An OSINT agency would create a uniform system to procure, develop, build and operate the systems utilized to exploit, analyze and disseminate intelligence. This solution would give OSINT the credence it deserves and create an effective method of acquiring and procuring equipment while improving the quality and quantity of OSINT products.

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OSINT uses open-source tools to collect information from publicly available sources and analyze it for decision-making. The sources it uses to create intelligence products range from academia to traditional  such as television and radio, social media and even . As a result, OSINT provides actionable intelligence and includes support and . Despite the presence of OSINT in the US security apparatus for the last 80 years, it is currently the only intelligence discipline that does not have a .

No Standard

There is no singular standard or platform for OSINT to be processed and no standard acquisition or purchasing process for OSINT equipment. This  is especially troubling, as the technological edge in the United States shifted from defense and security structures during the Cold War to the academic and business sectors today. Moreover, as new technical fields such as Big Data, artificial intelligence, robot process automation and blockchain technologies, among others, become utilized by the intelligence community, it makes sense that one agency is responsible for their acquisition and procurement.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) can serve as an example of what a new OSINT agency can accomplish. According to its , “The NRO is the U.S. Government agency in charge of designing, building, launching, and maintaining America’s intelligence satellites.” Created in 1961, the NRO developed US reconnaissance satellite programs but was never in charge of exploiting the images it produced. 

Instead, the NRO handles the maintenance and steering of the satellites so that they can meet all of the collection requests given to the NRO by other intelligence agencies. Since the NRO is the only agency handling  (GEOINT) collection, it can insist on high standards for every satellite’s design and procurement.

OSINT’s current challenges mirror those faced by GEOINT from the 1960s. Today, there is too much open source information to  much like there was too much satellite imagery to be processed effectively after the creation of the NRO. Decades later, the Journal of Defense Resources , “At this point, the challenges posed by OSINT consisted in the ability to convert into actionable intelligence the large volumes of data, which in most cases were unorganized, came from multiple sources, were available in different forms and collected through several categories of channels and to subsequently convert them into validated intelligence.” 

To resolve the gap, the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation () was created as a central point to manage “imagery collection, analysis, exploitation, production, and dissemination.” An independent OSINT agency could effectively collect, analyze, exploit, produce and disseminate open source information to the various intelligence agencies in a similar manner.

Technological Shifts

Technological shifts are another area in which OSINT today mirrors GEOINT from decades ago. Satellite technology  throughout the 1960s and 1970s, reflecting the rapid pace at which OSINT sources are changing due to the  of the internet and social media. By creating the NRO, the US government set the  of the satellite equipment it was procuring. 

A  by the Center for Strategic & International Studies states that “the U.S. I.C. cannot compete in the global intelligence arena and fulfill its vital missions without a reinvention of how it procures, adopts, and assimilates emerging technologies and delivers them to mission users — at speed and at scale.” The NRO’s model would be a perfect role for an OSINT agency to take the lead on procuring all OSINT technology rather than relying on different agencies.

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Using the NRO as a model for an OSINT agency will help the intelligence community in several ways. First, it will not take away from any agency’s existing mission set. That will avoid any large-scale reshuffling of the intelligence structure as a whole and prevent any mission overlap between existing agencies and the new one. 

Second, it will stop the stove-piping of OSINT within the intelligence community and permit a greater flow of finished intelligence products to senior officials and political leaders. Finally, an OSINT agency will guide and direct new research for other intelligence offices with similar missions. That office will allow the intelligence community to access the latest technological breakthroughs and decrease the costs of procuring and maintaining equipment.

With more people gaining access to the internet, smartphones and social media every day, open source intelligence will only become more relevant to shaping the future of the intelligence community. By creating a dedicated OSINT agency, the US intelligence community can maintain a strategic advantage over both adversarial state and non-state actors.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post It’s Time to Give OSINT Its Own Agency appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Recent military conflicts illustrated two additional essential tasks: training allies and enhancing cybersecurity. Building up the capabilities of military partners quickly became a primary concern for American forces seeking to turn over responsibility to local personnel and improve alliances with peer and near-peer nations. The rise of smart devices and social media platforms created an atmosphere in which cybersecurity defense became crucial to force protection, both at home and abroad, adding a new dimension to every block of warfare. 

