While these objectives may appeal to those who have long sought an end to the theocratic regime (most Iranians included), the strategic objectives and normative premises underpinning this campaign are undoubtedly flawed. The expectation that a strike campaign can produce meaningful, durable change reflects a profound misunderstanding of international relations by President Trump and his inner circle, and ignorance (or deliberate overlook) of the historical record of foreign-imposed regime changes in the 20th and 21st centuries.

The two-level game in an authoritarian context

Looking at the first issue, it might be worth noting that a foundational concept in International Relations scholarship is Robert Putnam’s “”. Putnam argued that domestic politics and international relations are inextricably entangled, given that national leaders must win ratification — either formal or informal — from their constituents for the international negotiations in which they take part and the foreign policy objectives they aim to achieve. This concept, which was later elaborated upon and referred to as “double-edged diplomacy,” holds that a nation-state’s behavior is a product of the “game” created simultaneously by its domestic political game and the international context in which it operates.

Such a concept, however, presupposes a degree of domestic accountability of a national government vis-à-vis the people it governs, which is categorically absent in the Iranian case. The Islamic Republic’s government is not obliged to seek or even retain popular support for its foreign policy decisions.

The nationwide crackdowns of January 2018, November 2019, and more recently, the January 2026 uprising, reveal a clear pattern of escalation in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) role has evolved from a part of the state security apparatus to executor of against any dissidents and — most significantly — the direct command structure of the country. As Iranian expert Karim Sadjadpour :

Five Iranian presidents … have come and gone without bringing meaningful or lasting change to Iran’s power structure: Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard have grown more powerful over the decades and dominate the country’s byzantine political institutions, as well as the judiciary, media, and surveillance state. Social repression [has] remained constant, regardless of who is president.

In brief, the Iranian regime does not need to win its population’s support — least of all, its approval — for any of the foreign policy decisions and actions it takes. It only needs to survive again, just as it has done for decades. And survival, for the foreseeable future, depends primarily on the continued existence of the IRGC as an institution, not that of its leadership.

Will the IRGC survive the strike campaign?

The IRGC’s constitutional mandate is to ensure the integrity of the Islamic Republic — interpreted as thwarting internal coups, crushing “deviant movements” and preventing any foreign interference that might harm the ideological legacy of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. A mandate which has never been merely rhetorical — and, on the contrary, has been fulfilled fanatically.

As Arab Gulf States Institute senior fellow Ali Alfoneh :

Even with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, having been killed, the regime would likely endure. Iran’s political system is structured to absorb losses among senior leaders through a form of collective governance in which the president, parliamentary speaker, judiciary chief, and senior representatives of both the IRGC and the regular military administer the state, preserving continuity and preventing a power vacuum.

This institutional resilience is precisely why the Trump administration’s assumption that decapitation strikes will suddenly lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime is historically unfounded.

Far from destabilizing the regime, external military attacks may paradoxically strengthen its grip on the Iranian society — at least temporarily. To maintain control of the country, the IRGC will likely resort to greater, not less, repression of society. The ill-calculated strategy that Iranian civilians will rise up and “finish the job”, as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu put it in an AI-generated in Farsi to the Iranian people, places an extraordinary burden on a population that has already endured decades of repression, sanctions-driven economic suffering (precisely by the actors which now want it to rise against its oppressors) and violent crackdowns by their own government.

In late December 2025, massive anti-government protests took place across more than 100 cities in Iran. The Iranian regime responded with violent repression, including massacres of protesters. The demand placed on the Iranians then, is to keep risking (and losing) their lives for an uncertain outcome. “We will create the conditions for the brave people of Iran to free themselves from the chains of tyranny,” the people of Iran, while the US and Israeli strikes hit , and . Trump and Netanyahu warn the Iranian people to “not let this opportunity slip away.” As if the continued existence of the Iranian regime had ever been their choice.

What if the campaign succeeds?

Even if the bombing campaign were to produce a temporary collapse of the Islamic Republic’s formal structures, the historical record on regime change offers little comfort. The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya clearly (and painfully) demonstrate that military campaigns and even prolonged occupations do not guarantee that those actors that are removed today will not come back tomorrow (or in a few years’ time). The Taliban’s to power in Afghanistan in 2021, two decades after their initial removal, is only the most recent example.��

Moreover, as former Israeli government adviser, Daniel Levy, has :

Israel has no real interest in smooth regime change. [Most Israeli leaders] regard that as a kind of fairytale, though that’s not something Netanyahu and allies might be ready to admit publicly. Israel’s more interested in regime and state collapse. They want Iran to implode, and if the spillover from that takes in Iraq, the Gulf and much of the region, so much the better.

Israel’s — and by extension the US’ — actual interest is, therefore, not the occurrence of a democratic transition in Iran. Rather, a total state and societal collapse of Iran.

The international law implications

Beyond strategic considerations, this military campaign represents a serious violation of international law. The strikes are unquestionably a breach of the , which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of sovereign states. And (un)fortunately, it does not contain an exception for regime change, regardless of how insidious the regime might be.

Furthermore, bombing a sovereign country to prompt regime change, in the expectation that its civilians will sacrifice their lives to advance a third country’s foreign policy objectives, is not only a flagrant violation of international law. As the historical record consistently demonstrates, it is among the least effective means of producing the genuine and durable political transformation of a country — and it does nothing to protect the human rights of the Iranian people. Calling for further Iranian civilian suffering to advance the strategic objectives of foreign powers is not solidarity with the Iranian people.

What can we do as observers?

At this crucial time, it is entirely possible (and, I argue, necessary) for us observers outside Iran to hold multiple positions simultaneously.

First, we must vocally oppose the Iranian theocratic regime and denounce the criminal actions of the IRGC. Second, we must support the longstanding democratic aspirations of the Iranian people and their urgent calls for assistance in defending their human rights. And third, we must continue to act as committed defenders of international law, opposing the use of “preemptive” force by foreign powers against the peoples of those countries which they claim to be helping.

And, just as importantly, we should remember that these positions are not mutually exclusive. They are mutually reinforcing.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Force Without Legitimacy: Bombing Iran Will Not Produce Regime Change appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Researchers, including medical professionals, agree that social media is addictive and that its excessive use can lead to the development of mental health issues among its users. They point, for instance, at how excessive use of social media might with aspects of a healthy life, including regular sleep, fulfillment of commitments, exercise or socialization. In extreme cases, usage can even lead to . These risks are higher among younger or vulnerable individuals who might not regulate their social media consumption.

Who is responsible for social media addiction?

Despite the damage social media addiction causes, in consumerist societies, users are expected to hold themselves accountable for their social media use, as individuals are assumed to be making decisions freely. Just as any other potentially addictive yet legally commercialized product would be, management of internet use is left to the consumer.

