting the organization as a conventional combat force, which means we are no closer to defeating IS now than we were in July 2014, when the group .

The entire IS equation, however, is by no means balanced by military intervention alone. We often overlook the fact that the Islamic State’s successes are not just attributable to military prowess or religious fanaticism—although they play a part—but are also the result of political failures that gave agency to its cause in the first place, especially in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, political solutions must run congruent to any military operation for there to be long-term success in defeating IS. Unfortunately, at the end of 2015, these political solutions remain in short supply by the regional and international powers.

The good news is that in 2015, the IS caliphate finally hit the limit of its territorial expansion. And the group will continue to lose ground next year given the overwhelming international response aligning against it. The recently released audio message of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, rallying his troops and supporters, underscores the fact that the Islamic State is feeling the pressure.

But as IS suffers more battlefield losses in Iraq and Syria, it will inevitably look to make up that deficit by engaging in acts of global terrorism. We have already seen the direct result of this in France, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia, and in 2016, we should expect to see more terrorist attacks that can be attributed to IS.

Iraq’s Forever War

We certainly cannot talk about the Middle East without talking about , since the Islamic State was born in the chaos of US occupation and because former Iraqi army officers populate the upper echelon of the group’s military leadership.

In any case, Iraq is not faring well and 2016 will prove just as challenging. The precipitous drop in the price of oil has ravaged Iraq’s hydrocarbon-based economy, which will go into deficit only to be saved by loans from the and the —contingent on governmental reforms that might not necessarily be deliverable. Coupled against ongoing military expenditure that has not been balanced in the war against IS, and Iraq has a pending economic crisis that could undermine the entire war effort.

While there has been some progress made in reclaiming territory from IS, what has become clear over the past year is that seizing territory in Iraq is not the same as holding territory in Iraq. The preeminent anti-IS fighting force has now become the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), also known as the Hashed al-Shabi, and it comprises the various Shia militias with names such as the Badr Organization, League of the Righteous and Kitab Hezbollah.

For a lot of Sunnis, the fear of these militias and their history of sectarian violence far outweighs their fear of IS, making long-term political reconciliation in Iraq extremely difficult. This provides a strategic and tactical disadvantage for the Iraqi government, since the militias cannot hold or be garrisoned on Sunni land (long-term) due to the potential for sectarian reprisals. And without a process to reabsorb former IS territories back into the political orbit of the Iraqi government or national legislation to govern how the PMU operate, these areas will remain susceptible to terrorism and other forms of insurgency. Regardless of what happens on the battlefield, this will give IS an open corridor to maintain influence in Iraq for 2016.

Disclaimer: The United States

I must now offer you a disclaimer, because I have to break up our section on into two distinct parts: What is left of the Obama administration, and what foreign policy plans are being advanced by the various presidential candidates, because these two things are uniquely linked. With regard to the latter, be happy that there are only 11 more months of campaigning left, since we have not even remotely scraped the bottom of the proverbial foreign policy barrel just yet.

John Kerry © Shutterstock

President Obama’s Foreign Policy Gambit

US foreign policy in 2015 was of mixed success, and it is unlikely that Washington will augment its current strategy for the Middle East in any significant way in 2016—barring the universe of unforeseen circumstances that might arise from the current instability.

President Barack Obama has engaged in what might be called a “Fabian Strategy” with regard to IS. This strategy precludes a major military engagement in favor of smaller, more nimble operations that revolve around things like airstrikes and Special Forces missions. In theory, this kind of strategy will lead to victory by attrition, having exhausted the resources of IS, while giving local forces space to maneuver and attack. The problem with this strategy is that it is not running congruently with a firmly articulated legislative solution that can course-correct the kinds of political grievances that gave cause to IS in the first place.

In the most simplistic of terms, this leads to a position of intractability that favors the conditions that IS can thrive in.

None of this is likely to change in 2016, given the temerity of election year politics and their ability to adversely influence US foreign policy. What is likely to happen is that the US will continue to work through global partnerships such as the International Syria Support Group and the United Nations (UN) to affect change in Syria, while working bilaterally with countries such as Iraq, Russia and Turkey to deconflict airspace, coordinate operations and develop methods to deny IS access to global financial markets.

These, unfortunately, are baby steps and are not indicative of an overarching foreign policy that can accommodate the many state and non-state actors who will shape the modern Middle East’s future. Until that happens, the US will struggle to maintain credibility in areas where the Islamic State is most entrenched: Iraq and Syria.

US Election Year Politicking

Where does one even begin? Let me first state implicitly that you should always be wary of candidates who claim to have a silver bullet solution to the foreign policy challenges in the Middle East. The situation has grown beyond any one plan that might shape outcomes clearly favorable to the US. And as the presidential elections grow closer, so too will the unsubstantiated rhetoric about what is possible in the war against the Islamic State.

The good news is that in 2015, the IS caliphate finally hit the limit of its territorial expansion. And the group will continue to lose ground next year given the overwhelming international response aligning against it.

This is a dangerous trap for the unsuspecting to fall prey to, and here are some examples why.

A no-fly zone in Syria is not possible, given Russia’s military support to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. If implemented, the US and Russia would potentially be in direct military confrontation over airspace, which would not only exacerbate the conflict, but offer zero net result in either the fight against IS or the removal of Assad from power. This policy might have been possible in the early stages of the conflict in 2011, but that time has now definitely passed.

The “boots on the ground” scenario (beyond Special Forces) will not be possible for one simple reason: US troops would have to stage from Iraq, and the Iraqi government along with Iraqi civil society would neither authorize nor accept such a deployment, making this scenario little more than casual blunderbuss.

Then there are calls to arm the Kurds directly. Assuming this is the Peshmerga, it is important to remember that they are also part of Iraq, and to arm them outside of the central government in Baghdad is to undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi state. This would also set the Iraqi government and the US in opposition to one another, since arming a faction independent of Baghdad could potentially lead to a breakdown in cooperation over fighting IS and provide space for countries like Iran and Russia to further increase their influence.

Moving away from these talking points, what will soon be obvious is that all serious foreign policy proposals from the US presidential candidates in 2016—regardless of which party—will slowly start to resemble one another. This is because most options are quite limited, and most serious foreign policy professionals know this. They might differ in tone or rhetorical presentation, but in practice they will not be wildly different from what is currently taking place.

Syria’s Hard Tomorrow

There has been some good news for Syria at the end of 2015, even if only tentative. After meetings held in Vienna in November by the International Syria Support Group, the UN Security Council has unanimously agreed on a resolution to map a path toward an eventual peace process, starting sometime in January 2016. This resolution, however, deviates along some very serious fault lines that have yet to be predetermined.

Bashar Al-Assad © Shutterstock

For starters, it does not address the issue of Assad personally. This is obviously an attempt to placate Russia, but it also undermines the legitimacy of the resolution for the Syrian rebel groups who will be insistent on his departure. Nor does the resolution address the question of rebel groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, which the US labels a terrorist organization, yet is one of the most powerful factions in Syria.

Then there is the critical issue of how to implement a ceasefire in a country that has, for all intents and purposes, broken down into various statelets and cantons—not to mention whose authority this could possibly be executed under.

Nonetheless, the diplomatic push is a significant development leading into 2016 and should be viewed as a victory for US Secretary of State John Kerry, who managed to bring together countries like Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia to support this resolution.

The year 2016 will be a capstone moment for Syria, given the burgeoning UN agreement and global alignment on IS, but the prognosis is still unfavorable. Policy positions in Syria seem to be retroactive under the premise that the country can be put back together again, which is highly unlikely for all the reasons mentioned above. On top of this, there is still no regional strategy that accounts for the fact that Iraq and Syria have become one continuous battlefield, and until that happens, the conditions to defeat IS will remain elusive.

Happy New Year

There you have it, a quick and dirty round-up of where 2015 finished and what 2016 might look like from some of the key players in Middle East. Hopefully this overview has provided you a modicum of perspective that might be useful as you move into 2016 (or as conversation starters for any New Year’s Eve cocktail party).

But just to reinforce how complex the situation will remain in 2016, I did not even attempt to touch upon Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Russia, Israel and Palestine, or how they connect to the foreign policies of Western coalition countries. For that, I would have to write you a much longer missive, but that will have to wait until the new year.

*[Note: This article was updated on December 30, 2015, at 18:00 GMT.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Citizens in Virginia, United States, should be proud of Governor Terry McAuliffe’s decision to support refugee resettlement in the commonwealth—especially those fleeing the violence in Iraq and Syria.

I was not only in (IS) exploded out of Mosul, but can also personally attest to the kinds of violence and brutality that some of these refugees have experienced. Nothing I write will ever adequately describe the chaos left in their wake.

During the summer of 2014, I was living and working in Baghdad while IS overran northern Iraq and made its way toward the capital city. My colleagues and I watched in horror as a marauding army of fanatics, psychopaths and jihadist adventurers summarily executed everyone who posed a threat to the establishment of their so-called caliphate. Victims included men, women and children, along with anyone who might have played a role in Iraqi civil society: politicians, activists, doctors, journalists, as well as religious minorities who were singled out for extermination.

In the span of four days, we watched IS erase the border with Syria, slaughter what remained of the Iraqi army and destroy the existing geopolitical order in the Middle East—only a mere 50 miles up the road from our villa in Baghdad.

The tension and stress my colleagues and I experienced during that week was unlike anything we had experienced to that point—and we were incredibly skilled security and intelligence professionals.

Being in Baghdad while IS rampaged through Iraq has become one of the defining experiences of my life and career. Fortunately for me, I was able to relocate out of the capital and eventually find safety somewhere else.

The same cannot be said for the millions of refugees and internally displaced who are stuck in a purgatorial no man’s land—pinned between the violence they’re fleeing and the paranoia that’s preventing us from helping people who are escaping some of the worst atrocities on the planet. Just watch any IS propaganda video to see what I mean. And this is exactly what IS wants.

Children As Our Enemy?

As an intelligence analyst in Iraq, I witnessed IS engage in this same endless strategy: dividing people, sect and faction by using fear to turn them against one another through a cycle of mistrust and suspicion.

This is a primary factor contributing to the militant group’s success and longevity. Its goal always has been to create a perception that Muslims are being persecuted, which provides a justification for their violence and terrorism.

Denying assistance to largely Muslim refugees is an ideological ambush of our own making, one we’re walking straight into. It not only reinforces a crucial component of the Islamic State’s message, but also is critical for its ability to recruit would-be supporters, militants and suicide bombers—much like those who conducted the .

The Islamic State will never be defeated by closed borders, bombs or bullets. We will not defeat it by entrenching ourselves into political positions based on fear and antipathy. Furthermore, the attackers in Paris were not refugees, but French and Belgian citizens.

To confuse these two things is to lose sight of where the real threat is coming from. This war is an ideological war. For us to win, we cannot resort to the same tactics that have legitimized IS’ own narrative. Even after the tragedy in Paris, the French have committed to taking 30,000 refugees. We should be humbled by this magnanimous gesture.

Yet instead of leading by example, we are falling prey to a cynical worldview that would see children as our enemy and powerless families as groups of terrorists. Our security concerns are entirely valid, but they must also be weighed against a broader political agenda that can be flexible enough to accommodate those who need our assistance without being obstructed by the politics of fear.

Maybe one day our politicians and pundits will have an opportunity to see this kind of violence firsthand. They may still claim that threat. Or they may learn from their experience and understand what it is like to be a stranger in a foreign land, divorced from home, family and culture while relying entirely on the charity of others.

Until then, we should try live up to the very best of who we are, which doesn’t include disparaging the most vulnerable of those among us.

Should Iraqi or Syrian refugees be resettled in Virginia, I will be one of the very first to greet them and repay them with the same kindness they showed me when I was a stranger in their country.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: ��/��

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The attacks in Paris highlight the deep complexity and uncertainty that surrounds the 21^st century. War and terrorism seem to be ubiquitous, and the competing narratives of politicians, pundits and experts have only further obfuscated our understanding of these situations. In the week since the Paris attacks, however, there has been a torrent of commentary focusing almost exclusively on the effects of ��(the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State or ISIS), and how it might impact on foreign policy and security. Yet there has been almost no conversation about the root causes that drive such violence and extremism in Europe or the Middle East.

Until that conversation has been exhausted, this kind of terrorism will inevitably become part of the status quo. As a result, the recent epidemic of terrorism linked to Daesh in France, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey is hardly coincidental and should be balanced against wider social, political and economic failures that are rarely discussed.

To make sense of these complicated issues, 51�Թ� met Dr. Yasir Qadhi, one of America’s most influential Islamic theologians, clerics and intellectuals. Qadhi is the dean of Academic Affairs at the Al-Maghrib Institute and an associate professor at Rhodes College. He is also one of the organizers and signatories of the “Letter to Baghdadi,” a global campaign organized by Muslim scholars condemning Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Daesh.

In this edition of , 51�Թ� talks to Yasir Qadhi about a range of subjects not traditionally addressed in the aftermath of such devastating terrorist attacks. They are all at once provocative and challenging, which is exactly the kind of frank and honest discussion that is needed to shape our perspective in the wake of such tragic events.

Landon Shroder: I thought it was important to conduct this interview with you, because after such tragic events—like those in Paris—the global media seems to intentionally omit the Muslim perspective, which I personally view as being critical to understanding things like terrorism and the politics that surround it. In fact, one might go so far as to say that it is the essential perspective needed to defeat terrorism. So, let’s start with the attacks in Paris: What is your take on the situation? What do you think ISIS’ goal was in launching these attacks?

Yasir Qadhi: Thanks for interviewing me, and it is always a pleasure to speak with you. Obviously, I begin by making an unconditional condemnation of this attack, and I state that as a Muslim preacher, theologian and cleric that I firmly believe with every fiber of my body that the interpretation of this group is antithetical to my religion. I do not at all sympathize with what they have done, and [I] believe what they have done is a grievous offense, and in fact, their interpretations are outside the scope of mainstream Islam.

I make this disclaimer because the problem comes every time we want to discuss the causes and motivations of such groups; automatically there is this attempt to portray the person who brings up these causes as sympathizing—or worse, maybe even justifying these attacks. So, I have to begin any discussion with that disclaimer.

With that prologue being said, the causes of this terrorist attack should be linked to what ISIS has said, and it is reasonable to at least pay attention to what they themselves are saying. Typically, terrorists are extremely explicit about the causes of their terrorism. ISIS released a statement after the attacks claiming responsibility and explaining and clarifying why they did it. The fact of the matter is—from their perspective, not ours, not mainstream American or European Muslims—they feel they are at war with France. As justification, they mention France’s involvement with the bombings of Syria and getting involved in the tragedies that are taking place in the Middle East.

© Shutterstock

There are also other factors that need to be looked at, such as rising Islamophobia and the alienation and disenfranchisement of European Muslims, in particular. It is not a coincidence that some of the main people involved in the attack were coming from families and places in France and Belgium where the unemployment rates and the ghettoization of Muslims is quite pronounced. Now, again, there is no justification, but when you have large segments of unemployed youth loitering around unable to find jobs or get educated, it is only natural that they will gravitate toward a militant, utopian version of a faith that seems to give them a sense of purpose and glory to their lives.

I will also point out that it is not a coincidence that radical Islamist movements seem to have more sway in Europe than in America. One of the simplest explanations for this is: American Muslims, by and large, are better integrated, better welcomed and more a part of society, whereas European Muslims, especially in France, suffer from discriminatory practices.

Shroder: After these attacks, the West is usually predisposed to retaliate via bombs and bullets, and we’ve already seen the French launch a series of airstrikes against ISIS in Syria. For lack of a better term, I guess we can call these “revenge attacks.” The Americans, Jordanians and now the French have all gone down this path. How do you view this kind of response?

Qadhi: This is the irony. Forget learning from history—what happened post-9/11 isn’t even history; it is living memory. We do not even learn from living memory.

If we are not going to learn that bombing entire civilizations and cities is not going to solve the problems of terrorism, then we are in for a very grim future. Here is the point: The cities in Syria controlled by ISIS—99.999% of them are just civilians trying to eke out an existence between the brutality of Bashar al-Assad [the Syrian regime] and the fanatical militarism of ISIS. It is these civilians who are going to take the brunt of these bombs, not ISIS. And as you kill more and more civilians, inevitably you are going to generate more sympathy for the terrorist groups. You might also see the spawning of groups even more radical than ISIS. Frankly, it is terrifying that al-Qaeda was our biggest enemy—no one could have ever imagined that a group could be worse than them. Now, al-Qaeda looks like a group of pacifists compared to ISIS.

We need to recognize that we have caused this kind of fanaticism. So, if ISIS is the result of a post-al-Qaeda world of regional destabilization and the destruction of an entire country, I shudder to think what the potential permutation of ISIS might look like.

One day before the French blast, ISIS attacked Beirut [in Lebanon]. Dozens of people were killed and wounded—all of them civilians. What was the reaction of the world? Hardly a blip registered on our moral consciousness scales. How about when innocent civilians are killed by our own misjudgments and tactical mistakes? How much outcry is raised? Not that much. The problem then becomes: Is all human life equal? The visceral rage that some of us feel to attack back and kill them—from their perspective, they are feeling the exact same rage and that is the scary part.

Shroder: There seems to be a lot of talk about military action, but little in the ways of actual political solutions, which I find ironic since political failures created the space for ISIS to metastasize. Is ISIS a political issue, a military issue, a religious issue or a combination of all three?

Qadhi: I have no problem if we included strategically targeted ISIS leadership and made sure we eliminated them without harming civilians. But the fact of the matter is: There are no surgical strikes; this is a figment of Western imagination. You cannot target the leadership of an organization that is living among the civilian population without bringing about casualties that are more civilian than actual leaders of ISIS. You cannot militarily target a group of 400 or 500 people who are living in a city of a million. If you think this is justified as collateral damage on their side, then guess what? You are quoting [Osama] bin Laden’s justification for 9/11; ISIS’ justification for attacking targets over here.

Additionally, even if you could eliminate ISIS, why is there such palpable anger and hatred against certain societies? Those answers are political. It is not that they hate us because of our freedoms. They hate us because of what we have done to their countries, and that has a political angle that needs to be dealt with as well. Religion comes in at the end to justify their actions and to drum up more recruitment. The religion is not the cause of these terrorist actions; the religion of Islam is brought in at the very end to give it a veneer of acceptability.

The fact of the matter is [that] if the Muslims of the West were sympathetic to such acts, we would see this on a daily basis. The mere fact that nothing like this has occurred for 15 years [in the US] clearly demonstrates that ISIS and al-Qaeda are bankrupt organizations when it comes to popular support [in the Muslim world].

Shroder: And that is a desperately overlooked as a narrative in the West, isn’t it?

Qadhi: Totally overlooked. If Muslims were inherently so violent and terroristic, then we would really be in trouble. Even the FBI has acknowledged that we have more to fear from right-wing racists groups and militias than we do from Muslim groups.

Shroder: That is a great lead in for my next question. From my perspective, Muslim involvement in preventing terrorist attacks is obviously a critical component of global security, without which there is no real hope in defeating something like ISIS. So, from a Muslim point of view, what is the most efficient way for countries to deal with attacks such as these? There needs to be a balance between state security and sensitivity to Muslims—can these two things be reconciled?

Qadhi: If governments fall for this narrative that Muslims are a potential fifth column, then ISIS has won, because that is exactly what they want. This is the main recruitment tool that ISIS uses: disenfranchised, young, angry men. If racism increases and Islamophobia is on the rise, what is going to happen if the narrative of ISIS actually gains more traction? We need to be very careful about not falling prey to what ISIS wants us to do. Muslims are not sympathetic to ISIS or al-Qaeda, because we suffer doubly.

Firstly, we live in the same society that the terrorist attacks take place in, so we die as well. During 9/11, at least 92 Muslims were also killed, so we suffer like everyone else. Secondly, we suffer the backlash from the larger society who thinks we are complicit, and then if we try to contextualize and explain that it does not come from the religion, but from political grievances, we are then somehow being complicit or sympathetic—when we are not at all.

Just because the American Muslim community is sympathetic to, let’s say, the Palestinians does not at all triangulate to them being sympathetic with these radical groups that claim to be fighting on behalf of these oppressed people. There is a world of difference. You can sympathize with the causes and be very much opposed to the tactics of particular groups who support those causes.

Shroder: In terms of state security and how it relates to their own Muslim populations after events such as Paris, how can governments be better engaged with the Muslim community in working together to prevent further attacks?��

Qadhi: At some stage, we really do need to take a step back and ask ourselves: How ethical are our foreign policies? How legitimate are they? Is there something we are doing wrong, or do we really firmly believe that what we are doing across the world is legitimate and fair and valid?

That is the conversation we never talk about. We immediately jump to, “How do we control the Muslims?” Before we even get there, let’s take a step back ask the very difficult question: Are all people actually equal? Let’s talk about that.

In our case [the US], is our foreign policy ethical and fair? Is this something we are proud of? Let’s have this conversation even as we have the other difficult conversation: What can the American and European Muslim community do to combat terrorism? Let’s not concentrate on one element without taking a step back and asking ourselves: What is it that causes a young Muslim man to sympathize with radical groups?

The causes are not reading the Quran. The causes are, and here we can bring the long list of grievances that they have: drone attacks, Guantanamo, Islamophobia, or in the European case, it would be racism, discrimination and ghettoization. These are very legitimate economic and political causes that have nothing to do with the religion. Now we have to ask ourselves, are we going to disenfranchise the Muslim community of France even more? Are we going to increase the ghettoization and the scrutiny and make them feel even more like a fifth column and then assume that crime and terrorism is going to go down? I think that is very naive.