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The pervasive requirement for training allies and ensuring cybersecurity have expanded General Krulak’s three-block war into new dimensions. Service members execute these actions as part of offensive actions, peacekeeping operations or humanitarian missions. Adopting a multidimensional mindset emphasizes their critical role across each of the three blocks and demands a mentality shift around the way that the modern US military is trained and employed. 

Training

Training allied forces became a critical component of strategic victory at the turn of the century. For the past 20 years, US service members have trained with allied forces in operations and exercises around the world. The goals of these sessions vary depending on the location and threat. No matter the partners, training allied militaries remains a key mission necessary for enhancing security around the world and repelling threats from organizations the United States opposes. Therefore, training should be considered a basic function of the US military.

Success in unconventional warfare does not hinge on traditional battlefield metrics but on the ability of the allied nation to maintain its own security and to leverage allied strengths to grow internal capabilities. Promoting training as a key function of the army brings this mindset to the forefront. During the war in Afghanistan, the United States provided security in the host nation while simultaneously training its new army. This contrasted with the , where the American military equipped and trained an existing organization. In Afghanistan, the United States had to build a military from scratch.

In January 2002, several months after the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and US President George W. Bush announced the , which would receive training from the United States. From 2002 to 2014, 194,000 Afghan troops, in an attempt to give Kabul the ability to fight anti-government forces.

At the end of 2014, the United States ended Operation Enduring Freedom and began Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. In keeping with the belief that American victory hinges on the success of the indigenous forces, Freedom’s Sentinel laid out two objectives, one of which was the training of the . In 2019, there were over 14,000 American troops stationed in Afghanistan.

Training remains one of Washington’s primary methods for victory over the Taliban and other anti-government forces in Afghanistan. With President Biden’s decision to end America’s longest war and US troop withdrawal now in its final stages, the success of this mission will hinge not on the performance of foreign forces but on the performance of the Afghan army when it becomes the sole guarantor of security in the country.      

Support

The conflict in eastern Ukraine saw a different style of unconventional warfare led by America’s allies. Here, the host nation is responsible for its own security but relies on the United States for support to train service members. After the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada created the  with “the mission of training, equipping, training center development and doctrinal assistance to the .”

US and allied service members set up at Khmelnytskyi, Javoriv and Kamyanets-Podilsky. The was for up to five battalions to be trained every year. By 2016, the had 200,000 combat-ready soldiers. Over these years, Ukraine maintained its own security and relied on training from its allies to break the stalemate between nation-states.

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This mission was different from Afghanistan since the United States never took over Ukraine’s defense and worked to improve an existing organization, not create one that did not previously exist. But like in Afghanistan, the ability of American service members to train with allied troops was key to the success of the mission: enabling Ukraine to withstand the separatist insurgency in the Donbas region.

Following the start of JMTG-U, The Ukrainian military was able to prevent the pro-Russian forces from pushing further west, thus making an aspect of the mission a success. In 2020, Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe negotiated a in Kyiv. Though there are routinely tactical level of the ceasefire, it remains in place at a strategic level.

The longstanding training mission, combined with Ukraine’s desire to hasten its , likely means that Ukrainian forces will not have to fight pro-Russian forces unilaterally on a strategic level again. Thus, the only judge of mission success is Ukraine’s ability to guarantee its own security until becoming a NATO member.

Tandem

The US needs allied support to be successful against peer or near-peer threats, and mutual training allows for the cooperation and integration necessary for victory. In this scenario, the United States does not take sole responsibility for training or security but rather pursues those goals in tandem with an allied military. For instance, the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) )created the in 1978, with the mission “to deter, or defeat if necessary, outside aggression against the ROK.” In this alliance, the US and Korean forces share all responsibilities equally and have a structure for headquarters and component commands.

US training with Korean forces is similarly integrated in large-scale military exercises. is designed to “enhance ROK-US interoperability by training commanders and staffs from both nations in wartime planning, command and control operations, intelligence, logistics, and personnel procedures required for the successful defense of the Republic of Korea.” Similarly, is meant to help with the “integration of US augmentation forces that would be deployed to the peninsula during war.”

In both scenarios, the focus is on the two nations working together as peers on training and security. In the event of a conflict, the ability to repel a foreign adversary depends on the United States and its allies being able to overcome an enemy force together while still maintaining the ability to train new service members. Although the US and South Korea came close to fighting side by side multiple times during the Cold War, the most recent scare came in 2017, when President Donald Trump’s “” threat prompted North Korea to announce it was examining plans to launch missiles at Guam.

