The end of the Cold War saw an era of systemic redefinition, undermining the friend-enemy dichotomy that shaped the international system for half a century. The path of the American century has since been put in jeopardy by an initial — and troubled — period of US-led unipolarity and then by the growth of new powers in the East. Yet the expected emergence of an “Asian century” is more present than ever. As , a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, notes, “[T]he ‘rise of China’ has been the most read-about story” of the 21^st century. This shows the magnitude of a debate that has rapidly become mainstream among academics and the general public. Are we facing a progressive West-to-East power shift within the international community?

The decline of the West

The assumption behind the emergence of an Asian century is the ongoing decline of the West. Unsurprisingly, research about the decay of the Western system is remarkably rich. The essay that is often dubbed the modern progenitor of this scholarship is British historian Paul Kennedy’s . Kennedy’s work is a complex historical analysis that finds in the balance between economic wealth and military power the equilibrium that ensures the resilience of great powers. As Professor of the University of Exeter notes, Kennedy’s book became popular because of one short section in which he was directly engaged with the American decline, simultaneously stating the rise of Japan as next leading world power.

Many scholars have stressed the economic dimension of the decline. In 2011, Professor Danny Quah of the National University of Singapore proposed a showing the shift of the global economic center of gravity toward the East. The Asian economic momentum has been highlighted by many researchers, while the French economist notes that “China has replaced Germany as the world’s leading exporter.” Furthermore, declinists produced their own vocabulary, introducing concepts such as the “” and “.”

Despite its momentum of popularity, research on the decline of the West faces a constant and articulated critique. and of the London School of Economics are among the many voices who argue for a nuanced interpretation of the Eastern ascent. Even the concept of the West-to-East power shift seems problematic. Asian countries, in fact, are not following a common path of economic development, nor do they constitute a cohesive political body. China is the rising power in the international community, albeit stretching and consolidating its regional leadership is still a crucial step for Beijing.

The constructed resilience of the Western system

Most theories and critiques focus on the relative distribution of power and economic wealth as the essential indicators of a power shift. Although significant, these arguments fail to consider the relationship between the system and its components. This relationship is neither static, nor purely geographic.

The international system is shaped by the dialogue and interaction of supra-national, national and sub-national subjects, and the values and norms they represent. This dialogue takes place in an environment in which a structure is already established: the West. In international relations, constructivist theories make a qualitative leap in considering material power and structural advantages as meaningful only through “the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded,” as per of The Ohio State University. Consequently, the essence of this system is socially constructed, which is understood as mutual construction and interaction.

The West is more than a geographical or economic sum of state and material forces. It is a structure of shared norms and practices. The West is a socially constructed system that embraces every subject that accepts its structure. Here is the reason of its resilience: systemic subjects interact among themselves and with the framework in which they are embedded, and in this way they constantly produce reinterpretations of what constitutes as “Western.”

As American historian brilliantly states in his work, systems are organized in the form of paradigms. Once a paradigm is no longer efficient, a revolution occurs. A revolution completely redefines the existing language and premises and, in this way, it generates a new paradigm. At the present time, the West resembles a paradigm that is still developing.

The Western paradigm still matters

The 2008 financial crisis, which was generated by the high default rate of the US mortgage sector and then resulted in the Great Recession, seemed to be a potential game changer. As the traumatic pivot from a long-lasting system of speculation and financial deregulation, the Great Recession showed a huge vacuum in the structure of Western political and economic governance. The financial crisis amounted to a domino effect that questioned the efficiency of democracy and capitalism. Nevertheless, the structure of the West could respond to the post-crisis recession by simply operating minimum changes within its paradigm. In a nutshell, even after the most tragic non-military crisis of its history, the West remains a valuable framework for Western actors.

A paradigm shift of the West did not occur and is unlikely to occur in the short or medium term. Non-Western actors are still attracted by the Western system. Unsurprisingly, figures show that US universities consistently see an of Chinese students enrolled in their courses, which suggests the appreciation of the Western educational model among Chinese elites.

Moreover, Beijing is occupying the geopolitical space left free by the Trump administration. In his address to the 2017 Davos World Economic Forum, President Xi Jinping pictured China as “.” While he was not promoting an alternative Chinese language, his speech was deeply embedded into the discursive framework established in the West. At Davos, Xi appeared more Western than any other leader.

Another indicator of resilience in the structure of the West can be seen in a speech delivered by after US President Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia in May. “Mr. Trump visited the region at the time millions of our people went to the polls,” Rouhani said. “He went to a country whose people haven’t even seen ballot boxes and elections don’t have any meaning for them. I hope one day Saudi Arabia also drives its national strength through elections. Power should not pass on through inheritance, but through elections.”

Since 1979, Iranian confrontation with the US has always been reciprocally fierce and harsh, with both actors keeping their distance and underlying the idea of their belonging to two different and competitive systems. In his speech, Rouhani directly accused the United States, which is still the major promoter of liberal democracy and holds its importance in Western identity, of being a strong ally of a non-democratic regime, Saudi Arabia. Rouhani implicitly pitched Iran as the new standard bearer of democracy in the Middle East. Again, however, the Iranian president’s speech did not set an alternative paradigm, yet it re-elaborated the Iranian space of agency within the already established Western structure.

Eastern actors seek more agency to maneuver

On the one hand, the West as a system of norms and discursive practices is still attractive and resilient, and it shows a general tendency to re-evaluate meaning and actions within that paradigm, rather than promoting an alternative one. However, it can be argued that China and other emerging Asian powers are efficient and capable of eventually filling the political spaces left by Western actors.

