The short-lived was launched by a section of the armed forces on July 15 by the so-called Peace at Home Council. During the ensuing hours, 145 civilians and 63 security personnel were killed, along with 24 personnel allegedly involved in the coup. Media outlets were shut down, bridges over the Bosporus in Istanbul were sealed, and shots were fired at the presidential and parliament buildings. Reports have said that onto Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s presidential aircraft, but did not fire.

The turning point in the coup attempt came when the plotters attacked parliament and Erdogan landed safely in Istanbul, galvanizing opposition politicians and a number of senior military officials to speak out in greater number against the action and prompting thousands of civilians to take to the streets to confront the plotters. Within hours, government-aligned security forces had succeeded in subduing the coup.

Despite fears of a possible second coup attempt, the prospect of this remains low in the near term, given the initial coup’s failure to secure wider backing among the military or public and the rapidly expanding crackdown against the military since. Only sporadic and low-level clashes took place after the coup had been quelled—those reported at Istanbul’s Sabiha Gokcen Airport and the Third Main Air Base in Konya on July 17, when suspected coup supporters resisted apprehension by the police—and there have been no subsequent indications of renewed clashes. The will also bolster the government’s authority, allowing it to restrict or suspend rights such as the freedom of assembly.

Erdogan’s crackdown

There is still uncertainty over who was behind the coup, though its participants seem to have been predominantly drawn from the ranks of the air force and the gendarmerie. President Erdogan has alleged the involvement of the Hizmet Movement led by who resides in the US.

Regardless of whether or not Gulenists played the leading role in the coup, its scale suggests much broader participation than just the cleric’s followers, indicating deep dissatisfaction within the military with government policies. Among the most controversial factors include the authoritarian and Islamist slant of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is widely seen as undermining the historically secular nature of the Turkish government. Meanwhile, there is significant discontent over Erdogan’s approach to the Syrian Civil War and the conflict against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The government’s current purge has the potential to significantly reduce the capacity of the armed forces at a crucial time for Turkish domestic security. In the days since the plot collapsed, 50,000 police, army officers, judicial officials and civil servants have been detained or suspended. The detention of more than 100 generals, along with more than 6,000 soldiers, suspected of involvement in the coup will have a detrimental effect on the capabilities and morale of the army. Among those detained is Adem Huduti, commander of the Second Army responsible for protecting the borders with Iraq and Syria and leading the conflict against the PKK in the southeast.

In addition, the divisions exposed between various factions of the security forces—with the coup largely led by the air force and gendarmerie, and the police and other military branches largely staying loyal to the president—pose major concerns over their ability to work together in countering the numerous security threats faced by Turkey. Coming just weeks after the , the purge stands to undermine the state’s resilience to such attacks, potentially increasing the terrorism risk around critical infrastructure and sensitive buildings in major cities.

Longer-term political implications

Erdogan is likely to use the crackdown to build momentum behind his efforts to strengthen his position, possibly rejuvenating efforts to increase the executive powers of the presidency through proposed constitutional reform.

The three-month state of emergency allows the president and cabinet to bypass parliament when drafting new laws. Political opponents of the AKP have already warned that the current purge will also be used as a justification to curtail their activities and to push the constitutional reform through parliament. Rival parties opposed to the constitutional change, notably the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), may prove particularly vulnerable. Before the introduction of the state of emergency, the government had lifted the parliamentary immunity of HDP lawmakers and accused them of links to Kurdish rebels.

Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism, including the continuing crackdown on dissent, risks provoking further civil unrest. In the past three years, there have been multiple incidents of protests against Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian style—the most significant being the weeks of anti-government rioting in mid-2013, which began in opposition to the development of Istanbul’s Gezi Park.

Although Erdogan is hoping the attempted coup will build public support behind his campaign to increase powers under the presidency, there are still doubts over support for the changes, with an IPSOS poll in May suggesting that just 36% of the population back the constitutional reform he seeks.

Continued opposition to the reform agenda and the purge may increase the risk of civil unrest in major cities in the months ahead. But as recent days have shown, Erdogan is unlikely to show much patience for further signs of dissent.

*[This article is based on a report by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your  is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a .

The post Purge Risks Weakening Turkish Security Forces appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Security has significantly worsened in Turkey since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to secure a majority in the June parliamentary election. The resumption of full-scale conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and a continued threat from Islamic State (IS) militancy in border regions and major cities show no signs of abating in the short-term. Although unrest in the southeast could still derail the election process, the current instability and the failure of efforts by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to erode support for the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) suggest the AKP will still struggle to secure a majority on November 1.

The two-year ceasefire between the government and the PKK came to an abrupt halt in late July following a Kurdish attack on Turkish security forces, reportedly in retaliation for the perceived government failure to prevent an in the Kurdish-majority town of Suruc. The escalation of violence since shows no sign of abating and, if maintained, could propel the conflict toward the height of the violence witnessed in the 1990s.

Ankara has broadened its attacks against the PKK, including tens of air strikes and a military and the imposition of curfews in some areas. The PKK has sharply escalated its activities against the security forces, conducting guerrilla attacks across the southeast, including ambushes that killed 16 soldiers in Daglica on September 6 and a further 14 in Igdir two days later.

As part of the preceding peace process, many PKK fighters were withdrawn from their traditional bases in the mountainous area near the Turkish-Iraqi border and repositioned inside the cities of southeast Turkey, increasing the vulnerability of urban areas in the southeast.

More than 100 security personnel have died in the recent outbreak of conflict to date, while the government claims to have killed around 2,000 PKK fighters—though media estimates are closer to 1,000. There have also been infrastructure, affecting critical oil and gas pipelines linking Turkey to Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. An attack on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which is vital to KRG oil exports, forced the closure of the line from July 29 until August 5, resulting in the estimated loss of $250 million in revenues to Erbil.