To maintain its dominance during any type of warfare, the United States must prepare all its service members to be able to train with allied forces. In special forces training, Green Beret candidates complete a capstone event known as , where the goal is to train with a local military force to repel an invasion. In this environment, candidates train mock resistance fighters. Mission success is when the resistance fighters are capable of leading training for others in their organizations and conducting operations missions on their own in a fake country called .

Robin Sage is meant to train service members for an unconventional conflict, but the hallmark feature of having Americans train with an allied nation can be adapted into other training scenarios designed for conventional forces. A US military prepared to train with allies will be able to adapt and win during future conflicts, making training with allied service members a crucial fourth block in the next generation of warfare. 

Tactical Cyber Warfare

The US military has focused on cyber, its related domains and the impacts they can have both abroad and at home. Part of this has been the acknowledgment of the newest war front — . Since the publication of “The Three Block War,” the scope, scale and investment in cyber warfare increased exponentially as information, and its use and misuse, loomed large in public minds and military planning. By 2004, the military and civilian was worth $3.5 billion in the United States alone. This expanding market was also tapped by cybercriminals, who collectively stole almost $1 trillion in 2020, prompting additional government and private security spending.

The growing importance of the cyberspace domain and the expansion of the Internet of Things has played a role in this acknowledgment. As more devices become networked and the sophistication of cyber tools grows, hostile actors have more opportunities to execute with and in case of success. In 2019, NATO declared cyber a domain of war, : “Allies recognise that cyber-attacks could be as harmful to our societies as a conventional attack. As a result, cyber defense is recognised as part of NATO’s core task of collective defense.” Tactical cyberwarfare’s growing presence and its potential to affect future conflicts illustrate why it is an important dimension in General Krulak’s neighborhood.

The closest example to an official definition of cyberwarfare was proposed by the former US national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counterterrorism, Richard A. Clarke. He defines cyberwarfare as “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” However, this strategic definition is based on the history of cyber warfare and technological limitations.

The as a means of exchanging communications is overwhelmingly the most common method at the strategic and operational levels of warfare and is increasingly important in tactical warfare. Advances in computer technology and other personal devices created a new realm of cyber: the tactical level. Harmful actors no longer need to depend on nation-states for funding and access but are capable of executing wide-ranging and crippling attacks as or .

Our current use of is defined as actions within the cyber domain that enable another warfighting function to achieve the commander’s objective. Tactical actions are executed at the division level or below, with approval authority residing at the level of the . Tactical cyber warfare in this discussion is executable by the military in the operating forces in support of ground forces without requiring support from another service or national agency. This definition brings cyber authority to a lower level than it currently resides at. But this is the level necessary to maintain an expeditionary force capable of acting in a time-dominant environment.

Tactical cyberwarfare presents both potential benefits and pitfalls for the US military. Recognizing cyber’s growing influence, the 2014 US Army’s stated the need for cyberspace capabilities that would be joint as well as tactical. This would enable service members to utilize cyberwarfare weapons in a wide range of environments, from local missions supporting combat operations to strategic cyberwarfare actions undertaken by coordinated actions across multiple branches of the military.

Many are only able to be used one time. Once a has been exploited, the adversary knows it exists and can monitor for similar intrusions or address the liability. An example is the discovery of , an extremely effective malware targeting industrial control systems that damaged nuclear facilities in Iran. The attack illustrated how cyber weapons are not restricted to computer networks; after the attack, the was patched. This limits future attacks that would have targeted the same software vulnerabilities and has potentially limited future attempts against systems other than computers as now more designers are aware of potential threats.

Onetime use results in tensions over who can approve cyber techniques, since a commander using an offensive cyber capability for one mission may result in future commanders being unable to use that capability. Unlike developing body armor to respond to new types of bullets, the for fixes on networked systems can have quick turnaround times and instantaneous upgrades across a large network. Although these decisions happen far above the tactical level, troops in an operation must understand why some capabilities cannot be used during a mission.

New Dimension

Opposite from the offensive side of cyber operations, operations exist to maintain the security of US military networks. But just as the US can use cyber as a weapon, its adversaries can as well. Every service member deals with devices that could potentially be exploited through cyber tools. Both military and personal devices are vulnerable to a variety of attacks, from malware to phishing. In 2018, following the revelation that were showing the location of US service members, the Pentagon banned devices with GPS capability in war zones.