Consider, for comparison, tobacco and alcohol. Despite an overwhelming amount of evidence proving the negative health consequences of their use, more than a people around the world continue to consume both substances out of their purported free will. Some might claim that comparing social media to such products is unfair. Social media is not a chemical substance and does not have anywhere near the same effects as alcohol and tobacco on the human body. Yet, as happened with the alcohol industry in the 1920s, and the tobacco industry in the 1960s, there is a growing debate on the marketing behind these substances. Individuals question whether social media companies are addictive products and whether legal action against them is possible.

The companies’ motivation is clear. Their profits skyrocket with increased interaction. Social media companies invest significant resources in creating, developing and perfecting their platforms to induce increased user engagement. They monetize the time users spend looking at photos, watching videos, posting messages or sharing memes. By tailoring content to the extreme for their audiences, they manipulate users into spending more of their time-consuming content. In turn, users create their own content, enabling a cycle of constant engagement. Unfortunately, but intentionally, this process thrives on the human need for personal connection and social approval.

Algorithms manipulate our minds — intentionally

This level of hyper-specific content tailoring is only possible because of carefully crafted algorithms. An algorithm is a set of instructions made of text strings and mathematical operations. It is designed to deliver an answer or perform a task. Algorithms are useful for sorting data, processing it to transform it into information, and using it to solve a problem. Some authors have algorithms to cooking recipes. Like algorithms, recipes need structured input to provide an output. After all, a recipe is just a collection of words until they are structured logically. 

All algorithms are created with a purpose. Their intent is determined by the person, or group, designing them. With the help of multiple algorithms, computers can “” how to find better solutions to a problem and improve the relevance of their outputs. This is called machine learning. Machine learning can train an algorithm to sift through a user’s internet searches and learn about, for instance, their love for vintage cars. The frequency or specificity of a query can factor into the algorithm’s behavior. Then, a company can use the algorithm’s findings to tailor search results for that user. It may generate advertisements about vintage cars more often to heighten the likelihood of the user’s interaction with them. This engagement is one way that search engines and social media companies generate revenue.

Algorithms do not write themselves yet. They need humans to create them. Even when algorithms are created using machine learning, a human has to specify the desired behavior for the machine to learn how to do it.

To maximize potential profit, social media companies invest a considerable share of resources, including time, money and work hours, to better understand their user base. It should be unsurprising, for example, that in 2021 alone, Alphabet (the parent company of Google), Meta (formerly Facebook), and Twitter (now called X), collectively nearly $57.5 billion in research and development (R&D). For comparison, that is almost $25 billion more than all the companies, research institutes, universities, and government-owned laboratories in Türkiye invested in R&D that same year. 

The claim that social media companies are not collectively liable for creating addiction among their users is implausible, to say the least. The amount of resources invested in these algorithms and the intent of their parent companies paints a picture of corruption. 

What legal mechanisms can protect us from addictive algorithms?

However, the existing legal frameworks regarding addiction-inducing algorithms are complex. They often must strike a balance between too much and too little transparency. On one hand, users have the right to know which algorithms influence their lives. They should be informed about how a platform’s code can control their decision-making capabilities. On the other hand, these well-crafted algorithms are trade secrets for their companies.

Even if a company made the design of its algorithms public, it would likely be too difficult for users to understand. In this situation, individuals would be in a weak and passive position as consumers. Established social media platforms would determine almost all the terms of the relationship. One option for a consumer would be to use the product without fully understanding its dangers. Another is to legally protect the algorithms through an independent authority. A court or third party would regulate consumers’ usage. In reality, however, the law has not caught up to the influx of ethical issues brought about by technological advancements. So, both options are non-starters at this point.

Although there are already some on social media platforms in certain countries (most times, motivated by political interests or socially conservative preoccupations), there are still no regulations to protect users specifically from addiction-inducing algorithms. These regulations must secure individuals’ rights to know about the platforms’ impacts on their mental health. The danger of social media addiction is a critical public health issue. Yet, attempts to do so have been limited so far.

Some countries have been working separately on public health to ensure the effective protection of digital consumers. These endeavors aim to minimize the harmful effects of social media use on their populations. Yet, lawmakers must go beyond attenuating the effects of social media use. They must address the root of this problem—t��� creation of addiction-inducing algorithms. To social media companies, their greedy objectives trump the rights of individuals to a healthy life. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that laws will be enacted at the pace necessary to catch up with the rapid growth of technology. Given the lobbying power of these companies, they will slow any attempt at regulating their platform substantially.

For this reason, it is almost inevitable that the use of addiction-creating algorithms in social media will continue to be lawful for years to come despite the evidence of their harmful effects on users around the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Are Addiction-Inducing Algorithms in Social Media Lawful? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

These groups and voters have given significant legitimacy to Trump and his presidency. They have drowned out the voices of the popular majority that did not elect him and replaced them with those of a vociferous, unapologetic crowd happy to ignore the views of experts, scientists and long-term public servants alike in support of President Trump.

To engage with, serve and grow this support base, Trump has made use of two strategies. The first one is establishing a highly personal, face-to-face visibility in all his activities as president. Trump routinely appears on talk shows, gives live interviews and attends rallies across the country, portraying himself as the best, most popular president in US history, or as “” and even “.” These public appearances, along with the speeches he regularly delivers, contribute to the euphoria and momentum that characterized his very successful candidacy.

Trump Administration Tries to Rewrite History

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The second strategy is maintaining a highly active, virtual presence on social media where Trump continuously reinforces the messages that he delivers in live events and sets the agenda for new topics of discussion. Compared to previous administrations, which have also made use of digital tools to inform about, promote and raise awareness about the work of the president, the White House and the US federal government, Trump has used social media to promote himself and his administration and to influence the national and international agenda to suit his personal interests.

Highly Effective

Both strategies have been highly effective. But, undoubtedly, it is the latter which merits and has garnered greater attention from political commentators, analysts and scholars. On the one hand, as Anthony Gaughan, a professor of law at Drake University, : “Trump went on to win both the Republican nomination and the general election. How did he do it? The answer is he used his global celebrity and his mastery of modern communications platforms such as Twitter to reach tens of millions of voters virtually for free.”

