Since the beginning of the nuclear interim ���ɾ��ٳ� the P5+1 in Geneva,  has expressed its displeasure at international negotiations with its regional rival. Riyadh is governed by a -influenced monarchy that seeks to legitimize itself through sectarian rhetoric, stirring the –divide. This rhetoric allows Saudi Arabia to counter its geopolitical enemy and predominantly Shia neighbor, .

Saudi Arabia has been among the most active governments funding the opposition throughout the . The Saudi government reportedly financed a major  of infantry weapons from Croatia to rebel forces. In addition, Saudi Arabia spends millions of dollars to aid and train the Syrian rebel group, , to overthrow Syrian President and act as a counterweight to jihadist groups operating within . These groups, most notably the , could pose a potential threat to the  (GCC), as seen by Riyadh’s recent deployment of troops to the ���ɾ��ٳ� . For Saudi Arabia, it is imperative that Assad falls from power and that Iran does not continue to expand its influence within Syria. This would allow Iran access to the Mediterranean Sea and a growth in proxies that are loyal to its government.

The fear of the Saudi government and the GCC is that Shia groups within the Gulf will become emboldened by Iran’s actions, leading to widespread unrest that would threaten regional stability.

Limited Options for the US

The has a number of key strategic goals in Syria, but faces several conflicting interests that have resulted in its inaction. The administration wants to limit civilian casualties within the country. In addition, it seeks to prevent the establishment of safe havens for  affiliates and other radical groups in Syria and Iraq; curb the growth of Iranian influence within the region; deter the use of chemical and biological ; ���Ի��� regional instability.

Unfortunately, Washington has placed itself in a position where it has only limited options to bring the Syrian conflict to an end. The Obama administration greatly desires a nuclear interim deal and does not wish to jeopardize ongoing negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran.

The second option is a partition of Syria into two states — one that is governed by Assad, and another ruled by a coalition of different Syrian rebel factions. While this outcome is not desirable either, the reality is that Assad is not going to fall from power, especially given his recent reelection. 

 in the is shifting from an active role to a more passive one, as Washington seeks to create a multipolar state system within the region where no one state can become the hegemon. The US government hopes that Middle Eastern countries will counterbalance one another, preventing states from becoming too influential. The US can, therefore, exercise soft-power influence as opposed to a physical presence within the region.

But US foreign policy has achieved the exact opposite. In seeking not to jeopardize the nuclear interim deal with Iran, the Obama administration has given Tehran free rein to continue its operations within Syria, laying the foundation for the expansion of Iranian influence. In addition, the brought a Shia-dominated government to power that has close ties with Iran. Therefore, Washington’s unwillingness to confront Iran has emboldened the Islamic Republic to secure its hold over the Shia crescent. For instance, the Iranian government will be the primary actor in sending troops into Iraq to combat the growing influence of the Islamic State — a group that threatens the strategic interests of both the US and Iran.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia sees itself as increasingly ostracized by the US, and has become frustrated with the Obama administration’s unwillingness to take military action against the Assad regime or to arm Syrian rebels. Moreover, Riyadh was left out of negotiations with the  in Geneva, due to concerns that it would jeopardize the deal-making process. Saudi-US relations have hit a historic low. Iran is enjoying its growing influence, while Saudi Arabia’s .

Therefore, the US has not achieved the creation of a multipolar regional system, but has rather enabled Iran to become a new regional hegemon that will continue to promote instability within the Middle East. Further, the Obama administration’s unwillingness to act has emboldened to extend its influence throughout the region. It is true that US policy must mimic the public’s war-weary opinions, but its foreign policy has achieved the exact opposite of its strategic interests.

Policy Suggestions and Predictions

Recent talks in Geneva failed to produce anything substantial for a peaceful conclusion to the Syrian conflict. The Assad regime attempts to keep the focus on terrorism, in order to distract from discussions of real reforms or even Assad stepping down. In contrast, rebel groups seek the overthrow of Assad and the creation of a transitional governing body, in accordance with Geneva II, but the Syrian regime refuses to comply with this point. In addition, Assad has been reelected for another seven-year term with 88.7% of the , widening his support base. Both the opposition as well as its Western allies, including the US, have deemed the  as illegitimate and a farce.

Regardless of the outcome, the Syrian Civil War and its repercussions within Iraq have changed the balance of power in the Middle East. The US is increasingly passive and Iran has risen as a regional hegemon, whose power will only increase as the international community seeks to reach a resolution on the nuclear issue. 

As both Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and hence enjoy veto power, there will be no international humanitarian intervention in Syria, save for the temporary ceasefire in Homs. Moreover, because Western powers resisted providing arms to Syrian rebels due to the persistent fear that those weapons could end up in the hands of al-Qaeda affiliates, there has been irreversible damage to the opposition’s strategic standing. At this point, the overthrow of the Assad regime seems unlikely.