Additional security threats

As well as the resumption of the PKK conflict, Turkey has also experienced increased threats from Islamist terrorism in 2015. Prior to the Suruc attack in July, Ankara had managed to strike a precarious balance between Islamist militant forces fighting the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Turkey’s major ally in Washington. The Turkish government had seemingly tolerated the cross-border movement of Islamist fighters, including those affiliated with the Islamic State group, and also resisted US requests to become directly involved in operations against the group.

In late 2014, following sustained pressure from the US, along with violent Kurdish protests over the failure to assist the Syrian border town of Kobane against an IS siege, Peshmerga fighters to cross its territory to prevent the fall of the town. In so doing, Ankara managed to mollify the Kurds and the United States, while still limiting its involvement in operations against IS.

Following the Suruc attack, however, Ankara switched to a policy of direct involvement in the anti-IS coalition, first facilitating US air strikes, and then carrying out attacks of its own against the group in Syria. This has provoked a for supporters to attack Turkish targets and to conquer Istanbul. Given the position of Turkey as a primary conduit for Islamist fighters traveling to and from IS-controlled territory, it is now considered vulnerable to further attacks.

In addition, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), a Marxist organization, has conducted sporadic attacks against the government as well as US interests and has contributed to perceptions of insecurity in Turkey. An attack by two of the group’s fighters against the in August followed soon after the government had granted permission to Washington to utilize Turkish air bases for military operations in Iraq and Syria.

Implicating the HDP

President Erdogan has been widely accused of using the attacks against the PKK to generate nationalist support for the AKP ahead of the November elections. In recent weeks, the AKP has increasingly attempted to cast the HDP as the political , in an effort to erode the 13% that the HDP achieved in the June vote, which gave the party 80 deputies to parliament. This ultimately prevented the AKP from forming a viable coalition government and forced Erdogan to call the upcoming election rerun. If in November the HDP fails to achieve the 10% threshold for parliamentary representation, there is a much greater likelihood the AKP’s majority will be restored.

The AKP’s efforts to weaken the HDP’s popularity do not, however, appear to be succeeding and the party still maintains similar levels of support to those achieved in the June election. The government’s overzealous means of attacking the party and its areas of support–such as with the curfew in Cizre and mass arrests of party supporters–could actually bolster the HDP’s popularity.

The Turkish government has been linked to mob violence and attacks on HDP offices and Kurdish businesses, as well as media outlets considered critical of the government, with the US State Department expressing concern over in such activity on September 9.

Furthermore, media reports have also pointed to significant discontent among members of the military and their families, who view the resumption of full-scale conflict with the PKK as unnecessary, especially given the threats facing the country from Syria.

On September 13, the HDP chairman, Selahattin Demirtas, called upon the PKK to instate a ceasefire and resume talks with Ankara, in a clear attempt to head off the AKP’s efforts to portray his party as complicit in the PKK’s campaign of violence.

The diminishing prospect of peace

The insurgency appears likely to persist at least until the election, and the AKP has given little apparent consideration to a ceasefire agreement since the conflict intensified in July. Therefore, attacks against security personnel in the southeast and military air strikes targeting PKK strongholds will continue and key energy infrastructure may remain vulnerable to attack.

Major cities could also be targeted by Kurdish militants near to the election date, while the ongoing threat from the Islamic State, lower-level DHKP-C activity and probable large security deployments in Istanbul and Ankara ahead of the November vote will all contribute to a growing sense of insecurity among the electorate.

The PKK also shows , with imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan a somewhat diminished figure recently. Internal divisions will make any potential future ceasefire difficult to enforce among thousands of PKK fighters in a unified fashion.

As a result, the AKP could again suffer in the November election, ensuring the backfiring of Erdogan’s efforts to secure a parliamentary majority for the party. Local media reports and the latest polling bring into question the AKP’s prospects of regaining its majority in November, and English language daily Today’s Zaman has suggested that the AKP may even than during the June election.

There remains the prospect of the election being postponed, with Erdogan possessing the constitutional right to delay it by a year on the grounds that the country is in a state of war. A further possibility is that of a partial election, with the security situation in the southeast deemed too severe to stage polls in the region.

Indeed, Demirtas has that under the current conditions, the election will be impossible to stage in the southeast. An exclusion of a large proportion of Kurdish voters from the ballot could undermine the HDP’s support, thus favoring the AKP, but this scenario will be considered undemocratic and would likely intensify current levels of violence.

With such uncertainty comes greater instability, and Erdogan’s hopes of recovering the AKP’s majority are now being replaced with fears of rapidly resurgent conflict.

*[This article is based on a report by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your  is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a .

The post Bombs and Ballots Bring Uncertainty to Turkey appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Background

On May 7, the electorate will take to the polls in an election that seems virtually certain to end in a second consecutive hung parliament. Though it has been widely predicted that no party will possess sufficient among the 650 in Westminster to form a majority government, what remains unpredictable is the form an eventual government will take. The results that emerge on May 8 are likely to be followed by days, or even weeks, of negotiations toward the creation of a viable coalition.

In 2010, the right-wing Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats — who had long been the United Kingdom’s third largest party, with no experience of government at that time — combined to form a coalition that few had expected ahead of the election. Their marriage was one of convenience, and arguably necessity, as it represented the only way two parties could command an overall majority in parliament.

In 2015, however, polls indicate that Labour, the main opposition party, are at risk of losing many of their Scottish seats to the Scottish National Party (SNP), while the anti-EU (UKIP) may chip away at the Conservatives’ current holdings.

The Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, have suffered from being the minor partner in the ruling coalition, failing to promote their successes in tempering the Conservatives’ austerity program, and are also likely to see their tally diminish. The presence of several smaller parties, including some like the Greens and Wales’ Plaid Cymru, who have gained in prominence during this year’s election coverage, will fog the post-election political landscape even further.