It is falling prey to the narrative of ISIS. And there is some very basic human psychology at play here as well: The more you make them feel like the “other,” the more likelihood they have of being the “other.”

Shroder: Switching direction slightly: The regional refugee crisis post-Paris attacks is going to become a global issue, and the usual knee jerk reactions are already being called for: a closing of borders, refusal of entry to people fleeing the very same violence. Is this what ISIS wants? Is this part of the chaos they are hoping to fuel as part of a wider global agenda?

Qadhi: This is obviously twofold for ISIS. Number one, they do not want Syrians fleeing from their own land because ISIS is controlling some of that land. Number two, they want to exacerbate the tension between Muslim immigrants and the West. What people need to realize is that these people [refugees] are fleeing from ISIS, and to blame the refugees and deprive people of the freedom that we as immigrants all enjoy is horrible. That is not the American way; all of us are immigrants to this land, and to deprive people who are facing such difficult circumstances is wrong.

I have to mention another point, which really is poignant here. The French prime minister said this was a new type of war, and that they need to amend their constitution and change their laws. This is exactly what we did in America, yet I find it ironic that our freedoms are so fragile that one attack can cause us to restrict those freedoms, which we cherish the most.

What this means is that people of Muslim backgrounds will be treated in a different manner. We have already seen this in America post-9/11. This is exactly where we are headed, but where are we going to be two or three steps down the line when fear and paranoia develops about a minority population and a stigma is attached to them?

So here’s the point: It has become mainstream to talk about getting rid of Muslims. This is a precursor to any action the government could take against us, and one wonders are we going to see the re-emergence of internment camps like with Japanese Americans [during WW2]? Is that the way it is going to go? Because we are projecting our own fears and insecurities onto a group that is not by and large supportive of what is going on.

If we want to be frank, there have been more mass murders by young Caucasian kids than by Muslims in America.

Shroder: Well there is that. In conversations I always try point out that juxtaposition, but usually to no avail. People seemingly forget that the levels of gun violence in the US far outweigh any potential threat that terrorists might pose. Let me ask you something else. We talked about why European Muslims become marginalized and feel the need to join ISIS, but you only touched briefly on the problem in the US. Do you think the US has a similar problem? Is the potential for seduction the same?

Donald Trump © Shutterstock

Qadhi: No, not to that level, which is why we have far fewer cases of American Muslims flipping over. It is much more pronounced in Belgium and France given the demographics and socioeconomic difference, and that is a very palpable difference between European Islam and American Islam.

Shroder: Can you explain that a bit more—the differences? I feel like that is very interesting for readers, because so many Americans assume the playing field for Muslims in Europe and America is exactly the same.

Qadhi: OK, let me put this in a very crude way. Certain demographics in America—let’s call them, for lack of a better term, “Fox News viewers”—they fear three distinct issues: number one being-immigration; number two being racial issues (blacks or Latinos); and number three being Islam. This is true for a large segment of this country—a segment that is not as educated as I would like them be.

Well, imagine those three fears being combined in one group. That is essentially what is happening in France. The immigrants are Islamic, who are also socioeconomically depressed, so the problems we have in America, which we split into three, are all combined in France. Muslims are stigmatized, stereotyped, under-educated and made the “other.” As one example, Muslims represent 5% of the total population in France, yet in prisons Muslim account for almost 60% of all inmates.

In America, those demographics are somewhat similar to the African American community.

Additionally because of the way European cities are structured, there is a lot more ghettoization. What I mean by this is that there are entire areas in many cities that are predominately Muslim. So there is a physical ghettoization of Muslim communities—not in every city, but in some cities and Paris is an example where there are parts of the city that are entirely North African.

These areas are underdeveloped and underprivileged, and that does not exist in America. Most Muslims in America live in suburban capitals and are engineers, lawyers and doctors. The average Muslim is upper middle-class in America and educated, whereas in England, the average Muslim is from the labor class.

Most Muslims who came to the US came for the sake of education, and automatically that changes the entire dynamic. That in and of itself is enough to belie the concept that Islam is the cause of radicalization. There are social and economic causes, as well as political grievances and yes, at the end, as I said, there is an element of Islam.

Shroder: Let me bring it back to America for a second, and I am sure you followed the news today. US governors [31 of them] have gone public in their refusal to take Syrian refugees for fear of terrorist attacks. And as we know, leading presidential candidates have also called for monitoring and potentially shutting mosques. How does this impact the perception of the millions of Muslims living in America? Because a “Syrian refugee” is really just a code word for Muslim.

Qadhi: It is sad because this is a veiled form of racism, where it is assumed that these refugees are responsible for these kinds of terrorist attacks. Whereas the fact of the matter is, in all likelihood, there was probably not a single Syrian refugee involved. To further stigmatize people who are fleeing for their lives and to shut our borders is about the most un-American thing we can do. Have we not learned from the 1930s when we shut the doors to the Jewry of France and Germany fleeing? We all regret that now, and we never seem to learn from our own history. American is a land of immigrants.

By the way Steve Jobs’ father was a Syrian immigrant—so to deny Syrian immigrants, we wouldn’t have Apple.

What this means is that people of Muslim backgrounds will be treated in a different manner. We have already seen this in America post-9/11.

Shroder: After attacks such as these, we constantly require condemnation of extremists from the Muslim community. Do these kinds of statements do damage to the Muslim community? To have to constantly deny your association with ISIS given that it has nothing to do with you.

Qadhi: So again, this is one of those nefarious paradoxes that ends in an infinite loop where nothing we ever do is enough. We do condemn ISIS; I just released a statement on behalf of my mosque where we unconditionally condemned what happened—no ifs, ands or buts. After having condemned it, is mere condemnation going to solve the problem? Because we are going to have to get to the root cause.

Certainly there is a double-standard because we are asked to condemn when a Muslim does it, but we do not expect the same condemnation from any other demographic. In particular, when it is the mainstream Christian or Caucasian demographic who commits a crime. When the Catholic pedophilia scandal took place, we did not expect every Catholic to go and say, “That’s not my Catholicism, I’m not guilty of this.” But when it comes to Islam, unfortunately the entire faith is suspect and guilty.

We can apologize until we are blue in the face, but mainstream America will never be happy with us no matter how much we apologize.

Shroder: It just makes people feel good, right? And that is about it.

Qadhi: It is diverting attention away from the real problem, and the real problems are political and economic, not religious.

Shroder: You helped organize the global Muslim response to ISIS by being one of the more well-known signatories of the “Letter to Baghdadi” in September 2014. What were you hoping to accomplish by this? Do you feel it has had an effect so far?

Qadhi: So, the main reason for that letter was to demonstrate to the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world that the bulk of us are opposed to this. We laid out the detailed reasons of why we are opposed to ISIS from a theological and a jurisprudence point of view. What we wanted to demonstrate was, “Look you might be quoting religious texts, but we know those texts better than you do.” We have presented the mainstream body of the Muslim world, all different strands of Sunni Islam and even some Shia clerics. We all came together to showed our unity and opposition to ISIS. The letter, very frankly, was not aimed at Baghdadi himself because he is not going to change his ways.

It was really aimed at young men and women who might not understand where ISIS is coming from and [who] might possibly sympathize. But it also demonstrates to the broader world that we are all opposed to this fanatical group.

Shroder: There has been lots of talk in the news and on the campaign trail about how to identify groups like ISIS: jihadist, radical Islam, Islamists, fundamentalists, extremists, etc. But I am cognizant that perception often equates to power, and the unintended consequences of that can be far reaching. As a Muslim, what is the best way to refer to a group like ISIS?

Qadhi: I would call them Daesh because that is their [Arabic] acronym. The reason I do not like using ISIS or Islamic State is because��the name Islam is in there, and as people of other faiths keep reading “Islam,” it can lead to a misunderstanding of the entire faith and tradition. Imagine if the KKK [Ku Klux Klan] was the only exposure to Christianity that a group of Muslims ever had, and every time the KKK did something it was always “Christian this or Christian that.” Understandably, that segment of the Muslim population might start thinking that the entire Christian world was the KKK.

That is the main reason I do not like using the term Islamic, but we have to call them something though. They are radicals, they are jihadists, but they have perverted jihad obviously. Jihad is a concept that can be interpreted in a positive manner, as the mainstream Muslim world does.

You can call them radical jihadists. I don’t have a problem with that per se, but I think we should call them by their first term: Daesh.

Shroder: Any predictions moving forward—for the US, Europe, or the Middle East? It all seems very cynical these days, and there seems very little to be optimistic about. Any final words of optimism to part on?

Qadhi: Unfortunately, I totally agree with you. It seems that we are locked in a vicious loop where we don’t seem to learn from our own living memory. We are uncomfortable discussing the possible causes of the existence of such groups, and we simply think it is more convenient to keep on blaming the Muslims entirely and stigmatizing an entire religion—and not thinking about the political or economic causes which are the underlying symptoms of these types of tactics.

Until we take a step back and rationally and calmly learn from our own mistakes and begin to wonder about why such groups exists beyond a simplistic view of, “Oh, Muslims are so radical and backward,” I’m afraid I do not see much hope. Especially if we continue down this vicious line of bombing and counterbombing, and bombing yet again and then invading.

At this stage, I have to admit, I am pessimistic. I am worried about the future; as a father and parent, I am worried about my own children living in a land that is more and more Islamophobic and wants to blame them for something that they have nothing to do with. I worry about the future of Islamic minorities across the Western world and the Middle East. This is just a very difficult time to be living in, and as a religious person I can only say: May God help us.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Foreign policy is a long game—a calculus that should always supersede the whimsical proclivities of election year politics or petty score settling. Unfortunately, this has never really been the case. Over the years, Republicans and Democrats alike have polluted the foreign policy lexicon to score cheap political points at the expense of long-term strategies in places like Iraq and Syria.

However, within this vortex of confusing policy conundrums and complex decision-making, there has always been the steady hand of Republican Senator, and now presidential hopeful, Lindsey Graham.

Senator Graham has been described as many things over the years—war hawk, interventionist, realist—but one thing is for certain: He has a detailed plan to address some of the most challenging foreign policy issues of our times, which is more than what most politicians are ever able to claim.

In this edition of , 51�Թ� talks to Senator Lindsey Graham about Russia, Iraq, Iran, the Islamic State and what the US can do to regain the initiative in the Middle East.

Landon Shroder: With Russia engaged in an air, land and sea campaign in Syria, along with the intelligence sharing agreement that has just been put into place between Iraq, Syria and Iran, has Moscow completely outmaneuvered the US in the Middle East? Is US foreign policy in danger of collapsing?

Lindsey Graham: Russia has not so much outmaneuvered us, but they came up with a strategy that is beneficial to their interests, and we have a hap-hazard strategy. We talk about degrading and destroying ISIL [Islamic State], but there is no plan to destroy ISIL—bombing ISIL is not going to destroy them. We talk about replacing [President Bashar al] Assad, but we’ve never taken Assad on because [President Barack] Obama did not want to disrupt the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear deal. He knew if he pushed hard against Assad, Iran and Russia would be mad.

We’re captured by this official Iran deal, and we have a president that just gives lip service to the things that you need to do. You got a Russian president who wants to prop up Assad, who is a proxy of Russia, a puppet of Iran, and he is willing to commit ground forces, airpower and he has created a regional alliance between the Iranians, Hezbollah, [the] Syrian army and some Russian troops.

They are going after the people threatening Assad—and winning. We are sitting on the sidelines watching the region become more influenced by Russia and Iran. President Obama’s foreign policy is a complete, abject [and] miserable failure.

Shroder: So where does US foreign policy go from here? How do we regain the initiative in Iraq and Syria given this new axis that has formed against our policies?

Graham: Here’s the good news for the United States. The region as a whole has aligned with us. The outliers are Syria and Iran. Every Arab capital wants the same two things we want: The destruction of ISIL, because they are a threat to their government and their people, and they want Assad gone because he is a proxy of Iran and the Russians.

With the right American leadership, you can form a regional alliance that has a lot more capabilities than Russia and Iran, and [then] really isolate them. A regional alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt (all have air forces, all have armies) and we would form a regional alliance—90% the region, 10% US [and] we go in on the ground. We can’t find indigenous forces in Syria to train to destroy ISIL and really fight Assad. A regional alliance to counter the Russian and Iranian alliance and would destroy ISIL.

Shroder: How would we bring these nations��together, especially Arab countries that have competing interests in a place like Syria?

Graham: It all starts with pushing out Assad. They are backing some of the extremist groups, trying to create a bulwark against Assad. So it all falls into place with American leadership. Without American leadership it will never happen.

Shroder: With Russia now engaging inside of Syria, is there ever going to be scope for the US to cooperate with Russia with regard to a joint strategy in fighting the Islamic State?

Graham: No, because the goal is not to destroy ISIL—they [Russians] could care less about what happens in the eastern part of Syria. Their goal is to prop up Assad. They’ll launch some airstrikes against ISIL, but their real goal is to destroy opposition to Assad.

Shroder: Is there going to be an opportunity for Russia to transition Assad out of power? Would that be an acceptable policy that the US could back—if the Russians could institute regime change, but not necessarily dismantle the government?

Graham: Russia wants to keep Assad in power, which they are using force of arms to accomplish, or replace him with another puppet. What I want is for the Syrian people to decide who leads their country. If Russia has a presence in Syria post-Assad, it will be up to the Syrians if they want to find a place for the Russians in Syria—that’s fine with me, as long as the Syrian people make that choice.

Shroder: In terms of fighting the Islamic State, you spoke of the need for US boots on the ground, which I am assuming would stage from Iraq. How would that look given the fact that the Shia militias have eclipsed the Iraqi security forces and would not accept such a deployment?

Graham: One, it would change the balance of power inside of Iraq. More American boots on the ground, if accepted by the Iraqi coalition government, which I think it would be, would neutralize the advantage the Shia militias have. It makes it more likely that the Sunni Arabs could pull away from ISIL in Anbar Province, [and] makes it more likely that the Kurds will help us in Mosul. It makes everything more likely and is a big blow to Iran.

Shroder: Is it a wise strategy to arm disparate factions inside Iraq? For instance, is arming the Sunni tribesmen or arming the Kurdish Peshmerga independent of the central government a policy worth exploring?

Graham: Yes. We have been training these Sunni Arabs. That is what led to the success of the surge and the Sons of Iraq; we are going to have to do it all over again. Eventually, we are going to have to have a coalition government. You are not going to be able to partition Iraq. Bottom line is the Sunni Arabs are not going to break or rely on the Shia militias for their security. The Sunni Arabs were aligned with the coalition we were a part of, and it worked before. But they are not going to break from ISIL and pin their hopes and dreams on a Shia-dominated, sectarian-dominated government in Baghdad.

Everyone went back to their sectarian corners after the withdrawal of the US forces—as the security deteriorated, people went back to their sectarian corners. You are going to have to do the surge all over again, this time with less American help.

Shroder: But by arming the different groups outside of the central government, doesn’t that undermine the credibility of the central government in Baghdad?

Graham: Right now, Baghdad in terms of arming the Kurds is mixed, and Iran has more influence today than they ever had before. There is no scenario where you take back Anbar Province without arming the tribes, period. Now, you are not arming them to the extent that they can take over Baghdad, but you are allowing them to more effectively fight ISIL and dislodge them from Anbar Province. Giving more military capacity to the Kurds helps us with ISIL in other problem areas, but we are not arming these people to the extent that we are going to have an invasion of Kurds in Baghdad. But you are going to have to bolster the alliances that we need.

The alliance in Anbar Province is the Sunni tribes with Iraqi security forces—not pin it on the Shia militias. In Mosul, the Kurds [and] Iraqi security forces working with us could dislodge ISIL from Mosul. This is going to be a very complicated endeavor, but those are the alliances. And when you throw the Shia militias in, you break apart the entire structure.

Shroder: I get that. I also spent seven years in Iraq, so I am quite invested in the country.

Barack Obama © Shutterstock

Graham: It is sad to see the progress just wasted, because it did work—the surge did work. They were working on the hydrocarbon law, the de-Baathification law, politics were moving forward in Baghdad. The security environment had transformed, and when we pulled out, that security vacuum was filled by al-Qaeda in Iraq, which eventually turned into ISIL and [the] political progress stopped.

That was the warning everybody gave Obama: If you leave too soon everything falls apart. And it did, and it has to be rebuilt.

But the good news is that it can be rebuilt. The region is now looking for American leadership more than ever. There are opportunities for new alliances we did not have in 2009-2010.

Shroder: I was in Basra Province when the US pulled out, and we just woke up one morning and everyone was gone. You could sense the vacuum forming pretty much overnight.

Graham: Yeah, that is when JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi] and all these guys moved in and became a sectarian militia-run area. Iraqi security forces are too Shia. That’s what [Nouri al] Maliki did—he basically destroyed the national army. The Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shia are going to have a loose confederation. You are not going to have a partitioned Iraq. The Sunni Arab nations are not going to allow anyone to give southern Iraq to Iran and that’s what happens with partition—the oil fields go to Iran, and I don’t agree with that.

Shroder: Do you think the US has enough legitimacy in the Middle East to still effectively shape regional events?

Graham: Not under Obama. I don’t think anyone is going to follow Obama, because he’s been seen basically doing a deal with Iran that does not help Middle Eastern turmoil. His willingness to withdraw all troops, drawing a red line with Assad and besides crossing it, he still stands—he’s [Obama] made us weak in the eyes of the region. I think his credibility as a leader in the world is almost zero.

Shroder: How do your policy positions on Iraq, Syria and the Islamic State differ right now from the rest of your Republican rivals? You seem to actually have a plan in place that is quite pragmatic.

Graham: I think the difference is knowledge and a plan versus talk, platitudes versus proposals. Understanding that more American ground components are needed in Iraq. There is not an indigenous force left to train that can destroy ISIL and push Assad out. I am willing to work at that with a regional approach to isolate Russia and Iran. That regional approach will have a military component, but be diplomatic too.

Just understanding the players and having spent time in Ramadi and Fallujah and understanding the tribes, having met with the tribal leaders—they all know me. Having been to Mosul several times, there is a level of understanding. I know all the Arab leaders. I know they would gladly align themselves with an American president they can rely upon, because Iran and ISIL [are] a threat.

So what I’ve got is a way forward that will lead to victory, and my goal is to destroy ISIL and change the Middle East for the better. The big difference in this race is the level of understanding.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Over one month into the Russian military campaign in Syria and it has become clear that US foreign policy in the Middle East is losing serious ground—possibly heading for a state of collapse. Not only has the terminal regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad been thrown a critical lifeline due to Russian airstrikes, but a realignment of interests in the war against the Islamic State (IS) is now starting to favor Moscow’s involvement in Iraq. All the while, regional events are moving at breakneck speed and outpacing the strategic, dare I say, judicious capabilities of our politicians to shape them into effective foreign policy.

None of this bodes well for the long-term interests of the United States, and we haven’t even got to the worst part yet.

Since commencing airstrikes on September 30, Russia has played its hand pretty brazenly—not so much targeting IS, but groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and other rebel factions (some of which have links to the CIA) that are putting direct pressure on Syrian regime strongholds. And due to this intervention, Iran has become emboldened and deployed up to 2,000 troops to assist the Syrian army in their assault on the rebel-held city of Aleppo.

From an American strategic perspective, this spells foreign policy disaster on a potentially biblical scale. Here’s why:

Should the Syrian army manage to retake Aleppo with support from Russian airstrikes and Iranian ground forces, President Assad will attempt to consolidate his control over cities to the west of Syria, including the individual rebel statelets forming on the periphery of the Alawi coast. However, in doing so, Assad will remove the last fragment of rebel opposition to IS, which will potentially secede a far greater portion of the east to its control. All of which drastically undermines US President Barack Obama’s strategy to ultimately “degrade and defeat” IS, regardless of the announcement on October 30 that a paltry 50 Special Forces will be deployed to Syria.

And just to add further insult to injury, all of these events were preceded by the implementation of a joint intelligence sharing agreement at the end of September, which has brought together Iraq, Iran and Syria under a new axis of cooperation that is being spearheaded by Russia, based out of the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad.

When all of this is added up, the US position in the Middle East is starting to look pretty untenable—isolated even.

Strategic and Tactical Missteps��

Some of this is the resounding failure to articulate a regional strategy—not just to the American people, but more importantly to Iraqis and Syrians themselves, which could have potentially generated an indigenous coalition that might have aligned with US regional interests. While the US policy is to “degrade and defeat” IS, in reality it only provides the basis for containment; it is not a formula for any kind of sustainable victory.

And after one year of military operations against the Islamic State, known as Operation Inherent Resolve, the US has not been able to strike a mortal blow against the self-proclaimed caliphate. Daily airstrikes have been conducted, but there has been little in the way of actual ground support, which is an absolute necessity to defeat an enemy as cunning as IS. The lack of success surrounding the campaign is fueling a perception that the US has now become part of the problem, which has given Russia space to advance its own interests at the expense of Washington’s.

(Please allow me the luxury to interject here: Only the US could conjure up such a disabused name for a campaign it can never actually win. “Inherent Resolve” probably says more about the insufferable politics surrounding the war with the Islamic State than the actual conflict itself.)

Even in Iraq, where US support should be relatively stable given over a decade of nation-building, leading politicians are now calling for deeper Russian involvement.

