Recent times have seen the contemporary far right growing in popularity across Europe. The narrative of the international media has often focused on the that these far- right parties have caused in Europe by shaking up the mainstream political establishment. A number of European countries have seen a general in electoral support for-far right parties in national parliamentary elections recently, most notably in countries such as Germany, Austria, France and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. Three key — immigration concerns, dissatisfaction with the EU project and a lack of trust in mainstream parties and politicians — are often said to have caused this increase in support.

The Populist Radical Right Is an Electoral Threat That Is Here to Stay

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At the same time, it is often assumed that the far right has monopolized and laid claim to “owning” the immigration issue from mainstream parties on both the left and right. Recent research by has demonstrated that the far right’s ownership of the immigration issue is not uniform or as clear cut as the international media often portrays it to be. In some cases, center-right parties may shift their stances on immigration, adopting more anti-immigrant stances that may serve as a strategy to counteract the electoral threat that insurgent far-right parties offer on this issue.

Party Competition

Building on , we can argue that mainstream center-right parties are better able to frame and position themselves on the immigration issue compared to party families like the center left. There are two primary reasons for this. Firstly, center-right parties are to populist radical-right parties on immigration positions. Center-right parties have also been known to adopt dynamic stances on immigration, and there are numerous cases — such as in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France — where center-right parties have been closer to radical-right spaces and have also made the issue salient in their party manifestos.

At the same time, while some center-left parties have engaged with the immigration issue, they have generally seen electoral fortunes. Some have also argued that center-left parties are more constrained on the immigration issue than center-right parties due to their internationalist outlook and have thus been less willing to emphasize the issue.

Secondly, immigration is centrally linked to the core ideology of the right and to key such as keeping taxation low, maintaining law and order, alongside national security, which are likely to appeal to a core base of the center-right electorate. Recent research has demonstrated that center-right parties such as the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the (VVD) has historical precedence on the immigration issue, having adopted a cooptation strategy on immigration in reaction to the far-right List Pim Fortuyn’s electoral success in the early 2000s.

Issue Salience

Center-right parties recognized the 2008 economic crisis as a time of greater voter volatility during which the populist radical right seeks to secure more support through appeals over immigration. Examining parties’ electoral performances (the percentage change in vote share from the last two national parliamentary elections) during the economic crisis in 24 European Union countries, we find that specific center-right parties sought to respond with a “strategic emphasis” on the immigration issue to .

Whilst this effect is statistically significant, a closer inspection of the dataset showed that a specific type of center-right party performed electorally better, namely non-incumbent/challenger parties that were not in government at the time of the economic crisis. These results are also surprising as they depart from recent studies that demonstrate the importance of issue positions such as adopting tougher stances on immigration. Instead, these findings correspond to the issue salience model of voting and the importance of center-right parties making the immigration issue a salient one in their party strategies as opposed to adopting anti-immigrant stances. Thus, challenger center-right parties emphasized the immigration issue and performed electorally better or matched the electoral success of the respective far-right party. Examples include center-right parties such as the New Flemish Alliance Party (N-VA) in Belgium, alongside the Dutch VVD.

There are also center-right parties that did not perform electorally better during the economic crisis period, particularly when they are incumbents and are punished in line with theories of economic voting, like the Union for a Popular Movement in France, or when they do not emphasize the immigration issue, like the National Coalition Party and the Finnish Center Party in Finland. Thus, these cases show that there are electoral restrictions to emphasizing immigration in bad economic times, with potential electoral gains for populist radical-right parties.

A New Electoral Winning Formula?

The political scientist coined the phrase “electoral winning formula” to describe the dominance that specific radical right achieved in the 1990s by adopting neo-liberal economic positions alongside hardline positions on issues such as crime, law and order, and immigration. Since Kitschelt’s study, a number of scholars have shown how the immigration issue has come to the ideology of the populist radical right and the attitudes of the voters that this party family attracts.

There is preliminary evidence for a new electoral winning formula in this economic context, whereby center-right parties, particularly challenger parties, can profit electorally from this issue when they emphasized the immigration issue in times of economic crisis. In certain cases, the center right can even perform better electorally than the populist radical right on this issue. Center-right parties that were in opposition, like the N-VA in Belgium and VVD in the Netherlands, during economic downturns were not tainted by anti-incumbency effects and therefore had more freedom to compete on the immigration issue with populist radical-right parties.

