The intellectual of the 21st century finds himself between a hammer and an anvil. On the one hand, there is freedom of choice and the broad availability of media representing all political orientations and formats, from full-fledged printed newspapers to bloggers with no professional journalistic training.

On the other hand, the emergence of a phenomenon of mass entry into journalism gives rise to autonomous branches of propaganda, whose breadth is equally vast: from old state newspapers to influencers who may lack strong analytical abilities, but who nevertheless possess inherited public trust from the past and a talent for engagement.

As a result, even such powerful authoritarian systems as President Vladimir Putin’s Russia are unable to control and turn into a single mouthpiece of propaganda not only liberal and opposition Russian media and opinion leaders, but even media loyal to the regime itself.

The resulting picture is this: numerous pro-Putin Russian bloggers, independent of federal channel institutions, are able to simultaneously convey different emotional tones to the actions of the authorities, creating meanings without crossing into the opposing camp.

Mythology from below: autonomous propaganda

One blogger, well-read in Russian history, may take Ivan the Terrible’s Oprichnina — as a result of which the tsar acquired the full scope of a punitive apparatus for terror against the elites of that time — and link it to the case when, in the early 2000s, Putin began a the oligarchs of the “” (a clan of businessmen united around Boris Yeltsin), in particular against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who financed .

Without delving into the details, our fictional blogger may fervently compare Putin to Ivan the Terrible. And the image he creates of Putin as a “fighter against traitors,” or, in a more literary form, a “purifier of the Russian land,” has every chance to become fixed and crystallize into a myth.

Especially if one takes into account the of a monument to Ivan the Terrible in Vologda on November 4, 2025, and the prevailing attitude of the Russian people toward oligarchs. According to , 43% of Russians are unequivocally opposed to the presence of oligarchs in politics.

From another, more sober perspective, Khodorkovsky was simply a rather successful businessman who was in negotiations with , an international giant, for a $6.5 billion deal and a stake in his company. Putin’s actions, meanwhile, were more likely reactive behavior, provoked by the factors of the upcoming presidential elections, a strategy of political survival and personal prejudices against the oligarchic “Family.”

As a result, at that time, publications began to appear in the press, both international and Russian, with headlines such as “an attack on business.” All of this, to put it mildly, does not lead to investment or to easing the conduct of business in Russia.

Further on, from another intellectual angle but with similar convictions, a blogger may equate Putin’s rule in the economic sphere and neoliberalism, basing such judgments on a style of governance grounded in the suppression of elite groups in order to strengthen power.

Under former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, these were trade union leaders and members of her party; under Putin, oligarchs and opposition parties. The resulting image is that of a tough, classical liberal. , one of the last reformers before the Russian Civil War, is also often invoked.

And once again, the fictional blogger leads the reader onto the pages of myth, where there is no place for truth about the relationship between the state and business without the analogies of myth-making.

Upon closer examination, the myth of Putin as an economic liberal, ready for harsh measures to rid the market of politicization, does not withstand the facts. Together with his community of security officials, the curtailment of the oligarchs’ economic power precisely in order to remain . Putin facilitated this through the destruction of Khodorkovsky, who financed the opposition, and through a strategy of winning elections by exploiting toward oligarchs.

As can be seen, in reality, Putin had no plan to construct an economic philosophy of market and law in the new Russia. And while neoliberalism and Thatcherism carry ideas of the primacy of the market over the state, Putin, wishing to preserve his security officials from manipulations against oligarchs, suppresses business for electoral success.

Through his real actions, Putin delivers the final blow to the myth, leaving only the image and a political-technological design.

Mythology from above: state propaganda

If in the previous case the myth arose “from below,” through the numerous interpretations of bloggers and commentators, thereby distancing us from the truth, there also exists a phenomenon opposite in its motivation — when a myth is constructed “from above.”