In a statement released on October 11, Iraqi Member of Parliament (MP) Aliya Nassif said: “American betrayed us over the past 12 years.” The statement finished with: “The political forces today must assume national and historical responsibility as we must invest the historic opportunity for the Iraqi people in letting Russia direct strikes against ISIS [Islamic State].” This was followed by an acknowledgement on October 14 from Iraqi MP Hakim al-Zamili, head of the powerful parliamentary defense committee, that Russian intelligence has been used by Iraqi security forces to target IS commanders.

When all of this is added up, the US position in the Middle East is starting to look pretty untenable—isolated even.

At present, official sources from US CENTCOM have indicated that no such appeal from the Iraqi government has been issued to the Russians. But unofficial security sources inside Iraq have suggested that the request is not far off.

Unnatural Trajectories

This loss of influence calls attention to a more nuanced view of the preconditions that the US has set for its involvement in the fight against the Islamic State and Assad. These terms are entirely unnatural to the trajectory of either conflict and are predicated on political agendas that are not so much about pragmatic strategy positions, but entrenched ideological positions that are pointless in a war against a non-state actor like IS.

In Iraq, this has meant denying support for operations that are led by Shia-backed popular mobilization units known as the Hashd al-Shaabi, which have links to Iran and have eclipsed the Iraqi army as the main fighting force against IS. And in Syria, this has meant arming rebels to fight IS, but making them sign a pledge not to fight the Assad regime. Yet for most opposition fighters in Syria, their main goal remains—and will always be—the removal of Assad, not the defeat of the Islamic State.

This has led to a bipolar foreign policy that exists in a state of semi-permanent contradiction, which has eroded confidence in the type of assistance the US is willing to offer. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the calamitous $500 million program to arm Syrian rebels to fight IS—a signature foreign policy piece of the Obama administration that was abandoned on October 9 due to its inability to actually find, train and arm any moderate Syrian rebels.

In fact, external military pressure from Russia probably helped bring about the decision to scrap the initiative, which goes to show just how lukewarm the initial program was to begin with, making it more about political optics in the US and less about strategy or tactics in the conflict against IS. Not only was the program deeply unrealistic given the battlefield experience of IS—honed over the past 12 years—but it was the expectation that the US could develop objectives that might superseded those of the Syrian opposition, which displayed the most remarkable lack of foresight.

Barack Obama and John Kerry / Flickr

Russian Realpolitik

For their part, the Russians have no such squabbles—not about political optics, not about battlefield casualties and not about what their long-term strategy should be. Their interest in building a coalition to support the internationally isolated regime of Bashar al-Assad has only highlighted the extent to which they will go to protect their own foreign policy interests—something the US has neither the will nor capacity to do. And in this respect, US foreign policy is unlikely to survive in its current form.

The proverbial silver lining and the one thing that might inadvertently save the US from its own foreign policy black hole is that Russian support for one of the most despised regimes in the world—with a coalition of minority Shia states—does not provide the basis for sound long-term foreign policy. Not when the majority of Sunni states in the Middle East have an interest in seeing the Islamic State defeated and Assad removed from power.

Nonetheless, in the short-term, the US will have to demonstrate that it is still an effective player in the Middle East. This will require more than a token ground force deployment in Syria—50 Special Forces versus 2,000 Iranian soldiers is hardly a good showing—or the occasional airdrop to resupply anti-IS forces in Syria, especially when Russia is committing vast military resources. Although, in recent weeks, the US has accelerated airstrikes against IS in the contested Iraqi city of Baiji and in the restive Anbar Province, in an attempt to offset the specter of Russian influence in Baghdad.

Will this be enough for the US to regain the advantage in the Middle East?

Only time will tell. But with the forthcoming foreign policy discussion, which will dominate parts of the 2016 US presidential election debates, along with Obama’s obvious desire to maintain the status quo for his successor, it is safe to say the US is not setting the conditions for long-term foreign policy success. However, maybe this has been part of the plan all along.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The post The Slow Death of US Foreign Policy in the Middle East appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Friedrich Nietzsche, the great German philosopher, once quipped: “If you gaze long enough into the abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.” I am not sure if any statement—philosophical or other—can more accurately describe my current feelings toward the US Presidential Election only a mere 15 months away (please take note of my sarcasm).

Nonetheless, I must warn you that what I am about to say could come across as uniquely strange and unquestionably metaphysical, since some mysterious agency compelled me to watch all 53 minutes of ’s “pep-rally” in Mobile, Alabama on August 21.

I say strange because once I started watching Trump, I became entirely mesmerized by the spectacle of his performance and couldn’t stop. I say metaphysical because the longer he spoke, the more I found myself deeply internalizing the abstract simplicity of his message. The subsequent resonance was all at once horrifying and profound—so much so that I had to drink some otherwise “special occasion” scotch to steady my nerves and make sure I was not having some kind of spiritual crisis.

After a week of being tormented by a sense of general self-loathing for being so easily coopted into the Donald Trump phenomenon, here is what I have surmised (I am still self-loathing).

Let me set the scene: 20,000 Alabamians have assembled to hear Trump speak. The energy is palpable; how can it not be? The organizers have even played the generically impossible “Sweet Home Alabama,” which only furthered the genial and slightly hostile southern atmosphere.

Remember, American politics is a contact sport and Trump is currently the reigning champion—the symbolism of having this “pep-rally” at a football stadium should not be lost on anyone. No other venue could better suit his general demeanor, which is raucous and confrontational, all of the things that now epitomize the hyper-factionalism of modern America.

Standing at the podium, he wore a crisp white shirt with impeccably folded French cuffs that peaked out of a sturdy blue blazer. This is a casual look that makes him seem relatable without overpowering the refinement, which can only come from being a billionaire. Trump is gregarious about his wealth, but the candor in which he speaks about money is easily disarming.

Far from having an air of contemptuous entitlement, he draws you into his world, speaking to his supporters like they are also people of affluence. This is the ultimate political sale, the ultimate political intoxicant; the idea that with only a nudge in the right direction, every American might also have the potential to become a billionaire like him.

And while he personifies the dreaded 1%, he somehow does not share the same nefarious qualities that are usually associated with such status. Regardless of Alabama being the seventh poorest state in America, his supporters welcome his financial braggadocio with roaring applause—even asking for their permission to steal $5 million from lobbyists. Yet behind this bombast and pomp, Trump is deeply accessible (personally and politically) and this breeds a kind of familiarity that does not exist with other establishment candidates like Jeb Bush or Hillary Clinton.

(While watching Trump, he immediately reminded me of someone I once met at an airport bar, who was amusing only because he kept buying me free drinks.)

Although, before we venture any further down the proverbial rabbit hole with the Donald, a few things need clarifying. There are some points with regard to his candidacy that should be quite obvious to any astute observer of the human condition. More so since there has been an abundance of bewilderment and denial about his status as a top-tier candidate by the Republican establishment and mainstream media.

So why is this?

The Republican establishment is loath to admit that he represents the inevitable culmination of years of incendiary rhetoric and reactionary politics. However, there can be no “big tent” agenda that engages new voters when demagoguing an entire race of people becomes the mainstay of your political agenda. Case in point: If you want to attract Latino voters, do not refer to their children as “anchor babies.” The real issue, though, is that Trump has taken the outward projection of Republican obstinacy and turned it inward against his fellow candidates and other party luminaries such as John McCain—a big taboo.

Should Donald Trump have directed this antagonism against his fellow Democratic challengers, all of this would be a moot point.

Trump is also a business man, not a politician. Therefore, his calculus and strategy are about securing the bottom line. And like all great businessmen, he is using whatever competitive advantage is available to close the deal. If this includes tarnishing the Republican brand by attacking his fellow candidates, then so be it—it’s just business.

For conservatives who believe in the unfettered virtues of the free market, here it is: welcome home to your Frankensteinian monster.

As for the media, they simply cannot wrap their head around a candidate who challenges their position as the arbiter of public discourse. Given the way Trump draws ratings and the extensive coverage they afford him, the relationship is no longer symbiotic, which he knows all too well. This has fueled a kind of sportive combativeness that has allowed him to go on the offensive against certain media figures in a way no other candidate possibly could or would. Instead of setting the narrative tempo, both conservative and liberal media are now constantly having to play defense to Trump.

© Shutterstock

Plus, Trump’s not inconsiderable fortune is his own financial backstop. As a result, he does not have to conform to the public relations fundamentals needed to raise money from whatever depraved super-pac is quietly ushering him in millions in dark money.

The Once and Future President

But let’s go back to Alabama, shall we? People are cheering about deporting babies, and we should try and understand why.

Given his total disregard for solutions that might actually prove substantive, the Donald clearly has a pervasive disinterest in the world around him, which was on full display in Ladd-Peebles’s Stadium. While this might be an unusual quality for someone running for president, the fact that this was the largest Republican rally to date is not just hugely significant, but it also underscores a certain rejection of choreographed political theater. In a world governed by tireless public relations, people are ravenous for authentic characters like Donald Trump who lack the polish of career politicians.

Therefore, positioning himself as the consummate maverick outsider is not just ironic, but sinisterly clever—given that the government he claims to loathe is also the same government that provided him the opportunities to achieve what he has. But to a generation of dispossessed political refugees who have been misled, lied to and hustled by their government, is it really so hard to see why a vaudeville act like Donald Trump would become so appealing?

Which is why his speech could be callow and dismissive, but also sharply humorous at the same time. The punditry often underestimates the value of humor in politics, especially as a mechanism to misdirect people away from the complexity of issues that might generally be inaccessible. Trump understands this all too well and replaces substance with an oafish drollery that always ends with the same conclusion: “I was right.”

This appeals to a certain kind of base populism that thrives in a world of absolutes—one that equates political correctness with a loss of personal liberty and anger as the basis for sound policy. This is the reason why he can parade such a flippant term like “anchor baby,” regardless of its racial implications, all the while calling for the deportation of millions of families and still receive a thunderous applause. (For non-American readers, yes we are talking about deporting babies and children.)

For the past 15 years, America has thrived on the discordant perspectives of people who feel their station in life has been predetermined by groups of people they have had no contact or experience with. Trump has either—by design or involuntarily—offered his supporters a worldview that has been reduced to that of an aggrieved status, where they are all victims because of duplicitous politicians, illegal immigrants, China and Mexico.

He offers all of this, wrapped in a glamour and flamboyance, which is befitting of a country that is overstimulated by celebrity cachet and disgusted with career politicians. This perfect confluence of events has led to the rise of Donald Trump.

Going into 2016

In summation, I will leave you with this, as I attempt to sort out my once spiritual, now existential crisis.

Going into the 2016 Presidential Election, we must be cognizant of what America has become due to the zealous entrenchment of both political parties. For supporters of the Republican Party, the success of Donald Trump is a rejection of the status quo and a confirmation of how certain Americans feel about their elected officials. Mitigating the political threat brought by Trump is simple: Bring forward pragmatic ideas that can appeal to the evolving shape of modern America, which includes young people, minorities, women, immigrants and (gasp) even anchor babies.

If not, then brace yourself for the Trump revolution, which will be the abyss staring back at all of us.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your����is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a��.

The post This is Why Donald Trump is Surging in the Polls appeared first on 51�Թ�.

After almost 20 months of a carefully choreographed diplomatic pirouette, the long-awaited nuclear deal between —the United States, China, Russia, France, Britain and Germany—has finally been made official. So, has the time come to celebrate the virtues of diplomacy, the nobility of dialogue and the tenacity of hard negotiations?

No, of course not. Congress now has 60 days to approve this landmark deal, and the countdown has just begun.

Cue the chorus of disapproval, the maelstrom of discontent and the absolute righteous indignation of politician and pundit alike. But, for good measure, let’s insert some more platitudes, reckless assessment and political slogans.

Iran is evil. US is good. Moral certainty prevails, much like that time we went to war with .

The deal between the P5+1 and Iran is arguably the best and most progressive piece of foreign policy to come out of the Middle East in the past 15 years. While the baseline for successful policy in the region is not hard to exceed—when balanced against the failures in , , Iraq and —the nuclear deal provides the context for a much-needed geopolitical realignment. One that will open up new economic markets, encourage reconciliation and prevent (at least in the short-term) the potential for another armed conflict.

What is all the yowling from the peanut gallery about, then?

Republicans and their enormous roster of presidential candidates have naturally weighed in with their cacophony of doomsday rhetoric, as have our always supportive and ever appreciative allies, and .

I will, therefore, endeavor to address a wide variety of talking points from some of the more portentous statesmen in this group. Each of whom think the Iran deal should be terminated, for the far better option of perpetual hostility.

In the immortal words of the Roman poet Horace, let us “Begin, be bold, and venture to be wise” (hopefully, maybe?).

Through the Perpetual Looking Glass

Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, in a recent speech, the deal “one of America’s worst diplomatic failures,” followed by, “Looking ahead, we need to terminate the bad deal with Iran on the very first day in office, put crippling economic sanctions and convince our allies to do exactly the same thing.”

Sigh, OK, here we go…

Beyond the absurd conjecture of this statement—given the diplomatic failure that led to the Iraq War and, by consequence, destabilized the entire Middle East, leading to the rise of the Islamic State—the nuclear deal with Iran will two-thirds of all centrifuges, storing them under international supervision and granting the (IAEA) entry to nuclear facilities and areas of potential interest, in addition to permitting access to Iran’s supply chains for 20-25 years. The agreement also stipulates a ban on producing or acquiring any highly enriched uranium for 15 years, while reducing current stockpiles by almost 98%.

Getting a country like Iran that is permanently belligerent to the US, let alone the entire West, to accept an inspections regime that is nearly unfettered is not just an achievement, but a substantial victory.

Plus, the idea that sanctions might somehow be reapplied without a breach of the agreement stipulations is next to impossible. There is little chance they would be ratified by the rest of the P5+1, making renewed sanctions unilateral to the US. This would not only isolate Europe, but it would also provide space for and to exert greater economic and political influence throughout the Middle East.

As for our allies, Germany will soon be up a 60-person-strong business delegation to Iran, and Britain has already that its embassy will reopen by the end of 2015.

The only loser in Scott Walker’s scenario will be the US.

Next, we have the near ceaseless umbrage taken by our dear ally Israel. A country that seems content to subvert our foreign policy every chance it gets, while never really articulating what it offers the people of America in return.

Nonetheless, had this to : “The leading international powers have bet our collective future on a deal with the foremost international sponsor of terrorism … In fact, the deal gives Iran every incentive not to change.”

The narrative of Iran being the world’s leading brand of terrorism has been effective in the past, but not so effective since the rise of the and the breakdown of geopolitical structures in the Middle East. More to the point, none of the recent terrorist attacks in Tunisia, France, Denmark, Australia or the US have been organized or funded by Iran, making this line of reasoning quite one dimensional.

Yes, Iran funds Hezbollah. Yes, Iran funds Hamas. Yes, Iran funds the Shiite militias in Iraq. Yes, Iran supports the Assad regime in Syria. Should any of these impact the foreign policy position of the US, vis-à-vis the nuclear deal? No.

The threat from Hezbollah and Hamas are unique to Israel; they are not existential threats to the US and should not be taken as such. Nor should US foreign policy interests be beholden to a country that was singled out for criticism in 20 UN between 2014-15. Most ironic is the fact that Israel has the only undeclared nuclear arsenal in the Middle East, but refuses to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—of which Iran is a signatory.

Iranian support to Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria is boorish, but not beyond the bounds of any state looking to project its own influence. And, as it stands, these militias are the only fighting force capable of challenging the Islamic State without a complete reengagement of US military on the ground in Iraq (something most Americans are not super keen on).

This is the devil’s bargain, but highly indicative of the complex world we now live in.

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With regard to Netanyahu’s remarks, I would squabble that Iran already has an incentive to change, and this change originates with the signing of the nuclear deal. Furthermore, maintaining a sanctions regime without the possibility of a deal, while continually threatening military action, all but guarantees nuclear breakout and squanders any opportunity for political change inside Iran.

The Wisdom of Ages

Moving on to more doom-laden pastures…

Now comes the time where I must implore of you one small indulgence, as I circle back to presidential hopeful and part-time , Republican Senator Ted Cruz, whom I quote: “The greatest risk to this Iranian deal is that millions of Americans will be murdered by radical theocratic zealots.”

The murder of millions of Americans via a nuclear apocalypse, Mr. Cruz?

This, after the on the streets of Tehran when the deal was announced. Iranians were even filmed cheering, “Green and prosperous Iran does not need an atomic bomb.” While there was some hard-line rhetoric, including the always excitable “death to America” chant, it was probably negated by our continued instance on labeling Iran “evil.” Maybe we should just agree to split the difference?

It is also worth mentioning that these theocratic zealots have one of the most enterprising art house cinemas in the world, one of the only condom factories in the Middle East and allow sex-change operations by decree of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself.

This is not an attempt to excuse state repression or issues surrounding human rights, but it does work to dispel a certain myth. One that ambitious politicians like Cruz promulgate as political strategy to play on the fears of Americans who lack the understanding to make informed decisions about foreign policy.

Iran, far from being a country whose sole existence is to wage holy-war against the US, is actually recognized as being one of the more liberal states in the Middle East. When , 51% of Iranians held a positive opinion of the US. Iranians do not want to be at war with the US, much like Americans do not want to be at war with Iran.

But facts are not important to Cruz, as he continued this baseless assessment by his constituents that Iran will load a nuclear bomb onto a ship and detonate it “to shut down the entire electrical grid on the Eastern Seaboard.”

Just to soothe our collective consciousness, and temper the fears of those who believe we might be careening toward nuclear oblivion, it is worth mentioning that the US still maintains a military deterrent strategy referred to as “mutual assured destruction.” Which effectively means this: Should Iran reach nuclear break out and instigate a thermonuclear war, the US reserves the right to totally and utterly annihilate Iran with a much larger and infinitely more powerful nuclear arsenal.

All of this, of course, would have to be orchestrated under the careful and continuous watch of the IAEA, which will be monitoring Iran’s nuclear sites for the next 20-25 years.

This is a winning strategy for a country that just spent two years negotiating a deal it will never live to see.

Check and mate, Mr. Cruz.

The Hardest of Truths

Finally, there is Saudi Arabia, where an anonymous diplomat The Washington Post that “If sanctions are lifted, Iran will try even harder to redesign the region. Iran is trying to change the Middle East, and this is unacceptable to Sunnis.”

Sunnis, not Saudis. No truer statement could be made to illustrate the rubric by which Saudi Arabia views its role in the Middle East. Not one of a state power, but one of a sectarian power, which is partly sustained by the idea of religious conflict with the Shiite of Iran.

This was echoed by another Republican presidential candidate, the mostly coherent Lindsay Graham, who that the Iran deal would be a declaration of war against Sunni Arabs.

Yet given the decades of Sunni proselytization, funded by oil revenues from Saudi Arabia, which legitimized the ideologies espoused by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, this seems a bit dramatic. Iran still remains a minority religious state, whose Shiite sect only for 10-13% of all global Muslims—essentially limiting its power to narrow spheres of influence in Sunni majority countries, where Shiite might be present.

The other part of Saudi Arabia’s intransigence toward the Iran nuclear deal originates with adverse economic conditions. Once the sanctions are lifted, Iran will kick-start a nascent oil sector that is projected to close to 1.5 million barrels per day.��As the market is flooded with surplus oil, the cost per barrel will fall even lower. And if you are a unitary oil state like Saudi Arabia, this does not bode well for your long-term financial projections.

On the other hand, if you are a gas guzzling SUV-loving American, this provides one more incentive for you to support the nuclear deal with Iran.

In summation, I will leave you with this: There are very few reasons not to support the nuclear deal, and even fewer reasons to maintain a state of permanent antagonism with Iran. Was it the best deal ever negotiated? No, but that deal would have required a total dismantling of Iranian nuclear infrastructure—and that was never going to happen. Is this deal good enough to support some measure of rapprochement with Iran? Yes.

As the 60-day countdown commences, our elected leaders must weigh the choices: reconciliation and ��é�ٱ�Գٱ� or antagonism and hostility. Because in the end,��the US might slowly start to resemble the country that needs to rejoin the international community.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your����is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a��.

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One year ago, I was in as the (IS) overran Iraq. By that time, I had already spent seven long years of bombings, rocketing, shootings and mass killings inside the war-torn country.

Over the years, most of us tried to work normal jobs, but somehow, we always returned to Iraq in one form or another: contractor, oilman, security—it didn’t really matter, the skill set was transferable between each of them.

This is why none of us ever really left Iraq. Understanding terrorism and insurgency had become the only thing we were really good at. We had become fluent in the tactics and techniques of groups with names like IS, JRTN and MRTC—each having their own signature, their own trademark. And on June 10, 2014, we watched as IS overran most of Iraq’s Sunni provinces. Within 48 hours, a full-blown insurrection had developed only a mere 70 miles up the road from us in Baghdad.

For all the promises and ambitions, Iraq was never going to recover after the invasion of 2003. Certainly not in the way American politicians thought it could, or would; our cultures were never compatible, our religions too foreign and our styles of business not well-suited. The old sectarian hatred ran too deep.

And, once again, as the United States widens its involvement in Iraq, one inescapable fact must be remembered. Without the US invasion of Iraq, there would be no Islamic State. The disbanding of the Iraqi army, police and intelligence services, along with various political and military mistakes, allowed IS to thrive and metastasize in the chaos that followed Saddam Hussein’s removal—first as al-Qaeda in Iraq, followed by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and finally, in its current form, as the Islamic State—or the (ISIS).