Establishing cyberspace as a new dimension creates a seriousness and intent that do not currently exist. The perils and risks of adversary tactical cyber operations need to be added to the military’s updated training modules. The idea that both friendly and enemy forces can be located and destroyed due to carelessness with everyday devices needs to be imprinted into the minds of service members. These actions need to occur not just when troops deploy but as they train at home.

Cyber does not lose its utility outside of a hostile environment. In permissive or semi-permissive areas, cyber can be used for outreach, education and mission planning. Public affairs offices ensure with local media outlets, crafting a narrative around troops’ presence and intentions in foreign countries. In addition, cyber actions shape the environments for future operations. such as the Department of Defense’s “Humanitarian Operations Save Lives, Build Goodwill” adjust global perceptions of American troops.

These products, created in cyberspace for global consumption, are rapidly disseminated and obtainable at every level, from decision-makers at the United Nations to the users of internet cafes in developing countries. While cyber can reinforce hard military power, it can be just as useful reinforcing messaging from the United States through soft-power persuasion. As the US military plans and executes operations, cyber should be intentionally utilized from shaping actions to the execution of attacks.

US military operations validated General Krulak’s vision for the future. Knowing how to carry out all three types of engagement, as well as knowing that they may need to rapidly transition between tasks, was vital to the success of unit operations. But there are now more dimensions to the neighborhood.

Training local national forces has already become a mission for US service members. Despite shifting focus at the national level, training and tactical cyberwarfare remain key activities for the US military. Rather than a holdover from counterinsurgency operations, training local national forces is a way to ensure success in a conflict with a great power. As General David Berger stated in his , “Our wargames have shown that in any great power conflict, our alliances are an essential factor to achieving success.” Entering the fight with allies by our side enables more effective actions and reactions by the US military.

Meanwhile, cyberwarfare offers stunning new possibilities and horrifying new risks. Information that seems innocuous can be turned into a weapon. As the US military prepares to fight in cyberspace at the same time as it conducts operations in a physical environment, it needs to ensure its service members understand how the cyber factor changes operations at home and abroad, expanding conditions in General Krulak’s original three-block war.

Adopting a multi-dimensional mindset prepares the military, including the newest strategic corporals, to act in a complicated world. While the pressures and responsibilities facing our leaders continue to grow, changing mindsets during training and deployment enables service members to see the whole picture and make the right decision, saving lives and accomplishing the mission.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Changing Nature of the Three-Block War appeared first on 51�Թ�.

With this ever-increasing antagonism between China and the US playing out on the world stage, little imagination is required to appreciate the catastrophic result of a conflict between the world’s two largest economies with nuclear triads.

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Several years ago, Dr. Graham Allison of Harvard University unveiled a historical pattern where increasing tensions between rising and reigning states led to diplomatic friction and war. Allison this pattern Thucydides’ Trap, in honor of the Athenian strategos who identified “the growth of the Athenian power, which [put] the Lacedaemonians into fear” as a cause of the between 431 and 404 BC. Allison identified 16 cases throughout history in which the rise of a rival state provoked a response from an existing hegemonic power. In 12 of those cases, titanic wars followed, while peace prevailed in only four.

So, what lessons do the four cases with a peaceful ending offer when considering the nascent Sino-American rivalry? Close examination reveals that military, economic and political considerations contributed to a diplomatic decision for peace. In every case, both sides were vulnerable to substantial military losses in terms of personnel and equipment. The winner of the contest would find economic gains that paled in comparison to what they could have achieved in peacetime, and the loser could expect nothing short of economic devastation. Likewise, winning these conflicts could leave the victor weakened politically and almost certainly lead to the deposition of the loser. Victory in each case would have been Pyrrhic in human, economic and political terms. Defeat would have been near annihilation.

Thus, the four cases in which adversaries escaped the trap provide potential avenues for China and the US to do the same.  

Spain vs. Portugal

In the late 15^th century, the Iberian Peninsula held two of Europe’s economic and military powerhouses: Spain and Portugal. In Portugal, the reign of Henry the Navigator ushered in a period of exploration and colonization in Africa. Through a combination of squeezing out rivals and occupying key positions in the Eastern Atlantic, Portugal was able to utilize important sea lanes to facilitate with western Africa. However, the War of Castilian Succession between 1475 and 1479 with a unified Castille and Aragon, greatly shifting the balance of power by creating a unified Spain.