The myth is constructed through institutions that deliberately shape symbolic meaning. In the second case, the myth ceases to be merely an emotional narrative and becomes an instrument of political design. Let’s illustrate motivation with an example from art:

For genuine conservatives, the value of classical art lies in the traditions of painting. They will create or purchase works by those artists who strive to reproduce the techniques of the old masters and to make copies not for the sake of copying itself, but for the sake of preserving traditional techniques. Here lies a deep metaphor of symbolism that, in this case, explains the features of conservatism.

When repainting a work by an old master, we primarily strive to replicate the technical methods and the master’s tradition. Only afterward do we think of the painting as a copy. The opposite extreme is the purchase of so-called “kitsch” paintings. Such art often has only one aim: to oppose contemporary art while hiding behind the myth of the great art of the past, without any connection to the real traditions of that past.

Here we encounter a new function of myth, also inherent in politics: an appeal to nonexistent traditions. To myths of forgotten customs, resurrected by propaganda and appearing morally outdated for the modern world. A tradition that does not unite contemporary people is a dead tradition. In politics, such an approach, with its appeal to ancient traditions, is considered crudely nonconservative.

In the case of Russia under the authoritarian rule of Putin’s regime, this practice shifts into the mode of propaganda. Since the time of Yeltsin, the appeal as a “centuries-old tradition” has ignored the fact that the institutional fabric of the Russian Church was destroyed in the 20th century, and that the religious practice of the majority of Russians today does not correspond to the model presented by the authorities as a “historical norm.”

After the Revolution of 1917 and the persecution of the Church, people, in order to survive, were forced to remain silent about their past and their family religious traditions. And despite the restoration of churches after World War II, Orthodoxy in the USSR remained largely within , with a loose and selective set of religious rules.

This made it possible to preserve Orthodoxy: according to surveys, about of Russians identify as Orthodox. However, only 10% attend religious services at least once a month. Among the youth, the connection to religion is even more ephemeral: fewer than 34% of those aged 18–25 consider themselves Orthodox.

This delivers a visible blow to the myth of Russia’s religious tradition. For a tradition that does not unite contemporary people slowly dies. Today’s reality is such that religion occupies a symbolic, but not a practical, place in the spiritual and personal enrichment of Russians.

Result: a political institution is created that, as a result of its history, has lost the ability to rely on tradition. It now stands on an imitation of tradition, which does not lead to the unification of society.

Philosophical result: the creation by the authorities of a myth of traditions is dangerous, first of all, because it substitutes the concept of “tradition” with myth. As a result, an illusion of a strong society rooted in tradition is created. In reality, however, dead traditions hinder the formation of human associations and, subsequently, of civil society.

The absence of “civil society” plays directly into the hands of any dictator or autocrat of the Putin type. Today, thanks to the illusion of a strong, traditional society created in Russia, propaganda can justify even the most horrifying adventures, such as the war in Ukraine, which under the pretext of “protecting the Russian Church and language,” without taking into account the reality of traditions in Ukraine and relying solely on the myth created within Russia.

Reflections on the method of symbolism

The paradox: by recognizing myths of perception, formed at different levels of propaganda (systemic media, bloggers), as false, we risk endangering other people’s right to the otherness of judgment.

At the same time, an unspoken law of intellectuals states that emotions derived from figurative creativity correlate only weakly with a realistic understanding of politics, since they are instruments for creating myth. Thus, a question arises from this paradox: how are we to seek truth in a world where an established myth of perception intertwines with the political tradition of symbolism and the right to dissent?

We cannot eliminate emotions and personal judgments from the linguistic practice of politics. As , politics is the highest sphere of the community. By a political community, Aristotle understood a union of people that includes all smaller unions and exists for the sake of the highest good. After all, what is good in one action for a single individual can become a potential good for the entire state.

Yet emotions and symbolic thinking, surprisingly, can also lead to good. For example, by reinterpreting what is happening through art, we can generate new, interesting perspectives and methods of inquiry. But can we also reinterpret it for the highest union itself, for the understanding of the political?