On the other hand, the novelty of the widespread and persistent use of social media and in particular his Twitter— as a reinforcement for and even replacement of the president’s duties and role as the country’s leader — was despite the existence of social media since the late 2000s. Initially, Trump used non-traditional communication tools like social media to earn a spot among Republican Party candidates. Once he outdid the competition and secured the candidacy, he used all his social media channels to crow out and undermine the messages of the Democratic Party’s nominee, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Trump used social media, and especially Twitter, as an instrument for getting replication and support for his agenda, using his followers as an echo chamber for his views and political platform. This is how Trump was able to make up for the initial gap in campaign funding between him and Clinton. As Gaughan writes:

“By November 2016, Trump had thirteen million Twitter followers, millions more than any other candidate. In all, Trump estimated that he had twenty-eight million followers on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram combined. Trump realized that he could gain free advertising for his campaign by routinely calling into live interviews on cable and network television and by saying controversial and offensive things on his Twitter account, which the cable, broadcast network, and print media rebroadcast without charging Trump a dime. For example, Trump used Twitter’s 140 characters to launch demeaning, attention getting attacks on his opponents, such as calling his opponents names such as ‘Lyin’ Ted,’ ‘Low Energy Jeb,’ ‘Little Marco,’ ‘Crazy Bernie,’ and ‘Crooked Hillary.'”

As research has , Trump has also used Twitter for setting the agenda. Numerous times, Trump was able to change the main topics of the national debate and drive focus either toward or away from himself simply by writing a short, but controversial, tweet. Even Trump himself has stated that he regards traditional news outlets that he to as “fake news” and as “not as important, or as powerful as Social Media.”

Foreign Policy Twitter

The use of this agenda-setting power by the president is not confined to domestic politics. As the leader of the United States and commander-in-chief of its military forces, Trump has two main responsibilities in relation to the country’s foreign policy. First, guiding its diplomacy by contributing to set the country’s foreign policy priorities and, second, to make responsible (and, hopefully, restrained) decisions in the use of its military abroad. Trump has made an erratic and inconsistent effort, at best, to fulfill these two responsibilities. Much of this behavior results from its has effectively replaced though-out, carefully weighed guidance of US foreign policy.

Much like with domestic politics, Trump has used Twitter to set the foreign policy agenda. Both as candidate and after taking office, he has used his personal Twitter account to call Mexico “ of and even, “” of the US; the Paris Climate Agreement to riots in France; criticize the Trans-Pacific Partnership, initially it “a bad deal” for the US only to later change his rhetoric ; suggest abandoning the North American Free Trade Agreement, it “one of the WORST Trade Deals ever made” only to later the signing of the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA), at times even in the same tweet; to go to war with Iran; and China for the spread of COVID-19 around the world.

Trump has also aimed to increase the presidential or, more specifically, his own power to dictate the use of US military force abroad. For example, in January, Trump ordered the assassination of the Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for his alleged involvement in the planning of the killing of a US-Iraqi contractor in Iraq and the purported planning of attacks against US nationals in the Middle East. The assassination was launched without even , let alone getting its approval. It was also not consented to by the Iraqi government, which implied that there was no legal basis for killing a foreign military leader, either for protecting US interests abroad or Iraqi nationals, on Iraq’s territory.

Later that month, the US House of Representatives “approved a resolution asserting that Donald Trump must seek approval from Congress before engaging in further military action against Iran, [which reignited the] debate over who has the power to declare war.” Yet in May, Trump vetoed this resolution, calling it “insulting” to the presidency and that the US “Constitution recognizes that the president must be able to anticipate our adversaries’ next moves and take swift and decisive action in response. That’s what I did!” Despite Trump’s highly aggressive unilateral actions and his non-committal public attitude before and after the event, his actions on Twitter following the assassination took a much more restrained tone, aimed at rapidly de-escalating events.

According to , writing for Wired, “it seems possible that the leaders of both Iran and the United States turned to [Twitter] to help ensure that a tense night in the Middle East didn’t escalate into all-out war.” In Graff’s view, just a week after the assassination, Trump engaged in a non-direct diplomatic exchange with Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif. Zarif in English that “Iran took & concluded proportionate measures in self-defense under Article 51 of UN Charter targeting base from which cowardly armed attack against our citizens & senior officials were launched. We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression.” The minister was referring to an attack on a US military base in Iraq from which armed attacks had been carried out against Soleimani and other Iranian government officials.

The tweet also emphasized that Iran did not seek escalation or war. In turn, only some minutes later, Trump tweeted “‘All is well! … I will be making a statement tomorrow morning.” The subtext was clear: We’re not taking this any further; for now, there will be no war. The 13-hour Twitter silence which Trump kept showed that the attempt was to de-escalate tensions by showing the US president’s intent to not take any further, sudden actions against Iran.

Official Policy

This is not the only instance of effective Twitter diplomacy that Trump has conducted. As a social media star-turned-president, Trump understands the value of engaging in non-traditional indirect diplomacy. For instance, despite the rise of multiple scandals involving the presumed intervention of Russian intelligence services in the 2016 US presidential election (and the country’s electoral system in general), Trump does not overtly or continuously criticize Russia, or its president, Vladimir Putin, on Twitter unlike he does with other countries and world leaders.

Instead, Trump is constantly attempting to distance himself from the scandal generated by Russia’s alleged meddling in the election he won. Although to date the scandal is still alive, around 10,000 tweets every three days that mention both Trump and Russia. As Matthew Nussbaum in Politico, Trump does “not criticise Russia, or voice concern over Vladimir Putin’s attempts to undermine US elections.”

This approach toward Russia and the similar approach that President Trump has taken toward the scandal around Ukraine, as well as the hostility in relation to Iran, show, however, the issues that Trump’s “rule by tweet” foreign policy has created. One of the most visible examples of the very real consequences of Trump’s “” is the Turkish currency and debt crisis, which was not directly caused by Trump’s online activity, but which escalated as a result of his tweets — which in turn became official US foreign and trade policy.

The origins of the crisis can be traced back to the detention of Andrew Brunson, an evangelical pastor from North Carolina, who was accused of being linked to the Gülen movement, which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey but not the United States or the European Union. Brunson, a US national and long-term resident of Turkey, was accused of supporting both the FETO movement and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US and the EU. Brunson had been detained for two years without evidence when the US government decided to impose sanctions on Turkey’s Justice and Interior Ministers for “as leaders of Turkish government organizations responsible for implementing Turkey’s serious human rights abuses.”

By August 2018, the US government started to implement growing economic sanctions against Turkey, designed to pressure its government into releasing Brunson. To kickstart the sanctions, President Donald Trump , on Twitter, the doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum: “I have just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish Lira, slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar! Aluminum will now be 20% and Steel 50%. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!”

It is not an overstatement to say that, from that moment on, the Turkish lira lost value every time Trump tweeted. The “lost a third of its value this year, [plunging] as low as 14 percent to the dollar” in a single day. Although President Recep Tayyip Erdogan certainly further exacerbated the crisis when he suggested that Turks should exchange their dollars, euros or gold “under their pillow … for Turkish lira. It is a national fight,” the crisis had already been set in motion as investors very quickly lost confidence in Turkey’s economy and its repayment capacity, leading its currency to lose significant value, from which it has never recovered.