For those of us who had spent years in Iraq, IS was not something new, but a constant reminder of just how tenuous the balance of power had become in the Middle East after the invasion in 2003. Iraq had become a battleground for countries such as Saudi Arabia and to project their influence through religious, cultural and military means. Proxy groups and terrorist networks killed hundreds of thousands of civilians as a result.

After almost $2 trillion and 4,486 soldiers killed, US foreign policy landed right back where it began: in the middle of a conflict it could never win.

Black Flags on Humvees

None of us were really surprised when reports started circulating that places like Mosul, Tal Afar and Hawaijah had become occupied by insurgent forces. While IS was a crack fighting force, whose skills had been sharpened during a decade of war-fighting in Iraq and Syria, the Iraqi Security Forces also lacked any real motivation to stand and fight. The billions spent on equipment and training had become worthless once the army was divided along political and sectarian lines. The pictures of abandoned army barracks, discarded uniforms and insurgents riding on US Humvees—flying the black flag of the Islamic State—only confirmed this further.

What did surprise us was the organization, and ground game, which had been put in place to support the growing Sunni insurgency. Rather than being a spontaneous outburst of violence, this was a coordinated campaign, bringing together IS, anti-government tribes, former Baathists and jihadist adventurers under one de-facto command structure. Nothing like this had ever happened before, and there was little expectation that the Iraqi government could contain what was occurring. Everyone in Baghdad was preparing for the worst.

The foreign policy mistakes in Iraq have been truly remarkable. Some were made due to a naive confidence in American influence, others due to uncompromising political positions. Not accepting that Iraq and Syria were becoming a single continuous battlefield, as far back as 2012, was a perfect combination of both.

Due to a lack of unified policy, IS could extend its forward operations within striking distance of Baghdad, while connecting to a strategic axis that led right back into Syria. This ensured that a steady flow of fighters, finance and weapons could be facilitated with relative ease. Any significant military defeat could be simply managed by retreating back across the border, where one policy ended and another began. Only the US could conceive such a schizophrenic regional strategy. And yet one year later, as bombs keep falling and soldiers continue to deploy, no policy has been implemented to address this reality.

The March of War

The Islamic State continued to advance toward the capital on June 12, as the tension spreading throughout Baghdad was palpable and alive. No one was confident that the security forces could defend the city in the event of an assault. If the defenses were breached, law and order would have immediately broken down—mayhem would be the result. This was not an existential fear, but a near certainty, given the dissolution of the Iraqi army throughout the Sunni provinces, which bordered Baghdad to the north, east and west. Food and fuel prices had inflated almost 300% on the news that major towns such as Baiji and were being occupied by insurgents.

If we had to evacuate by road, our only option would be to move south, through the “Triangle of Death,” an area renowned for its attacks against the US military during the darkest days of the US occupation. An intelligence review of this maneuver, at the time, read something like this: “A southern road move could result in a catastrophic incident, along with an inability to provide any support if an incident did occur.”

As we planned for an evacuation scenario, reports started circulating that an international security team had become stranded at the country’s largest oil refinery in Baiji. Their fate was unknown, but IS had closed in on all sides and prevented their evacuation.

Iraq is a country that should have never really existed and was only created as a result of a secret agreement between the British and French governments during World War I. Its national boundaries are artificial and do not conform to the tribal, ethnic or cultural makeup of the region. When insurgents captured the border crossings between Iraq and Syria, those boundaries were effectively erased, eliminating 100 years of colonial history. This had always been the ideological objective of the Islamic State, even before the conflicts in Syria and Iraq were indistinguishably conjoined. The idea of the “caliphate” is central to this, and we all knew that as the border dissolved, so too would the existing geopolitical reality in the Middle East.

When Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s most senior Shiite cleric, issued a call-to-arms in defense of the state and holy places, we knew the security forces had lost the initiative. The government was failing to control the situation, and thousands of young men were now joining Shiite militias to fight against IS.

During the darkest days of the previous insurgency, Shiite militias murdered civilians and attacked US forces with near impunity. In 2007, the militias kidnapped five British citizens from the Ministry of Finance in Baghdad, killing all but one. The same groups were now mobilizing only a few streets over from us.

With support from Iran, the conflict would soon take on a permanent sectarian dynamic, making any kind of reconciliation between Sunni and Shiite almost impossible. Armed young men were openly roaming the streets of Baghdad, inspired by a religious mandate not subject to any government authority.

The Iraqi government started shutting down media and communications on June 13, and the assumption throughout the international community was that Iraq was on the verge of meltdown. These were desperate acts, which had also preceded government collapse in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Legislation was passed restricting national media from reporting on battlefield losses, and a memo started circulating from the government explaining the need to obstruct the Internet and social media.

We could no longer access Facebook, Twitter or YouTube in Baghdad. The conflict was being played out on social media, which was rapidly becoming one of our most valuable sources of information. IS fighters and civilians were posting real-time images and video direct from the battlefield. They were startling and brutal in their immediacy, some occurring only moments before being posted. Pictures would soon appear on Twitter documenting the mass execution of around 700 Iraqi soldiers. They were ordered to face down in a ditch, while militants indiscriminately fired into the mass of bodies.

The possibilities seemed endless for a conflict that combined the legacy of religious crusading with 21^st century social media technology. The Middle East would never be the same because of it.

The Long Cycle of Violence Continues to Grind On

Before long, I was relocated out of Baghdad. By our estimates, at least 22 cities and towns had been occupied by insurgents in the space of 72 hours, and eight were still be contested. They had also secured six airbases, five pieces of national infrastructure and innumerable pieces of military hardware. Of the almost 200 fighting units of the Iraqi Security Forces, only 80 could be accounted for. The rest had either been abandoned, captured or scattered throughout the Sunni provinces.

On the day I left, the airport was a disorganized mess of people, everyone trying to board a plane for somewhere else. Soldiers lulled about in worn US military surplus, smoking and laughing, while trucks crammed with militia recruits headed north—most would be dead in days.

One year has now passed since the Islamic State stormed Mosul, and there is little to be optimistic about in Iraq. Victory can only come from politics and reconciliation, and a defeat of sectarian ideals, but this is unlikely, given the current state of affairs in the Middle East. The conflict in Iraq has been ongoing in one form or another since the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD. For those involved, either Sunni or Shiite, this history will never be limited by the narrow politics of 2014, but connected to a deeper worldview that transcends things like national boundaries and international assistance.

US policy in Iraq never accounted for this, and it still doesn’t. For many years to come, Iraq will be one of the great political conundrums for policymakers because there will be little strategic gain for continued involvement. Nonetheless, the decisions made by the US government inflamed the old animosities, and now there is a real responsibility to ensure people are not slaughtered endlessly because of failed military adventures.

Even if the Islamic State should be defeated militarily, its ideology will continue to persist, and Iraq will still have militias, tribes, former regime types and armed factions to contend with. Each of which will fight to defend their own interests. The conditions have now been set for permanent instability, and like everything else in Iraq, the long cycle of violence will continue to grind on.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Republican presidential hopeful Senator Rand Paul has finally done the unthinkable: He has Lemarchand’s Box and sparked one of the most critical foreign policy debates, which has been avoided since the rise of the in 2014. Namely, who is responsible for what is happening in and ? Not only did he directly blame the more hawkish wing of the Republican Party, but he also that they have been wrong about most foreign policy for the past 20 years — cue indignation.

While this might just be a political strategy or an attempt to distinguish himself from a crowded field of presidential candidates, one unequivocal fact remains and it is something that all people who have lived and worked in Iraq already know: The Islamic State, along with its predecessors, was a result of decisions made during the US campaign in Iraq. This is a very hard truth for most Americans to face, even those who supported the initial invasion, and one that most politicians are not keen on advertising.

Part of the problem surrounding the issue of the Islamic State is that there has never really been a national dialogue on what happened during the Iraq War—or how the removal of Saddam Hussein impacted the entire Middle East. While the 2008 election of hinged on the idea of the war in Iraq, it was mostly a referendum on the performance of the campaign, the decision to invade and the prospect of ending the conflict. There was not a substantive debate on the consequences of US intervention in Iraq or how it impacted the governing structures of the Middle East. The complicity of media outlets and politicians to support the ambiguous circumstances for such a calamitous war has created a truth deficit. And this has undermined the potential for rational discourse on terrorism, insurgency and radical Islamism, which might allow US foreign policy in the Middle East to regain some of traction.

Of course, the political and factional environment of Iraq is also to blame; no US policy compelled the various Sunni and Shiite sects to commit the levels of violence they did. However, what Senator Paul has done is reset the Republican strategy and turned it inward to focus on the original policy miscalculations, which gave space for radical Islamism in the region to take hold and flourish.

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Nonetheless, the blame game is solvent in the Middle East. The current administration also bears its share of foreign policy failures: not supporting moderate Syrian rebels; not fighting to keep a residual force in Iraq after the main withdrawal; and not taking the fight to the Islamic State after the takeover of Mosul.

Yet each of these failures, in addition to the failures that were referenced by Senator Paul, are framed against the idea that military force can somehow defeat the root cause of the very same instability that it helped create. Americans have always been heavily invested in the idea of war as a remedy to problems that are beyond their understanding. This is where the core debate should be framed in the upcoming presidential election in 2016, more so since foreign policy will be heavy on the agenda.

The GOP Response

Unfortunately the from Republicans indicate that there is not likely to be any real debate shaped around the provocative but reasonable comments from Senator Paul. Leading party members, presidential contenders and conservative media have already circled wagons and gone on the offensive.

Louisiana Governor and potential presidential candidate Bobby Jindal had this to say on : “We should all be clear that evil and radical Islam are at fault for the rise of ISIS … And the next President’s job is to have the discipline and strength to wipe ISIS off the face of the earth.”

Jindal’s comments are jingoistic and not the least bit ironic, given they are wrapped in a similar language used by the same groups he is talking about destroying. They are quick to judge, but do not offer any viable alternative to deal with the current complexities of the Middle East.

In a recent , The Wall Street Journal also said: “Mr. Paul is intelligent enough, and his misreading of recent Middle Eastern history is so flagrant, that he might be trying to deflect attention from his own misjudgments.”

To challenge the foreign policy credentials of Senator Paul, while at the same time acknowledging that the “origins of the Islamic State are al Qaeda in Iraq or the post-Saddam Hussein insurgency that suffered a near total defeat amid General David Petraeus’s surge and the Sunni Awakening” only underscores how entrenched certain perspectives have become, since The Surge and Sunni Awakening were not long-term strategies to produce stability, but short-term solutions to systemic problems associated with US occupation.

The problem with assessments such as these—which attempt to reduce the intricacies of the “post-Saddam insurgency” (a terribly misleading misnomer, since the insurgency was directed against the US occupation, not the removal of Saddam) to digestible narratives that suggest the United States was on the verge of victory in Iraq—is that they are entirely reckless. This once again gives the impression that by applying military force alone, the US can defeat an enemy that is not just rooted in sectarian intrigues, but also cultural, ethnic, tribal and historical grievance.

Rand Paul is a Republican for a new generation, and he should be applauded for his willingness to break with policies that have not always offered the United States the best return on investment. The take away from his comments should not be a pedantic nitpicking of details, but about bringing an emotive issue to the forefront of the presidential debate. Hopefully his rivals in the Democratic Party will do the same, as they are also guilty of the same foreign policy fiascos.

The Republican Party should embrace what Senator Paul was attempting to put forward and use this as an opportunity to update foreign policy positions more suited for these complex times.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Any conversation with Ian McCredie reveals that he has been at the epicenter of world events, many of which continue to captivate our collective imagination. Whether it was developing sources in Zambia at the height of the Cold War, acting as a Swedish diplomat in after the Islamic Revolution or working to undermine the Soviet Union in various places, McCredie was there.

This makes speaking to him something a revelatory experience, reducing you to the role of an enthusiastic student, eager to understand the intersection of secret diplomacy and foreign policy — exposing a world that, for most, only exists in books and films.

As one of the most senior British officials in Washington DC on September 11, 2001 — and, later, as the UK/US intelligence coordinator for the invasion of in 2003 —McCredie is privy to information that few people will have, let alone get to hear.

51�Թ� traveled to Washington DC to hear what Ian McCredie had to say about world affairs. In such uncertain, unpredictable and interesting times, this edition of covers a lot of ground.

Landon Shroder: You have been in the political risk business for the better part of your life, specifically as a senior intelligence coordinator for the British government and then as the vice president for corporate security at Shell International. How has the world changed during this time, and what are the most glaring shifts that mere mortals might not be aware of?

Ian McCredie: It depends on what you mean by mere mortal. If you live in one of those areas where events are happening, you are certainly aware of them. The biggest change in my lifetime has been the fall of the Soviet Union. The threat of nuclear destruction and a global war was a very real fear for many years until the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The first time I came to America in the 1970s, I remember seeing the nuclear fallout shelters scattered all over New York. These visible signs indicated that the threat was real. With the declassification of war plans in Europe, you can now see the extensive preparations for nuclear war, both in the US and — all conducted in greatest secrecy to ensure the continuity of government and civil order.

This threat was existential on both sides, and the evaporation of the Soviet Union and the construction of the European Union has certainly been the most dramatic political and economic shift in my life. As a result, more people live in peace and security and are wealthier than was ever the case up until the fall of the Soviet Union.

Shroder: That is quite frightening. How did governments on either side of the Cold War plan for this pending nuclear war?

McCredie: One example is the construction of the Moscow Metro — its depth is because the stations are designed to be�� nuclear bunkers. There were very extensive civil defense organizations, both in US and UK, which were set up so [the] government could survive a first nuclear strike. Networks of underground bunkers for the continuation of government after a first strike were also developed. They were extensive and still exist, although they have since been scaled down. Then there was what to do the day after. This was all part of the war planning. Twice in my professional life, the West and the USSR [Soviet Union] came close to using nuclear weapons. This was a very real threat.

Shroder: September 11, for some, was the single, most defining moment in recent history. Since living overseas for most of my adult life, I am conscious, however, that this is almost exclusively an American narrative that reduces all other global events to the back page. Does the modern world expand outward from the events of September 11?

McCredie: No, it doesn’t, but that depends on your point of view. I had a good vantage point being a senior member of the British Embassy in Washington DC on 9/11. One thing I remember was that apart from the actual events of the day, it was hard to convince the UK government that there would be a significant shift in American perception of the world.

For the US, this was a watershed, but not for the rest of the world. From the point of view of London and other capitals, this was a very bad terrorist event, but there had been many terrorist events and indeed other awful atrocities — think of Srebrenica — around the world and this was one of many. I think many, including the Chinese and Russians, still wonder why Americans are so focused on this event.

Yet because of America’s size and policies adopted after the attack, it has impacted events, especially in the Middle East, out of proportion to the initial crime. Most of the terrorism and instability that has taken place since 9/11 has been partly of the consequence of the American reaction, and many of the things that have happened since might not have occurred, if not for the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans had the whole world behind them on September 11, and they wasted that advantage.

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Shroder: At what point do you think that advantage was squandered?

McCredie: George Bush’s pronouncement that you are either “on our side, or against us” was the pivotal moment. Many countries’ governments were equivocal about what exactly that meant and became automatic enemies or at least suspects. And the relentless pursuit of individuals, illegal prisons, renditions and the vilification of governments who spoke about human rights and the rule of law really soured the view of the Bush administration in many eyes. I believe you fight terrorism with the rule of law and don’t adopt the methods of those you are fighting. America crossed the line and, to be fair, many thoughtful Americans now bitterly regret doing so.

Shroder: In 2003, as the UK intelligence coordinator in Washington DC, you were part of the group helping to plan Britain’s involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. What were your impressions at the time?

McCredie: A big question was: Would the UK join the US coalition for the invasion of Iraq? The UK government of the day had many considerations to take into account, but one influential factor was that they very much wanted to honor their alliance with America, which they saw as a fundamental part of British foreign policy — and so right or wrong they would be at America’s side.

Another strong impression of the invasion was that, despite popular memory, it had nothing to do with 9/11. The policy of regime change in Iraq pre-dated 9/11, but 9/11 gave it great impetus, driven partly by a view of the Middle East, which had a significant influence on American foreign policy at that time.

Shroder: What was that view?

McCredie: The view was that Iraq represented the last Arab nation opposed to peace with Israel. By removing , you would remove the last vestige of support for the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would also remove the last vestige of Arab support for Palestinian resistance, who would in turn agree to a peace treaty.

And if you replaced Saddam with a democratically elected government, then peace would reign, both politically and economically. Free trade throughout the entire Middle East would flourish and that would be a permanent solution to the Arab-Israel problem. There was still Iran, but that was another matter.

Shroder: In the build-up to the Iraq War, was there an understanding of the kinds of challenges that would be present in participating in this kind of military adventure? Clearly, the British experience must have been informed by generations of colonial nation-building.

McCredie: I think we should tackle the myth that the British know how to do these things due to experience in colonial administration. If you look at the way Britain withdrew from [the] empire, most of the parts they abandoned were left in chaos and destruction. The independence of was followed by the slaughter of millions on both sides — Hindus and Muslims. The pullout from Africa resulted in all sorts of internal conflicts and corrupt regimes, and our behavior in the Middle East — arbitrary borders and spheres of influence — has led to interminable wars. So I don’t think we have any claim to wisdom. Experience, yes, we used to have some, but the generation that had it are nearly all dead.

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The people now running the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence are prone to the same kinds of misconceptions that their American allies are — and none of them have firsthand experience of running a foreign country, and few even speak local languages or are immersed in local cultures.

But were the consequences of the Iraq invasion discussed at the time? Yes, they were. There was a sharp difference of opinion between the British and American side on what would happen after the invasion. The Americans were convinced — at least the Pentagon was convinced — that just decapitating the regime would lead to a repeat of the same kinds of revolutions we saw in eastern Europe after the fall of communism. People would naturally become social democrats and rebuild their country into a flourishing civil society, and all those liberal institutions that were previously suppressed would somehow reemerge.

Shroder: But was there an awareness of the cultural disposition of Iraq, or an understanding of the factional and sectarian challenges that predated Saddam Hussein?

McCredie: I think some policymakers understood that, but at least on the American side, there was a belief that Saddam and the Baath Party was the problem, much like the Nazi Party or Communist Party. If you remove those, the rest of society would flourish.

Of course, that was a grave miscalculation. The British side did not believe society would automatically stabilize and were pushing very strongly for a large reconstruction plan to rebuild civil society. The Americans did not see it like that; they thought they could administer the country for a little bit by occupation and then pull out. But some aspects of the occupation was not thought through. For example, the governor of the Central Bank — immediately after the invasion — was not an Iraqi, but an American, which is outrageous if you are from Iraq. This was later corrected by the appointment of Sinan al-Shabibi in September 2003.

The de-Baathification of the Iraqi administration was also done swiftly and comprehensively and was a disaster for the Iraqi military. The tools left to any civil administration to maintain order were removed almost instantaneously, which made them entirely dependent on American troops for civil order and created a great deal of resentment. They might not have liked Saddam, but they certainly did not like a foreign occupying army.

Shroder: What are your impressions after all these years? America withdrew, now America is back. From an intelligence standpoint, what do you think?

McCredie: We are in a period of great chaos — a descent into the rule of warlords — and this is likely to continue for many years, as Iraq fractures into separate regions for Kurds, Sunni and Shiite. On top of a weak central government, many outside countries are continuing to interfere. The frustrating thing from the American point of view is that they cannot control events. For a while they did, but [they] no longer can, and no one knows where these events will eventually lead.

Shroder: Why do you think that is? Our politics tends to fixate on America leading from behind or not doing all it can, which typically means military solutions.

McCredie: Leadership in terms of what? What is there to do? Well, one thing there is to do is push [the] (IS) back and do some capacity-building to support civil government. America is doing that, as are other governments, but that is only one small part of a very complicated problem. The natural reaction amongst laypersons is to say, “OK, we need to get a grip of the situation.” Well, getting a grip of the situation means occupying the country and telling everyone else to “shut the fuck up and do what you are told.” Well, America tried that, and it did not work out so well and no one wants to do that again — not a chance.

Shroder: Can we continue to talk about the Middle East? I have been referring to the region as the “modern” Middle East, because the colonial borders that were imposed after the two World Wars seem to be failing. It is almost like the region is resetting to zero. Where is all of this instability coming from?

McCredie: The current instability in the Middle East began after the fall of the Soviet Union. This is when the spheres of influence belonging to the British, French, Russian and American became fluidized. Previously there was some stability — the client regimes maintained order at home with the support of the external powers backing them up. And the external powers restrained them from going to war with each other. This ensured not just political, but also military and financial stability, access to markets and so on. After the fall of the USSR, almost everyone declared a peace dividend and reduced their foreign commitments and withdrew support from their clients. So what was left was that many countries were without any outside support or popular support from their internal populations. So, they were inherently weak. This has led to both instability internally and adventurism externally.

This started with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which I do not think would have happened during the Cold War. But Saddam did not think anyone was paying any attention, and who cared about the Kuwaitis? Apart from Saudi Arabia, none of the other Arab countries were particularly rattled by the invasion. In fact, the invasion of Kuwait was quite popular in the Arab world because they all thought that the Kuwaitis deserved it. However, in the Western world, alarm bells started ringing when they realized that they had neglected the stability of the region. And there was�� panic at the thought that Saddam could soon occupy the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were alarmed because not only did they risk losing their oil fields, but they found that Saddam’s ally, King Hussein of Jordan, had started styling himself [as] “Sharif Hussein,” which meant he had fallen for Saddam’s promises of restoring the Hashemites to the Emirate of the Hejaz and custodianship of Mecca and Medina.