For practice, let us consider an example of a thought experiment using the method of symbolism. Through a method of topologizing the categories of history, sociology and politics, we combine them with metaphors from art, which replaces, in our consciousness, definitions of political categories with images, opening the path to pure cognition of the features of the object under analysis. Let us begin the experiment and take musical genres as metaphors:

Russian waltzes are regime propagandists. Russian marches are the right-wing opposition. Russian absurdist theater is the left-wing opposition. Historically, the theater of the absurd was in Russia and arrived there from abroad. In the same way, the Russian opposition, hiding abroad from Putin, loses trust within the country.

The result of the symbolic analysis: we obtain a new characteristic of the left-wing opposition in Russia (distrust on the part of Russians) while reflecting on musical genres. Such an analysis can also be applied to more complex phenomena. Its main goal is to help thought look at old things through new concepts, which fits perfectly into the work of the intellectual.

And in answering the question of this section, it is necessary to view the task of “debunking myths” without the prism of myths themselves. In a world of information as fast and fluid as shifting sand, it is difficult to get to the truth simply by discarding false options.

The modern intellectual needs not so much a new method as a new strategy of work, a strategy for preserving concepts and ideas. And in order to protect oneself from crisis while doing so, the method of symbolism described above helps to develop ideas through a strategy of acquisition without destruction.

Politics: The path of creativity

The duty and principal challenge of Eastern European conservatives lies in whether they are able to reinterpret the myth of Putin in such a way as to cleanse it of falsehood, while at the same time preserving a space for symbolic thinking, without losing creativity and tolerance for ideas.

In other words, to protect conservatism from the danger of turning into a mythical cult, which threatens our desire to preserve the intellectual tradition of symbolism represented by multifaceted images ranging from Hobbes’s Leviathan to the Ship of Theseus.

Thanks to this tradition, conservatism retains the deep inner meaning of literature and the depth of imagery. In contrast to this symbolic method stands the desire to simplify and fix the image of the political in a way that would be convenient for propagandists, for example: “Putin is the savior of Europe” or “Putin is the defender of traditional values.”

The duty of Russian thinkers, meanwhile, is to free Orthodoxy from the propagandistic myth of an “eternal tradition” and to grant it the respect it deserves within the framework of a real tradition of memory and respect for the past.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Yet, does Putin’s conservatism truly rest on any genuine philosophical foundation — the kind laid down and developed by serious political thinkers such as Sir , the English philosopher and one of the leading theorists of modern conservatism? To examine whether Putin’s so-called conservatism is authentic, I will turn to one of Scruton’s most renowned works, .

Biography and conservatism

One day in , Cambridge postgraduate Roger Scruton was staying in Paris when he looked out the window of his apartment and saw police dispersing a student demonstration. Watching as “spoiled members of the middle class” set fire to “cars earned by honest labor” and smashed shop windows in the name of the “proletariat,” to become a conservative.

Against this backdrop, Scruton formed his conservatism as a defense of law and order — seeking to preserve to overthrow — in contrast to the revolutionary suppression of authority. Thus, in his view, had those young activists of 1968 supported the positive laws of the state created for the public good, rather than dubious and supposedly “natural” human rights, society would have flourished over time.

However, Scruton’s ideas soon faced new trials after became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Conservatism in Britain was increasingly associated with free-market policies and . Scruton, by contrast, insisted that the true mission of conservatism lay not in economic gain but in preserving moral order and cultural continuity.

The new millennium proved even less favorable for Scruton’s conservatism. The right-wing program of UK Prime Minister , in the eyes of some, lacked the “” that Thatcher had possessed in abundance. In 1997, Labour candidate Tony Blair won a decisive . As Scruton witnessed the decline of British conservatism, an obscure figure named Vladimir Putin in Russia was beginning his audacious ascent to power.

The goal above all

At the dawn of the new millennium, in his political debut, Putin pledged to ensure Russia’s economic and — presenting himself as a politician. Through what were described as “” market reforms, he nearly halved the unemployment rate and increased Russia’s gross domestic product by about by 2008.

