China aspires for global leadership, but its intentions have often been undercut by its own reputation. Mercantilist, free-rider and, more recently, aggressive are a few of the labels that have been accurately used to describe Chinese foreign policy. Beijing, however, is doing all it can to counter these descriptors by using its power to reshape perceptions. One method used by the Chinese state to increasing effect is the deployment of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units for missions relating to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). Such operations, sometimes referred to under the term Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), present the PLA, and by extension China itself, as a responsible global actor. In truth, the criticisms of China’s foreign policy remain accurate, but the PLA has proven to be an effective tool by which to change perceptions about China’s role in the world.

According to a , China contributes more troops to UN peacekeeping missions than any other Security Council member state and is a leading financier of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). The same report detailed that China finds UN PKO operations a useful means to enhance the operational capacity of PLA units while also indirectly protecting Chinese national interests within and in proximity to conflict zones. PKO participation assisted in spreading China’s influence within the United Nations and enhancing its reputation among the other primary contributors to PKO around the world. These operations also have helped to improve China’s overall reputation throughout the world, particularly in developing states.

In 2014, the PLA sent a battalion of the troops to South Sudan for civilian protection-related missions. This was a progression from a major contribution of peacekeepers to Mali in 2013, which was Beijing’s most wide-ranging contribution ever. China’s interests in the Sudanese crisis stems back over a decade to the time when Darfur human rights violations were gaining international attention and the civil conflict between Khartoum and southern-based rebels was intensifying. A deal between the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation and the Sudanese government brought Khartoum and Beijing closer together and tied China’s national interests to the stability of Sudan.

According to an , China’s engagement with Sudan created a complication for its long-standing principle of non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign states. Negative international attention regarding the actions of the Sudanese government undercut Beijing’s messaging and the overall instability of the country put portions of China’s economic interests at risk. Partially because of instability in Sudan, the Chinese state decided on an adjustment to its long standing policy that declares foreign interference acceptable in cases where national interests are at stake, paving an easier rode for PKO going forward.

China’s military is also intensifying its capability to conduct HADR operations, which present an impactful way by which a country can gain international goodwill and, as such, it is a focus area around which military cooperation has . The PLA has invested in joint training operations on HADR with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia and the United States, among others. The PLA has stood up training units for quick deployment under emergency situations, similar to units used by the United States military during natural disasters or humanitarian crises. PLA’s humanitarian operations have had increasing impact in the Asia Pacific. PLA troops, viewed by many countries in the Asia Pacific as the face of China’s increasingly aggressive regional policy, can be easily portrayed throughout the media as an institution committed to stability and humanitarian relief.

China’s soon to be active dual use — its first overseas military base — will be a transit point for HADR operations throughout Africa and the Middle East. The base’s primary function is to facilitate People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels operating in the Western Indian Ocean, but Beijing consistently points out that the base is intended to serve multilateral and humanitarian aims. As such, China argues that the base is not evidence of China’s growing military strength and a tool to reshape the regional security order. Of course, the western Indian Ocean region, encompassing both the Gulf and East Africa, is important for China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative.

The project is a major vision for connecting Eurasia and much of Africa to China, and such intensive investment will inevitably have security dimensions. A base in the region can assist China’s future security dilemmas, but that is not the frame that Beijing wants to become solidified.

PLA evacuation capabilities were proven in Libya and Yemen, where thousands of Chinese nationals working in both countries were evacuated because of emerging warzones. In Libya, it was the start of the civil war in March 2011 that required the . It was the largest PLA-conducted NEO in history. A significant amount of sea, air and land military assets were used to conduct the overseas operation, including the contracting of private ships to ease evacuee overflow. In 2015, the PLAN evacuated about 800 Chinese citizens out of shortly after conflict arose. The Yemen evacuation was not anywhere near the size and scope of the Libyan operation, but the PLA, with assistance from other government agencies, was able to quickly direct aircraft to Yemen with little strain on the PLA and not complicate the international effort to evacuate other foreign nationals.