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Shroder: How much of the current instability in the region is linked to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003?

McCredie: The invasion of Iraq was the decapitation of a regime, but there was little nation-building or replacement of that regime with a government that had any legitimacy. There was an attempt to do that, but as we know it was a very poor attempt and it failed. The last attempt was with Nouri al-Maliki, the former Iraqi prime minister, who did not achieve legitimacy at all. In fact, the reverse, which has led us to where we are at now.

Shroder: Much of the US media focuses on things like sectarianism and factionalism, but how much of the ongoing conflicts can be traced to more traditional metrics like politics and economy?

McCredie: The traditional metrics still apply: politics and economy, and access to resources, jobs, stability.

Shroder: And this still underpins everything?

McCredie: One hundred percent, but grievance needs a language, and in the past that has been the language of anti-aristocratic revolution, or communism, nationalism, trade unionism or freedom (e.g. in the US case from British taxes or slavery).

One language of grievance today is the version of Islam used by groups such as IS. This, however, provides a similar kind of refrain: communal living, support for the poor, reversion to some utopian ideal and resistance to totalitarian rulers. Of course, Islam has the benefit of not being written by Marx and Engels, but actually dictated by God himself, and this adds legitimacy to the language. And it is the language or its embedded ideology, which is the focus as opposed to the underlying grievance. If you focused on rectifying the underlying grievance, a lot of these issues would go away: enough food and shelter, schools, hospitals, stability, representative government, health, security, rule of law and so on.

Shroder: To make a gross oversimplification, the region is split between influence, which fluctuates between Iran and Saudi Arabia. From one perspective, Iran has been the great nemesis of the US, but the projection of its foreign policy has been contained to some form of rational self-interest. From another perspective, Saudi Arabia has been something of an ally, but its ideology has fueled groups such as IS. How do we reconcile these two things?

McCredie: Well, you are right, that is a gross oversimplification. Iran has only recently had a sphere of influence, which has been the Shiite parts of Iraq and , both of which see Iran as a spiritual leader and a source of financial and military support. Outside of that, Iran does not have much influence; a bit in , a bit in Shiite Saudi Arabia, but not much elsewhere. And even in Iraq, it has its limits, since they are Arab Shiite, not Persian Shiite. From the Iranian point of view, they still feel surrounded and isolated, rather than having a sphere for influence. They were a regional power in the brief period of the British pullout in the Gulf in 1971 and the collapse of the Shah’s regime in 1979. They have aspirations to get back to that, but of course the Gulf States don’t want to see that happen. This has nothing to do with the current regime in Iran. It is just the way that Arabs and Persians view each other.

Saudi Arabia’s influence is similar — not great. They have got, or had, Yemen and the lands they have occupied and incorporated, but the House of Saud are seen as rivals by the ruling families of Jordan and most of the Gulf States. They have banded together, of course, out of common desire for preservation, but there is no natural Saudi influence.

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Shroder: Since Saudi Arabia has the financial resources, I suppose, if there is a ground force invasion in Yemen, it will be outsourced to allied or affiliated countries?

McCredie: That remains to be seen. Inserting mercenary forces into the conflict will lead to great resentment even if they are Egyptian or Pakistani forces, which are the two countries most likely to support Saudi Arabia in this endeavor — and both of whom are greatly in Saudi Arabia’s debt. got a bloody nose in Yemen once before, and is also well-aware that deploying its Sunni troops in a sectarian fight will inflame, not calm, the situation. These would not be peacekeeping troops acting under a UN mandate, but a mercenary army — and I would not be surprised at fierce opposition from many sections of Yemeni society, not just the Houthis.

Shroder: IS, in no small part, came about due to the US invasion of Iraq. Is there a moral or ethical obligation to intervene in Iraq because of this? Or do we just leave them to their fate?

McCredie: Well, we don’t leave them to their fate. We support civil society and reconstruction, and we can supply them with arms, intelligence and air support, but this is very much an Iraqi fight. IS is a brutal, horrible regime, but I am not sure IS is any worse than some of the others that have come before it — the Nazi Party, for example. Similarly, the methods they have used — for instance, the Jordanian pilot being burned alive — are particularly horrible, but the only thing new is that you can now watch it on the Internet and on social media.

Some of the things that IS does are given legitimacy by harking back to the campaigns of the Muslims in the early years of Islam — executions and waging war are part of jihad. Some in the region do not see this as unusually brutal. It is just the continuation of history, but it is the publicity which is shocking to our eyes. The Nazis did far worse, but mostly in secret.

Shroder: How viable is the actual threat from IS beyond the Middle East? Its ideology is compelling individual acts of terrorism globally — Paris, Tunis, Copenhagen, Sydney.

McCredie: I think you said it there: These are individual acts of terrorism. They are pinpricks on the elephant. None of these will be existential threats to France, Australia, Britain or America. But there will be some horrible events, more terrorism, more beheadings, more bombs going off — this is very likely. IS does not threaten America or any western European country in terms of their existence. They are not going to occupy any Western country; all they have done so far is occupied ungoverned space.

Shroder: You worked in Iran during the years right after the revolution. What do you think of the nuclear deal? Can the Iranians be trusted as partners?

McCredie: Trust is the wrong word. The Iranians are more like unknown business partners. They are brilliant negotiators — look at the way they have extracted concessions from the P5+1 from a position of great weakness. They enticed the West into negotiations and concessions, right up until the deadline and beyond. For example, I think there was a key moment of Western weakness when the talks hit the March 31 deadline and did not get up and leave the table. This was a mistake. The Iranians knew they had him on the run and extracted a few more concessions, a few more centrifuges.

So yes, the Iranians can be dealt with and we have dealt with them, but we cut a less than optimal deal, but it is a deal, nonetheless. It is a deal we can live with; although they did better out of this than they should have done. Can they be trusted? Trust is still the wrong word, but can they be verified and held to account? Yes they can.

Shroder: Is having this kind of deal better than having no deal at all?

McCredie: Yes. Iran is ready for engagement. They are going through a generational change. One of the key issues, ignored in the press, is that [Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei is going to die. He is the lynchpin holding the regime together. He is one of the last remaining members of the revolutionary group that came to power in 1979, and when he dies, he won’t be replaced. He will be the last supreme leader.

Iran as a whole is going through this generational and demographic shift — 50% are under 30 and only 15% are over 50 — and because of this, politics will change quite significantly. Once Iran opens up and there is freedom of travel, freedom of movement and normal trading relations, it will immensely strengthen the hand of the young and those Iranian politicians, and there are many who preach engagement and moderation.

Shroder: Do you think the US is still the indispensable nation in complex times such as these? It seems like more and more countries are now willing to make policies that advance their own interests at the expense of the US.

McCredie: America has not been an indispensable nation for very long. It saved Europe from Nazism, but only late in the day. Since World War II, it has replaced Britain as the global Western military power, and that produced a certain amount of stability. And there is this view of America as the indispensable policeman because if America is not there, who is? And if America shows weakness, the space will be filled by someone else or would leave chaos in its wake — I think there is some truth in that. I think America is not indispensable, but in the absence of anything else, it is a force for some stability because the alternative is [a] vacuum, and we know what happens when there is a vacuum of power.

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Shroder: Let me ask you a question no one ever asks: Removing all emotive issues surrounding this, what does the US get out of constant and unwavering support of Israel? Clearly this will be one of the more pressing foreign policy positions debated in the forthcoming US election.

McCredie: What they get is a whole host of problems. The US does not get any strategic advantage because cannot be used as a launching pad for any kind of military intervention in the Middle East. They get some intelligence support in exchange for their billions in military aid, but that is not the point.

One consequence of World War II — broadly speaking — was that European Jewry either perished in the gas chambers or escaped to America. World Jewry is mainly concentrated in America and Israel, and it is only natural that American Jewry takes a particular interest, an emotional and religious interest, in seeing Israel succeed. And that, as we all know, has a great influence on American politics.

However, looking forward, 50 years from now, the living memory of World War II will be gone; it will not be a memory, but a history. Those who can give a firsthand account of the Holocaust will all be dead, and the absence of their testimony will impact Jewish leverage on US foreign policy. But for now,�� yes, Jewish influence on US politics and in return the willingness of the American people to support Israel is the reality, and although it creates loads of problems for America, it remains part of the body politic, which will not likely change in my lifetime.

Shroder: Do you think the idea of Israeli resilience, being this tenacious country in the middle of a desert that also has a terrorism problem, impacts the American perception of Israel?

McCredie: Israel has always shoved out a fair share of propaganda: the plucky survivors who made the desert bloom. Israel has been very successful in representing a specific viewpoint on Arabs and Muslims, and Arabs and Muslims have been very unsuccessful in representing their own interests. For instance, the most active Muslim group currently manipulating the media is IS, and that is not a very attractive position.

Why should the US continue to support Israel? I think the answer is very clear: About 75% of the Jewish Diaspora lives in America and helps elect the US government. Do Jews have too much political influence? Maybe they do, but that is not America’s fault; that is a sign of Jewish ability to organize their community to make an impact. If you don’t like it, then get off your ass and organize, make an impact of your own, quit complaining.

Shroder: This has been a great interview. Is there anything we should leave our readers with? Anything on the horizon that people should prepare for: pestilence, locusts, biblical flooding?��

McCredie: Yes. Climate change will force a reallocation of the world’s resources. The tens of millions who now live in areas about to be flooded, or covered in desert, or deprived of water for drinking and irrigation, will attempt to migrate to countries that are better resourced. The fight for those resources has just begun.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:�� / / / / / /

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“Baltimore is a troubled city, a city of lost souls.” Naisha Smith is only 25 years old, but she has an awareness that would escape even the most experienced of social observers. “The problems come when the citizens feel threatened … had they not rioted, the way they did, they would not have been heard. This is a build up from generations of constant anger.”

Her aunt, Renée Washington, a woman of sharp intelligence and inescapable warmth, who was sitting next to me in their Baltimore home, interrupted: “I agree with what the young people did, because these kids got tired of being another black statistic.”

She continued: “But if you never do anything, guess what? The next generation will be fighting the same fight we are fighting now, and it is time for it to stop.”

The candor in which they spoke about police violence was deeply unsettling. Attempting to justify my naiveté, I explained that I had just spent the past 11��years overseas. For me, the idea that in 2015 people still lived with this kind of fear was shocking. These are the same types of stories I grew accustomed to hearing in and Angola – not in the United States.

Only a few days earlier, I had met Renée at the headquarters of the People’s Power Assembly in West ��— a community activist group organizing protests throughout the city. During our brief encounter, she displayed a distinct skepticism toward the charges just leveled against the six officers who killed Freddie Gray. In a lively office full of volunteers, some of whom traveled from all over the US, she plainly told me: “Baltimore never gave any justice to the folks police killed. This is just an attempt to quiet people down, pure and simple.”

Renée’s finance was also killed by the Baltimore police in 2000, in a case.

The real story of what happened in Baltimore is with people like Renée, and how their perceptions have been shaped by years of mistreatment at the hands of the police. These are the feelings that truly fueled the unrest in Baltimore. And what soon became apparent was that the upheaval, far from being an opportunistic outburst of anger, was actually a carefully choreographed response. One that had been building over time, by young people looking to challenge a system that has consistently failed them.

Tired of Being Another Black Statistic

I saw this frustration vividly on the steps of the Baltimore War Memorial Building on May 1, only minutes after District Attorney, Marilyn Mosby, read the charges against the six officers. Community activist Jay Morrison, from the Young Minds Can Community Coalition, holding a megaphone, addressed the crowd: “This is not about civil rights, this is about human rights, how the police officers ignored that man’s [Freddie Gray] basic human rights …we treat terrorists better than we treat black people.”

© Landon Shroder

Analyzing conflict in any country that is prone to violence would reveal unique similarities to Baltimore: a lack of access to jobs, education, opportunity, soaring , as well as state-sanctioned violence, tends to end in overt hostility – think the . And, given that the city of Baltimore has been involved in 317 lawsuits involving the police since 2011, resulting in $5.7 million worth of payouts, this is not a far-fetched assessment.

Furthermore, of at least 109 people have been by the police in Baltimore between 2010-14, 69% were black. And of the total number killed, black people were five times more likely to die from an encounter with the police. Half of these, almost 45%, were not armed with a weapon of any kind.

Given these facts, the shock from politicians, pundits and commentators that followed the riots is not only misplaced, but highly cynical.

Abandoned Buildings and��Vacant Lots

After the protests and demonstrations were over, I traveled back to Baltimore to spend some time with Renée in an attempt to better understand the perspective of local residents. Her fiancé, Joey Wilbon, was killed after someone reported that he was stealing cars from the auto repair shop he owned. No police officers were ever charged with��his murder.

She showed me the press clippings about her fiancé, as well as a book of old photos. “The police thought he was homeless, and of course they did not go to the people who called them — then they killed him.” There were clear discrepancies in the story told by the Baltimore police about what happened. A police spokesman said there was no sign of trauma, but when relatives eventually viewed the body, days later, there were bruises and swelling on his face. This follows a similar pattern, which exists to this day: One which portrays the victim as being unruly, before being processed on a fabricated charge and, in some instances, dying while in police custody.

A short time later, Renée took me around to some of the neighborhoods where the police had killed local residents, including Joey. Accompanying us was a woman named Sharon Black, who runs the People’s Power Assembly. A retired nurse, Sharon is every bit the committed community activist, having spent years on the front line of equality struggles in Baltimore.

Before we toured some of these neighborhoods, I asked Sharon where Baltimore was going to go from here, after the cameras leave and the media loses interest. Like a battlefield commander, she laid out a plan for what is going to happen next:��“The phase we are in right now is demanding amnesty for the youth. There is very close to 500 people arrested during the past two weeks. So immediately coming to the defense of those arrested, and making sure there is a conviction and the police serve jail time are our short time priorities.”

Anthony Anderson memorial © Landon Shroder

“In the long-term, we are going to implement a ‘know your rights, cop watch’ campaign to train people in how to use cameras and patrol their own neighborhoods. We are also looking into the possibility of a charter amendment for the election of the police commissioner.”

Our first stop in East Baltimore was near Montford Avenue and Biddle Street. In 2012, a now-redundant special unit of the Baltimore police, called the Violent Crime Impact Section, also known as “knockers” by local residents, killed a man named in a vacant lot. The police claimed he was dealing drugs and died from swallowing a bag of heroin, but the medial examiner’s report listed the cause of death as “blunt force trauma,” which included eight broken ribs, lung bruises and spleen lacerations. His death was ruled a homicide, but no charges were ever filed against the police.

Only a sad memorial remains as tribute to Anthony Anderson. A stuffed bear, held up by some old wood, which we found laying on its side.

This area is notoriously impoverished with derelict houses lining narrow streets, which are in various states of collapse. Some estimates have indicated that there are upward of 16,000 abandoned buildings and 14,000 vacant lots in Baltimore, the same kind that Anthony Anderson was walking through when accosted by police in 2012. Young men occupy every corner, some selling drugs, some just milling about with little else to do. Unemployment for young men in this part of the city is at a staggering 37%.

The spot where Renée’s fiancé was murdered is little more than a small parking lot on the corner of Homewood and Bartlett, also in East Baltimore. This was the first time she had been back, since visiting it with Joey’s mother in 2005. She carried herself with a quiet resolve, but I could tell being back was upsetting for her. “It took months for his family to get the police report, months, because they couldn’t figure out what should be in it.” When I asked about the outcome, about justice for her or his family, she just shook her head. “There was nothing.” There is no monument for Joseph in this place.

As two young men walked by, Renée stopped them and asked what they thought about the Freddie Gray case. Both responded in great detail about how the legal proceedings were handled, including how the charges and potential prosecution could work. Impressed, I nodded my head in agreement, until I realized that this was probably due to first-hand experience of being arrested and maneuvering through the courts.

92% of all marijuana arrests in Baltimore come from lower income communities, which is almost six times higher than white communities, even though drug use is comparable in both.

During our conversation, one of the young men conducted a drug deal in front of us.

Bloods and Crips © Landon Shroder

In Order to Stop This Fighting, We Have to Stir Up the Peace��

A few days before my tour of the city with Renée and Sharon, during the May 1 demonstrations, on the corner of Penn North, next to the CVS, which was ransacked during the riots, a young student named Tee Latrice told me: “In order to stop this fighting, we have to stir up the peace.”

Not long after, a local member from the Crips gang, handing out slices of pizza (pizza diplomacy never fails) also on the corner of Penn North, told me: “We ain’t got much, so sometimes, you got to cause some devastation to get your point across.” When I pressed him on what this meant, he simply said: “People care about shit getting burned down, why? This man’s dead.”

Once I heard this, I started hearing it everywhere: The idea that rioting and property destruction was somehow the story — not their lives that had been brutalized by an out-of-control police force. This theme soon started to connect a local narrative that was almost entirely overlooked for the more sensational aspects of media consumption. For the protesters, these two things were entirely linked, the destruction of property and the death of Freddie Gray. That was the entire point, not the consequence. To separate these things only reinforces the impression that the conditions which led to the upheaval in Baltimore were somehow irrelevant.

The one time I asked someone on the street about the looting, I was met with a look of complete incredulity, which seemed to say: “Is that your takeaway from this, the looting of a CVS?”

This concept is quite hard to understand, let alone relate to, especially for people who have been fortunate enough to never have been truly disenfranchised — not just in their own country, but also in their own communities. Reducing the enormity of this to mere abstractions like “rioting” and “looting” will only guarantee that episodes like this will continue to happen with increasing frequency.

For some commentators, the demonstrations and celebrations in Baltimore have been indicative of a certain perception — one which attempts to portray low income communities as uniquely subversive or antagonistic toward police.

This is an easy trap to fall into, more so, as income inequality and partisan politics drives communities further apart and challenges our ability to empathize with one another. The reality, however, is much more simple. Lower income communities have finally found some small degree of accountability, after years of police abuse. The same kind of accountability that is demanded by medium income communities throughout the US.

As the sun was going down, we walked over to a demonstration being conducted by a local church. Walking around the neighborhood in the shadow of a dilapidated school, which was vacant and crumbling, the pastor blessed the community and asked for the strength to rebuild. But not before blessing the city officials, the mayor and finally the police.

Renée just looked at me and said, “Maybe they should pray for those people who are killing our children.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Landon Shroder

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a .

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The Middle East has exploded into an elaborate vortex of aerial campaigns, proxy wars and shifting alliances. Unless you are an expert on international affairs, it is almost impossible to get a balanced opinion on what is happening throughout the region — especially with the salvo of commentary coming from the media.

Nevertheless, as the spring months will contain an excess of cocktail parties and happy hours, it is incumbent upon us to speak intelligently about these things. Therefore, I give you the first-ever “Conversationalist Guide to the Modern Middle East.” A pithy collection of talking points, which will help you astonish your friends, colleagues and lovers at any social event where alcohol might be present.

Please feel free to claim any (or all) of these points as your own.

“I Drew This Gallant Head of War” — The State of Affairs in the Middle East

The Middle East is currently on fire, there is no disputing this. Years of foreign policy successes and failures are coming to fruition between ally and enemy alike, blurring the line between the two. While this might make the region appear desperately complex, it is also exposing the planning and strategies of each country involved. Remember, foreign policy is a game of strategic calculus, a contest of brinkmanship between nations where the outcome is sometimes entirely unpredictable — regardless of how logical things might initially appear.

And because of this unpredictability, some countries have now reached a point where threats, once thought existential, have moved into the realm of the very tangible. This is a dangerous state of affairs, especially in the modern Middle East where “perception is power” reigns supreme. The confluence of regional events is now forcing countries into confrontation with one another in ways once thought unthinkable, even six months ago.

“Hang Out Our Banners on the Outward Walls” — The Islamic State

It is hard to see how the can be defeated militarily or ideologically, unless the sectarian landscape of the Middle East drastically transforms. A policy of containment, unfortunately, seems to be the most effective solution in the short- to medium-term. This is a hard fact to accept, especially for those living under the sadism of the Islamic State, but unless the region comes together, things are unlikely to change.

For the Islamic State to survive, however, it must continue to wage war. Once it is obliged to administer its own territories as a functional state, it will implode under the weight of its own brutality. The recent ban on mobile phone usage in Mosul, punishable by having a hand removed, probably confirms this even further.

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While the territory of the Islamic State is being reduced due to various military interventions, its ideological gains are currently expanding. Social media has broadened access to the kinds of death-cult propaganda appealing to those who are susceptible to radicalization. There is an inverse relationship to this, though: As physical territory is lost, global terrorism with ideological links to the Islamic State will grow. Paris, Tunis, Sydney and Copenhagen are all symptomatic of this situation. Until there is an information campaign that can counter the kinds of propaganda perfected by the Islamic State, this will remain the new status quo.

“The Fire-Eyed Maid of Smoky War” — Iraq

Without the US invasion of , there would almost certainly be no Islamic State. The irony of this has not been lost on anyone, especially the Islamic State, since its leadership nucleus consists of former army officers dismissed by the US Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003.