Yet, this period of prosperity proved short-lived: it was followed by and in Georgia and . This interweaving of events and decisions was perceived by many in Russia as the beginning of a dictatorship.

The fragmentation of wholeness

“Society is a shared inheritance, for the preservation of which we learn to restrain our demands, to see our place in the world as a link in a continuous chain of giving and receiving and to recognize that the good we have inherited must not be spoiled.” — Sir Roger Scruton, How to Be a Conservative.

By destroying the common heritage of peoples, Putin violated the very conservative idea Scruton upheld — the duty to preserve what was created before us. With his of Ukraine, Putin annihilated the shared heritage that once united the Ukrainian and Russian peoples — a heritage built upon common language, culture and history; upon social and familial bonds; upon financial and cooperative projects.Ěý

In its place, Ukraine experienced an accelerated rise in and the of nation-building. Ukraine began to distance itself ever more sharply from the now-hostile post-Soviet cultural sphere dominated by Russia. The Ukrainian language , while social and professional connections were severed in the crucible of war.

This process of separation may rightly be called historical, for it is precisely what constitutes the birth of a nation, much like “growth for a child.” And although this brought about positive developments in Ukraine — the strengthening of national identity and territorial loyalty (which, in Scruton’s conservative view, are far more genuine foundations than faith in cosmopolitanism, partially present after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]) — Ukraine simultaneously suffered a rapid rupture of its social, cultural and academic ties. This outcome certainly weakened its , rendering it more susceptible to the spread of multicultural ideologies.

Through the trauma of war, Ukraine continues to drift away from the Russian-speaking . Putin, in his attempt to “defend” Russian speakers in Ukraine and to preserve the region’s common heritage, instead alienated the second-largest Russian-speaking nation after Russia itself.

He stripped the concept of the Russkiy Mir (“Russian World”) of its meaning — a project once meant to unite Russian-speaking nations within a shared cultural space, preserving it as a civilizational achievement. 

In Scruton’s view, common values should deepen mutual understanding and facilitate cooperation in solving problems. Yet Putin shattered this cultural connection and deprived the “Russian World” not only of its meaning, but also of its spirituality. He transformed it from a concept of cultural coexistence into one of military expansion — shifting its essence from creation and the pursuit of the good through shared values to the expansion of violence.

Its ontological core was inverted: coercive promotion of Russian political culture replaced the preservation of the living, shared heritage of the USSR. Was it worth it for Putin to tear apart the established order of the region, only to later hide behind the banner of “defending ,” dancing to the tune of Europe’s ?Ěý

For the world strives toward wholeness. And when Putin destroyed the unity among Slavic nations, that very wholeness was reconstituted at the national level in the states harmed by Russia, not only directly by war, but also on a metaphysical level, through the rupture of the unity and equality among Slavic peoples that had survived the fall of the Soviet Union.

“There is a line of obligation that binds us to those who passed on to us what we have and our care for the future is a continuation of that line. We care for the future of our society not through fictitious calculations of costs and benefits, but by inheriting the goods created by previous generations and passing them on in turn,” wrote Sir Roger Scruton. Instead of continuing that line of continuity Scruton described, Putin severed it — replacing genuine care for the future with war and propaganda.

Philosophy in a cage

Putin seeks to expand the cultural concept of the “Russian World” by filling it with philosophical depth — turning it into a supposed civilizational project. The idea is presented as follows: the search for and realization of one’s “Russian essence” as a .Ěý

According to Putin, to be Russian is to possess a soul and consciousness that transcend nationality. In his speeches, one often hears phrases like “” and “a special path.” Yet, what exactly has Putin prepared for the ordinary person in this philosophical project of his? And how did this concept ultimately become a tool that ensures his popular support against external threats, while simultaneously distancing Russians from genuine reflection?