The PLA’s success in evacuating Chinese nationals out of Libya and Yemen was rightfully praised by Chinese citizens and many throughout the international community. These operations proved that the PLA is capable of conducting evacuations far from China’s shores, but it should be remembered that this ability has value beyond evacuation operations. The PLA, long a force capable of only homeland defense, had achieved the operational sophistication and tactical capability to engage in rapid deployment on a global scale. Observers around the world took note that the PLA’s abilities had become rough equivalents of leading militaries in North America and Europe.

The PLA’s capabilities in peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation have clearly matured over the past decade. Countries around the world now have evidence of how China can effectively contribute to humanitarian efforts that require the use of military units. Images of Chinese soldiers keeping the peace in warzones, providing relief during crises and evacuating its citizens when they are in danger have provided a narrative that shows China in a positive light.

Fewer people in the developing world are fearful of China’s foreign policy objectives, and the PLA’s efforts have contributed to this changed perception. Yet, despite its humanitarian contributions, China’s foreign policy remains problematic. Humanitarian concerns, regardless of the narrative they create, are not a priority for the PLA. These missions always have a public relations component attached to them. Given the changing reputation of China and PLA globally, it seems the PR campaign is working.

*[Note: The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the US government.]

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Elements of the Chinese and Russian navies just completed an eight-day joint exercise in the . Part of the ongoing Joint Sea 2016 training operation between the two nations, the most recent exercise featured anti-submarine components and amphibious landing elements, among others. Global reactions to the exercise have varied, but as with any joint project between China and Russia there have been ample speculation that the exercise signals a growing partnership between Beijing and Moscow. Joint Sea 2016 does have a geopolitical intent, but the message is more about the waters of the South China Sea than an emerging Eurasian alliance.

A Tale of Two Leaders

There is no mistaking that ties��between Beijing and Moscow have warmed in recent years. For much of the latter half of the 20^th century, relations between China and Russia were stormy, with the two countries even engaging in a seven-month border conflict in 1969. The warming of relations is in no small part due to the strong ties between the two countries’ leaders: Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

President Xi came to power with a deep understanding of Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, as he was both a student of Eurasia and spent time in Russia as he was rising through the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). President Putin, while not sharing Xi’s knowledge of the other’s country, has emphasized China and Russia’s overlapping geopolitical interests and found in Xi a strong leader who helms another of the world’s major powers.

The affinity between Xi and Putin has been noted by many and been used as an indicator that warming relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic could very well lead to a strong partnership capable of changing global trade and the world’s balance of power. China and Russia do have mutual interests. Both are wary of global institutions that have been established by Western powers and are perceived to be set up to hinder non-Western regimes.

Beijing and Moscow are keenly interested in the affairs of Central Asia, both��as a region in which to spread influence or as a region firmly within their��sphere of influence. The regimes of Xi and Putin employ nationalism as a means of��maintaining political legitimacy. Xi emphasizes the role of the CCP��in leading all of China back to its “rightful” position as a global power that can repel any aggression and erase the memory of China’s struggle during the 20^th century.

Putin likewise has portrayed himself as the leader who will protect Russian civilization against challenges from abroad, keep the West at bay from its encroachment into Moscow’s sphere of influence, and ensure that Russians set the course of their own future. Finally, through institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as more regular bilateral engagement and increasing skepticism of the West, the governments of both states are more familiar with each other today than in previous decades.

Political Divergence

There is no denying that these regimes have in both their strategic visions and political methods, but this hardly adds up to an emerging Eurasian partnership between the two strongest countries in Asia. For starters, despite Xi and Putin’s affinity toward one another, mutual distrust still exists throughout both governments. The legacy of the Sino-Soviet split in the mid-1960s essentially ended relations until the 1989 visit by then-Premier Mikhail Gorbachev. By that time, the Soviet Union was coming to an end, while China was on a path toward integration into the global marketplace.