Just ahead of the election, the two main parties remain extremely close in polling, with many aggregate indicating as little as 1% between them. Notably, Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system — in which each constituency is won by the party with the largest share of the vote, regardless of whether this represents a majority of the electorate in that seat — means that the significant poll counts of some of the smaller parties will not translate into a similar share of seats. UKIP, for example, has a support base that is far too thinly spread across the country for them to claim anything like the number of seats that would reflect their poll level, currently around 14%; they are, in fact, unlikely to win more than one or two seats.

© Shutterstock

Why is the UK 2015 General Election Relevant?

The result of the 2015 UK General Election could represent the diminishing of the Conservative-Labour dominance that has characterized much of the last century. It seems highly likely that in order to command a majority in Westminster, any government will have to include at least three parties. While the resulting horse-trading and compromise over policies and pre-election promises are familiar to many countries in Europe and beyond, this is something with which British parties have had very little recent experience.

The matter is complicated by the supposed red lines held by certain parties. Labour leader Ed Miliband, for instance, has ruled out a coalition with the SNP due to its stance on Scottish independence, despite the willingness of the party to support a Labour-led government, not to mention the fact that such an alliance could prove if Miliband is to take over 10 Downing Street. An alternative arrangement may see one or more parties offering support to a minority government’s legislative program on a case-by-case basis, without being part of a formal coalition.

The unpredictable nature of the post-election environment and the virtual certainty of in-depth negotiation between the parties mean that no political party will be able to carry out its manifesto in full. As such, the positions of each party represent a mere starting point for negotiation over policies that often diverge in profound ways.

Among the landmark policy areas of the 2015 election are the future of the economy, the UK’s status in the European Union (EU) and the country’s immigration controls. The parties’ stances on each of these issues could prove potently divisive during negotiations.

Under the Conservative-led coalition, the British economy has started to emerge from the malaise of the previous decade’s financial crash. In 2014, the economy grew by 2.8%, and wages are gradually rising. Meanwhile, the national deficit has been reduced by around a third. However, the government has faced persistent criticisms for failing to keep borrowing in check, or for placing too much faith in its policy of austerity as an economic panacea.

All three of the major parties promise to continue to lower the , and though opposition to this as an overall priority has been voiced by both the Greens and Plaid Cymru, the influence of either party in any governing arrangement would likely be too small to hold much influence. The differences between the three main parties are to be found in the speed with which the deficit is to be reduced, and the balance sought between tax rises and spending cuts. Whatever form the next government takes, it will face the difficulty of continuing both deficit reduction and economic growth.

© Shutterstock

The UK’s membership of the European Union has been a prominent point of contention between the parties, and an area in which one of the smaller parties — UKIP — has had a notable influence. UKIP advocates a complete withdrawal from the EU, despite the 2014 European elections in Britain. The party views the EU as a costly, inefficient and undemocratic restraint on British sovereignty.

In an attempt to mollify its long-standing anti-Europe wing, the Conservative Party has pledged to hold a referendum on membership of the EU. Labour and the Liberal Democrats are much more pro-European and would only support a referendum in certain circumstances, like a further transfer of power to Brussels. While the Conservative Party commands a great deal of from the business community, many have warned that a withdrawal from the EU following a referendum could have profound economic ramifications. Banking giant HSBC has warned that it may relocate its headquarters in event of a British withdrawal from the EU, and a recent German has suggested that a so-called “Brexit” would cut Britain’s gross domestic product (GDP) by up to 14%.

Immigration is another issue where the nascent UKIP has held a disproportionate influence. The party has employed persistently tough and rhetoric regarding infrastructural strain, loss of jobs to foreign labor and “health tourism,” capitalizing on the government’s failure to reach its target of reducing immigration to below 100,000 a year. The resulting pressure has driven even the left-wing Labour Party to of the need to control immigration; though some parties — most notably the Greens — have pointed to the it has brought the country.

The negotiations that follow the election will test the resolve of the parties involved to stick to their manifesto pledges. The set of policies that results may not strongly resemble those espoused by any single party, but if the present trend of increasingly multipolar politics continues, this is something the UK electorate will have to get used to. The same may be true of the that will characterize British politics after the election, as the two-party dominance of Westminster continues to ebb away.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: ��/ / /��

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your  is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a .

The post The UK General Election Explained appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Background

After decades of global prohibition encompassing virtually all except alcohol, there are signs that major reform of drug laws is starting to become a possibility. There is a growing awareness among researchers and policymakers that the current system of prohibition has failed in its goals. The proliferation of new psychoactive chemicals, along with technological developments that have created novel and covert distribution channels, pose real questions over the ability of law enforcement to keep up with the vast criminal enterprises that currently profit from the status quo.

In the 1920s, the banned the sale of alcohol, a policy that resulted in the opening of thousands of illegal bars across the county and led to the rapid rise of the mafia. Once this misguided experiment was brought to an end, criminal groups and the authorities shifted their focus to drugs. The following decades saw the introduction of increasingly restrictive policies, in the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the War on Drugs by US President Richard Nixon soon after.

Despite billions of dollars spent on interdiction, incarceration and eradication, drug use has continued to rise. The UN that around 243 million people use illegal drugs, and the global trade is around $435 billion. This money is absorbed by vast criminal enterprises and even terrorist organizations.

In the US, punitive drug laws have led to the development of an expansive prison industrial complex, with the prison population exponentially since the 1970s. This has been characterized by huge racial disparities in arrests, prosecutions and sentencing.

Meanwhile, evidence from several countries has shown the dangers of attempting to tackle by force the gangs who control the market. In large parts of , the ongoing drug war launched by President Felipe Calderon in 2006 has resulted in the collapse of law and order, with tens of thousands of people having been killed since.