National can pose questions that give the full spectrum of self-identification. Two of these are particularly important: Who are we in the face of our complete opposite? And who are we in relation to those who, in some respects, resemble us?Ěý

But Putin has created a situation in which the second question disappears entirely. Russia is of European civilization — and naturally, Russians feel this. Yet, Putin rejects even the premise of this fact, replacing the nation’s search for self-understanding with an abstract notion of a “special path” toward his “civilizational project.” 

The essence of this idea, however, does not lie in genuine creation, but in antagonism — in opposition to the European idea of the national quest. In Putin’s Russia, a war has been declared on one of the fundamental principles of European civilization: the idea of , which, according to conservatives, is the chief source of strength in European states.

Putin’s “” removes the second question of self-identification — the one that ultimately leads to the most intimate reflection: the awareness of oneself before oneself. The chain — I before the opposite, I before the friend, I before myself — is broken.

And even if Russians, freed from propaganda, manage to pass through this entire chain and reach the final question — Who am I before myself? — for them, the authorities destroy not only the chain but life itself. Putin’s contempt for freedom of speech and the existence of hundreds of make the national idea impossible. Without self-determination and self-realization, individuals eventually vanish, and the nation loses its face, dissolving into an atomized mass.

In essence, Putin’s “” for the individual is a project of perpetual striving toward a goal, where only the goal has value. Meanwhile, the path itself — i.e., the life of ordinary Russians — plays little role. This repeats the story of the USSR and its race toward the cloudlike vision of communism. Extending Roger Scruton’s philosophy: when state control leads to a politics of goals, society loses the capacity for free associations — the associations it forms when it begins to ask questions about national self-identity: 

When a civic association is destroyed in the name of progress, when some idea of the future becomes the judge of the present and the past, when a great goal is set and the state or the party leads all citizens toward it, then everything is reduced to mere means — and the true ends of human life retreat into darkness and the underground.

Theory of elites – an introduction

In a society free , power must rest upon intellectual elites while remaining attentive to the broader masses. Such a concept of democracy allows the rational voice of the elite to advance the most well-argued ideas and address the concerns of ordinary people. Here, elites are those who embody Russia’s spiritual wholeness and . Their purpose is to point the way toward a future in which as many citizens as possible can love and take pride in their country. The mission of the true elite is to strengthen love for the homeland — within themselves and in others.

By contrast, pseudo-elites pursue goals of personal enrichment, status-building and social dominance without regard for the intellectual and philosophical development of Russian society — or even hindering it through corruption and clan systems. The true elites are the creative minds of culture and science — individuals who, having reached great heights, attain a philosophical understanding of their role. 

A fitting example can be found in the lectures of the Leningrad literary scholar, Pushkinist and , . Though a man of science — albeit in the humanities — his lectures, even those like “” (1988), which at first glance appear to be mere historical accounts, reveal to the perceptive listener a deep philosophical undercurrent.Ěý

This depth was forged under Soviet isolation and pressure, imposed by representatives of the pseudo-elites. Yet Lotman’s creative philosophy endured, and it remains focused on the act of creation itself.

Ultimately, the weak-spirited — opportunists and conformists — learned to benefit from an old system built upon the deprivation of their country’s potential for growth. They are not conservatives but preservatives — suffocating rather than safeguarding. 

And although pseudo-elites exist in every state and cannot be entirely eliminated, their paradoxical role — both harmful and beneficial — is that they create the difficult conditions from which the strongest representatives of the true elites emerge.

Yuri Lotman can rightfully be regarded as a representative of , characterized by ethical integrity, skepticism toward utopian ideals and a profound view of social relations.

Putin and decaying love

At the start of the war, Putin — by means of repression and the threat of punishment for antiwar sentiment — forced hundreds of true elites to leave Russia. Putin is the antagonist of my concept of spiritual harmony, a harmony that democratic institutions can foster, where pseudo-elites create harsh conditions that, once overcome, give rise to genuine elites. 

Putin interpreted this differently. For him, elites are not an intellectual support but a group with business interests whom he satisfies and who, in return, offer popular loyalty. Putin places the role of spiritual support on the broad masses. 