Today, the two countries are really only connected in a political sense. China is an established economic power and a rising military power that seeks to gain hegemony over the western Pacific and to gain influence in the regions to its west. Russia, by contrast, is entirely dependent upon its natural resource wealth, invested in maintaining its friendships abroad and obsessive in protecting its traditional sphere of influence.

has not come close to expectations. By 2015, between China and Russia was set to reach a goal of $100 billion, but actual trade totals missed that mark by nearly $35 billion. A $200 billion goal by 2020 seems ludicrous at this point given the slow development of bilateral trade, an economic slowdown in China and a global drop in energy prices. Moscow emphasizes its trade with China far more than Beijing, which matches with the reality that Russia needs Chinese capital far more than China needs Russian raw materials.

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Political divergences are also present in the current relationship, even if the ties between the leadership remain strong. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its ongoing operations in Ukraine were an unwelcome distraction for Beijing, as it required China’s leadership to craft a message regarding the events in Ukraine that neither alienated Moscow nor gave the appearance that it��backed Russia’s actions. China has long followed several foreign policy tenets, chief among them is respect for sovereignty, and while China does not always follow its own guidelines, such as in the South China Sea, it does use this idea as means for building relations throughout the world.

The border region between both countries has long been the promised location of prosperity, but little has on the Russian side due to a decreasing population. on both sides of the border about a “wave” of immigrants remain even as workers and farmers flow into Russia from China.

In Central Asia, where both countries are heavily invested, there are indications that cooperation and competition between Russia and China go hand in hand. Russia has dominated Central Asia since the end of the Soviet era, but its interests there have always been primarily of a geopolitical sort. China sees Central Asia as a set of markets in which to gain a presence and as the backbone of its ambitious . In the final accounting, positive trends in the Sino-Russia relationship have not erased long-standing problems in the relationship. China and Russia remain competitors for influence in Eurasia and that should not be forgotten.

South China Sea

Over the last five years, the South China Sea has become one of the most tension-filled areas on earth. The waters of the South China Sea are that important. Fisheries account for billions in potential earnings, natural resource deposits provide the promise of additional windfalls, and some of the world’s most heavily used shipping lanes flow through these waters. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan each claim substantial parts of the South China Sea as territorial waters. Each claimant has engaged in some variant of behavior that could be called destabilizing.

The dispute over these waters is not new, but China’s recent actions in support of its maritime claims are particularly aggressive. Beijing has always posited that the vast majority of the South China Sea is its national waters on both a historical and political basis. Due to the modernization of its navy, its relative strength vis-à-vis other regional states and the arrival of a new administration in 2012, the People’s Republic intensified the means by which it claimed the South China Sea. The actions taken by China are well-documented and include the construction of artificial islands, the confrontation of regional naval vessels, and economic activity in waters that are not recognized as belonging to China.

In response to China’s more aggressive actions, East Asia is in the midst of a military arms and much of the region has become less politically toward Beijing and much more receptive to Washington. The United States, as a Pacific power in its own right and an ally with several East Asian states—Japan, South Korea and the Philippines—has become more involved by seeking to keep at bay, expressing concern over China’s island building and routinely engaging in (FONOP). Beijing does not want the US involved in the South China Sea, nor does Beijing believe that the US has any business being an actor within the dispute.

This is what Joint Sea 2016 is :��the tensions building in the South China Sea. The exercises included fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, marine forces, amphibious operations platforms and naval assets. Chinese and Russian military participants engaged in mostly routine naval activities, save one that should be noted—an island-seizing exercise that has repercussions for the South China Sea.

China, while enjoying positive relations with many countries around the globe, has very few relationships that include a security dimension. Russia is one of the few that it has developed a track by which joint training engagements can take place and with whom it��can convey a message regarding their capability and commitment. China has suffered several complications with its��maritime claims this year, including the of more frequent joint patrols between US naval and Japanese self-defense force vessels and the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s regarding maritime dispute between China and the Philippines.

A display of strength along with its Russian counterparts communicates that China is not interested in altering its claims. Russia, for its part, has not publicly supported Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea, but Putin has long had an interest in developing the capabilities of the Russian military in its Far East and signal to the world that it too is a Pacific power.

Joint Sea 2016

Joint Sea 2016 is not an unexpected development. The exercise itself is part of an existing set of joint training operations between China and Russia that have in past years taken place in the Sea of Japan and the Mediterranean. The fact that the exercise occurred in the South China Sea is perhaps provocative, but joint exercises are a routine component of modern naval operations and have had the positive offshoot of enhancing the professionalization of naval forces that, in turn, help to diminish the probability of problems at sea.