In recent years, two further advances have served to highlight the failure of the current system of prohibition. In 2009, first in and then the US, the illegal drugs market was flooded with a set of “legal highs,” because they were developed and circulated faster than laws banning their sale could be passed. This short-circuiting of the law was solidified with the concurrent development of murky online marketplaces, concealed in the shadows of the dark web, most notably the Silk Road. These marketplaces have allowed drug users to buy virtually any quantity of any drug they like, and efforts by the authorities to shut them down have struggled to keep apace with the technological experts behind them.

© Shutterstock

Why is Drug Reform Relevant?

With the failures of drugs prohibition increasingly evident, recent years have seen the first tentative calls for change at a high level. Foremost on the reformist agenda is the moving of drug policy out of the criminal justice realm and into that of health. A harm reduction approach of this type is seen as a crucial first step in solving the problems currently caused by drugs and drug laws, but many go further and claim that only through legalization of the bulk of illegal narcotics can the criminal trade be brought under control.

Legalization in this sense does not imply an open market free-for-all, but rather the regulation of substances — in a manner similar to pharmaceuticals or alcohol, depending on the drug — so the highly lucrative trade is taken out of the hands of criminals and put into those of governments, thereby allowing not just for taxation, but also a much greater degree of quality control, reducing harm to users.

While the Netherlands’ long-time toleration of cannabis will no doubt be the most famous example of a country experimenting with a more liberal approach to drugs, it has perhaps been Portugal that has taken the boldest step to date. In 2001, all possession or use of small quantities of drugs to be a criminal infraction, instead being dealt with through treatment or community service programs. In the years following the change in policy, drug use among adolescents and so-called “problematic” users declined, as did the rate of HIV infections in what had been the worst-affected country in the . Nevertheless, all production and supply has been left in the hands of criminals.

With such a positive sign of the potential of policies that favor harm reduction over punishment, the calls for change gathered pace. In 2009, the chairman of the British government’s Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, Professor David Nutt, was fired by the Home Office following his calls for the laws over individual drugs to more accurately reflect their harms.

His argument featured the now notorious claim that statistically, taking ecstasy is no more than horse riding. Two years later, a panel of officials the Global Commission on Drug Policy released a report calling for an end to the War on Drugs. The commission includes former Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan, former US Secretary of State George Schultz and the former presidents of several of the countries most affected by the illegal drug trade, including , and Mexico.

Of course, calls for liberalization have not been as forthcoming from serving politicians, though notable exceptions have arisen. In 2012, then-President José Mujica went against public opinion and began the process of legalizing cannabis in Uruguay, while newly elected President Tabaré Vázquez has said he will keep the policy unless it produces negative results. In January 2014, US President — whose administration has abandoned the phrase “War on Drugs” — stated that cannabis was no more harmful than alcohol. Most recently, Liberal Democrat MP Norman Baker  from his post as a UK Home Office minister following a dispute with Home Secretary Theresa May, when the latter reportedly tried to block the release of a government-commissioned report that found tough laws did not lead to lower drug use.

Nevertheless, serious change is still some distance away. The British government shrugged off Baker’s challenge with little concern, instead continuing to highlight the dangers entailed by certain drugs, such as high-strength “skunk” . In the US, Obama has in fact done very little to change the legal situation, beyond placing a stronger emphasis on treatment and going some way to addressing the long-standing disparity between crack and cocaine penalties, seen by many as racially biased.

A number of US states may be experimenting with the legal regulation of cannabis, but only with the tolerance — not approval — of the federal government, with no guarantee that this will continue into a future administration. While the likes of Uruguay, the Netherlands and Portugal may be seen as setting useful examples of different approaches, we are likely still some way off from any government experimenting with the broad regulation of illicit drugs. Yet the dialogue is starting to change, and with that, the prospect of the law following suit will only increase.

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a or you could choose to be a .

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: / /

The post Should Drugs Be Legalized? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Despite numerous attempts to enforce the ceasefire reached in Minsk in September 2014, the separatist conflict in eastern is deteriorating. On January 23, Alexander Zakharchenko, leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, any prospect of a truce, and the separatists’ unwillingness to enter negotiations forced the of peace talks in Belarus a week later.

Kiev has echoed a separatist pledge to conduct a major recruitment drive, as separatist forces continue their assault on the city of Debaltseve. The city is strategically located between the separatist strongholds of Donetsk and Luhansk, and its fall would represent a major victory for the pro- forces. The level of the separatists’ territorial ambitions was perhaps indicated by their brief attack on Mariupol on January 24, a city that lies on the road to Russian-controlled .

The United Nations has since warned of a potential humanitarian crisis, as the conflict zone threatens to spread over a region containing some 5.2 million people.

Amid the repeated, failed attempts at reviving the ceasefire agreement, recent actions by the and have risked further destabilizing the situation. In the past week, officials in Washington have stated that they are considering whether to arm the Ukrainian military, broadening assistance to Kiev beyond non-lethal military aid. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich that this would result in “colossal damage” to Russian-US relations, and NATO’s on February 5 of its greatest defensive reinforcements in eastern Europe since the will further antagonize Moscow.

The extent to which the US is willing to follow through on its threat is questionable. Washington has sought to portray the threat as meaningful, and during his confirmation hearing in front of Congress, Defense Secretary-Nominee Ashton Carter indicated that he would support the commencement of lethal aid. Three major US officials — Vice President , Secretary of State and current Defense Secretary — have traveled to Europe to discuss the situation with Ukrainian and NATO officials, adding further credence to the threat.

However, there are indications that Washington would lack support among many of its major European allies, with both and declaring their opposition to a plan to supply arms. In addition, any lethal support from the US would likely be matched and exceeded by Moscow, and Washington would be unlikely to sustain the level of commitment required to offset Russia’s alleged provision of military aid to the separatists.

© Shutterstock

NATO commander Gen. Philip Breedlove of arming Ukraine as “throwing more weapons on the bonfire,” and he warned that an escalation of the conflict may provoke a strong response from Russia. This could come in the form of more direct intervention by Russian forces, who Moscow insists are currently involved on a small-scale and voluntary basis only.