The here has implications for the contemporary party competition literature in suggesting that specific types of center-right parties have the potential to benefit electorally from emphasizing the immigration issue in times of economic crisis. Whilst these findings do point to the electoral success of certain center-right parties in being able to challenge — and in some cases outperform — the populist radical right on its core issue of immigration during periods of economic crisis, there are a number of situations where the center right perform electorally worse. This is particularly true when they are incumbents, or when they do not emphasize the immigration issue.

Thus, these cases show that there are electoral restrictions to emphasizing immigration in economic bad times, with potential electoral gains for populist radical-right parties. Future research should seek to understand further the electoral success of the center right across Europe in different economic contexts through investigating how center-right and radical-right parties emphasized the issue of immigration outside periods of economic crisis, specifically in the context of the ongoing refugee crisis.

*[The  is a partner institution of 51�Թ�. This piece is based on a paper recently published in by the authors.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Drives the Center Right’s Electoral Success? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Academic scholarship and media coverage of the populist radical right has in the past few years, due to its rising prominence in global politics. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, these parties have further increased their vote shares and won in countries such as France and Italy. Although the Conservative European People’s Party will still form the largest faction in the European Parliament, the bigger factions of euroskeptic and populist-right parties will also make governance of the European Union increasingly difficult. Yet their continuous successful electoral performances at both European and national levels suggest that they will likely be part of European politics for the foreseeable future.

It is first important to differentiate between populist radical-right parties and extreme right-wing parties. Drawing on key scholars such as at the University of Georgia, there are three key features that characterize radical-right parties parties. First, they have a nativist, authoritarian and largely populist ideology. Populism for such parties means that they portray themselves as the “outsiders” in society and seek to overturn the existing political elites through widespread anti-establishment messages.

Importantly, populist radical-right parties seek to work under the confines of democracy and do not seek to overturn the democratic system. They do, however, reject the “liberal” component of democracy, manifested in their general opposition and intolerance toward immigrants and ethnic groups such as Muslims. Key examples include the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the National Rally (formerly the National Front) in France. In contrast, extreme right-wing parties tend to reject being democratically elected, and many of these parties’ historical roots can be traced back to post-World War II neo-fascism. Golden Dawn in Greece is one such example.

Key Drivers

Generally speaking, there are three key drivers that have fostered support for populist radical-right parties in the 21^st century. The first driver is a protest vote against mainstream center-left and center-right parties. Secondly, an emphasis on an anti-immigration strategy and turning immigration into a salient issue is another key driver in explaining why voters have chosen populist radical-right parties, most recently with the significant “” of these parties in the 2015–18 refugee crisis across national parliamentary elections.

These electoral increases can be found in our recent articles in both and , where we have built up an elections database covering recent national parliamentary elections in the 28 EU member states. Furthermore, during this time, the AfD, for instance, entered the German Bundestag for the first time in 2017, gaining 11.5% of the vote, while Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) obtained 26% of the vote the same year. Similarly, populist radical-right parties have also prospered from adopting strong euroskeptic stances resonating with some concerns among the electorate.

A third factor is the type of electoral system. In the UK, for example, where the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system is adopted, the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP) has to translate its overall vote share into seat share, the 2015 general election being one direct example of this. However, a proportional representation system used for European Parliament elections enabled UKIP to emerge as leading party in 2014. Proportional representation systems generally favor smaller parties since they are not based on “winner takes it all” competitions as is the case with FPTP mechanisms.

Interestingly, the (2008–13) and the did not lead to any significant increased support for the populist radical right, primarily due to parties focusing more on the immigration and euroskeptic issues, largely ignoring the key concerns about the economy and how to redress widespread unemployment and inequality at the macro-economic level. In a recent paper in the journal , the authors actually find that populist radical-right parties did not gain significantly in this electoral period, with mainstream center-right parties benefiting more electorally than the populist radical right, and especially mainstream center-left/social democratic parties.

There is no direct “copy” effect. There are some key commonalities as outlined above. But there is no direct electoral winning formula that can explain the electoral success of populist radical-right parties in 21^st-century European politics. Variations exist across Europe. For example, the FPÖ performed well in economic good times (1999 coalition government with the center-right Austrian People’s Party), as did the Flemish Interest Party in Belgium.