It would be premature to see these joint exercises as evidence of a building military partnership between China and Russia, for there remain divergences that will continue to create complications in the relationship. The lesson, instead, is that China is willing to bring to bear its full economic, strategic and military capabilities to ensure its claims in the South China Sea are maintained. Russia, while having its own objectives, is an effective partner by which to run these training operations in the western Pacific Ocean.

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The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China will soon take control of a dual-use port facility in Djibouti. Designed to serve both military and civilian functions—thus the moniker of dual use—the naval installation will serve China’s national interests in the western Indian Ocean region and can be used as a platform for operations in the Middle East and Africa.

This is the first overseas military base for the People’s Republic. The PLA has historically focused its efforts at protecting China’s borders, which made the military an army-, not naval-, dominated force. This base, estimated to be finished in early 2017, demonstrates that the PLA is increasingly interested in the maritime domain. Once a bloated organization tied down by inefficiency and poor strategic planning, the PLA is becoming increasingly more efficient, technologically competitive and strategically prepared.

The base being constructed in Djibouti is evidence of this. The position of the base is strategically sound and does not substantially risk stoking regional tensions due to its existence. More than anything, the PLA base in Djibouti reveals where Beijing plans to deepen its footprint and that it is increasingly ready to shoulder the risks that follow from such an act.

Why Djibouti?

Djibouti might seem too far afield from the Chinese homeland to make sense as Beijing’s first foreign military installation. Logistically,����is a difficult location, but from a political and strategic vantage there are few better locations anywhere in the world.

For starters, China’s immediate vicinity is tension-filled. Relations with its East Asian neighbors have����for the most part since President Xi took control in 2012, in no small part due to China’s more aggressive foreign policy since the new government arrived and a series of missteps that seemingly were designed to insult other states in East Asia.

Central Asia is a major destination for Chinese foreign investment and it could have been a location for a facility in support of land operations, but Central Asia remains a region where Russia’s shadow looms large and where suspicion of China’s intentions for the region have increased since the announcement of Xi’s One Belt, One Road Initiative.

A dual-use naval facility remains a possibility in South Asia, particularly at Gwadar in Pakistan, where the infrastructure already largely exists to establish a dual-use facility. China has nurtured relationships with several states in South Asia, but the region’s politics have and will continue to prove unstable. Furthermore, India’s����of a Chinese military presence in close proximity would inevitably lead to increased tensions. One day a base in South Asia may be a necessity, but today it would be too high a risk.

Djibouti is located in the Horn of Africa, giving China the����to project strength in both the western Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The installation is located amidst a region where China enjoys a positive reputation. The location also provides a base of operations for the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN)����counterpiracy operation in the western Indian Ocean.

China has put considerable national resources into the modernization of its armed forces and expansion of its foreign policy reach. This process has been a slow progression, but the base in Djibouti represents both a benchmark for the sophistication of the armed forces and as a culmination of investment in being able to build and sustain distant military operations.

Concern, Not Opposition

China’s enhanced����is a source of concern for other major military powers around the world. Look no further than the South China Sea, where China’s burgeoning military strength has changed the nature of maritime disputes and contributed to an����in the militarization of those waters.

The region surrounding the Horn of Africa, by contrast, has been a source of international cooperation, not regional contestation. The threat of piracy off the Somalian coast helped to establish��, a multilateral partnership that patrols the waters near the Horn of Africa to protect maritime trade and counter threats at sea. While China did not formally join CTF 151, PLAN has actively cooperated with other nations since arriving in the western Indian Ocean in 2008.

The base in Djibouti provides a dedicated repair and resupply facility for vessels engaged in maritime security and counterpiracy operations. China has also become over the course of the past decade one of the largest contributing nations to����(PKO). Currently, PLA peacekeepers are deployed in Mali, the Congo, Lebanon, Liberia, and South Sudan. Djibouti provides a central location to assist in both the deployment of peacekeepers and to supply such missions.