A Contradiction at Best

Trump’s use of Twitter in relation to US foreign policy has been one of contradictions, at best. On the one hand, Trump is characterized by his erratic, individualistic and self-glorifying attitude toward his responsibilities and powers as president and commander-in-chief. His messages, often delivered as outbursts of activity on Twitter, reflect that. More often than not, he exaggerates and overestimates his capacity as the top decision-maker when he portrays himself as a know-it-all who defends America’s national interests and who needs to consult no one but his inner circle when making decisions of national or global impact.

On the other hand, Trump appears to be a more (although not entirely) restrained diplomat-in-chief. For instance, Trump resumed apparently friendly (or, at the very least, respectful) with Justin Trudeau in January, less than a month after Trump called the Canadian prime minister “” following the release of a video where Trudeau pokes fun at Trump with other world leaders at NATO reception in December 2019. Trump had subsequently called Trudeau “” and mocked him in return by stating that he “doesn’t much like my making him pay up on NATO or Trade!”

This capacity, and now permissiveness, to bounce back and forth between insulting other world leaders and then praising them for cooperation appears to be a unique feature Trump has skillfully exploited. For these reasons, it is worth reevaluating common perceptions of Trump as an unskilled and irrational populist catapulted into office by a relic of the US electoral system and to see him for what he is: a skilled, well-advised social media phenomenon redefining the way in which US foreign policy is made and exercised — for better or for worse.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Successes and Failures of Trump’s Twitter Diplomacy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

At the beginning of 2018, it seemed that a US withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was both possible and likely. US President Donald J. Trump’s critical stance against NAFTA was aimed at renegotiation, and by November 2018 talks secured a continuation of trade under a new, and most uninspired, title: the�� (USMCA), which closely resembles the original deal.

Neither Canada nor Mexico wanted to renegotiate NAFTA, signed nearly a quarter century ago in 1994. When, first as a candidate and then as president, Donald Trump vocally expressed his dislike for the trilateral pact, it “the worst trade deal ever made,” he vowed to pursue a new agreement that would be more favorable to the United States. As Trump’s candidacy consolidated, both Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau expressed their disagreement with the US point of view, continuing to voice their concern as Trump assumed office in January 2017.

As the US president’s criticism of NAFTA became more vocal, Mexico and Canada abandoned their separate positions and negotiating strategies and created a common front against Trump’s rhetoric. But, just as it occurred during the negotiation of the original NAFTA, Mexico reached an agreement with the US well before Canada. On the one hand, just like Canada, Mexico wanted to secure an agreement that maintained or preserved free trade with the United States. On the other hand, unlike its northernmost counterpart, Mexico also wanted to secure an agreement to ensure the continuity of the neoliberal that had prevailed in the country for over three decades. Hence, despite initial reluctance to negotiate, Mexican diplomats agreed to and continued to take part in the “” on NAFTA, even when these were neither constructive nor productive.

Striking Similarities

The similarities between the original agreement and the USMCA, and the objectives that the Mexican government pursued in both, are striking. Back in 1990, Presidents Carlos Salinas de Gortari and George Bush Sr. discussed and agreed to establish a US-Mexico free trade agreement. Mexico’s interest in proposing and negotiating this agreement stemmed from the adverse economic situation that the country had been facing since the mid-1980s. To address it, the government looked to by dismantling trade controls and opening the domestic market to foreign competitors. It was crucial for Salinas to liberalize Mexican trade with the US, given that it was the main source of foreign direct investment and already accounted for most of Mexico’s foreign trade.

The Salinas administration wanted to secure and implement NAFTA to complete its set of neoliberal reforms. All of these reforms were from the traditionally nationalistic policies that had constituted the backbone of the Mexican economy for over 40 years. During the decades known as the “Mexican��miracle,” protectionism allowed small and medium-sized firms to compete on the domestic market. But such protectionism also led to a slower GDP growth rate, which eventually reached its in the 1970s and 1980s, causing a collapse of the system.

Jaime Serra Puche, then-secretary for trade and industrial promotion, argued that the Salinas administration was compelled to press on with these policies to ensure that economic protectionism, which had only resulted in low growth and hyperinflation of Mexico’s economy, would become a thing of the past.

Securing Continuity

Today, the logic for securing the continuation of NAFTA remains the same as in 1994. The decision of the Peña Nieto administration to renegotiate and secure the free trade agreement was resolute and decisive. The setting and deployment of Mexico’s negotiation strategy, along with the domestic economic policies guiding it, were not politically neutral. They were built upon the government’s ideological affiliation toward the management of the national economy, and especially the means for wealth creation and distribution. The way in which the neoliberal administration of President Salinas viewed the original NAFTA in the 1990s and President Peña Nieto’s saw its most recent renegotiation in the 2010s is remarkably similar.

Once the renegotiation of NAFTA was inevitable, Peña Nieto was interested in reaching an (ideally trilateral) agreement. But should that not be possible, Mexico’s priority was, once again, to secure a free trade agreement with the US. Peña Nieto was keen to achieve this outcome before December 1, 2018, when then-President-Elect Andrés Manuel López Obrador —��the first leftist head of state in nearly 80 years — would take office.

In the view of the outgoing administration, it was urgent to both reach and sign a new agreement to ensure its continuity. The significant diplomatic effort made by Mexico in the run-up to December 1 was, therefore, an attempt at depoliticizing and maintaining the country’s economic policies (including its trade policy) to ensure the continuity of NAFTA — and neoliberalism. The continuity of a free trade agreement for North America under the USMCA is, therefore, a victory for Mexico’s trade diplomats, even more so than for Canada’s.

Just as it occurred in the 1990s, the reaching of an agreement between the Mexican and US negotiation teams in August on Canada to come (back) to the negotiating table and agree to the minimal changes that were made to the terms of its bilateral trade with the US. Had Mexico not already reached a similar agreement with the United States (just as it did back in 1993), it is likely that the northernmost party would have abandoned the negotiations altogether. Yet the reaching of a last-minute understanding between Canada and the US ensured the former’s continued participation in NAFTA and the continuity of the agreement for all sides.

A Better Deal

President López Obrador has the opportunity to implement the USMCA in a better way than the Salinas and Peña Nieto administrations did. Under the country’s neoliberal policies, Mexican firms and individuals in unprotected sectors of the economy such as agriculture were unable to compete with their North American rivals, and the Mexican economy suffered as companies closed down and unemployment increased. On , the period from 1994 to 2000 saw a mere 2% economic growth across Mexico, with per capita GDP growing only 1% between 1994 and 2006.