What is clear, however, is that some populist radical-right parties have benefited to a lesser extent from protest voting during the 2008–13 economic crisis, alongside increased levels of euroskepticism and, most significantly, in the recent refugee crisis electoral period, where populist radical-right party vote shares have increased at a . Electoral success for populist radical-right parties is also heavily dependent on the stances and strategies that the mainstream center right — conservative/Christian democratic parties — can adopt on the issue, alongside The latter appear to be the main party family that is losing key voters, from the working classes to a number of populist radical-right parties, particularly in Western Europe.

Ideological Variations

Populist radical-right parties by and large all tend to have the same ideological policies and strategies on immigration, in seeking to protect the white ethnic in-group and to reduce the number of immigrants coming in. In recent years, reducing immigration has changed to focusing more on reducing/getting rid of Muslim immigrants, alongside asylum seekers and refugees. This has been a key strategy of the AfD in Germany, openly propagating that Islam does not belong there. The main differences today are that populist radical-right parties have widely different policies on socio-economic positions.

For example, populist radical-right parties such as the National Rally generally adopt socialist/state centric (nationalization) policies toward the economy. In contrast, populist radical-right parties in the Netherlands, such as the Party for Freedom (VVD), and in Austria (FPÖ), have actually adopted neoliberal economic policies in seeking a laissez-faire approach to the economy. Populist radical-right parties are generally becoming more accepted now in the political domain. Some mainstream center-right parties such as Fidesz in Hungary are shifting more to the right on the key issues of immigration and nationalism, effectively transforming from a traditional conservative party toward a fully-fledged populist radical-right party in the 2018 Hungarian national parliamentary elections.

It is important to note that populist radical-right parties are now more tolerated and accepted by mainstream political parties, in part because they now have much larger vote shares than they used to and must now be taken seriously. One such example are the Swedish Democrats, who were rejected by mainstream parties at first, but have slowly turned into potential coalition partners. In contrast, extreme right-wing parties such as Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary tend not to be tolerated and accepted, as they do not seek to hide their racist policies toward ethnic outsider groups and, at the same time, have tended to hold violent street movements and protests.

Furthermore, the most electorally successful insurgent right-wing party family has by far been the populist radical right, performing considerably better than extreme right-wing parties. Primarily, this is because they have mainstreamed their parties and toned down their ideological rhetoric to become more palatable to a broader electorate across the EU and greater Europe. A key case study here would be Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, where the party has arguably become mainstream and more attractive to a much wider section of the French electorate in recent years. This has also certainly led to the party’s victory in last month’s European Parliament elections, in which it obtained 23% of the vote.

Right vs Left

As mentioned above, euroskepticism is one of the key characteristics and strategies of populist radical-right parties. However, for both the populist radical-right and the populist radical-left parties euroskepticism can come in many different forms. This is an important point to outline and note. Populist radical-right parties tend to focus much more on leaving the EU (hard euroskepticism) due to national identity factors such as sovereignty and controlling overall borders and territories. For the populist radical right it is about defending national sovereignty and the dominant ethnic in-group (nationalism). However, it is important to note that hard euroskepticism (opposition to the EU and a rejection of the overall EU project) is manifested completely differently in both far-left and far-right parties.

Though nationalism is the common denominator of both radical-left and radical-right euroskepticism, the radical left tends to equate nation with class as it opposes class exploitation. In contrast to populist radical-right parties, the left embraces civic nationalism. For the radical left, which seeks emancipation and independence from, among other things, Western capitalism and US imperialism, the EU is often portrayed as a sign of imperialism. However, tensions remain for radical-left parties on the issue of nationalism and internationalism, which need reconciling.

Radical-left parties’ rejection of the European Union stems from the EU’s tendency toward a neoliberal market structure, but not an Both Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain espouse a positive integration model based on social and inclusive policies alongside democratic institutions. They do not offer a binary choice between austerity as an EU member and anti-austerity as a non-EU member, and have focused on austerity as an issue while confronting the undemocratic and neoliberal EU political order.

Despite being labeled as euroskeptic, the radical left’s strategy on euroskepticism is “softer” than of the radical right and not in opposition to European integration outright. In contrast, populist radical-right parties base their opposition to the EU project around identity politics and socio-cultural issues such as immigration, in opposing the core freedom of movement principle and at the same time outlining how the EU is undermining the nation-state and the ethnic makeup of countries. Thus, there are clear differences between far-left and far-right euroskepticism within both party families.