Nonetheless, Nouri al-Maliki, the former Iraqi prime minister, shares some if not an equal portion of the blame that led to the success of the Islamic State. His enfranchisement of Shiite interests, at the expense of Sunni interests, set the security conditions the Islamic State so easily exploited — leading to the collapse of the Iraqi army and losing the US government a sobering $25 billion military investment in the process.

Contrary to the popular belief, the only solution to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq is political. No amount of bombs, bullets and dead terrorists can remedy the circumstances that have fueled this insurgency.

However, almost one year after the takeover of Mosul, political solutions to empower marginalized communities remain in short supply. Iraq is now a society entirely mobilized for war with every sectarian demographic arming themselves in defense of their own communities. How can there be any confidence for long-term reconciliation when the ministers for interior and transportation also happen to be members of the largest Shiite militia in Iraq? Because of this, Iraq will inevitably federalize into three parts: Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the center and Shiite in the south.

“He That is Truly Dedicated to War” — Iran

It would be hard to find any astute practitioner of foreign policy that has not been somewhat impressed with the capabilities of since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 — some more begrudgingly than others.

Iran has played a seriously clever long game, which has seen its influence become indispensable in places like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, Yemen. This has only been strengthened by Iran’s tactical shrewdness in fighting the Islamic State. From a certain perspective, this has legitimized Iranian foreign policy and thrown regional geopolitics into a tailspin, which was clearly the objective all along.

Much to the dismay of Republican presidential candidates, it has also given Iran strategic depth to maneuver around the region and keep Saudi Arabia, its great opponent, on edge. And by drawing Saudi Arabia into a proxy conflict in Yemen, Iran has limited the scope of its foreign policy abroad, while at the same time provoking internal instability at home (seriously clever).

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Then there is the nuclear deal — as if everyone in the United States somehow forgot there are also five other countries involved in the negotiations. The primary motivation for Iran to reduce its nuclear ambitions was not the threat of military force, but simple economics. As it became obvious in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria during the Arab Spring, countries that cannot meet the economic needs of their populations soon get the proverbial “boot.” With half the population under 35, the ruling mullahs in Iran probably recognized that crushing international sanctions are not in their long-term self-interest. And with the world’s third largest proven oil and gas reserves, Iran is on its way to becoming the next economic powerhouse of the Middle East.

“Sit Laurel Victory! And Smooth Success” — Yemen

Links between Houthi rebels in and the Iranians are almost certainly exaggerated. Some connections exist, but they have been overstated by the Saudis to justify their military adventurism. This is unfortunate, since there does not seem to be any real objective beyond dropping bombs against groups who do not seem overly impressed. Without shaping a political narrative for what might come after, the Saudis are about to commit strategic suicide. More so if the only goal is to restore disposed Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, who lacks any real support at home.

Iran, for the most part, has been content to watch events unfold, limiting its response to the usual outrange that bounces around the rhetorical echo chamber. Yemen might be an added bonus, but Iran will not jeopardize its position in Iraq and Syria or the nuclear deal to support the Houthis.

More concerning is the growing influence of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Both groups thrive and metastasize in ungoverned spaces like Yemen. Just to add a sadly satirical twist, the Houthi rebels, who have traditionally fought against AQAP and the Islamic State, can no longer do so because of the Saudi-led aerial campaign against them. These terror networks will soon creep into the conflict, which will reduce any legitimate political concerns to mere factional and sectarian disputes, making the conflict intractable.

On a more somber note, it will not be long before the images of condemned men, clad in the orange jumpsuit used by the Islamic State, start appearing in videos from Yemen.

“The Other to Enjoy by Rage and War” — Republicans and Israel

Republicans seem to have only two viewpoints on the modern Middle East: undying support for and hostility toward Iran (there might be more, but they will probably include something to do with war). Both of these things are obviously connected, although the reasons are less interesting than one might suspect.

The Obama administration has had some significant foreign policy failures: pulling out of Iraq in 2011 and not enforcing “red lines” in Syria. However, the administration has to be balanced against aggressive policies on drone strikes, fighting the Islamic State, expansion of the surveillance state and surging troops in Afghanistan. Most of these are positions taken by neoconservatives which, when co-opted by the president, leaves Republicans with almost no foreign policy of their own — except cantankerous bickering over Israel and Iran.

Israel, on the other hand, has refined the manipulation of US foreign policy into a science. Always playing on the customary fear of Muslims to gather support for positions clearly not in the best interests of the United States. The alarm created by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu over the nuclear negotiations with Iran was a perfect example of this. This was not about the threat of some fiery nuclear apocalypse, but about drawing attention away from settlement expansion into Palestinian land and providing cover for economic discontent during an election year.

© Shutterstock

Israel is rapidly moving toward pariah status. The appalling treatment of Palestinians in Gaza, along with an inability to advance a two-state solution, has left the Israelis with few allies outside the US. And even now, that welcome is wearing thin. Despite this, the upcoming US presidential election in 2016 will likely be a total Israel love-fest.

“O War! Thou Son of Hell” — Syria

In all seriousness, the conflict in remains the great tragedy of the international community. Syria has been ground zero for the disintegration of the colonial Middle East and the birth of the modern Middle East. Officially, there are to 3 million refugees and 6 million internally displaced, which means there is an entire generation of people who are versed in the skills and realities of war.

This leaves almost no opportunity for conflict resolution, but it provides ample opportunity to reinforce the cycle of violence that has ripped Syria apart and defined the future of the modern Middle East. Reconciling the various factions, at this point, into some kind of power-sharing agreement will be next to impossible. The levels of violence have been too severe to build any kind of framework that might end hostilities in their current form.

Last but not least, there is still the Islamic State to contend with. A group that has no intention of negotiating with anyone, let alone a government it views as apostate. The border that used to separate Iraq and Syria remains almost nonexistent, with the territory reverting back to the pre-colonial boundaries of the early 20^th century. Unless the world powers can implement a policy to address Syria and Iraq as one continuous battlefield, there is little hope that the Islamic State can be defeated militarily.

“Our Battle is More Full of Names Than Yours”

There you have it, the first-ever “Conversationalist Guide to the Modern Middle East.” Due to the pace of events in the region, I would encourage you to make use of these points as soon as possible. In all likelihood, everything will have changed by next week, rendering most of the points in this article null and void. Until that happens, enjoy and feel free to email me if you have any questions, comments or snide remarks.

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Will we see a victory against the ? Maybe. This will depend entirely on what metric we might use to measure success in victory. Will this be defined by the number of insurgents that have been killed or wounded? In a war of attrition that is asymmetric, measurement against a body count is practical — if not a bit gruesome. Or do we measure the political prowess of lawmakers who see genuine opportunity in resolving the conflict? The only real solution to defeat the Islamic State is political, but in the murky world of geopolitics, sometimes the best option is to maintain the status quo.

Regardless of what your opinion might be, the inevitable climax in the battle for Tikrit will soon provide the answers to all of these questions and more.

The significance of the military operation to retake Tikrit in cannot be underestimated. It will be the first major urban area wrested from the Islamic State since its advance in June 2014. While the circumstances surrounding the operation have been less than ideal, no one can really be faulted for imperfection when it comes to this kind of war. Even if augmenting the Iraqi Security Forces with upward of 20,000 Shiite militia remains highly controversial, if not the least bit pragmatic. As does the presence of such notable commanders on the battlefield like Qasem Soleimani of ’s Quds Force.

Unfortunately, without these things, the assault on Tikrit would have ended much in the same way as previous attempts: in disaster and retreat. But now that 65-75% or more of the city has been cleared of insurgents, we should focus on what is to follow. What comes next will shape the rest of the conflict with the Islamic State, because in Iraq the fighting has always been the easy part.

Shiite Militias and Iran

The real war against the Islamic State can never be won by military solutions alone, much like the group’s ascendancy was not only the result of zealotry or ideology. These things never exist in a vacuum. They are compelled by circumstances that allow them to flourish in places where there are no other viable alternatives; the result of failed policies, political marginalization and sectarian enfranchisement. In Iraq, the engine of this discontent has always been the promotion of Shiite interests over .

© Shutterstock

So what happens now — now that a Shiite army is taking control of a major Sunni city, which has been a known support center for the Islamic State? There should be no question that every Sunni politician, tribal leader, opposition figure and armed insurgent in Iraq will be contemplating their next move based on what happens in Tikrit.

Fears of an indiscriminate massacre of Sunni civilians seems somewhat overstated, although understandable. The Shiite militias have a documented history of killing, displacing and abducting civilians. For some Sunnis, the presence of the militias — with names like the League of the Righteous, Badr Corps and Kata’ib Hezbollah — inspire the same kind of dread as the Islamic State. Nevertheless, the participation of some major political figures, such as Hadi al-Amiri, in the battle for Tikrit will likely restrain some of the more aggressive elements within the militia, as will the involvement of Iran.

While some extra-judicial killings and human rights abuses have already been reported, Shiite militias and Iran do not have a vested interested in returning to a state of permanent sectarian conflict. Both parties have a desperate need for political legitimacy, which will be weakened by sanctioned abuses of the Sunni population.

Once the battle for Tikrit is over, though, the most immediate concerns will be stabilization and reconciliation — both of which the Iraqi government is exceedingly bad at encouraging. Despite this, there has never been a better opportunity to implement the kinds of political solutions needed to reassure the Sunni population that there is a place for them post Islamic State. Funds should be allocated for reconstruction, while the government engages politically at a grassroots and tribal level. This will not only empower a new constituency that can take ownership of their own security, but provide incentives for Sunnis to rejoin the political process. This is the only way to truly defeat the Islamic State.

None of this can be achieved by leaving armed Shiite militias garrisoned on Sunni land. Having the militia act as an occupying force will only aggravate tensions and lead to the same kinds of sectarian violence everyone is so desperate to avoid. Furthermore, any ungoverned space will be susceptible to agent provocateurs and other anti-government forces that still exist in droves throughout Sunni provinces. This is exactly the kind of environment that the Islamic State excels at exploiting, which not only advances its military options, but gives credibility to its entire political narrative.

The outcome of this might not result in any further territorial losses, but the measure of success against the Islamic State cannot be calculated against terrain held and fighters killed. It must also be measured in terms of reconciliation and a commitment to the political process.

© Shutterstock

The US Role?

The battle for Tikrit has also called attention to the receding influence of the mission in Iraq moving forward. Indeed, our reticence to support this operation due to the Iranian involvement was not lost on the Iraqis. Prioritizing domestic politics over the practical requirements needed to rapidly mobilize against the Islamic State appears fickle and non-committal. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the US will probably not be consulted on major planning to retake Mosul.

Unconfirmed reports have already started to emerge that Sunni tribal leaders are now reaching out for assistance from Shiite militias such as the Badr Corps, who have close links with Iran. We should be comfortable with this, and not attempt to redress any holistic avenues of cooperation between Sunni and Shiite.

What the lack of involvement in Tikrit does spotlight, however, is that the main regional priority for the US is no longer the fight against the Islamic State, but the nuclear deal with Iran. We seem content to trade space for time with Iran over its growing influence in Iraq, in order to ensure the successful completion of negotiations over the nuclear program. This is not necessarily a bad thing, since our influence in Iraq is superfluous at best and destructive at worst. At the same time, the influence of Iran has the potential to be an accelerant for sectarian conflict.

Remember, all choices at this point represent the perpetual struggle between bad and worst case scenarios.

Our influence, therefore, needs to be peddled where it actually has the ability to be meaningful, which is through the Kurdistan Regional Government. There can be little doubt that after the success of Tikrit, the Iraqi government will attempt to expedite planning for the “big push” against Mosul. US military advisors should actively ensure that the Peshmerga’s objectives are clearly consistent with the goals set forward by the Iraqi government, especially as historically disputed territories are cleared of the Islamic State. Failure to de-conflict these priorities will only set the conditions for future instability.

The true metric for success in victory will be the Iraqi government’s commitment to reconciliation, regardless of what role Tikrit might have played in the current insurrection. There is only one chance to get this right, one chance to show the Sunnis — and the world — that there is a place for them after the Islamic State. If this is squandered due to petty factionalism, reprisals and sectarianism, then Iraq will never recover in any meaningful way. The context for continued violence will be permanently established, and the subsequent battle for Mosul will be only that — a battle — with no clear purpose or objective past the war fighting. And by that time, the Islamic State will have won already.

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The demeanor of Israeli Prime Minister during his speech to a joint session of Congress was that of a peevish child about to throw his teddy for not getting his way on . His usual rhetoric, replete with the customary comparisons to Nazi Germany have become a tedious metaphor, no more clever than his cautionary warnings over “betting the security of the world.” The same security, which Israel is in the process of gambling with by undermining our nuclear negotiations with Iran.

Yet even among the standing ovations and raucous applause, politicians who are so quick to bemoan the loss of leadership seemed elated that a country like will, once again, commandeer our foreign policy — the best bit of foreign policy to come out of the Middle East in a very long time.

Has there ever been a better moment to evaluate what the relationship with Israel really means for the ? Clearly there is no longer a unity of opinion among politicians; more than 50 lawmakers were conspicuously absent from the prime minister’s speech on March 3. The obsessive fixation with Israel continues to impede our foreign policy interests abroad, and most, I believe, would be hard pressed to articulate how this relationship has remained mutually beneficial. As opposed to a coherent regional strategy that might actually advance the objectives of the United States, our relationship has devolved along the lines of partisan politics and special interests.

Bibi’s Agenda

Before I attempt to address some of the more dubious claims made by Netanyahu, let me first disclose that I have lived and worked in the for close to seven years — most of them in Jordan and Iraq. During this time, I realized just how warped my preconceived notions about the Middle East had become. This was a natural consequence of coming of age in Washington DC after the events of September 11, 2001, as well as watching the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq unfold in real-time.

The reason I bring this up is because a politician like Netanyahu is uniquely adept at exploiting these preconceived notions. Whether it be about Iran, multiple wars in or the expansion of against international law, he has played to the American fear of the Muslim world with a sense of calculated precision. This kind of incessant fear mongering is one of the reasons why we have not been able to reconcile our national interests with our strategic objectives in the Middle East. And it is time that we realize the agenda of Israel, under Netanyahu, is no longer compatible with the long-term interests of the United States.

For example, trying to link the or to Iran is beyond ridiculous. Forget about the obvious sectarian incompatibility of one being Sunni, the other Shiite, these kinds of comparisons have the ability to do irreparable damage. Especially as our government seeks authorization for war against the Islamic State — a war that will inevitably see American soldiers in close proximity with Iranian advisors.

Binyamin Netanyahu and John Boehner / Flickr

It is equally as dangerous to make synonymous a legitimate state actor, such as Iran, with a nihilistic non-state actor, such as the Islamic State. This portrays the world in unambiguous terms, which reduces the complexity of the modern Middle East to a simplistic narrative that only Israel has authority over. Nothing can be more damaging for our long-term interests than to view the world with this level of naivety.

While it is true that Iran projects its influence throughout the Middle East via proxy groups and partisan networks, it is also true that every country in the region acts in a similar manner — defending their own self-interests. This isn’t “gobbling up countries” or a “voracious appetite for aggression.” This is international relations 101.

By no means is this an attempt to vindicate the actions of any one country; it is only an observation on how influence is projected in a region that is experiencing prolonged instability. Claiming that Iran is the bedrock of global terrorism only diverts attention away from the very real threats posed by groups such as the Islamic State. Groups that were initially supported by countries like , and Kuwait.

We should also keep in mind that the face of modern terrorism is the kind of “lone wolf” activity recently conducted in , , and . These individuals were not radicalized by Iran, but by groups who are adherents of ideologies that originate from the Gulf states. Attempting to conflate these threats is a lousy political tactic, one that seems desperate, when 15 of the 19 hijackers on September 11 were Saudi, not Iranian.

There is also something deeply troubling about blindly accepting the foreign policy objectives from the one nuclear power in the Middle East, which refuses to admit it has nuclear weapons. Nor has Israel ever signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which Iran has. Coupled against recently leaked from Mossad, which claimed “Iran at this stage is not performing the activity necessary to produce weapons,” Israel starts to look suspiciously like a state that is “refusing to come clean.”

We should also remain deeply skeptical of a country that continues to flaunt its democratic credentials, while at the same time running the largest open air prison in the world: Gaza. Talks of “cherishing freedom and offering hope” are entirely hypocritical and without merit for a country that not only consistently violates the rights of Palestinians, but is also heading in the direction of state apartheid. Our politicians should not be providing standing ovations when Netanyahu rallies around the concept of “the one and only Jewish state.” No, they should be aghast that this justification is being used to marginalize 20% of Israel’s Arab population.

Furthermore, using the “Islamic Republic” (of Iran) as a pejorative, while at the same time flaunting the righteousness of a “Jewish State,” is every bit as divisive as the kind of sectarianism that has eroded security throughout the Middle East. These two concepts are hardly indistinguishable from one another. Regardless, we should be supporting secular states that are committed to progressive diplomacy, and not cheering on a country that is forcing us to act under the pretenses that Iran is going “to deliver that nuclear arsenal to the far-reach corners of the earth, including every part of the United States.”

Finally, we are not alone in these negotiations. We must recognize that our other allies and partners in the group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China) have also staked their foreign policy objectives on the success of these negotiations. Without these talks, Iran really has no incentive to not reach nuclear breakout. The only other options are military, and given our previous lack of success in the Middle East, this course of actions remains highly unadvisable.

Withdrawing our support for negotiations, under pressure from Israel, would only risk further alienating the international community at such a critical time when we have the ability to affect real change. Is the political career of Binyamin Netanyahu really worth this? Because, this is ultimately what his speech was really about — election campaigning — not the future of Israel or our security in the United States.

Purposefully misleading Congress, while at the same time advocating for steps that would damage, if not collapse, our foreign policy is incredulous. This should not only outrage the American public, but permanently put our relationship with Israel on notice. The time has come for Israel to be removed from our politics.

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Once more into the breach, dear friends, once more — and with that, we will yet again authorize war in Mesopotamia. There is no doubt that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to wage war against the (IS) will pass Congress.

According to a CNN/ORC poll, 78% of all Americans support the use of military force, which should come as no surprise. We are, after all, heavily invested in the idea of war, especially in places where we fail to grasp the underlying causes of conflict, like and . The crowdsourced Twitter campaign from the Department of State, seeking solutions to fight terrorism, probably confirms this.

Waging war against IS, however, is a Faustian bargain and one that will inevitably challenge some, if not all, of our more established foreign policy positions on the .

Put into the simplest of terms, to defeat the Islamic State, we must work together with our old nemesis: . We have reached a point where pragmatic results must outweigh ideological beliefs and decisions must conform along strategic lines regardless of how distasteful. Our foreign policy must remain flexible enough to adjust to the complexity of these rapidly changing events. Failing to do so is part of the reason we are now in this geopolitical mess.

We must either be committed to the defeat of the Islamic State or committed to the idea of isolating Iran — we can no longer have it both ways. This would only open the potential for conflict on two fronts, neither of which would be winnable for all the reasons that came to define the Iraq War between 2003-11.

And as we move closer to formally authorizing war, a more robust appreciation for how the various international actors have come together should become a point of public knowledge. The context of which should start here: Without the intervention of Iran in the days immediately following the IS assault on Mosul in June 2014, the Iraqi government would most likely have collapsed. (I say this with a degree of certainty, since I was in Baghdad watching these events unfold.)

It is also worth mentioning that we did not commit to any military endeavors until the capital of Erbil came under threat in August 2014. Almost a full two months after the commencement of hostilities; by this time, the battlefield had already been partly shaped by the Iranian intervention. While it is easy for our politicians and media to ignore this contribution, for the people of Iraq, it remains the most legitimized form of international assistance. One that took control of the situation when Iraqi security forces were on the verge of collapse — without which, the Islamic State would still be expanding in a vacuum of disorganized resistance.

Hassan Rouhani

These are important facts to remember, as we once again look to engage militarily in a region whose nuance and ambiguity constantly escapes us.

Whatever the official party line might be, there is already some level of coordination with the Iranians in Iraq. The ongoing security operations are too delineated to suggest anything to the contrary. Airstrikes supporting militias aligned with Iran all but confirm this, as does the lack of condemnation for alleged Shiite crimes against Sunni civilians — the most recent being the murder of 60 residents in Diyala Province on January 26.

This reversal of longstanding policy is indeed controversial, but also necessary as the Islamic State evolves in unpredictable ways. A great deal of commentary has been given on the recent successes of the aerial campaign in halting the expansion of IS. While this is mostly correct, it also delivers a false narrative that is driven by domestic politics and the need to reaffirm public opinion. This not only limits our range of military options, but it inflates the sense of what we might actually be able to achieve without the single greatest influencer in Iraq: Iran.

Unfortunately, no group has yet proven capable enough of taking on the Islamic State in areas where it is heavily entrenched, without some form of international assistance. And to date, the most successful military operations have been collaborative efforts coordinated by Iran, which have brought together the Iraqi army and Peshmerga, with support from Shiite militias.

Attempting to undermine this cooperation due to longstanding political positions will not only put our troops in greater danger, but provide greater opportunities for the Islamic State to exploit.

So now that a spring offensive has been announced by the Pentagon to retake Mosul, we are facing a sizable conundrum: How do we work with Iran?

Barack Obama © Shutterstock

The Iranians will be involved one way or another, either with us or against us. This is why talks of new sanctions are entirely counterproductive, as are amendments to the AUMF that provide authority to strike Iran. It only reinforces just how little our legislators actually understand the war they are going to authorize.