As we get closer to the third decade of free North American trade, Mexico has the chance to reverse poverty through a more careful, fair and more equitable implementation of the new agreement. Mexico, its companies and its population could benefit from the USMCA through a better implementation of the agreement, namely by pushing for the three countries to address their , especially in the areas of investment on cross-border infrastructure, co-operation on research and development, easier and safer transfer of financial resources of foreign workers across borders, as well as better mobility of workers across North America.

Should these gaps in the trilateral relationship be addressed, the new agreement has the potential of working better than its neoliberal predecessor. The record track of Mexican trade diplomacy shows that the country has managed twice to push its neighbors to reach new mutually beneficial agreements. The first leftist government of the 21^st-century in Mexico has the chance to deliver these changes.��

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post In Mexico, the Signing of the USMCA Was a Victory for Neoliberalism appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Ukraine‘s political and socioeconomic circumstances have become the subject of various debates across Europe and the United States. The focus of these discussions has been the decreasing optimism among Ukrainians about the limited progress the government has made over implementing structural reforms, which were announced after parliamentary elections in October 2014. These reforms promised to bring changes to the judicial, health care and pension systems, as well as a decentralization of the state and closer relations with the European Union and the West.

Over the past four years, these reforms have been implemented at an extremely slow pace. This lack of progress contrasts starkly with the hope and enthusiasm among Ukrainians in the aftermath of protests and the ensuing “” that took place between November 2013 and February 2014. While efforts to reform the country’s social, economic and political systems have continued, they have been than the people had hoped.

This snail pace has already generated animosity and concern, both among the public and analysts inside and outside Ukraine, who claim that the country’s leadership is stalling the implementation of reforms. Some nongovernmental organizations and observers, for instance, pointed at the government’s lack of satisfactory progress in the investigation into former President Viktor Yanukovich and the government’s apparent reluctance to probe�� that plagued his administration and to prosecute those who enabled it.

Stalling Reform

For instance, the reform of the judiciary, prosecutorial and law enforcement systems, which were expected to strengthen domestic order and security, have been implemented in a slow and controversial manner. One of the main demands of the Euromaidan protesters was the establishment of impartial courts, free from corruption and independent enough not to bend to vested interests of Yanukovich or his associates. A proposed re-attestation of judges and police officers was expected to bring more transparency to the system as a whole.

According to , associate professor at McGill University, despite calls from all sectors of society, including the government itself, “Yanukovych-era judicial elites have so far actively resisted attempts to be purged and have refused to bow down to the new government.”��Even though Ukraine’s then�� himself called for full re-attestation of 9,000 of Ukrainian judges as early as December 2014, it soon became evident that judges who undertook but did not pass the re-attestation exam would still be able to retain their jobs. The High Council of Justice, the institution responsible for the nomination of judges, ignored 75% of��, meaning that those judges deemed unsuitable, incompetent or openly corrupt were able to stay in office, stalling the process of eliminating .

When it comes to money laundering, it has become clear that under-the-table commitments have prevented reformists, activists and even judges from exposing and prosecuting those involved in illegal economic activities. While new legal provisions have been put into place to deter the practice, it can be confidently affirmed that money laundering is still widespread in Ukraine. Acts of corruption are still taking place on a daily basis both in private and public sectors. Tax evasion, fraud and the creation of shell companies have enabled the continued existence of an underground economy, where money is hidden, laundered and converted into funds transferred out of the country. As the has reported, the widespread use of cash and the existence of “so-called conversions centres through which funds are siphoned from the real to the shadow economy” has made the country especially vulnerable to money laundering.

Unsurprisingly, those individuals engaged in money laundering are the very same government officials who are supposed to be eradicating it. Given that Yanukovich and his associates controlled the country’s judiciary and law enforcement systems, they had, according to , “broad discretionary powers to initiate or block investigations.” Rather than curbing money laundering, the pre-Euromaidan government actively sustained the conditions that enabled corruption, domestically and internationally, through direct actions by officials and the use of tax havens abroad. By 2014, for example, more than 90% of Ukraine’s outward investment was channeled to Cyprus, to accounts owned by top Ukrainian government officials and oligarchs.

Furthermore, it is not just Ukraine’s public institutions and officials that are involved in illegal economic activities. An investigation conducted by the National Bank of Ukraine revealed that PrivatBank, the largest commercial bank in the country, had only just fallen short of exercising absolute nepotism in the allocation of its corporate loans. According to , 95% of the loans went to “companies related to the former owners” of the bank and had been regularly used for money laundering and , headed by the . The central bank targeted this massive illegal operation, which, according to some estimates, led to the for PrivatBank and to its subsequent collapse, portraying it as a token of the government’s serious commitment to fighting money laundering. To this date, however, there has been no meaningful progress on the investigation, and the bank was only fined —��by the Central Bank of Cyprus, not Ukraine’s — for a total of €1.5 million ($1.8 million) for breaking anti-money laundering regulations.

Despite the law’s purported objectives on transparency and oversight, there is a high probability that only the oligarchs who already possess the economic means will be able to actually buy former state property in Ukraine.

Health-care reform does not seem to be faring any better. Back in March 2009, then�� proposed to upgrade the country’s health-care system. The cornerstone of the reform was the creation of a new state agency, the National Health Service of Ukraine, modeled after the United Kingdom’s NHS. This agency would administer and allocate funds for financing the provision of health services for the Ukrainian population through the creation and operation a national network of family doctors (general practitioners) and the improvement of the medical emergency services nationwide. In October 2017, Ulyana Suprun, Ukraine’s acting health minister, declared that the reform will soon be .

While there are a number of benefits to the proposed reform, the fact is that it is envisioned in a country with very different socioeconomic conditions to those of the UK. For instance, there are proposals for paramedics rather than doctors to visit patients requiring care at home. Given that profession of paramedic did not exist in Ukraine until very recently, there is a shortage of specialists throughout the country. So far, the system has left positions unfilled and patients unattended. Given that the need to implement a new education track aimed at training paramedics is costly, there is a of equipment and transport. Moreover, the profession itself can be quite . For all these reasons, reforms have to be better adapted to the immediate reality, needs and expectations of Ukraine and its people.

Lack of Progress

Although there are many other reforms to be implemented, the lack of visible progress progress has been frustrating. By contrast to judicial and financial reforms, the highly lucrative sale��of state property and opening of the land market has moved at a very fast pace. In March 2018, President Petro Poroshenko signed a law that could the state’s approach to privatization of state and municipal property and establish a more competitive and transparent procedure for its sale and acquisition. The new law condenses all the rules on privatization —��which were previously scattered across seven different pieces of legislation — and also aims to make sales more transparent through setting up online auctions for low-value properties and regulated auctions for high-value ones.