Returning to populist radical-right parties, they are represented broadly in the Europe of Nations & Freedom Group in the EU Parliament. However, they have often disagreed with one another on socio-economic positions and also have different national-level interests. This is why there are often severe ideological disagreements between populist radical-right parties both in the European Parliament and also at the domestic level.

Take the of the FPÖ in Austria as a direct case of this, with the alleged corruption scandal and intra-party fighting over key issues such as immigration. Whilst populist radical-right parties appear to be surging in recent years across Western and Central-Eastern Europe (forming governing coalitions in Austria and Italy most recently), these parties often implode due to internal disagreements between the more moderate and the more extreme factions. This is not unlikely to happen to more populist radical-right parties in the future, with the FPÖ being one such potential example due to the recent scandals, and France’s National Rally being another party that has traditionally suffered from intra-party conflicts on strategies.

Here to Stay

In contrast to conventional wisdom, populist radical-right parties did not gain significantly from the global financial crisis, nor was there a “political earthquake” for the populist radical right in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Whilst mainstream parties on the center left and center right did lose out electorally, it was the populist radical left that performed better. However, fast forward to 2019, and we are witnessing substantial levels of support for populist radical-right parties in the European Parliament elections, with widespread fragmentation and greater voter volatility. At the elections in May, the populist radical right performed considerably well in Italy and in France. The Brexit Party, led by former UKIP leader Nigel Farage — more of an anti-political establishment party than a populist radical-right party — also recorded a “seismic” political earthquake, becoming the biggest party representing Britain in the European Parliament.

However, there were also losses for the populist radical right, particularly in the Netherlands (the Party for Freedom under Geert Wilders and at the same time increases for the challenger, the euroskeptic Forum for Democracy) and with the AfD not performing as well as expected. observed that populist parties won about 29% of the seats in the 2019 European Parliament election, an increase of around 5% from five years ago (24%), but less than the polls predicted (about 31%). Clearly however, populist radical-right parties performed considerably well in these recent elections and should be viewed as a warning sign for the political establishment across Europe.

Thus, in recent years, the populist radical right has profited electorally from the refugee crisis period and dissatisfaction with mainstream established parties across Europe, with its emphasis on anti-immigrant sentiment, a tough brand of identity politics and hard euroskepticism. The populist radical right is here to stay for the foreseeable future: It is not a flash-in-the-pan movement, and with politics arguably becoming more polarized, mainstream parties on the center left and right alike will need to rebuild.

*[The  is a partner institution of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Populist Radical Right Is an Electoral Threat That Is Here to Stay appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The majority of recent research has focused on the rise of populist radical-right parties in contemporary European politics. Recent cases such as Italy (Northern League), Austria (The Freedom Party), Hungary (Fidesz), Germany (Alternative for Germany) and the Netherlands (The Party for Freedom) have shown how the radical right has benefited from events such as the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe. However, it is important to note that this is not the case across all EU member states. It follows that much less attention has been paid in the academic literature in understanding cases where the radical right has seen electoral decline.

Belgium, for example, presents a “negative” case where the radical right has experienced a downward electoral spiral. The political scientists and have outlined how the Belgian political system is a highly complex consociational set-up that has historically led to frequent coalition governments being formed due to its multi-party arrangement, with French (Walloon) and Dutch (Flanders) speaking political parties being represented in coalition government.

Historically, these linguistic divides were the reason for high party fragmentation in the country. In addition, the underlying party competition that structures both Wallonian and Flemish politics is different. In 2010, it took a staggering 541 days  — a — for Belgian politicians to form an official government. This pattern further underlines the complexity, patterns of electoral volatility and uniqueness of the Belgian political system.

Immigration and Flemish Regionalism

In the early 2000s, the radical-right Flemish Interest (VB) dominated the Flemish political landscape, winning 24% of the overall vote in Flanders in 2004. The VB was often seen as a case where the radical right had prospered electorally. However, since reaching this short-lived apex, the party has been in significant decline for over a decade. A key court ruling in 2004 considerably weakened VB’s momentum. The party originally known as Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) was forced to set up a after the 2004 trial condemned it for racism. Since the founding of the newly created Vlaams Belang, the party has suffered a drastic reversal in its electoral fortunes.