This leaves the international community with two options, none of which are desirable but both being realistic and probable outcomes. The first option is that Assad will retain his hold on power and emerge as the victor in the conflict. This outcome is by far the least desirable for Western powers, as well as the Gulf states and the wider Middle East. The second option is a partition of Syria into two states — one that is governed by Assad, and another ruled by a coalition of different Syrian rebel factions. While this outcome is not desirable either, the reality is that Assad is not going to fall from power, especially given his recent reelection. This second option allows those that resist Assad to obtain a safe haven within a new state rather than suffer under the oppression of the .

This is the goal toward which the Geneva talks should strive. A focus on regime change has proven time and again to be fruitless, as each side refuses to compromise on their hard-line agenda. Partition would allow Iran and Russia to continue to have a strong state ally in Assad, and would likely entail Alawite-majority areas in Latakia and around the port of Tartus, giving Russia access to the port.

Additionally, a partition of Syria would allow for members of the opposition to form a government to counterbalance that of Assad’s and the Shia influence in the region. While this option may not be the most appealing, it is the most beneficial one for the international community, and allows for those who oppose the Assad regime to seek safety within a new nation.

Regardless of the outcome, the and its repercussions within Iraq have changed the balance of power in the Middle East. The US is increasingly passive and Iran has risen as a regional hegemon, whose power will only increase as the international community seeks to reach a resolution on the nuclear issue. The escalating situation in Iraq will be a test for the ever-reluctant US on how passive a foreign policy it can maintain. It appears that Washington has no problem allowing  to fulfill the role that the US has often played in the past.

The influence of Saudi Arabia as a regional hegemon and protector of Sunni interests will continue to weaken. Due to the softening of relations between Iran and the US,  will see its strategic influence diminish within the Middle East as its sworn enemy continues to rise. Finally, Russia will extend its influence within the region, in an effort to tap valuable energy resources. The effects of the Syrian crisis will be felt within the Middle East for decades to come.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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After the failure of peace talks at Lake Geneva, and the reelection of President , the question of how to resolve the devastating civil war in remains unanswered. Ever since the in 2011, diplomatic efforts have been repeatedly blocked by . The conflict has become a geopolitical proxy war between different members of the UN Security Council and key regional actors, in an effort to exercise and extend influence throughout the strategically important . In order to analyze a potential outcome of the , it is pivotal to understand the geopolitical interests of the most important players and their implications.

Putin’s Ambitions

In examining the underlying geopolitics of the Syrian crisis, the most important actor to dissect is the Russian Federation. is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has ensured the continued preservation of the Assad regime. Since the election of President , Russian foreign policy has sought to create a multipolar international system on the basis of statist values and norms, with Russia as an indispensable pole. The Kremlin seeks to secure its power and influence within the international system. This requires a balancing of regional hegemony by blocking efforts to supersede the Security Council, where Russia holds veto power as a permanent member.

In addition, Russia aims to extend its influence within the Middle East. It has supplied weapons for the Assad regime, while Putin ���ɾ��ٳ� , the new president, earlier this year. The stakes in the Syrian conflict are high for Russia, since regime change in could mean the destruction of Moscow’s last foothold in the region — its strong alliance with the Assad regime and the vital warm-water port in .

The Putin administration also fears for its own security, since a dissolution of the Assad regime could lead to widespread instability and sectarian violence stretching from to . One such precarious situation is in , where the , a jihadist group formerly known as the (ISIS), has declared the establishment of a caliphate; this was preceded by an offensive against the Iraqi government, with support from other Sunni groups and tribes. Such instability could be a security threat to Russia, who fears that violence may potentially spread across its southern .

Furthermore, Russia has strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. It is often mentioned that Moscow greatly desires stable control of Tartus, in order to serve as an eastern Mediterranean port. Tartus currently hosts the Russian Navy and maintenance station. The Kremlin has demonstrated its strategic interest in the port by : “As long as the Russian Navy performs missions in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea, this base is critical for us.”

In 2008, talks were held with Syria to expand the port and to establish others in and . These negotiations must be analyzed within the larger context of Russia’s deteriorating relations with . Due to diminishing ties, Kiev announced in 2008 that it would not renew the lease to Russia for its naval base in Sevastopol. However, the decision was reversed in . Due to Ukraine’s unpredictability toward Russia ever since the Orange Revolution of 2004, as well as the 2014 ouster of , President Putin has feared for his critical warm-water port in the Mediterranean. As the international community witnessed, the Kremlin took advantage of the uprising in Ukraine to send troops into Crimea, where Sevastopol is located. These actions, in addition to Russian support for the Assad regime within the Security Council, further demonstrates that Moscow seeks to expand its power and influence on the international stage.