Although the US, the EU and the International Monetary Fund have been actively pushing for this reform, its benefits for the Ukrainian public are still unclear. Despite the law’s purported objectives on transparency and oversight, there is a high probability that only the oligarchs who already possess the economic means will be able to actually buy former state property in Ukraine. The acquisition of land, including former state and municipal property, usually involves high administrative costs for the buyers.

Moreover, big buyers and sellers usually possess better information, leading to limited competition and inadequate allocation of land resources. The fast pace at which this law has been introduced has left little time to implement that ensure equity, fairness and protection of property rights of small and medium-sized buyers and sellers through the creation or improvement of appeal and dispute resolution mechanisms. It is paradoxical that both the Ukrainian and foreign governments, as well as Western-led , have not called for a more thorough consideration and restraint on the implementation of this law, especially when small and medium-sized actors in the land market are being deprived of economic opportunities as a result of practices by large buyers and sellers.

As recently stated, “the window for reform is closing in Ukraine.”��Most of the population is tired and dissatisfied with this situation. In November 2013, Ukraine proclaimed its willingness to defend democracy through revolution and further integration with Europe. Enough time has passed since the 2014 Maidan uprising for the government to deliver results to the people of Ukraine. Had reforms been better suited to Ukraine’s immediate reality and needs, they could have already achieved much better results.

The government of Ukraine needs to listen to popular discontent. Legal reform in Ukraine would have been better and more meaningful if it had been genuinely aimed at fighting corruption raging across state institutions and diminishing the power of oligarchs rather than just curbing some of it. There is only so much time the Ukrainian people can tolerate the same dire situation repeating itself. Should these and other reforms not be implemented in the near future, another — and potentially more violent — revolution might rise on Ukraine’s horizon.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Since the start of diplomatic relations in 1944, and until very recently, economic and political links between Canada and Mexico were limited. Their geographic positions have historically (and strongly) shaped their understanding of the significance and the potential of their mutually-beneficial relationship. The two countries perceived themselves as distant from each other, with significantly different societies, cultures and traditions, that merely happened to be pulled together by the economic weight and hegemonic status of their common neighbor, the United States.

For decades, this mutual understanding constrained the breadth, scope and possibilities of a bilateral relationship and a commitment to pursuing and achieving a broader and deeper regional in North America that went beyond the implementation of a handful of trilateral and bilateral agreements. The fragility of the Canada-Mexico link enabled the United States to dominate this process — diplomatically, geopolitically and economically. While the US promoted freer trade exchanges in the region and around the world, both countries willingly accepted this circumstance. Then Donald Trump won the 2016 US presidential election, partly due to the success of his nationalistic, anti-free trade rhetoric. His victory quickly exposed the feebleness of the US-mediated relationship between Canada and Mexico and the fragility of the North American integration process.

Air of Uncertainty

As a candidate and then as president, Trump called for an immediate renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). His well-known intention to pursue an “America First” agenda, which included favorable provisions for the US in its trade with its North American partners, caused an air of uncertainty and put into question the entire purpose and integrity of NAFTA itself. When the US trade representative, Robert Lighthizer, first announced the intention of the Trump administration to and later set the position and objectives of the US in such a process, NAFTA was left in jeopardy.

For both countries, the US is still the most important trading partner in the world. Hence, their economies largely depend on their bilateral trade with their common neighbor. Mexico and Canada were distraught at the possibility of a . In July 2017, they both suddenly found themselves forced into a renegotiation that they had opposed for over a decade.

At the time, the US government seemed willing to abandon the agreement. This was due not just to the chief executive’s convictions, but also to the neglect of the legislative branch toward the proposed negotiations. Their apprehension, however, turned into action. By the end of the year, both governments had launched separate but sustained to show the US the enormous value of the agreement. At every opportunity, their heads of state and government officials highlighted the benefits of free trade in North America, the nature of NAFTA as a foundation of the region’s economic prosperity and the scale of damage that the Trump-inspired US economic nationalism was already generating in and the rest of the world.

Canada filed a case before the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the US for its use of import taxes as a measure for protecting its domestic industries. Meanwhile, senior Mexican government officials, including the chief of international trade of the Ministry of Agriculture, publicly warned that Mexico was willing to leave the negotiating table if the US tried to abandon NAFTA.

The fact that these pressure campaigns were not concerted, however, demonstrates that Canada and Mexico were trying to approach this issue using the very same strategies that landed them in this dilemma in the first place. Officers from the two countries carried out parallel actions and issued statements with similar objectives and messages, aimed almost exclusively at US audiences.

This approach to the renegotiations perpetuated the dual-bilateral nature that has characterized the relations between the North American countries since their onset in the early 1990s, where Canada and Mexico maintain close and strong, yet asymmetrical, diplomatic, political, commercial and socio-cultural relations with their common neighbor, but only limited ones between themselves. Unsurprisingly, this dynamic played well for the US, but poorly served the Canadian and Mexican interests —��and only in very specific instances for the latter.

For Better or Worse

For better or worse, until President Barack Obama’s time in office, the US was the pivot of North American relations. As a candidate and then president, Trump put that privileged position into question. Trump’s challenge to NAFTA, nonetheless, had a positive effect: It questioned the dual-bilateral nature of North American integration. Should they have perpetuated this trait, the Mexican and Canadian governments would have failed to devise the benefits of creating a common front for securing and improving NAFTA and would have divided their diplomatic and political efforts. But after decades of inertia, the two countries finally changed their strategy.

On January 2017, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto spoke with Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau ahead of the talks between Mexican, Canadian and US senior government officials on regional security, trade and immigration issues. They agreed to to encourage economic integration in North America. Since then, they have regularly , and reiterated their conviction and commitment to working together for a NAFTA that will benefit the three countries.

The action and decisions from the Canadian and Mexican heads of state can be regarded as the creation of a united front against Trump’s hardline plans to “Make America Great Again.” It is also, however, a front against Trump’s��disregard for the progress and precedents previously made in modernizing and updating NAFTA and its side and parallel agreements. While doing so, the two leaders also acknowledged the need to strengthen their own bilateral relationship and to work more closely on regional and global issues, including the creation of a freer North American and global trade system that does not depend on the status and position of the United States. The announcement of the creation of the is a first step in that direction.

To effectively progress with the NAFTA renegotiations, Canada or Mexico can recalibrate their trade and make concessions to the US. These measures should not be implemented at the detriment of their economies or societies. The two countries might not have actively pursued the NAFTA renegotiations. They could turn out, nonetheless, to be beneficial for the economies of all the three countries.