After the Reconquista ended with the capture of Granada in 1492, Portugal’s trading empire was exposed to a newly united Spain. Flush with captured Muslim treasure and in possession of an experienced military, Ferdinand and Isabella needed only to look west to find targets for future expansion. Later that year, the discovery of the Americas and the potential for economic dominance over two continents made war even more likely. Yet Spain and Portugal were able to the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. In doing so, they averted a potentially brutal military conflict.

Subsequently, Spain and Portugal concentrated their militaries and economic might into their colonial empires. Spanish colonies in Latin America and the Pacific created a colonial that only crested in the 18^th century. Portugal’s possessions in Brazil, Africa, India and the Far East allowed it to access spice markets, and it a Portuguese-Indian sea trade monopoly. Though both empires eventually faded, their shared peace allowed each of them to experience massive economic growth — albeit at the cost of the indigenous peoples they attacked and enslaved in doing so.

The example illustrates an emphasis on foreign trade and domestic investment instead of escalation to war. As a result of their peaceful settlement of tensions and the ensuing economic boom, Spain and Portugal became more politically stable. The new Spanish monarchy consolidated its power after 1492, making its previously multifaith state into a Catholic and ensuring that the ties between Aragon and Castille were permanent. Meanwhile, spurred on by strong trade from their colonies, Portugal was able to endeavor its

The United States vs. the United Kingdom

The precipitous rise of American industrialism and the modernization of the US Navy challenged British domination of the seas at the turn of the 20^th century. As American factory , as well as iron and steel production, surged, the US built a formidable modern of the latest capital ship designs. Consequently, the British government realized that the cost of a conflict was something it could ill afford. By the early 20^th century, the first lord of the Admiralty admitted that the United States could create a navy than the British Empire.

A territorial dispute over Venezuela in 1895 threatened to ignite a third Anglo-American war, creating economic panic. By 1901, the British Admiralty realized that the US Navy would soon possess the potential to outstrip the British Grand Fleet. Thanks to the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the leadership of President Theodore Roosevelt, American naval tonnage had tripled from to . Britain’s ability to maintain a stronger navy than its allies was threatened by this massive growth.

Meanwhile, Britain was also engaged in a naval race with Germany, its primary antagonist during the era. The rapid construction of the German high seas with the latest armor and guns threatened the British coastline and maritime trade routes in the event of a war. Faced with two bids for naval supremacy, the UK concentrated on the German threat and ignored American naval competition. By exempting the US from the two-power standard (to have as many battleships as its next two great competitors, plus 10%), and by leaving the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine unchallenged, Britain was able to deescalate the potential conflict between the two countries.

As a result of this diplomatic and military resolution, Britain’s prudence soon netted extensive economic and national security gains. As the Great War commenced, Britain’s war economy relied increasingly on raw materials, munitions production and food supplies from the United States. This ongoing trade, coupled with Imperial Germany’s unrestricted submarine and the of the Zimmerman Telegram, helped propel the US into declaring war on Germany in April 1917 and thus into becoming an ally to its onetime rival. By averting a war, Britain was able to win another, one with truly disastrous consequences for European liberty had it lost.

Although its enemies were dismembered or subjected to humiliating terms that sowed the seeds of political violence and the Second World War, the UK enjoyed a period of political continuity, which helped its victory against Nazi Germany in 1945 and led to a more gradual dissolution of the British Empire by the 1960s.

The Soviet Union vs. the United States

Following a joint victory in World War II, tensions rose rapidly between the United States and the Soviet Union. A 40-year rivalry and a nuclear arms race threatened the world with a mutually annihilating conflict. But despite multiple flashpoints, such as the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Cold War never fully went hot. 

Though the “mutually assured destruction” is typically used to refer to destruction by nuclear weapons, a conflict even before both sides wielded large arsenals could have been catastrophic. The Soviet Union was savaged by the Second World War with an estimated 24 to 27 million and could not afford another conflict in the immediate aftermath. Though the United States held a stronger economic position, it realized that an invasion of the Soviet Union was likely to end the same way it did for the Germans in the summer of 1941. Thus, for both sides, victory would have come at too great a cost.