It may also impact on the US directly, through an increase in sanctions on American businesses operating in Russia, and a rise in Russian cyber attacks against US government offices and businesses. Such attacks have already increased in concurrence with the Western sanctions regime against Moscow, as exemplified by the major Russia-linked data breach at US bank JP Morgan Chase and nine other major financial institutions in summer 2014, regarded as one of the largest such breaches in history.

Given the lack of international support for the plan, along with the risk of escalating the conflict and exacerbating poor relations with Moscow, the prospect of the US arming Ukrainian troops remains low.

The threat has, however, served to increase the urgency around finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict, with French President and German Chancellor travelling to Kiev on February 5 to launch a renewed attempt at a negotiated peace. Although details of the proposal have yet to be announced, Hollande has claimed that it is based on preserving Ukraine’s territorial integrity and that it may prove acceptable to all sides. The leaders are due to meet with Russian President on February 6 to discuss the deal.

Yet the experience of recent ceasefire attempts leaves the outlook of this latest effort pessimistic. Ukrainian President has steadfastly refused to countenance any proposal that threatens Kiev’s sovereignty over the separatist regions in the east, a position that is unacceptable to the separatists. Meanwhile, even if Russia can be persuaded to support the plan, indications among separatist forces suggest that they have little interest in ending their offensive at this time.

As such, regardless of the US decision over supplying the Ukrainian military with arms, the conflict threatens to resume at its current intensified state. With Kiev and the separatists both augmenting their forces, there is a heightened risk that the conflict will expand and the civilian death toll will continue to escalate.

*[This article is based on a report by .]

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your  is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a  or you could choose to be a .

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: ��/ /��

The post US Intervention in Ukraine Risks Further Conflict appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Background

On September 18, 4 million voters in will be asked a “yes” or “no” question that could have profound implications for their country, and for the United Kingdom of which it is a part: “Should Scotland be an independent country?”

The fact that the referendum is scheduled to coincide with the 700-year anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, a landmark victory for the Scottish during the First War of Scottish Independence, highlights the historically fraught relationship between England and Scotland. This has included numerous cross-border disputes and campaigns for independence from English subjugation, of which this referendum is arguably just the latest.

Since King James VI of Scotland unified the English and Scottish crowns in 1603, the union has not always been harmonious. While there has been little by way of violence between the two countries since the Jacobite revolt of 1745, several attempts have been made in the interim period to secure Scottish home rule. These culminated in 1999 when the Scottish Parliament was established in Holyrood, granting Scotland a range of legal powers, while still leaving it ultimately subservient to the will of Westminster.

It seemed as though the question of Scottish devolution had been settled, by and large. That is, until May 2011, when Alex Salmond’s Scottish National Party () won a sweeping victory to take control of the Scottish Parliament, and demanded that a referendum on independence be held. In October 2012, First Minister Salmond and British Prime Minister signed the Edinburgh Agreement, outlining the terms for the referendum to be held in 2014.

The campaign in favor of independence, Yes Scotland, is being led by the SNP, along with the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Socialist Party. It has sought to promote the benefits of an independent Scotland, finally granted political autonomy, much greater economic self-sufficiency, and the possibility of its own range of social policies divorced from the traditional elites that control Westminster.

Meanwhile, the Better Together campaign, championed by the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties that dominate politics in London, believes that both Britain and Scotland will suffer in terms of finances, culture and security by breaking apart.

have consistently shown that the majority of people in Scotland would prefer to retain the union, even if they do prefer the notion of greater autonomy. However, in recent weeks, the polls have tightened considerably, with the latest just a six-point lead for the No vote, down from 17 points in June. Following the final televised debate between Salmond and Better Together leader Alistair Darling, polls indicating a SNP victory.

Why is the Scottish Referendum Relevant?

Scotland has been in a solid political union with England, as part of , for more than 300 years. Scottish identity is widely considered to be an integral part of the wider identity of the UK. Yet there are far more tangible reasons that make the upcoming referendum very relevant to the future of the UK.

The Yes campaign points to the many benefits of political independence that are taken for granted by the stronger party of any union: the ability to determine social policy; to choose which wars to enter into; and to levy and spend taxes in a way deemed most suitable for that geographic entity. Independence would certainly incur notable costs, such as the need to negotiate entry into the and , and the loss of the collective security of the UK. Scotland on its own would have struggled to bail out Scottish banks in the wake of the financial crisis. But these are costs worth paying for the sake of genuine political independence, according to Yes Scotland.

The rest of the UK would face its own notable changes. The British parliament would require significant reform, having been shorn of 59 out of 650 seats in the House of Commons. This could result in a major boost to the Conservatives, who currently have only one Scottish member of parliament; without Scotland, the Tories would have won a majority of 21 in the 2010 general election, thus avoiding the need for a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Cameron’s opposition to Scottish independence, then, could at least partly be attributed to a fear of being the prime minister who oversaw the breakup of the union.

The UK without Scotland would have notable economic . Britain would be be deprived of a significant source of revenue in terms of the North Sea’s oil reserves, to which Scotland could be entitled to as much as 90%, representing billions of pounds in annual revenues. The UK itself would lose 32% of its land mass, albeit only 8% of its population. It would be forced to relocate its nuclear submarine fleet, currently based on the River Clyde.

In the event of a No vote, the issue of further devolution of powers — specifically a significant broadening of powers over taxation and welfare policies — may arise once more. But with the next general election to be held in 2015, such an issue would likely take something of a backseat, especially given the Tories’ of support north of the border.