Trudeau and Peña Nieto might decide that continuing the NAFTA negotiations is in their countries’ best interests. Yet they should be ready to walk out from them if the US makes unreasonable demands. It is true that without the participation of the US in NAFTA, North America would not exist economically or politically. But it is also true that the rhetoric and the position of the US in the NAFTA renegotiations has already alienated Canada and Mexico from their formerly most important partner. Paradoxically, this hardline stance has already brought Mexico and Canada closer to each other than they had ever been.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Germany is facing the most important immigration crisis in its history since World War II. The recent attacks that took place on three consecutive days in , and broke the fragile peace that reigned in the country after the Islamic State-linked attacks in and earlier this year. These unfortunate events, which are all regarded as part of the latest wave of terrorist attacks to hit Europe, have renewed criticism toward the open-door asylum policy that German Chancellor Angela Merkel has��.

The fact that the state of Bavaria was the main point of entry for many refugees and the target of the recent attacks by asylum seekers has left a bitter feeling among Germans. Just months ago, German citizens had warmly welcomed refugees arriving on board the trains from Hungary following their treacherous journey from Syria and other areas of the Middle East and across eastern Europe.

In 2015, many homes and buildings in Munich, Berlin and other of “Welcome, Refugees.” Now, the so-called immigration crisis has politically polarized German society. Today, popular demands and proposals to swiftly combat the terrorist threat have taken the place of such welcoming attitudes.

Increasing Security or Infringing Rights?

Increasingly, some sectors of German civil society are and retract the freedom of movement and political liberties that the country granted to and upheld for its citizens and inhabitants until just recently. So far, some of the demands that seem to be gaining ground in the political discourse in Germany include: setting stricter border controls within the Schengen area and German borders themselves; expanding personal data holding programs on German and foreign citizens; increasing the number of police officers on the streets of Bavaria and the rest of Germany; and even using the army to safeguard public places.

Worryingly, many of such demands and the resulting policy proposals are aimed specifically at two particularly vulnerable groups: new immigrants and refugees. They include, for instance, the decision to process the deportations of irregular immigrants more expeditiously (regardless of of doing so), and monitoring refugee camps more closely (therefore, blurring the line between ).

Bringing the issue of immigration to the realm of national security has created a dilemma between the German government’s priorities and societal preferences. Until recently, Merkel and her cabinet had directed the government’s attention and efforts at promoting and sustaining the image of Germany as a country willing and eager to become a haven for persecuted and displaced people from around the world—especially from the Middle East.

After the recent attacks, however, some sectors of society appear to believe that Germany’s borders, police and military forces cannot adequately protect them from global terrorism and organized crime. Increasingly, immigrants and refugees in Germany are seen as a danger that must be addressed and controlled. Hence, the government’s priority has rapidly shifted toward regulating immigration flows and managing and enforcing its borders more strictly.

Perceptions and Policy in Historical Perspective

As with any other government, the kind of immigration policy that the German government pursues and sustains is also based on the perceptions that its people have about borders and immigrants. Should the immigration phenomenon be perceived as an opportunity, the government’s priority will then move away from security and enforcement and on to the effective integration of immigrants into society for its benefit. Achieving this latter objective is not only possible, but has already been done in previous decades.

During the 1950s, the German Federal Republic welcomed the Gastarbeiter��(guest workers) in response to the labor shortages that followed World War II. In need of rebuilding itself but facing a shortage of low-skilled labor, the government recruited mostly male workers from Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal, Tunisia, Morocco, South Korea and Turkey through bilateral agreements with these countries set up in collaboration with West German employment offices.

The programs were generally considered successful. By the end of the boom years of foreign recruitment in 1973, the level of qualification of these workers remained relatively low, and most of them were employed and remained in low-skilled jobs. This issue had not been of concern to the government or the public. It was thought that the program responded only to the temporary demand for labor and that, by the end of it, foreign workers would simply leave. Nonetheless, when the workers did not leave and instead permanently settled in the country, German society gradually integrated them—albeit .

New Immigrants, New Challenges

The experiences of today’s immigrants to Germany, however, have been very different from those of their counterparts in the early 1960s. First, their arrival is not the outcome of a search for better job opportunities, but a forced departure from their homes in Syria, Afghanistan, Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq, Albania, Eritrea, Pakistan, Somalia and Ukraine due to wars and domestic conflicts. Such conflicts have caused a wave of asylum applications that has been steadily rising since 2011.

This phenomenon, along with an increase in the number of immigrants from the European Union, has brought the total number of foreigners in Germany to 10.9 million—a figure with which not all sectors of the German population feel comfortable.

On the one hand, some sectors, including the (CDU), as well as a large number of intellectuals, look favorably on the open-door policy of Germany and the arrival of refugees. On the other hand, there are groups like PEGIDA, or Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West, and the radical right. These groups argue that “uncontrolled” immigration from the Middle East has exacerbated the prevailing social and economic disparities existing in the country and has disrupted and threatened their lives and German society as a whole.

The perception of foreigners as a threat to Germany has become a headache for the country’s government and institutions. Initially, Merkel had sought to show a “” to refugees, which she upheld with more conviction than most of her fellow party members in the Christian Democratic Party. Now, she is being pressed into choosing between helping refugees, or responding to the to take a tougher stance on the fight against immigration.

Germany and Mexico compared

Surprisingly, the political debate and infighting that Germany is currently undergoing to ensure the civil liberties of its people��while protecting the security of the country has parallels with Mexico. While Mexico has historically been a for migrants, from the 1940s onward, it also started to become a . Therefore, it has experienced similar problems to Germany.

In those years, Mexico witnessed the arrival of tens of thousands of , as well as others escaping from European countries that had been . Similarly, three decades later, a large number of Lebanese, Argentines and Chileans left for Mexico, fleeing civil wars and political persecution in their countries. Likewise, in the 1980s, Mexico welcomed and became a from the civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.

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Immigrants, especially refugees, were perceived in a positive light in Mexico, and their status in the country benefited from such a view. At that time, for instance, Mexico’s policy of open arms toward Central American refugees sharply contrasted with the unwavering refusal of the United States to provide asylum. Such perceptions��and policies resulted in one of the largest increases in the number of immigrants to the country. By 2000, the in Mexico had reached about 40,000 people. In 2015, that figure had surpassed the 60,000 mark.

With the rapid increase of immigrants, including those en route to the US via Mexico, soon changed and . Law enforcement agents as well as criminal groups��began profiting from ��across Mexico’s borders, while Mexicans in general began developing a negative view of immigration, especially from Central America. Consequently, toward the region began hardening.

Paradoxically, the discrimination and xenophobia that many Mexican migrants still endure in the US were reproduced by Mexico’s government and citizens against Central American immigrants. For instance,��in 2015, immigrants than the US. In Mexico, just as in Germany, borders began to be thought of as “floodgates” against the immigration upsurge.