Reeling from the cost of total war from 1941 to 1945, the Soviet Union quickly repaired its economy and produced notable growth consistently. Its annual gross national product (GNP) by 5.7% from 1950 to 1960 and 5.2% from 1960 to 1970. At the same time, the US experienced development. This was due in part to geographic isolation from Europe during World War II, which prevented extensive damage to American industries. The inception of new industries such as television, the rise of suburbia and government investment in infrastructure helped the US economy expand continuously for decades after 1945. The resources for each nation’s respective economic success would not have been available if they had chosen to start a third world war.

Extensive proxy wars led by the US and the Soviet Union offered glimpses of the destruction and economic hardship that would have ensued if NATO combated the Warsaw Pact. From 1955 to 1975, the United States fought a desperate containment war against insurgents in Vietnam that ended with a communist victory and the destabilization of several other countries in Southeast Asia. In Afghanistan, the Soviets 10 years trying to suppress the mujahadeen before their ignominious withdrawal in 1989.

Both conflicts resulted in the US and Soviet Union suffering tens of thousands of casualties among military service members, while causing even higher death tolls among the people of Vietnam and Afghanistan. Those wars also cost the US and the Soviet Union large sums of money that could not be regenerated, prompting economic hardship. The price of these proxy wars, terrible as they were in their own right, offered a window to the horror that would have ensued if the two superpowers had gone to war.

Eventually, the nonviolent end of the Cold War brought with it far greater political stability than a military tête-à-tête between the Americans and Soviets would have done. The new government of the Russian Federation was to take power quickly and without international incident.

Germany vs. the United Kingdom and France

Following the reunification of Germany in 1990, the fear of a third world war was foremost on the mind of the British and French governments, who prepared to make an independent should Germany rearm. Understanding this fear, and with the horrors of the world wars within living memory, Germany opted against its military to the same degree as earlier in the 20^th century. The costs of the two world wars further dissuaded Germany from posturing in a way that would invite another total conflict. In this way, the Germans ensured peace for the foreseeable future in Europe. 

As a result of decreased military tensions between the UK, France and Germany, Europe focused its energy on opening its borders and harmonizing its economic exploits. The of the European Union and the introduction of the euro currency cemented these aims. All three partners benefited economically from this period of stability. In 2019, Germany had the largest in Europe, followed closely by the UK and France, respectively. There is freedom of travel and ease of custom that furthers cultural interaction and social development, and Europeans are arguably happier, healthier and freer than they were at any previous point in history.

Subverting the Modern Trap

None of the four cases cited above is an exact clone of current relations between the United States and China. In both the Iberian and the American-British examples, there was a shared cultural background and a similar language between the two sides that doubtlessly contributed toward peace. During the Second World War, the US and the Soviet Union formed a military alliance that defeated Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. By contrast, the US assisted nationalist forces during the of 1945-49 and combated Chinese communist soldiers during the Korean War of 1950-53. In the late 1980s, memories of both world wars provided Britain, France and Germany with enough incentive to resolve their issues peacefully.

This does not mean there are no similarities each side can use as a guide to peace. Economic incentives played a role in the reduction of tensions between Spain and Portugal. Similarly, ending the trade war between the US and China and resuming normal economic ties would help fill each nation’s coffers. The United States and Great Britain were able to ally before combating a single enemy. If climate change were viewed as a shared problem, the US and China could ally to combat it together.

Finally, the US and China do not share a land border, which was also true of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; this reduces the opportunity for an overzealous or nervous service member to inadvertently start a conflict. Both countries, in addition, are important members of the United Nations, which mirrors how Britain, France and Germany were important members of the European Union and NATO.

Graham Allison’s analysis of relations between rising and reigning powers paints a grim future, one in which two powerful nations armed with nuclear weapons fight one another. To avoid such a future, the American and Chinese governments must strive to understand the lessons of the past. They must learn about the instances in which Thucydides’ Trap did not spring. Diplomacy between the two powers must always be pragmatic, and each side should understand that they will never get everything they want at the negotiating table. Finally, each side must scale down their military presence, particularly in the South China Sea, before a misstep or negligent discharge can potentially ignite a global war.

By recognizing the devastating harm that would occur in the event of a war, and the potential for economic growth and political stability if peace is sustained, two of the world’s largest powers can concentrate on shared goals and projects for mutual benefit. This will not be easy. But, as Benjamin Franklin once observed, “There has never been a good war or a bad peace.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Escaping Thucydides’ Trap: Keeping the Peace Between Rising and Reigning Powers appeared first on 51�Թ�.