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Beijing has substantial interests in Africa and the Middle East. Infrastructure projects throughout Africa have facilitated trade between China and a host of states. The Middle East remains the primary source for the natural resources that fuel “factory China.” Greater ties between China and regional states translates into greater exposure to a host of security concerns, including piracy, terrorism, smuggling, and conflict. China, while still rejecting any notion that it will insert itself as an actor in any dispute away from its homeland, desires to possess the ability to better protect its goods, materials, and citizens.

Other global powers have taken a wait-and-see approach to this new Chinese base. The United States, the most active global power in the western Indian Ocean region, also maintains a����in Djibouti. Where relations in East Asia have become complicated between China and the US, in Africa, the Middle East and connected maritime regions, there are several avenues of bilateral cooperation, at least in theory.

Global Player

China’s stronger position in the region may prove to assist greater cooperation on a host of vital issues and help to dispel the viewpoint that China is and seeks to remain a free rider in global affairs. Yet China’s first base could also be a launching point for China to complicate US interests in the region, including gaining the favor of the Djibouti state over the US. The impact of China’s base will not be seen for some time, but the fact that other powers, especially US, are not inherently opposed to a deepened presence by the PLA in this region shows that China’s choice of location was a clever one.

China has become a global player. Its successes in diplomacy and trade have increased Beijing’s influence, but that success also brings with it increased threats. China’s citizens and property are today at greater risk to terror, piracy and theft as they have ever been before.

As such, the Chinese state recognizes that it must invest in the military and security sectors in order to protect the nation’s interests. This process within East Asia, where China’s efforts have been more aggressive, has led to increased tensions between Beijing and Washington (and most of the rest of East Asia). At the meeting point of Africa and Asia, however, China’s efforts thus far have increased Beijing’s ability to protect its interests while not undermining regional security efforts.��China is unlikely to become a major military player in Africa and the Middle East anytime soon, but what the base in Djibouti clearly shows is that China is determined to have a global military reach.

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Like most other major global powers that have preceded it, China is becoming entangled in the Middle East. A friendlier region to its interests than its own neighborhood in East Asia, China found in the Middle East an attractive zone for building economic ties. It��did not come to the region with much baggage and, as a result, found itself a trusted partner of virtually every state in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). China’s warm welcome throughout MENA encouraged Beijing to deepen its footprint—especially in the development and energy sectors.

The problem is that the MENA region is currently in tumult. State failure, civil war and regional conflict have all emerged simultaneously and in different ways have threatened the interests of every involved actor. China, for its part, continues to claim that it adheres to its tradition of non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign states and neutrality in regional disputes, but it is getting harder for Beijing to sell that story. China, whether they like it or not, has invested in the MENA region in such a way that it is now a party to some of the region’s most heated disagreements. No dispute looms larger and has more significant implications for Beijing than that of the proxy competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

China in West Asia

The MENA region—or what China calls West Asia—has been a critical area for Beijing for several decades. China’s booming economy constantly required greater energy resources to fuel growth, and the MENA region was an accessible locale for obtaining necessary fossil fuels.

Additionally, rising tensions with its neighbors throughout East Asia and increased pressure to find new market access for commodities the Chinese state to seize new opportunities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The MENA region offered more opportunities than most—the region, beyond being resource rich, was actively looking to build stronger economic and diplomatic relations throughout East Asia. Beijing created a presence in Libya, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel and Turkey, among others. Of chief importance were Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both are relatively stable states in an unstable region, possess immense natural resource wealth and can effectively serve as a target for strategic economic investment.