On the other hand, the relative power of China is undoubtedly growing, suggesting a partial erosion of US primacy. Nevertheless, the US and Europe still have some crucial structural advantages, as the Western system is based on norms and languages that are eminently American and European. If the power shift continues to happen within this environment, what can be expected in the short/medium term is an increase in the agency of Asian and Eastern countries, not a hegemonic substitution. This power shift is accelerated by the disengagement of the US from its global leadership role.

The construction of an alternative and attractive model is costly. Thus, rather than expecting the Easternization of the Western system, the increased Westernization of Eastern subjects is far more likely to happen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Exactly 4 minutes, interrupted by a dramatic pause to gain the (cold) applause of the United Nations General Assembly. This is the time that US President Donald Trump dedicated to attack Iran in his first at the UN on September 19. If this fact is not surprising in itself, it becomes astonishing vis-à-vis the approximately 3 minutes that Trump spent speaking about the issue that is rocking the international community: North Korea.

The entire world was waiting for a solution to the Kim question. While Trump spoke harshly about the North Korean leader, calling him a “rocket man” on a suicide mission, he soon turned to . Trump’s obsession with Iran was one of the leitmotivs of his 2016 presidential campaign, which has since translated into a particularly aggressive rhetoric once in office.

Trump’s anti-Iranian posture is not new in the history of US politics. As Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, a professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, : “Iranian-American relations have been beset by mistrust and occasional outbreaks of vitriol and violence for the past three decades.”

Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of 9/11, George W. Bush included Iran in his “” speech of 2002. However, the Obama administration took a different path by establishing dialogue with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, which culminated in the 2015 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Promoting the re-inclusion of Iran in the international community through a multilateral, nonproliferation treaty was the major outcome of Obama’s bittersweet policy in the Middle East. Trump does not share the same opinion.

A regional strategy behind Trump’s obsession

In front of the UN General Assembly, President Trump called the JCPOA an “,” promising once again to cancel the deal under the pleased gaze of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The rest of the speech concerning Iran followed the same arguments that in May at the Arab-Islamic-American Summit in Riyadh — that Tehran is the safe harbor and financer of Islamist terrorism and that it is responsible for chaos in the Middle East. Yet the message is clear: The alliance between Washington, Tel Aviv and Riyadh is safe and sound.

Trump’s obsession with Iran is neither casual nor unpredictable. Rather than approaching the Middle East through multilateral dialogue, as his predecessor tried to, President Trump remains close to historical American partners in the region. He has chosen a simple strategy: define a clear enemy and build an aggressive narrative around it.

Tehran is the perfect target. Still inspired by revolutionary revisionism and hegemonic ambitions, the Islamic Republic of Iran is Saudi Arabia’s ideological and geopolitical rival in the Persian Gulf and more than a problematic neighbor for Israel. Thus, Trump has simply restored the neoconservative narrative of the axis of evil to trace a clear-cut line between good (the US and its allies) and evil (Iran and its policies toward the region).

Short-term benefits for Washington are already emerging. Israeli lobbies on Capitol Hill that were dissatisfied with Obama’s openness toward Iran have welcomed the new stance, while the Saud family is more than prone to with Uncle Sam and exporting its capital assets to the US.

Elected with the promise of a rupture with the establishment, President Trump is dealing with Iran as an old conservative politician. He has found an enemy to reinforce America’s relationship with its old and safe allies.

Who said North Korea is more important than Iran?

The UN General Assembly is a forum that matters, especially for that have the rare chance of addressing global issues in front of an assembly made up of equals. Heads of state from more powerful countries, however, come to the UN headquarters in New York to share their global strategy. That is what Trump did by stressing his America first policy and by identifying the major enemies of the United States: North Korea and Iran. Fifteen years after the Bush speech, another Republican president has restored what remains of the axis of evil.

Iran is certainly not the most peaceful nation on earth. Tehran defends its independence by pursuing an active and sometimes controversial foreign policy in the Middle East. The support of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon and the alignment with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad contrasts with US interests in the region.

However, with the implementation of the JCPOA, and its potential nuclear threat toward the international community is far more limited than North Korea. But reality is not Trump’s primary concern. For the president, it is not a question about how powerful and threatening the enemies of America are to US interests. What is at stake is the definition of who is an ally and who is a belligerent. This will help the administration justify its foreign policy strategies.

Within the Trump administration’s narrative, Pyongyang and Tehran are comparable targets in two different but equally crucial regions. In East Asia, US hegemony is directly confronted by China. Thus, the rogue behavior of North Korea represents an ideal situation to strengthen ties with Japan and increase the . Trump is gaining from Kim Jong-un’s madness.

The Middle Eastern situation is even more complex. Israel and Saudi Arabia are very demanding allies, and Washington’s policy in the region is far more uncertain than the one in East Asia. The Syrian Civil War and the presence of the Islamic State are polarizing the regional actors more than ever, casting a dangerous shadow on the post-conflict reconstructions of Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen. Yet the Trump administration has chosen to accept the emerging cold war. The US is strengthening its alliance with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, and Iran is the direct target of this bloc. But it is the rising that is increasing the level of confrontation in the Middle East.

Albeit highly reprehensible, President Trump’s obsession with Iran is by no means absurd. It fits perfectly with the administration’s grand foreign policy strategy. Yet Tehran and Pyongyang will probably remain the best enemies that the White House could find on its path.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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