A Yes vote, meanwhile, would represent only a first step in a long process toward Scottish independence. Negotiations would then begin, over issues like a potential currency union and the splitting of oil revenues, to determine the precise shape of the new political landscape in Britain and Scotland.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

��/

The post The Scottish Referendum Explained appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Despite the undoubted early coup of killing , foreign policy has proven a particular area of vulnerability for US President . He has been stalked by sustained attacks from over his response to the deadly assault on the Consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. His efforts to bring the and to the negotiating table seem to have been undone by the recent merger of Fatah and , and the subsequent rapid  in the conflict. Obama has been accused of attempting to placate long-time enemy , and of dithering over how to respond to Russian expansion into and now the ongoing security situation in .

Many of these criticisms have been lacking in substance and are largely partisan in nature. The  affair has become one of the Republican Party’s favorite sticks with which to beat the president, despite the fact that no amount of digging has led to the kind of scandal they have sought to portray. Obama’s lack of success over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has mirrored that of virtually every previous attempt to address the issue. While many Americans may react with an instinctive revulsion to the notion of cutting deals with Iran, the engagement with Tehran over its nuclear program may yet lead to an agreement that allows for a purely civil nuclear program. Even if it does not, the ongoing dialogue marks a significant shift in Iran’s relations with the West and could result in further cooperation, as already  in regard to the Iraq crisis. The application of sanctions on Moscow for its involvement in the ongoing unrest in Ukraine seems to have had some effect, with Russian President  taking apparent steps to deescalate the crisis.

Shifting Sands

However, Obama’s hesitancy in determining a course of action over the -led insurgency in Iraq represents a major test of the shift in foreign policy he set out in a  to the West Point Military Academy in May. The speech outlined a new role for the US as an enabler of security, by facilitating partner countries in their efforts against shared threats. The goal is the projection of US power from a distance without the profound costs in terms of dollars and lives incurred since 9/11. This new foreign policy stresses that military action will only be resorted to when US interests are directly at stake and prizes rather than shirks international support. It sees a renewed emphasis on the use of diplomacy and sanctions for applying pressure. It also recognizes the fact that military force alone cannot confront extremism, by highlighting the importance of education and development as “soft” weapons in the US foreign policy armory.

This shift reflects contrasting political exigencies faced by the White House. The aforementioned criticisms by the Republicans of Obama’s weakness on foreign policy necessitate a response that underlines America’s continued role at the forefront of international affairs. But there is also an awareness that after the experiences of Iraq and , there is no longer an  in the US for direct intervention, as exemplified by the administration’s failure to gain support for airstrikes on in 2013, both in Congress and among the .

Certainly, it is difficult to envisage more of a failure than George W. Bush’s Iraq folly, yet there is thus far little to suggest that Obama’s approach will achieve the kind of enduring success in confronting Islamic extremism that eluded his predecessor.

Crucially, the new policy also reflects the fact that no longer represents the monolithic threat it was portrayed as ten years ago. The threat has instead been devolved to myriad smaller and decentralized groups, spread over a broad geographical area. As such, a more granular, reactive and cooperative approach is required than that seen in previous years. Any direct action on America’s part would thus be limited and focused. Examples of this approach have already been borne out in the continued campaign of drone strikes in �����Ի���, the involvement of Navy SEALS in  the hijacked MV Morning Glory oil tanker in in March, and the operation on June 15 to apprehend a  in the Benghazi attack.

Of course, whether the exploitation of isolated opportunities to achieve narrow tactical goals will have broader strategic success than the grand military campaigns of the Bush administration remains to be seen. Certainly, it is difficult to envisage more of a failure than Iraq folly, yet there is thus far little to suggest that Obama’s approach will achieve the kind of enduring success in confronting Islamic extremism that eluded his predecessor. The splintering of al-Qaeda into countless dispersed groups is hardly emblematic of a contained threat.

Iraq: Testing the New Foreign Policy

Obama’s careful deliberation over major issues has been one of the defining features of his presidency, certainly compared with Bush. However, over the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, accusations of hesitancy have started to seem justified. The Islamic State and its Sunni supporters made sudden and rapid advances to take control of several important Iraqi cities, including Mosul and Tikrit. On June 29, the Islamic State proclaimed the establishment of a caliphate encompassing territory under its control in Iraq and Syria.

The period after the escalation of the insurgency offensive in June has been marked by speculation, first over the US redeploying troops to Iraq and then over possible airstrikes. The first was swiftly ruled out, while the second seemed a strong possibility, particularly when, on June 18, the Iraqi government formally requested precisely that action. The pressure on Obama to engage with the crisis has been intense, especially given the global perception that it is a crisis in which American action has played a formative role. With Secretary of State  comments on June 24 that in the absence of a substantial Iraqi military to support would be a “total act of irresponsibility,” the Obama administration seems to have taken a clear step back on direct military action, for now.

Instead, we can see what might be an example of calibrated but cautious support for a country on the frontline of the battle against Islamic extremism. The Pentagon is sending military advisors to evaluate the state of the Iraqi military, thereby providing the White House with a better impression of how best to support the country’s fragmented forces.

The depth of division in Iraq and the evident weakness of its security forces — contrasting with the demonstrable strength of Islamic State insurgents and their allies — may make this something of an unwinnable situation.

Meanwhile, Obama and Kerry have stressed the importance of national unity in confronting the insurgency, calling upon , Sunni and leaders to pull together and support the Iraqi government. In the face of a splintering country, Kerry has facilitated moves toward forming a new government and distributing power between Iraq’s various sectarian and ethnic factions. Despite early indications that the prospects of forming an all-inclusive unity government were highly limited, the Iraqi  is pressing ahead in hopes of a breakthrough.

Obama’s Greatest Test

The current Iraq crisis is perhaps the sharpest possible test of Obama’s shift in foreign policy, and the administration certainly faces enormous challenges. The depth of division in Iraq and the evident weakness of its security forces — contrasting with the demonstrable strength of Islamic State insurgents and their allies — may make this something of an unwinnable situation.