As well as Hezbollah, it should be noted that Iran has provided support and guidance to other non-Syrian groups, including an Iraqi Shia militia, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, to which it gives monthly contributions of up to $2 million, according to Iraqi intelligence officials. 

In the context of the UN, the Putin administration has repeatedly spoken out against the actions of NATO within Libya. For Russia, UN Security Council Resolution , which authorized a no-fly zone over the country in 2011, was grossly misinterpreted and abused for regime change. This is precisely what Russia seeks to avoid with regard to .

Another reason for Russian concern in the Mediterranean is economic. Recently, large natural gas reserves were discovered in the Levant Basin Province, off the coast of . In addition, has located natural gas reserves off its own coast. These recent discoveries in energy resources are expected to decrease (EU) dependency on Russian energy supplies and, therefore, reduce Moscow’s leverage over the EU. Thus, it is of utmost economic importance for the Kremlin to exercise influence and control over these natural gas reserves in the Middle East. This may explain Russia’s recent actions in Crimea, as well as its continued for the Assad regime.

The Quds Force

In addition to Russia, Damascus enjoys the political and material backing of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Syria has long been Iran’s closest state ally and is seen as vital to Tehran’s interests. The country has historically been Iran’s strategic partner in deterring Israel from attacking the Islamic Republic’s proxies or its nuclear facilities. Syria has long served as Iran’s direct supply line to , and as a tool for Tehran to expand its influence within the “Shia Crescent” — the growing number of Shia regimes loyal to the Islamic Republic. Regarding the Syrian conflict, the Iranian government’s strategy is to keep Assad in power for as long as possible, if not indefinitely, while setting conditions to ensure it can maintain its influence if the Syrian president falls.

The Islamic Republic pursues this strategy through a  approach, which involves direct material support to the Assad regime, as well as an advisory and assistance mission to back Damascus’ security forces. In addition, Iran backs pro-Assad militias that are tasked with maintaining Iranian influence in Syria, in the event that the president is overthrown. As well as Hezbollah, it should be noted that Iran has provided support and guidance to other non-Syrian groups, including an Iraqi Shia militia, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, to which it gives monthly of up to $2 million, according to Iraqi intelligence officials. Iran has also trained militants prior to sending them to Syria. This approach serves the Iranian government’s short-term objectives, while laying the foundations for its long-term strategic interests in the Levant.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force and IRGC ground forces have maintained a substantial presence within Syria throughout the civil war, and have provided training and advisory services to the Assad regime and its army. It is widely believed that Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the director of the Quds Force, is the true orchestrator of loyalists to the Syrian regime and that Assad acts as a mere mouthpiece and puppet. Reinforcing this belief, former Syrian Prime Minister Riad Hijab : “The person that runs the country is not Bashar al-Assad but Qassem Suleimani.”

The strategy of pro-Assad forces to concentrate within major urban areas can be seen as evidence of Iranian involvement. Iran uses Syrian territory as a supply route for providing weapons to its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Therefore, this may explain the reason why pro-Assad forces were concentrated within the Damascus suburb of Zabadani, a major urban area along the Hezbollah supply route, in early 2012. If the Quds Force’s objective was to maintain a steady supply of arms to Hezbollah, then this strategy seems plausible, even though there was a stronger contingent of rebel forces within Homs. This is significant because it shows that Iranian strategy is formulated by the most senior officials within the Islamic Republic. It is the within the Supreme National Security Council that determines Quds Force operations, as well as ties with Iran’s proxies.

Moreover, Iran provides arms to the Syrian regime through Iraqi airspace. This is possible due to the lack of control the Iraqi government has over its territory and the minimal resources it can deploy. In addition, the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 provided a vacuum, which Iran filled in an effort to serve its  objectives. Since the pullout, Iraq’s Shia-led government has developed increasingly closer ties with Iran, while the Iranian government continues to support Iraqi Prime Minister ���Ի��� sectarian rhetoric. Iran provides military assistance to the Iraqi government, in an effort to combat the growing threat of the Islamic State and prevent the loss of valuable influence it extends over the country.

It is, therefore, evident that Tehran seeks to expand its influence within the region through the so-called Shia Crescent, which extends from Iran to Lebanon. As a result, the Islamic Republic aims to prop up the Assad regime while supporting paramilitary groups that are loyal to Damascus. For Iran, this strategy is a bid to lay a foundation for long-term interests if Assad is ousted. The expansion of the Shia Crescent is seen as a direct geopolitical threat to and the .

*[Read the final part .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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