In the 2014 federal election, VB’s vote share declined by four percentage points, receiving 3.67% of the ballots cast. At the same time, the party saw a reduction of 9 seats, from 15 to just three, in the chamber of representatives; it witnessed a similar fate at the 2014 European Parliament elections.

What core factors have caused this electoral decline for the Flemish Interest? The first key factor comprises party competition on the socio-cultural dimension of politics. In recent years, Flemish politics have been tensely polarized, particularly around the issue of Flemish independence. The conservative center-right New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), led by Bart De Wever, has adopted tough rhetoric on Flemish nationalism, embracing secessionism by seeking to eventually separate from the Belgian nation-state and form its own Flemish community. At the same time, N-VA has dominated the Flemish political landscape in Belgium and outperformed the VB.

One key explanation for this pattern is the N-VA’s cooptation of two key issues that VB was most often associated with. Our shows how the N-VA to emphasize the salience of the immigration issue alongside further highlighting the importance of Flemish independence. Such a restrictive strategy on immigration was likely an effective one, particularly in outperforming VB in the 2010 federal election.

It is conceivable that N-VA have offered a more and credible party strategy for voters in Flanders, compared to the rhetoric of the radical-right VB. But the N-VA’s right-wing political shift and restrictive positions on immigration have resulted in a high degree of , with the party gaining an incredible 44% of VB’s voters in the 2010 election. These same electoral patterns have continued into the 2015-18 refugee crisis period and underline how VB has become even more of a peripheral player in Belgian party politics.

Ideological Splits

A second and important factor that has also contributed to the long-term electoral decline of Flemish Interest is the ideological tensions within the party itself. VB has suffered from serious internal splits between its two main . These have polarized the party, with two contrasting strategies being offered. The current party leadership has outlined  (a so-called Marine Le Pen 2.0 strategy) and toning down the party’s rhetoric and language on key issues such as immigration and European Union integration. In contrast, a much more hostile strategy of radicalization has been put forward by another faction of the party. This internal schism has resulted in a loss of credibility among voters that the VB is capable of handling key electoral issues in Flemish politics.

A third factor is the so-called cordon sanitaire policy to effectively shut out the VB from ever entering mainstream Belgian politics. As Teun Pauwels and Emilie van Haute , the “cordon sanitaire is an agreement between other parties in the system not to cooperate with the VB under any circumstances at any political level.” This strategy by the main political parties in Belgium means that the VB can only ever remain an outsider and peripheral player in the country’s political arena. Even if the VB were to suddenly increase its vote share substantially, this would not likely aid the party. This is because mainstream Belgian parties would not cooperate, effectively prohibiting VB from gaining any real power.

Implications

The New Flemish Alliance has been able to outperform the radical-right Flemish Interest on key issues such as immigration and Flemish nationalism, effectively causing the downfall of the VB over the last decade. Though the ongoing refugee crisis has remained a highly politicized issue in Belgian politics, VB has not been able to capitalize from this issue electorally. The next federal election is scheduled to be held in May. Based on current polling projections, VB may perform marginally better electorally. However, it is highly likely that the party will continue its long electoral slide, with parties such as N-VA continuing to benefit from its weakness.

Though the Belgian case is a highly complex and an outlier in comparison to many other Western European countries, important implications can be drawn from demonstrating how center-right parties have the capacity to outperform the populist radical right on key electoral issues such as immigration. This is an important point to highlight as it suggests that center-right conservative parties may ideologically shift further to the right of the political spectrum, essentially mimicking the strategy of populist radical-right parties in seeking to capitalize on the salience of the immigration issue and outperform them electorally in national parliamentary elections.

As demonstrated recently in our article for , this strategy by the center right may serve to further legitimize the rhetoric of the radical right and bring it into the political mainstream. Recent election results in Hungary, Sweden and the Netherlands demonstrate how mainstream parties, particularly on the traditional center-right spectrum, have effectively sought to mimic the language of the radical right on key issues. This election strategy may serve to weaken liberal democracy in the long term across EU member states.

*[The  is a partner institution of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Is the Far Right Losing Voters in Belgium? appeared first on 51�Թ�.