The Impact of Popular Perceptions on Immigration Policy

It is worth noting that in Mexico, just as in Germany, the government does not regard immigrants as a national security threat. On the contrary, Mexico has traditionally been a refugee receiving country and, over the last decades of the 20^th century, it also became a transit country. However, at the dawn of the 21^st century, the country started receiving more and more immigrants. Increasingly, it has become a reluctant host to many Central American migrants who have escaped the that has hit their countries and have failed to enter the US.

Such a rapid increase in the number of immigrants is . Without adequate attention and support from the government, it is thought that such groups could become an economic burden to society or even a potential risk to public safety. One of such concerns, for example, is that if they are not provided with employment alternatives, they could be recruited by organized crime groups.

Views such as these have led individuals in both countries to speak of immigrants and refugees in the 21^st century as “qualitatively different” to those who arrived in the 20^th century. While the immigrants and refugees of the 20^th century are usually considered as integrated socially, economically and culturally, their counterparts of the 21^st are regarded as a collective threat to the security and wellbeing of Germany and Mexico.

Such a view of immigrants as a “danger” has alienated both local populations and newcomers. This hinders the effective communication, adequate integration, collaboration and mutual support that are the pillars of any society.

By toughening their immigration policies, Mexico and Germany are not only closing the doors to a social phenomenon that inevitably accompanies economic, political and social globalization. They are also breeding a critical mass of tension and mistrust within their countries which, as seen in Germany, could lead to harmful and deplorable attacks against civilians.

To meet these challenges, Germany and Mexico must seek progressive and sustained integration of newcomers. In the search for solutions, immigration should be understood as a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon, produced by economic differences between countries; historically-rooted patterns in bilateral relations; family and community ties; and political or humanitarian crises, such as those that have created the current flows between the , and . Unfortunately, many of these issues appear to be increasingly disregarded in the current immigration policies of both countries.

Restoring tolerance, restoring security

A large number of civil society groups in Mexico and Germany seem to have radicalized their attitudes and perceptions toward immigrants and refugees. For conservative groups and politicians in both countries (although more evidently in Germany), immigrants have become a “danger” to be contained. In domestic and international contexts marked by insecurity, terrorism and organized crime, the radicalization of such a discourse has led to the exclusion (and, in extreme cases, persecution) of immigrants and refugees, making these groups even more vulnerable.

The radicalization of anti-immigrant discourse makes both societies more likely to witness hate crimes within their borders—making them, in turn, more insecure for everyone. Germany and Mexico must remain vigilant to prevent public perceptions from negatively impacting their asylum, refugee and migration policies.

In previous decades, immigration to these countries had been a source of prosperity and well-being to both immigrants and host societies. By all means, Germany and Mexico could still see such a tolerant and mutually beneficial relationship restored early in the 21^st century.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In mid-June, Mexican Secretary of Finance Luis Videgaray to deliver a speech at the inaugural session of the��.

Videgaray affirmed that Mexico remains one of the main proponents of further and deeper North American integration as a source of joint prosperity and security for Mexico, Canada, and the United States. He made explicit Mexico’s interest in working closer together with its partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to protect the region’s economically competitive position, amid a global environment characterized by uncertainty and ensuring its continued physical security.

While brief, his main message, aimed at North America’s policymakers, was clear: The bilateral and trilateral economic exchanges and cooperation arrangements between Canada and the US with Mexico on development, health, education and energy matters are vital to their own security and prosperity. In brief, “our North American neighbors need us.”

To get this message across to the��American��and Canadian governments and publics, Mexico is investing significant political and diplomatic capital. Videgaray’s speech was just one in a series of similar statements made over the past : Secretary of��Foreign Affairs Claudia Ruiz Massieu; Secretary for Energy Pedro Joaquín Coldwell; Secretary for Social Development José Antonio Meade; and Undersecretary of Health Pablo Kuri.

Their statements are part of����to push for the advancement of North American regional integration. Such an effort is a key part of the Mexican government’s current economic strategy to promote job creation in the country and the consolidation of Mexico as an exporting nation and emerging power.

Objectives

The objective of these efforts is, presumably, to set the scene for Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto to introduce ambitious proposals on the future of the regional integration project, in the context of the , which is set to take place in Ottawa on June 29.

Specifically, Mexico wants to secure concrete agreements on three issue-areas of strategic importance for the country: regional trade, cooperation for infrastructure development and cross-border mobility. However, there will be a significant gap between Mexico’s ambitious objectives at the summit and the actual results it will likely deliver.

In these areas, Mexico will look for three things.

First, the Mexicans want to secure their privileged position in the NAFTA, in preparation for the eventual ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In practice, this will extend the privileges and advantages of NAFTA membership to nine other countries in South America, Asia and Oceania.

Second, Mexico will attempt (once again) to secure a commitment from Canada to create and participate in a North American infrastructure improvement and development fund, modeled along the lines (or built upon) the existing North American Development Bank (NADBank).

It is worth remembering that during the NAFTA negotiations in the early 1990s, Canada refused to participate and jointly fund the work of the NADBank. Mexico will once again try to persuade the Canadians about the need for and the benefits of creating a truly North American development fund.

Third, Mexico will try to settle, once and for all, the diplomatic impasse created by the requirement of visas to Mexican travelers to Canada, which were imposed by the administration of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and that the new government of Justin Trudeau has vowed to eliminate, but��.

Complexities

If these are indeed the issues and priorities that will be discussed in the North American Leaders’ Summit, Mexico faces (figuratively) an uphill battle. Given the current political climate in Canada, the US, Mexico and now the rest of the world, this will be one of the most complex, difficult and probably less productive meetings between the three heads of state to have ever taken place since the establishment of these summits in 2005.

Numerous factors account for the complexity of this meeting. One is the ever-closer presidential elections in the United States, characterized by heated debates on domestic economic issues and animosity toward Mexican immigration to the country. Another is the limited bilateral engagement between Mexico and Canada that followed the “.” Yet another factor is the recent and long delays and changes in the appointments of a US ambassador to Mexico and a Mexican ambassador to the US.

And, finally, the economic distress and��—t��� —which all make it hard to both visualize the construction of a solid trilateral regional project and limit the prospects of reaching such ambitious accords in the short or medium terms.

The North American integration project, which appears to be in a permanent state of crisis and self-doubt about its existence, faces an even more difficult moment. The North American Leaders’ Summit might be the start of a renewed effort of the continued decline of regional integration in North America.

Mexico might be, metaphorically, very keen to reach the summit, but its companions seem to be more interested in just staying at base camp.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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