Alternatively, one of the very few positive outcomes since the rise of the Islamic State has been the modest sense of rapprochement with Iran. This alleviation of tensions will, in all likelihood, lead to a nuclear agreement certified by the group of the , Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany, which is a positive development for the Middle East — one of the very few.

Unfortunately, this detente will have long-term consequences. We cannot defeat the Islamic State without the political and military acumen of Iran, and this will become our Faustian bargain. By even acknowledging Iranian participation, we will be enfranchising regimes in Baghdad and Damascus and furthering the conditions that have empowered sectarian conflict. Especially since proxy groups, including the Shiite militias in Iraq, and Hezbollah are becoming more involved in the fight against the Islamic State. This only reinforces the narrative that IS uses to justify its war and compel recruitment, since both Iraq and Syria marginalize and repress their Sunni populations.

It will also continue to make longstanding allies in the Middle East skeptical about our commitment to their security, specifically and . This is a legitimate concern, but it should never supersede our ultimate objective in authorizing war, which is to defeat the Islamic State, not pander to the foreign policy objectives of other countries.

In the weeks and months to come, as the inevitably of war becomes more official and our troops prepare for battle, we must confront each of these bad to worst case scenarios. There are no clear options left, only workable solutions that will continue to stress the very foundations of our longstanding foreign policies. We can work together with Iran to defeat the Islamic State, or isolate Iran and risk provoking conflict on two fronts. Both of these options represent the grim future of the modern Middle East. The choice is now up to you.

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The controversy surrounding the film American Sniper should come as no surprise. We live in an age that is desperately complex, yet we continue to reduce every issue to the simplest of  characterizations — most of which are almost always taken out of context. The entrenchment of opinion on either side of this movie has become all too typical of our cultural myopia, which seeks to pass judgment on things we do not truly understand. We continue to grasp at the starkest illustrations of what we perceive to be right or wrong, without ever thinking critically about the ambiguity that accompanies things such as war or (PTSD) —everything this film seemingly does so well.

Nonetheless, I thought it was only appropriate to watch American Sniper with my Iraqi colleagues while in Baghdad. They are, after all, the true beneficiaries of ’s liberation war and the one’s most directly impacted by the occupation. Their commentary is worth more than any perspective opined by pundits, politicians and celebrities sitting safely in the US.

There has never really been a national retrospection on what happened in or what the war really cost us in human terms. And our refusal to acknowledge certain truths has locked us into a perpetual cycle of shared PTSD. The visceral reaction to this film, from any perspective, only reinforces this point further. Because the truth is that the was a horrible experience for everyone involved: soldier, civilian and contractor, along with the entire Iraqi population who had to endure our failed policies and protracted occupation.

American Sniper is emotive because it has triggered all of these extreme feelings within our national consciousness, and we lack the perspective to adequately process what this film has attempted to portray. The sheer chaos and brutality of urban warfare, the unique propensity for violence given the right set of circumstances, and the inability to achieve any real results left us traumatized as a nation. It is a trauma we might acknowledge on an individual basis but never collectively.

There was a level of trepidation in asking my colleagues to watch this film with me. Obviously, this was not a war film dealing with some esoteric battlefield, but a film about Americans killing Iraqis, only 40 miles from Baghdad. Fortunately, my discomfort was somewhat assuaged when one of my colleagues commented on how much he liked Bradley Cooper. American movies sometimes have a way of transcending things like politics, war and cultural differences.

Bradley Cooper © Shutterstock

Chris Kyle was, indeed, a complex man and like most soldiers lived larger than life. Yet the discrepancies in his character are somehow being presented in a way that underscores our entire failure in Iraq. This is unfortunate and diminishes the very real struggle with PTSD and other symptoms associated with long-term deployments. It also moves us further away from reconciling what really happened during the war, as does idealizing him as something he clearly wasn’t. The failures in Iraq are well known, look no further than the , but they can stand on their own merit and do not need to be projected through any third party. And until we can have an honest dialogue about the war, this kind of counter-productive controversy will continue to manifest each time a piece of art about Iraq is made.

I must confess that my perceptions of the film, up until this point, were predicated on the controversy, commentary and articles I had been reading while in Iraq. So much so, that I was expecting a traditional American war film replete with brave US soldiers battling throngs of evil , who clearly hated the freedom we were so desperate to spread. But as the movie progressed, so too did my perspectives on the film. Perhaps this was connected to my own experiences in Iraq and how the film was forcing me to confront them, but more intuitively, it was connected to my Iraqi colleagues who were enjoying the film immensely.

For them, the most striking observations originated with the usual clichés that all war films are inevitably prone to. As the family back-story was unfolding, one of my colleagues casually asked me: “Is this how all Americans are raised, like that?” They had seen this scene before in countless films, and I responded with a casual shrug. The cinematic trope that usually accompanies stout middle-class American families was too much for me to explain at that moment.

Around 30 minutes into the film, once Kyle passed SEAL training, got married and was deployed to Iraq, someone blurted out: “… wait, is this based on a true story?” We both looked at each other and laughed out loud. If there was ever a moment of cultural dissociation between friends from different countries, this was surely it. He then pointed out: “Somehow this is true for most Americans.”

This was an astute observation, and he was all too correct. We are led to believe that the events in American Sniper were somehow sequential, linear and entirely simplistic. , followed by the invasion of Iraq, followed by the Battle for . This is where American Sniper fails as a movie, because everything that was wrong about the invasion of Iraq — the lack of strategies, the conduct of the war and the false pretense for invasion — all preceded the assault on Fallujah and the deployment of Kyle. The movie lacks all but the thinnest veneer of context and, as a result, the usual stereotypes are allowed to form, especially the ones American audiences are so desperate to believe.

Sienna Miller © Shutterstock

One of the biggest complaints throughout the entire film was the way in which Iraqis were portrayed, not necessarily their conduct, but their dress, cars, locations and accents (Egyptian). At one point someone chimed in: “No one would wear those kinds of clothes, well maybe a thousand years ago.” Iraq is a cosmopolitan place and the people are proud of this sophistication, even through the many years of occupation, terrorism and insurgency. This could be a general laziness with regard to the film, but it could also be the established caricature of Arabs and Muslims we have become so accustomed to, or maybe it is a combination of both.

Not long after this, as they were deploying to Fallujah for the first time, one of the soldiers in the film comments: “Any military aged man that is here, is here to kill you.” I looked over and asked if this was true, and I was given a dull look as he shook his head “no.” Military aged males can roughly be defined as anyone between 18-35, but based on a body count which is almost incalculable, that criteria was clearly flexible for the US military.

The casual indifference displayed to the scenes of Americans killing Iraqis was one of the more revelatory experiences of watching this film with a group of Iraqis. The only awkwardness was coming from me, as I constantly glanced in their direction every time someone was killed or a home was invaded by US soldiers. Someone commented: “So much violence, on both sides.” As the battle scene reached a crescendo, the same person said: “After all these battles, nothing has changed, and now we have ISIS [Islamic State].” We all laughed. The irony is ridiculous.

Those that came of age under American occupation also came of age in an era of unprecedented national terrorism, which developed after the removal of . While the two are obviously linked, US soldiers, for them, were not necessarily worse than the terrorists they were fighting, such was the level of hyper-violence in Iraq. The scene of “The Butcher” power drilling a young boy was entirely accurate, but not isolated to that one place in time. Incidents like this were pervasive throughout the occupation.

There has always been an understanding that the occupation was bad but not responsible for the kinds of extreme violence, which was endemic between the different sects or factions.

This kind of actualization can only prevail in a place where the concepts of right and wrong exist outside the pragmatism of daily life. In Iraq, things just are and people adjust their lives accordingly. Part of our inability to make peace with what happened in Iraq continues to stem from a dissonance that they should have somehow acted more like us. It does not conform to the American expectation that good can always triumph over evil. 

I often wonder how Americans would react to occupation by a foreign army. Would we just get on with our lives, or would we resort to the same kind of ferocity portrayed in this film?

Much emphasis has been placed on Kyle referring to Iraqis as “savages,” in both the book and movie. While some are keen to make this a racist statement and others are quick to agree to support their own prejudices, the reality is much more nuanced. The Iraq War was a savage conflict, regardless of the politics, which did not always apply on the battlefield. Everyone who has spent time in Iraq or in any hostile environment is prone to these nomenclatures, myself included. More than once, my colleagues watching the film expressed the exact same sentiments.

As the movie concluded, everyone looked at each other and nodded. Someone finally said, “That was an excellent movie,” and I cannot help but agree. There could have been much more, obviously. The lack of Iraqi perspective was irksome, but not entirely unexpected. What this film achieved was to show an American point of view without the familiar righteousness that usually accompanies these kinds of modern war films. Kyle’s experience in Iraq might have been extra-ordinary, but there was nothing sensational about the war. Regardless of how much we want to believe in the mythos behind Navy SEALs and the US Military.

Hopefully one day soon we can come to grips with our time in Iraq, and maybe then we can have a film about what it was like to live under American occupation. Until then, the entrenchment of insufferable opinions will continue.

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The events surrounding the massacre at the offices in on January 7 are reprehensible, but not necessarily shocking. At least not for the reasons we might think. Violence must be condemned, yet the inevitable politicization of this event, on both sides of the Atlantic, will soon start to configure around simplistic and digestible narratives.

We should be wary of these simplifications for a variety of reasons. Amongst them, the ability of politicians and media to diminish the complexity of relations between East and West, poor and affluent, secular and religious, or the obsessive fetish surrounding the very concept of freedom of speech. Each of these had some part to play in the Paris attacks.

We have already begun hearing the usual sound bites relating to “freedom” and “assaults on ,” and while it is easy to revert to such a facile assessment of the situation, the public should be justifiably skeptical. Such baseless tropes remain the foundation for countless policies, which have spun a never ending cycle of violence — look no further than the continued .

Moral Superiority

Our reflections about the Charlie Hebdo shootings should not start with a projection of moral superiority about Western values, but a quiet internalization on what freedom of speech really means. About how we contextualize it, in the hyper connected world we now live in. And, more importantly, how this has become fetishized as an unassailable component of modern democracy and how we continually fail to grasp the very real implications that it has on public well being. Especially when our ability to think critically is often challenged by the overwhelming abundance of often conflicting information.

This certainly is not meant to apologize away the behaviors, or violence, of any one person or group of people. We must concern ourselves with the deeply profound issues, which manifest from certain interpretations of , much in the same way we must acknowledge the failures unique to liberal democracy. What these shootings reflect, and what we must continue to acknowledge, is that we have reached a critical junction of where culture, media and self-awareness have intersected with national identity and policy, both foreign and domestic.

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Nowhere is this more perfectly embodied than in , where remain marginalized, totaling roughly 5-6 million, or 8% of the population. Within this demographic there is drastic , diminished opportunity connected to race and religion, post-colonial tensions and deep-rooted cultural barriers that remain in national opposition, such as the belief in state assimilation vs faith-based self-expression – like wearing the hijab��(headscarf). Therefore, generating content that is inherently provocative against a disenfranchised class of people only stresses these societal challenges and, unsurprisingly, has brought some of them to a point of political violence. To any objective observer, this should come as no surprise.

These are not value judgments — they only reinforce observations about why someone or some groups can justify violence to themselves, when living in a society that espouses liberal principles. Maintaining the ability to reason along these lines is important, if we are ever to fully understand the acceptable balance between and cultural acceptability.

Cycle of Violence��

Another way of understanding the basis of this tragedy is through the interminable War on Terror, a perpetual theme now engrained in the lives of most and since . We have been conditioned to believe that, at all times, a terrorist attack is imminent and our way of life permanently disrupted. Disrupted by whom? By Muslims. A ridiculous notion given the actual on terror attacks — even more so for Americans who contend with upward of 30,000 gun deaths each year.

Nonetheless, this has given rise to an entire industry that supports a certain kind of characterization of 1.6 billion people spread throughout 49 Muslim-majority countries. One which continually remains omnipresent in politics, media and movies. ’s Don Lemon recently asked renowned human rights lawyer Arsalan Iftikhar if he supports the Islamic State��, on the sole pretense that he happens to be Muslim.

The cartoons of Charlie Hebdo are indeed racist, offensive and completely objectionable and, at times, absolutely hilarious. But they are only funny to those of us who have not been marginalized, who have nothing to lose and everything to gain by laughing at that was generated to be purposefully offensive. The argument that the magazine’s burlesque targeting of religious and political groups was universal only holds up in the minds of those who believe there is some kind of equilibrium to the world’s power structure. Meanwhile, this is set against continued “war-fighting” in the Muslim world, illegal detentions, torture and drone strikes which, according to some , have killed upward of 4,000 people in the last decade.

So it is not just about cartoons or satire; it is about an entire mentality, which is advanced by governments and media to reinforce a cycle of violence against people from a religion we might never actually come into contact with. This is followed by the inevitable expansion of national security infrastructure, dilutions of personal privacy and an undermining of civil liberties. How ironic is it that we will allow these restrictions to permeate our thinking, our way of life, but unite over political mockery that is tasteless and offensive? This is a highly unpopular opinion because it forces us to acknowledge a certain level of prejudice and malfeasance that we have all been complicit in.

Unfortunately, there are no simple ways to rationalize what happened in Paris to the staff of Charlie Hebdo. Violence of any kind, especially in countries committed to secular liberal values, is unacceptable. We are, however, living in an age that has not yet fully come to terms with what it means to be truly interdependent, truly connected, to cultures and communities far different from our own. Nor do we completely understand what it means to be perpetually at war with an enemy and ideology that is as temperamental as it is unpredictable. Despite this, we must be reasonable in our approach to freedom of speech and balance it against the public interest.

There are a million ways to make clever points and further the cultural discourse, without having to show unadulterated support for satire and parody that is of questionable merit. This is the epitome of fetishizing freedom of speech. Should the situation be slightly different and the cartoonists be notoriously provocative against blacks, or any other minority, would we be as outraged as we are now?

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The views expressed��in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect��51�Թ�’s��editorial policy.

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What does it say about us as a country, when we have to actively debate the merits of torture? The mere fact that this is even a point of discussion, emphasizes just how far we have drifted from whatever national values we used to subscribe too. The recently released CIA “Torture Report” will soon make us confront some stark realities about our conduct since the days of 9/11.

Nonetheless, the usual partisan politics have already been set in motion, and phrases like “endangering the lives of Americans overseas” and “expose our allies” have already been sounded throughout the rhetorical echo chamber. Unfortunately, this is nothing more than political subterfuge to shield those who engineered and supported such a disastrous set of policies, which have now been universally condemned.

Reality is much more simple: There will never be a better time to have an honest discussion about what the War on Terror really cost us as a nation, not just in real terms, but also in moral capital. Especially as the US continues to be the pivotal player in a world that is experiencing a prolonged period of instability.

Capitalizing on Fear

Looking back, some things become painfully obvious after the 9/11 attacks. One of these is that the nation, collectively, experienced something along the lines of a neurotic breakdown. The old rules no longer applied, international frameworks and agreements could be twisted and dismembered to satiate a shared desire for revenge, regardless of the consequences.

Politicians capitalized on this fear and turned it into a political weapon; wars were started, civil liberties infringed upon, and prisoners were detained without due process. Sensible policy makers became swept up in the patriotic fervor of post-9/11 madness. But worst of all, torture happened, and the ability to justify its use though legal manipulations, will, without a doubt, be of the great national disgraces for many years to come.

Clearly this viewpoint is not shared by all. Comments made by House Intelligence Committee Chairmen, Mike Rogers, that the release of this report will cause “violence and death” are as ludicrous as they are naive. As are other assertions by Senator Marco Rubio that this report will be “used as a recruitment tool for our enemies.”

Failed Policies

The current upheaval in the Middle East is a direct result of failed US policies, such as those highlighted in this report. By continuing to deny our involvement with torture, we would only be perpetuating some of the critical failures, which have become endemic to both foreign and security policy.��What Mr. Rogers and Mr. Rubio fail to grasp is that without this kind of transparency, there is no real moral position that can be used to defeat the terrorist groups we are currently fighting.

Furthermore, the campaign of drone strikes, support for corrupt Arab governments, as well as a general inconsistency in foreign policy, provides enough propaganda for groups trying to generate anti-American sentiment. This report only highlights what everyone in the Middle East and South Asia already knows, or worse, has already experienced first hand.

This report should ultimately be about the right of the American people to comprehend what actions their government took, in defense of their own security. Everything else is political self-gratification for policy wonks in Washington.

To be a truly exceptional nation, we must live by a higher standard than our enemies, which does not include waterboarding, sleep deprivation and dehumanization.

On December 5th, a former CIA agent, Jose Rodriguez, wrote a compelling editorial for the Washington Post, amongst other things, he stated: “The interrogation program was authorized by the highest levels of the US government, judged legal by the Justice Department and proved effective by any reasonable standard.”It is not hard to imagine how much pressure the intelligence community was under in the critical days and months following 9/11.

It is also not hard to imagine how quickly those pressures turned into overwhelming frustration. What was once unthinkable, and illegal, became a pragmatic solution, as every politician in Washington demanded unrealistic results in the newly inaugurated War on Terror.

Mr. Rodriguez was also correct in pointing out that both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees remained briefed on such clandestine programs. Whatever discrepancies might have existed in the reporting chain, there is a reasonable expectation that Congress was aware of what the enhanced interrogation program entailed.

This is where the true soul-searching should come from. How elected leaders failed to ensure proper compliance with established traditions like the Geneva Convention, and given the right set of circumstances, became woefully complicit, in torture, under the guise of national security. Other questionable programs, whether domestic surveillance, extra-judicial killing of Americans abroad, or executive authority to wage war without Congressional approval are rooted in the very same national security rationale.

Wrong and Amoral��

So what do we do now?

We must stop having the torture debate. There does not need to be anymore judicious discourse on the positive or negative aspects of enhanced interrogation. Only one answer is correct – it is wrong and amoral. By giving equal time to individuals supporting enhanced interrogation, we are only continuing to legitimize a point of view that has permanently damaged US credibility abroad. The US is not safer or in a better position because of these programs.

Finally, the blame cannot be solely outsourced to any one specific individual or organization, albeit the CIA, the Congress or the White House. We are all to blame. The fear and panic, which came in the months following 9/11 and expedited the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, belonged to everyone. As a country, we allowed our elected officials, policy makers, and political appointees, to take us to depths previously unthinkable only a few years earlier.

By admitting this to ourselves, hopefully, we will not default to the same setting when the next mass-casualty terrorist attack occurs. To be a truly exceptional nation, we must live by a higher standard than our enemies, which does not include waterboarding, sleep deprivation and dehumanization.

The views expressed��in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect��51�Թ�’s��editorial policy.

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Baghdad is a city of drastic extremes. A place of violence, corruption, fanaticism, but also dexterity, tenacity, and warmth. Like most in , the people of Baghdad have suffered. Of this, there can be little debate.

A conversation with any Iraqi will reveal the extent in which they have been impacted through and insurgency or factionalism and . The narrative of each story remains interchangeable: of relatives and friends killed by a bombing, shooting, or just so happened to be in the wrong place, at the wrong time. These conversations are typified by a kind of prescient nonchalance, given the near certainty of the next terrorist attack.

Around 1,000 people are killed and wounded every month, while car bombs, suicide attacks, murders, and complex attack cycles have become the perpetual status quo. Iraq remains flush with oil and gas, yet the electricity in Baghdad can only stay on for a few hours at a time as summer temperatures peak at close to 115-120 degrees. Flights in and out of the capital, known cynically as the “freedom bird,” can be cancelled without warning and security is not just the overwhelming concern of those living in Baghdad, but dictates all aspects of life and routine.

Welcome to Baghdad

Working in Baghdad as an expatriate is like living life through a perpetual fish bowl, the outside world only being accessible through the glass of a B6 armored vehicle or from the rooftop of a heavily fortified villa. Men with weapons are everywhere. Traveling five minutes down the road requires a private security detail, consisting of armored vehicles, shooters, medics, and body armor. Any sense of self-importance soon dissolves, when, through 44 millimeters of ballistic glass, you see a bus of school children pointing and laughing at your small army of security contractors.

The streets are narrow and cluttered with garbage, power cables, and generators, their constant drone percolating day and night. The smell of sewage can sometimes drift and linger in the seasonal heat for days on end. Electricity is temperamental and will shut off without warning, making simple tasks like working on a computer, running on a treadmill or watching TV an incredibly difficult experience. Concrete barriers carve through the city, while police and military checkpoints create a perpetual gridlock of traffic that can sometimes back up for miles.

Despite this, these checkpoints remain easy prey for terrorists who have perfected small arms fire attacks and drive-by-shootings. Private security companies are almost always stopped and searched at these checkpoints, while saloon vehicles, taxis, and buses, which are used in wave after wave of car-bombings are allowed to pass with near immunity. The legacy of mistrust between private security companies and the people of Baghdad is almost irreparable, even if companies like Blackwater no longer operate in Iraq.

In recent days, the number of suicide attacks and car bombs throughout Baghdad has increased, coinciding with US����against IS. As the number of airstrikes and international involvement escalates, so too will the inevitable risk from terrorism throughout the capital. ��

To live and work in Baghdad you must first arrive at Baghdad International Airport, which is like walking into a movie set from the past. Shades of orange, green, and yellow adorn most of the signage and carpet, while white plastic conduit cylinders hang in rows from vaulted ceilings – a version of post-modernism from Iraq’s not to distant past.��People are smoking–everywhere. The cost of a multi-entry visa is officially $200, but on arrival the cost is actually $202. No receipt is issued for the extra two dollars.