China’s interest in the MENA region only intensified upon the implementation of the , or what is called OBOR. The initiative is one of President Xi Jinping’s prominent foreign policy efforts and calls for the construction of communicative, infrastructural and transportation networks that connect Europe with China. The initiative or, more appropriately, strategy, follows two paths—a maritime path that goes through the Indian Ocean and a continental path that flows through Central Asia and the Middle East. The of OBOR is to initiate a period of intense development throughout Asia and eastern Africa, while easing the distance between China and its largest trading partner—the European Union (EU). OBOR has made existing multilateral groups, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, more important for Asia and led to the creation of new institutions to assist development, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

For China, OBOR is a means to further expand trade, make obtaining natural resources easier, enhance China’s regional reputation, and to strengthen underdeveloped western provinces within China. The downside of OBOR is that it is a massively expensive undertaking through regions that are prone to instability. More importantly, the deeper China’s footprint becomes in Eurasia and elsewhere, the more important it becomes to protect investments against potential loss. In other words, the more economically tied China becomes with nations to its west, the less likely it is that China can remain removed from regional politics.

The Gulf Problem

The risk of Beijing’s increased foreign engagement is represented by China’s current situation in the Gulf. A decade ago, China was a rising, reliable consumer of Saudi and Iranian oil and other natural resources. Beijing had very little to do with politics in the MENA region and operated under the notion of being an opponent to none and a friend to all.

Today, China finds itself with a much different footing in the Gulf. China remains Saudi Arabia’s largest petroleum customer and several high profile between Saudi and Chinese firms have created durable ties between both nations. In Iran, China’s forceful, if private, for a nuclear agreement helped the P5+1 talks succeed. Since then, China has actively sought to comprehensively intensify its ties with most sectors of the Iranian economy.

Will China’s actions lead to a decline in China-Saudi Arabia ties? No, but the impression that China will not back Riyadh in its opposition to Iran’s influence will harden the perception that China cannot be relied upon in the long term.

China, due to changing domestic economic conditions and the forces of OBOR, has substantially increased its engagement throughout MENA. The scale of China’s interests in the region has made it one of the most active non-regional actors throughout the Middle East. China’s prevailing political interest in the MENA region is stability, but Beijing’s intensified interest just happened to correspond with the Arab Spring and its aftermath, one of the most unstable periods in recent history throughout the Middle East. This regional instability has been off-putting for the leadership in Beijing, so China has become more vocal in its support for stable regimes and the forces within the region that in Beijing’s accounting have the best chance to enhance stability.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Thus, Iran and Saudi Arabia are critically important states for China, now more than ever. Unfortunately, the peak of China’s interest comes at the same time as the intensification of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that is being undertaken through proxies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere. This rivalry is difficult to navigate. Beijing’s to Syria, for instance, has consistently argued that stability should be the first goal and until another actor emerges that can effectively lead, President Bashar al-Assad and his regime must remain the faction in charge of Syria. This interpretation of events in Syria is purely premised on China’s regional economic interests and has very little to do with geopolitics, but backing Assad means that China supports the same faction as Iran and opposes Saudi Arabia.

OBOR, due the geographic elements of the continental route, Iran over any other MENA state. Beijing has consistently pointed out that the benefits of OBOR will be felt by the entire region, but geography cannot be denied. For OBOR to work, railways, telecommunication systems, port facilities, bridges and more comprehensive economic projects will be built in Iran. Such investment will inevitably assist the Iranian economy and make it a stronger rival for Saudi Arabia.

Beijing understands the increasingly difficult situation it finds itself in the Gulf. During President Xi’s January 2016 to the Middle East, he made sure to visit both Riyadh and Tehran to combat any perception of China favoring one over the other. Yet China’s plans do seemingly support Iran over Saudi Arabia, and this has been noted by both Saudi Arabia and its regional partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Will China’s actions lead to a decline in China-Saudi Arabia ties? No, but the impression that China will not back Riyadh in its opposition to Iran’s influence will harden the perception that China cannot be relied upon in the long term. Likewise, the appearance of Beijing’s support for Tehran could be misinterpreted by the Iranians as ratification of their regional aspirations.

The scope of Chinese engagement in the Middle East has reached a scale where it seems natural for China to begin to develop certain key friendships with regional states. Thus far, Beijing resists such actions. China’s leaders believe they can continue to navigate the region’s politics without blowback. Yet, as China’s investment portfolio grows even further and becomes more entangled in global issues like countering violent extremism, the ability to act internationally without reliable friends will become a hindrance. Today, China can pretend it does not see the MENA region’s political crises, but one day soon that luxury will no longer be affordable.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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