In this light, Obama’s actions may be guided more by political necessity than by some nascent grand strategy. Ultimately, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq is likely to represent little direct threat to the US, beyond the already-present prospect of American citizens going to fight alongside extremists and then returning home with newfound militant expertise.

Also unpalatable to the Obama administration, particularly ahead of November’s mid-term elections, is the prospect of Republican accusations that the administration has frozen in the face of an Islamist militant advance, and is simply watching the great democracy project in Iraq crumble to pieces. As is so often the case in international engagement, with burgeoning partisan pressure and the prospect of Iraq’s total collapse seeming ever closer to reality, the worst option — politically at least — is to do nothing.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

��/

The post Iraq: Making or Breaking Obama’s Foreign Policy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

One of the most frequently touted arguments of those opposing immigration reform in the US is that sanctioning any sort of guest-worker program would have a deleterious effect on native workers. But this ignores the fact that entire sections of the economy thrive on the cheap, unskilled labor provided by illegal immigrants; labor which from within the American workforce.

Passing through almost any town in any US state which borders Mexico, one cannot help but be struck by the extent to which these sections of the economy thrive on this foreign labor force. Restaurants, farms and construction sites are particularly replete with cheap labor from across the border. There are millions of workers across the US who have entered the country illegally, and each year, hundreds of thousands are deported, often along with children who were born in America. As such, recognizing the role played by these workers by bringing them into an official system of worker rights — including the possibility of attaining citizenship — is not just a moral imperative, but an economic one too.

Recent efforts to address the status of America’s estimated 11 million illegal immigrants have failed, including as well as . But developments since the 2012 presidential election have indicated a newfound urgency among lawmakers to address the issue. President Barack Obama predicted the passage of a reform bill . On April 10, the Rally for Citizenship saw in cities across the US. And several business heavyweights, such as Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, have called for an end to an immigration policy which is

The Role of Demographics

But what of the Republican Party, who are normally steadfastly opposed to any reform beyond a tightening of border controls? The current demographic reality of the US may finally bring such unified opposition to an end. There are around 24 million Hispanic Americans who are eligible to vote, and this already substantial bloc is in coming years.

In last year’s presidential election, Mitt Romney lost the Hispanic vote . There is thus an increasing belief among Republicans that if the party is to have any chance of regaining the presidency, it must start appealing to Hispanic voters. And with most of America’s illegal immigrants being of Hispanic origin, a softening of attitudes towards immigration reform is likely to be a key part of this appeal. It is therefore unsurprising that among the "Gang of Eight" responsible for the in June, is Florida senator, and potential Republican presidential nominee in 2016, Marco Rubio, himself the son of Cuban immigrants.

The Senate bill would allow undocumented workers who have been present in the country since before 2012 to apply for "temporary status," following the payment of a fine in recognition of their thus-far illegal activity. This status would enable them to work under a legitimate and taxed system — but without eligibility for state benefits — and would create a path first to permanent resident status, and then to citizenship.

As a necessary precondition before those with temporary status can apply for a Green Card, the government would have to meet key border security goals, including the stopping of 90 percent of illegal entries into the US.

To this end, billions of dollars would be spent securing the most porous sections of the border with Mexico. This is seen as a crucial element for this bill to succeed where others have failed. The bill would also allow for a greater number of skilled immigrants to remain in the US technology industry, while including provisions designed to assuage the fears of conservative lawmakers, such as preventing companies from hiring cheap foreign labor over US workers.

An Uncertain Path

Then why are some claiming that the prospects for real reform are already dead in the water? Simply enough, the demographic pressures which exist for those concerned with the Republicans’ presidential prospects may not apply to the same extent to House Republicans, . Speaker of the House John Boehner has unequivocally announced that the Senate bill will not progress through the House. Instead, by representatives, which will include yet further provisions on border security. At the very least, this will slow down the legislative process considerably.

Furthermore, there is clearly a delicate balance to be struck between providing a pathway for legal status, and ensuring that the numbers and categories of those joining the US labor force are suited to America’s economic future. Those opposed to reform, such as the Heritage Foundation, which is presided by leading Tea Party member Jim DeMint, insist that anything resembling a mass amnesty for millions of illegal immigrants to those who are working in the US legally.

Yet it is clear that President Obama views immigration reform as a key goal in his second term of office, and has said that he will take the lead if Congress fails to do so. Opposition to reform continues to erode, with even the conservative that new legislation would inflict further damage upon the economy. While obstinacy among House Republicans certainly poses a substantial obstacle, it is not an insurmountable one. By blocking reform of an issue which has received so much media prominence, Republican representatives would be handing a different kind of political victory to the Obama administration.

For President Obama, and for those Republicans who genuinely care about their party’s long-term presidential prospects, this issue is too important to be allowed to wither on the vine once more. Therefore, there is still good reason to hope that some form of reform will be brought into law. With a little luck, whatever shape reform ultimately takes will reflect the fact that the US is a country founded by immigrants, in which foreign workers continue to play a vital role. 

*[This article was based on an earlier version published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright ©     . All Rights Reserved

The post US Immigration Reform: A Mirage on the Horizon? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Why has Obama failed to close Guantanamo Bay?

Background

The detention camp at Guantanamo Bay has become perhaps the most potent and divisive symbol of America’s “War on Terror,” and one which then-Senator Barack Obama promised to end during his 2008 presidential campaign. Yet there are still 166 detainees being held at the camp, and the past few months have seen the longest hunger strike in its 11-year history.

The detention camp was established in the early months of the War on Terror by then-President George W. Bush, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan.

The Bush administration asserted that the threat of future terrorist attacks justified the use of interrogation techniques verging on torture. The designation of suspected al-Qaeda members as “enemy combatants,” rather than prisoners of war, was used as a means of circumventing the Geneva Conventions, allowing for the application of “enhanced interrogation techniques” against them. Hundreds of suspected terrorists or terrorist supporters were sent to Guantanamo Bay from Afghanistan, often including those of dubious value to US intelligence operations.