Sometimes it takes hours for a visa to be issued, depending on the various moods of the customs officers; however, this will only be for a multi-entry visa, a multi-exit visa comes later.

Staying in Baghdad for longer than ten days requires a blood test, which is an attempt to screen for AIDS, although the only people who ever test positive, usually test negative in either Jordan or the Emirates. A potential false/positive is probably a consequence of the blood testing procedure, which is commonly referred to only as “bloods,” and seemingly only happens at night – when a man carrying a bag of needles, tubes, and a stack of official looking paperwork arrives at your villa. There is a 50/50 chance he will wear gloves and each blood test costs a few hundred dollars.

After successfully passing this blood test, which sometimes takes less than 24 hours, a person becomes eligible for a multi-exit visa that is good for one year, but only in Baghdad. A trip to the provinces will not recognize the twelve-month blood test; nevertheless, testing is available at their clinic for another modest fee.

Perception is Power

Most conversations in Baghdad are conducted through a series of acronyms IED, VBIED, ISF, SSG, EFP, SAF, DBS, IDF – inherited from the days of US military. Each of these has a specific context that can alter business or security planning at moment’s notice. Perception is power in Baghdad and rumors can shift the security dynamics from one neighborhood to the next, resulting in heightened threat or risk throughout the entire city. Areas dense with Shia neighborhoods seem to experience the worst violence, as Sunni terrorists conduct suicide attacks and car-bombings with comparative ease.

Mixed Muslim neighborhoods are becoming increasingly isolated from each other and dead bodies are found almost daily. Some bear the signs of torture, most will have been killed via close quarter execution. The killing of women “on suspicion” of prostitution is a regular occurrence in both and neighborhoods. Obviously, this has been exacerbated by the presence of the Islamic State (), only a mere 70 miles north of the capital. While the danger of an imminent assault on Baghdad seems to have abated, the anxiety remains palpable, conjured by social media and local mosques – some of whom claim the Islamic State was created by Israel.

Getting stopped at a checkpoint requires pulling over to the side of the road, where the threat is highest, while soldiers or police scrutinize paperwork and security licensing with orders that are almost always out of date. This process can sometimes be facilitated by the “cold water tax,” which consists of a crate of bottled water being relinquished to the soldiers who remain critically under-resourced. During the intense summer heat, cold water is as good as any foreign currency.

The security forces prefer to wear US military surplus, yet their ammo pouches are typically stuffed with foam and newspaper only giving the appearance of combat readiness. Shotgun cartridges sometimes line the webbing of their body armor, even though there is not a shotgun in sight. Some wear the jump wings of a paratrooper, but have clearly never been inside an airplane. A continually sore subject for international members of the private security detail who were actually badged paratroopers. Weapons handling drills are almost nonexistent, and it is not uncommon for there to be a negligible discharge from an ancient AK-47.

Terrorists attack these checkpoints with incredible frequency, yet there is never any real sense of urgency or preparedness from the soldiers or police. Their easy targeting potential makes them a quick win for terrorist seeking to conduct low-intensity attacks. In recent days, the number of suicide attacks and car bombs throughout Baghdad has increased, coinciding with US against IS. As the number of airstrikes and international involvement escalates, so too will the inevitable risk from terrorism throughout the capital.

Living in Baghdad is not so different from any other��metropolitan��city, especially those plagued by traffic, politics, and other cosmopolitan challenges. Except here, you live in a fortified villa behind rows of concrete blast walls, ballistic curtains, and static security teams. The sound of car bombs is unmistakable and creates a tenor of constant apprehension throughout the city. It is standard practice after any detonation to climb on the roof and locate the direction of the blast through the sighting of smoke or the sounds of sires and gunfire. Depending on the location of the detonation, the shockwave can convulse and rattle an entire villa. These car bombs are typically detonated during morning traffic or in the early evening, when people are socializing after work. Both are attempts to inflict mass-casualties by targeting areas dense with people. As one of my Iraqi colleagues is fond of saying, “Man, this is life in Baghdad.”

And while it is easy to parody bureaucratic failures, corruption, or the vagaries of a foreign army, the people of Baghdad continue to live their lives under the physical threat of daily terrorist attack. Accepting bombings, shootings, kidnappings, murders, assassinations, extortion, and sectarianism – day after day, month after month, for over a decade, with no clear end in sight.

Traveling with a private security detail throughout Baghdad requires a movement request form, which, sometimes, will only be issued for ten days in advance. Subsequently, any small bureaucratic discrepancy that prevents the document from being issued can delay your much needed leave flight home. As can sandstorms, public holidays, religious holidays (as determined by the not-so-accurate lunar calendar), airport closures or the occasional insurgent advance on the capital city.

Lessons To Be Learned

Gone is the era of the eponymous Green Zone, nowadays, it is simply known as the International Zone, or IZ. Surrounded by concrete barriers, soldiers, tanks, and sniffer dogs, this 3.9 square mile enclosure houses the political elite of Iraq, as well as the American and British Embassies. Disconnected from the security concerns of those living in the Red Zone, which from a certain perspective is understandable. Assassinations of politicians, military personnel, and prominent individuals from civil society is something of a past time in Baghdad. A trip into the International Zone takes 24-hour advance notice, in order to find a company or person that might have an access badge, which are sometimes regulated on an arbitrary basis. External security is administered by the Iraqi Security Forces, who continue to use a bomb detector called the ADE-51, even though the inventor of the device is now spending ten years in jail for fraud.

One of the checkpoints leading into the International Zone has a prominent billboard depicting a US soldier, a Roman centurion, and a crusading knight all kneeling before the figure of the 12th Imam, who can be broadly defined as the Shia savior of mankind. While this historical pastiche can appear uninviting, sectarian, even threatening, it is also hilariously appropriate and speaks to the irony and humor of life in Baghdad.

International media coverage of recent events in Iraq has been especially appalling. Reporting tends to fluctuate between the inevitable doomsday scenario and the righteous indication of Western politicians, whose failed policies have directly set the conditions for the growth of the Islamic State. This failure also negates the very real sacrifice that normal Iraqis have made; those, who contrary popular belief, have dug in and are fighting the Islamic State with a spirited ferocity, defending their homes and families against a marauding army of fanatics and��sociopaths.

And while it is easy to parody bureaucratic failures, corruption, or the vagaries of a foreign army, the people of Baghdad continue to live their lives under the physical threat of daily terrorist attack. Accepting bombings, shootings, kidnappings, murders, assassinations, extortion, and sectarianism – day after day, month after month, for over a decade, with no clear end in sight. It is hard to imagine what this kind of life is like unless you have lived it or lived amongst it. There is a lesson to be learned from the people of Baghdad – not just of extraordinary resilience and steadfastness, but also humility and respect. And that is the real story of life in the Pitiless City.

The views expressed��in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect��51�Թ�’s��editorial policy.

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It has been just over a week since the Israel-Hamas ceasefire ended Israel’s eight-day Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip. As the fog of war recedes, two issues have become uniquely apparent. The first is that US news coverage of the conflict was weighted towards Israel. Considerable time was given to Israeli lawmakers, spokesman, and military representatives with little or no time given to Palestinian lawmakers, the people of Gaza, or Arab Israelis. Secondly, and probably because of the former, of Americans sided with Israel during the conflict.

Sympathy for Israel remains a reflection of US perceptions of the Middle East for arguably two reasons. Firstly, most Americans see something of themselves in the perseverance of a country that has defied robust odds in such a hostile environment. Second and more instinctively, after 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and continued terrorist threats, support for Israel seems like a tacit victory against Arab or Muslim antagonists. However, these are perceptions and should not be the drivers of policy in a region of shifting power dynamics. Now is the time to redefine and challenge the existing US-Israel relationship.

The�� Dilemma of the “Jewish State”

On November 15, 2012, the US Senate passed , “expressing vigorous support and unwavering commitment to the welfare, security, and survival of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.” Herein lies the paradox and one which Americans valuing secular and pluralistic principles should recognize. Israel is not solely a Jewish state. At least .

Israeli lawmakers and lobbyists have become relentlessly efficient at demagoguing Israel’s non-Jewish demographics to the American public. This supports the narrative and discourse for an exclusive Jewish state, which in turn allows conservative Israeli politicians to always claim legitimate self-defense at any provocation. All the while, settlement expansion and land theft continue in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the blockade of Gaza has entered its sixth year.

Eventually, both demographics and external relations will overtake and shift the political archetype for American lawmakers and the relationship with Israel. An enormous volume of work, , has addressed the “demographic time-bomb” within Israel. While estimates vary, it has been forecast that at some stage, either the Arab-Israeli population will equal that of the Jewish population or eventually over take it.

While these numbers have been disputed, the irrefutable fact is that the non-Jewish population in Israel will continue to grow. At some stage Israel will have to either adjust its domestic and foreign policies or treat almost a quarter of their population as a “fifth column,” which will inevitably lead to a de facto state of apartheid. Should the American commitment to a Jewish state remain unwavering if this is the unavoidable outcome to changing demographics?

The Arab Uprisings, Israel, and US Foreign Policy

Prior to the events surrounding the Arab Uprisings, the engines of US foreign policy could always rely on countries such as Egypt and Turkey to play an active role in mediating conflicts with Israel. While the recent conflict in the Gaza Strip was, in part, mediated by Egypt, the atmospherics are not favoring ��é�ٱ�Գٱ� with Israel.

As a new generation of Arabs assume power, there will be an inescapable desire to challenge the status quo. This appetite for change has become apparent not only with the growth of Islamism but also with the accessibility of information and the cogency of youth, many of whom view policies on Israel as the vestiges of disposed dictators. Israel’s isolation is already evident. In addition to a European academic boycott, only two of the seven Arab embassies remain open in Tel Aviv.

Naturally, these shifts put US foreign policy in the Middle East in a precarious position. If the US fails to bring Israel back to negotiations and continues to provide uninterrupted military support to Israel, then it remains entirely possible that some Arab states will attempt to reevaluate relations with the US. This could include the termination of arms purchases, the rejection of aid packages, and the closure of bases — all of which the US uses as part of its wider strategic agenda in the region.

If Arab nations begin refusing US aid and arms, the US will have no leverage to ensure that those countries continue to rotate in its sphere of influence. China and Russia can act as an immediate stopgap to countries needing development, military, and financial assistance. Unfortunately, this will irreparably damage the strategic security portfolio of the US, in addition to hindering economic recovery domestically.

Of course, rejection of US assistance might not be the most prudent policy for certain Arab countries, but the Arab Uprisings have proven that no political class is safe from the ire of the streets. If pushed on relations with Israel, Arab leaders will inherently react in their own self-interest.

None of this is to imply that Israel does not have a right to self-defense. The firing of rockets into Israel is contemptible; however, the artistry of the Israeli media strategy has been to convince the American public that the Palestinians, in turn, have no legitimate right to self-defense. This misrepresentation has been constantly exploited by US lawmakers to justify the continued isolation of Gaza.

In one recent example, House Representative Eric Cantor wrote in a CNN editorial, “” The unspoken fact is that the Gaza Strip is only 139 square miles with a population of 1.7 million people. Any location of military hardware will likely be close to a population center. This inauspicious tactical reality should not justify the indiscriminate targeting of civilian populations.

The US is likely to damage its long-term prospects for successful foreign policy in the Middle East by trying to maintain the moral or ethical meridian while supporting Israel’s continued and disproportionate use of force. The current US policy on Israel also reinforces the general and often baseless perception that the United States can only project power through threats of force, which has regrettably become anachronistic in the Middle East.

So what can the US do to ensure that its foreign policy objectives are achieved, while also safeguarding Israel’s security?

Hamas and the Negotiating Table

For starters, the US should recognize that the political leaders of Hamas are the elected representatives of Gaza. Believing that the Palestinian Authority will somehow become the main negotiator for Gaza is uniquely misguided.

A probationary recognition of the political wing of Hamas would not only demonstrate good will towards Palestinians, but also align the policy interests of Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Jordan with the US. This move would give Hamas an incentive to engage in sustainable security frameworks, maintained by the US as a process for negotiations with Israel. Alignment with Egyptian policy will also encourage the Egyptian military to root out terror networks in the Sinai Peninsula and close the smuggling tunnels into Gaza.�� This will temper hard-line rhetoric and guarantee that Egypt does not attempt to revoke its peace treaty with Israel.

Additionally, both sides must be brought back to the negotiating table, and all factions and subdivisions within Hamas must acknowledge Israel’s right to exist. These goals can be achieved if the US acknowledges that it will withhold aid and assistance to both sides should they fail to meet their obligations.

The Department of State’s proposed spending plan for fiscal year 2013 allocates a crucial in humanitarian assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, and the US administration has requested in Foreign Military Financing to Israel for the same period. If neither side is willing to negotiate, this funding should be revoked. International funding for aid and weapons has enabled both sides to sustain the conflict indefinitely.

There are no easy solutions to the conflict between Israel and Hamas. There are only hard choices. These choices must come from a realignment of US foreign policy objectives to the contemporary political realities in the Middle East. If not, the outcome will be failure.

The total arc of US strategy in the Middle East must be pragmatic and incorporate countries like Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Such a strategy is unlikely as long as US policy remains inflexible regarding Israel and its policies for the West Bank and Gaza. The US must be firm with Israel while also maintaining its commitments to their security. The US can achieve this balance without kowtowing to a government whose Interior Minister publicly advocates, “.” This is not the message the US government should be supporting as it seeks to rebuild its image in the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Syria has been driving everyone in Iraq mad. In the past week, I visited four embassies in Baghdad and all we talked about was Syria. I went to the United Nations for a meeting on Iraq and all we talked about was Syria. On a recent conference call, every point I made somehow had a connection to Syria. During the conference call one of my Iraqi colleagues sent me an email saying: “The fall of the armies of Syria signals the coming of the 12th Imam”. In short, everyone in Iraq is mad about Syria. Let me explain.

Two Countries, One Outcome

Whatever the outcome is for Syria, the impact on Iraq will be appreciable. Iraq, like Syria is a sectarian environment driven by the self-interest and self-preservation of the various sects, primarily Sunni and Shi’a, along with the Kurdish. In the news coverage of Syria, the unique similarities to Iraq are being overlooked. It is no secret that most commentators and analysts are fatigued when it comes to Iraq. The sectarianism and terrorism is all old news. The day the US military left for Kuwait, Iraq became relatively “uninteresting”, but this is all about to change and Syria is the reason.

Since December 2010, the Iraqi government has been held together through the various machinations of the Shi’a political class. The interjection of the petrodollar has provided a degree of legitimacy and finance, but enduring political solutions have been abandoned. The current governance strategy is rooted in a sectarian realpolitik and most attempts at compromise have been forgone. Entrenchment across factional divisions within the political and security frameworks has become the perpetual status quo.

As a result, terrorist groups have space to operate and the security forces lack the political sponsorship needed to draft effective counter-terrorism policies. Mass casualty attacks have now become a cyclical event, occurring every four to six weeks. In the aftermath of the last terrorist attacks between July 22-23, there was not even a press release from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. There are no more assurances he can offer.

Amongst this mix of political gridlock, ineffective security forces, and sectarian division there is now the possibility of radical regime change in Syria. This is a major concern for the Iraqi government and rightfully so. While the commentary on Syria has been succinct and focused, it has not charted the impact on the region as a whole, and more specifically, Iraq.

This is unfortunate for a variety of reasons. Iraq has the second largest oil and gas reserves globally and an antagonistic eastern neighbor with Iran, who is about to lose their strategic depth in the Levant.

If there is radical regime change in Syria (driven by sectarian engines), it could invert the tenuous balance of power in Baghdad. Should this happen, the Iraqi government will be in an untenable position based on a combination of internal and external factors.

The Mare’s Nest: North and Central Iraq

Iraq as a sectarian society can be broken down into three geographical locations. Kurdish in the North, Sunnis in the Center, and Shi’a in the South. Each of these factions now has a unique role to play in how Iraq responds to regime change in Syria.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq, led by Massoud Barzani, has made it a policy to arm, finance, and train Syrian Kurds. This is in direct opposition to the strategy adopted by the Iraqi government, which has been a mixture of neutrality and maintenance of the status quo. An estimated have already been trained in the KRG and more are scheduled for training in the coming months. Moreover, at least six Kurdish towns in Syria are now being occupied.

No precaution towards national reconciliation is being established within this policy. The possibility of uniting an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria, at least in the short term, achieves aspirations of a pan-Kurdish alliance, but it will be short lived. The Free Syrian Army has already implicitly stated that it will not recognize Kurdish autonomy, while clashes between the two have been reported. This kind of factious fighting is exactly what Baghdad is desperate to avoid.

In response to this policy, on July 27, the Iraqi Army was deployed to a border crossing with Syria along the contested KRG boundary. The military of the KRG, known as the Peshmerga, halted their advance and until August 3 both sides reinforced their positions only a kilometer apart. The situation appears to have de-escalated, but only after significant mediation by US Vice President Joe Biden. This has now exacerbated internal resentment between the political coalitions and compounded sectarian positions within Iraq even further. The Shi’a coalitions have firmly aligned behind PM Maliki to disrupt what they perceive to be a consolidation of North Iraq (and subsequent oil reserves) by the Kurdish.

This stand-off along the KRG-Syrian border has wasted security resources and manpower from where it is really needed. For the past month there has been a noticeable increase in the rate of terrorism in the central Iraqi provinces. This has coincided with new leadership and strategy from groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, , has licensed a campaign targeting both the judiciary and the Iraqi Security Forces, called “Breaking the Walls”. More perturbing was also a call urging Iraqis to start a jihad in Syria. Syria remains the perfect environment for groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq to grow, and is accelerating enthusiasm for their core base inside Iraq.

This is an intolerable scenario for the Iraqi government. If terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda in Iraq are able to establish rear-bases in Syria, they will expedite the tempo of terrorist attacks inside Iraq. This scenario is also supported by a fear of radical regime change in Syria. If regime change is proceeded by the rise of a conservative Sunni government, a new sphere of influence will develop between Syria and the central Sunni provinces in Iraq. This will not only provide leeway for continued terrorism, but renew calls for greater Sunni autonomy within Iraq. This would also be in the strategic interests of Saudi Arabia, who is financing the Sunni opposition in Syria.

The Pressure Cooker: South Iraq

This leaves the southern Shi’a provinces who are the core of the Iraqi political elite, and their relationship to Iran. If a Sunni dominated government comes to power in Syria, Iran will lose their strategic depth in the Levant, but not necessarily their ability to project power. For Iran, the existing relationship with Iraq will provide new depth. This will come through a further integration of cultural and religious institutions, which are tied to the political and economic policies of Iraq. Certain Shi’a groups will try and maintain a level of autonomy, but if a Sunni government comes to power in Syria, the Shi’a political class in Iraq will gravitate towards Iran out of a perceived necessity. This will come at the expense of the central Sunni provinces, who are skeptical, at the best of times, about government connections with Iran. Increased polarization of the different political coalitions can be expected along with a catalyst for continued sectarian violence.

Iran through a clandestine military unit known as the Quds Force, still maintains an impressive network of Shi’a insurgent groups inside Iraq.Groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, battled the US military to a deadlock and their experience in urban and insurgent warfare remains a potent tool. While these groups are currently dormant they can provide a tactical depth, which can be used in Syria.If the Alawite community resorts to insurgency, post-regime, they will receive funding and support from Iran, some of which will come via these groups in Iraq. The recent abduction of close to 50 Shi’a pilgrims in Syria on August 4, could very easily provide the rationale for a wider involvement of these networks.It would not be impolitic to assume they are already there.

Iraq vis-à-vis Syria

Unfortunately, the current scenarios for Iraq are discouraging vis-à-vis Syria. Without international intervention, Syria will continue to slip into deeper sectarianism, which is the worst case scenario for Iraq. The links between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Islamist groups in Syria are becoming well established. The impact of this will further embolden grievances and frustrate the compromise needed to establish effective security mechanisms in Iraq. The policy of the KRG to arm Syrian Kurds remains myopic and divisive for both Syrians and Iraqis. In reality, the best policy has already been adopted by the government of Iraq: remain neutral and maintain the status quo. At a minimum this provides space for strategic leverage and does not overtly antagonize sectarian issues domestically or within Syria.

It is only a matter of time before President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian regime are relegated to the back pages of history. It might take three, six, or eight months, but the end will come and a measured approach is required. Giving countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar a free hand in the arming and financing of the Syrian opposition remains nonsensical. Too much has been invested in Iraq to let it destabilize because of a sectarian conflict in Syria that could have been prevented with a bit of calculated foresight. If anything, call in the Iraq experts. They understand better than most what happens when a country divides across ethnic or religious boundaries.

The international community, especially Western countries must pay special attention to developments in Iraq. It has only been six months since the US military left Iraq and the security profile continues to shift from bad to worse. Short-term gains in Syria should not be made at the expense of regional stability, specifically that of Iraq. Look at it another way. When the fighting in Libya was at its zenith, oil shares peaked at a two year high and this accounted for only 3% of the market in a localized conflict. Imagine if Iraq fails to maintain its oil exports due to stability issues, for the country accounts for almost 11% of total oil reserves globally.

The Shi’a believe in a prophecy that the “12th Imam” will return after the destruction of Syria and its armies. In another Shi’a legend, affliction and fear will plague the people of Iraq and herald the return of the Imam. Iraq survived the latter prophecy once, there is no need to tempt fate again with the former.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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