The sight of hundreds of detainees — shackled outdoors in orange jumpsuits — brought discomfort to many as the international goodwill towards America following 9/11 soon dissipated. As the wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq became increasingly drawn out, Guantanamo Bay came to represent American overreach in its battle against terrorism.

With reports of repeated sessions of waterboarding and other harsh interrogation techniques, along with a series of deaths including six suicides, Guantanamo Bay’s reputation continued to worsen. Obama, while running for president, claimed that the camp had damaged America’s image abroad and promised to close it — one of his first acts in office was to order the closure of the detention center within a year.

Why is Guantanamo Bay Relevant?

Despite a frequently proclaimed desire to close the detention camp, President Obama has made very little progress in doing so. Consequently, there are currently 166 detainees still being housed at Guantanamo Bay, more than half of whom have been cleared for transfer since January 2010.

The failure to address the status of these detainees, along with the reported seizure of personal items and mishandling of the Qur’an in February 2013, provoked an extended hunger strike which continues today. While hunger strikes have been fairly regular occurrences at the camp since 2005, the current one is notable not just for its duration, but for the number of detainees taking part — reportedly more than 100 at the strike’s peak.

Many of the strikers have been subjected to forced feedings by the camp’s medical staff. The strike has succeeded in drawing the attention of the international press, forcing President Obama to address the issue of remaining detainees once again.

The blame for the lack of progress has been placed on obstacles such as congressional opposition to the relocating of detainees to mainland facilities, and difficulties in ensuring the safety of those approved for transfer to their home countries.

Regarding the first of these obstacles, US politicians have proven themselves determined not to permit Guantanamo detainees to be moved to the US. Plans to house the remaining detainees in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or in the Thomson Correctional Center in Illinois, were abandoned in the face of steadfast opposition from local and national officials. At several junctures, Congress has voted to prevent any transfers of prisoners to the US, against the wishes of the president.

Transfers have been further inhibited by poor security situations in the home countries of many detainees, most notably Yemen. Of the 86 detainees approved for transfer, 56 are Yemeni nationals, yet there has been a moratorium on transfers to that country. On May 23 of this year, President Obama announced that this moratorium was finally being lifted, but so far, no transfers have occurred since then.

Even if all of those cleared for transfer are removed from Guantanamo Bay — and US jurisdiction altogether — there would remain a further 80 detainees whose status has not been addressed. Of this number, 46 have been designated for indefinite detention, on the grounds that they have been deemed too dangerous for release, but cannot be tried in court. This is either due to a lack of sufficient evidence against them, or to the inadmissibility of such evidence for having been obtained under duress.

Thus, despite a purported desire within the Obama administration to address this issue once and for all, there seems little prospect of the detention camp being closed in the near future. With only seven of the remaining detainees currently facing charges, Guantanamo Bay will likely remain as a kind of judicial limbo until a viable solution can be found.

Image: Copyright © . All Rights Reserved

The post The Future of Guantanamo Bay appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Despite signs of progress, the path to immigration reform in the US is far from clear.

Background

With an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US, the country’s immigration system has been regarded as broken for some time. This perception exists on both sides of the political spectrum. The Republicans are eager to improve border security and restrict the ability of cheap migrant labor to undercut American workers, and Democrats want to provide a path to citizenship for immigrants upon whom the economy partly depends.

Yet recent efforts to reform the immigration system have faltered. A bipartisan bill to address the issue , while the DREAM Act — aimed at granting residency to illegal immigrants who came to the country as minors — has , despite several reformulations since 2001. The issue has proven to be one of the most divisive in US politics. Supporters of reform decry the exploitation of millions of undocumented workers who have no legal rights. Opponents fear that reform could amount to amnesty for individuals that have crossed the border illegally. The economic impact of granting a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants is hotly contested, and for those living within the US-Mexico border states, the issue is often seen as one of security.

Despite the seemingly intractable nature of the problem, there have been recent signs of progress towards a solution. In April 2013, following months of negotiations, the so-called Gang of Eight — a bipartisan group of senators, including potential Republican presidential nominee Marco Rubio — proposed the . The bill would create a path to citizenship for immigrants who arrived in the US before 2012, while guaranteeing billions of dollars of funding for border security measures. The bolstering of border security is included as a precondition to the granting of permanent resident status, while those seeking citizenship would be required to pay a fine in order to account for their illegal activity.

In June, the by the Senate in a 68-32 vote. Even with involved in the bill’s passage, it is expected to meet tough opposition from the Republican-dominated House of Representatives. House Speaker John Boehner has that the House will not pass the Senate bill, instead taking a piecemeal approach which will delay — if not entirely derail — the legislative process.

Why is Immigration Reform Relevant?

In the early days of his first term of office, President Obama promised to make a key issue for his administration. With so much of his political capital expended on the passage of health care reform, the immigration issue fell by the wayside. Its return as a prominent goal during Obama’s second term can, to some extent, be seen as the result of demographic realities made apparent in the 2012 presidential election. The Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, by a margin of three-to-one.

With the already substantial voting bloc posed by the estimated 50 million Hispanic Americans in size over coming years, the Republican Party’s electoral prospects partly hinge on its ability to appeal to the currently eligible citizens. Standing in the way of immigration reform will do nothing to help this cause.

While Republican support for immigration reform may well be tempered by the need to appeal to their traditional voters, there are some indications that even this may not be as clear-cut as it once seemed. A prime example is the argument that creating a path to citizenship for millions of illegal workers will harm the American economy. That charge is from members of the business community.

The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the Senate bill would by hundreds of billions of dollars in the long-term, while boosting economic output. Whether such predictions will foster a spirit of compromise among House Republicans remains to be seen.

Image: Copyright © . All Rights Reserved

The post The Immigration Debate: Reforming America appeared first on 51�Թ�.