Through and the influence of pseudo-elites, the people become atomized and no longer seek a conscious love of the homeland. The dominant quality of the masses becomes an unjustified pride, often fueled by military myths.Ěý

Russian historian demonstrates this in his . Intimidated scholars — for example, during the years of Stalinist repressions — were compelled to write falsehoods on demand and to fabricate the myth of a “great victory,” abandoning genuine scholarly inquiry.Ěý

And when the system allowed a degree to be awarded in 2017 for about Vlasov’s army (the Russian Liberation Army), only to have it later revoked, this merely confirmed its totalitarian character.

In place of the idea of preserving Russia’s real, grand history — which certainly exists — comes a resentful desire: to prove, to avenge, to repeat. Such masses can be rallied to war, but it is impossible to find with them a new path to the future that seeks genuine love for Russia.

Putin’s political culture

When asking whether Putin is a conservative, we must first recognize that we are speaking about a man devoid of creative or constructive consciousness. Putin is one of the few Western-style politicians who emerged from a closed system of service. He served in the security apparatus, later as an official under , and subsequently reinterpreted the very model of “service” as the foundation of his rule. He serves, but does not create.

Many with artistic backgrounds have noted the similarity between Putin’s psychology and that of author fictional, character Max Otto von Stierlitz, whose arc supposedly to join the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) security agency in 1975.Ěý

This ultra-masculine association may lend Putin a certain air of respectability as a politician, but it simultaneously reveals a lack of the lofty, poetic sensibility that has always been intrinsic to Russia.

One of the most prominent Russian-speaking philosophers of the 21st century, , once called Putin a “sophist” during a broadcast, noting that his tactics are to draw others in and that his instruments are: “to persuade, to seduce — and only secondly, to threaten.”

Putin is non-creative on a personal level. Yet his attempt to construct an illusion of “persuasion and seduction” is itself a path of threats — threats disguised as strength and as a theatrical respect for “cooperation,” which in reality leads to the absorption of the opponent’s individual will.

Philosophical conclusion

Putin cannot be justified — for the moment we attempt to justify him, he strips our values of their meaning. He reshapes them within our own words: conservative, right-wing, fascist. Even the word Russia, which once carried a civilizational spirit, now signifies the rule of a dictator — one without ideology, yet with an overpowering personality.

The truth is that conservatism means the preservation of values and a pragmatic striving for peace — a peace that expands the possibilities for citizens to realize themselves. The attempt of dictators to “protect” traditional family relations through laws and prohibitions is, in fact, the path to suppressing both the future and love itself.

Conservatives preserve traditions and values not by freezing them under control. The true path lies in remaining modern — so that our ideas and values may live on in the future, unburdened by blind reverence for the past. Roger Scruton also wrote about this: “We must be modern while defending the past and creative while defending tradition.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Why Putin Is Not a Conservative: The Destruction of Integrity appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

— Sir Roger Scruton,

Political order constructs laws in response to the needs of the people. It appeals to empirical experience, where, for example, discrimination can only apply to scientifically established and indisputable categories, such as sex, race or types of physical limitations. Yet the scope of such law ends where the philosophical field of identity begins. 

The vast forms and principles of self-identification do not allow the law to protect them from discrimination, as they represent, in some sense, a form of frivolous law-making or law-demanding, which is more akin to a childlike prerogative.

A very recent incident occurred in in Ukraine, when the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) refused to accommodate the daughters of a Ukrainian filmmaker in its dormitory because of a lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer (LGBTQ) flag in an Instagram post.

This triggered widespread debates online, with some accusing the university of discrimination. Another part of Ukrainian society defended the university, arguing that it was not involved in any discrimination. From their perspective, the university was merely protecting its values without violating any financial or other agreements.

The universality of the liberal imperative

Philosophically, it is interesting that in this case of the Ukrainian Catholic University’s reaction to the LGBTQ flag incident, classical liberal political law, according to Scruton, protects the right to act in accordance with the philosophical convictions of a religious organization, shielding it from activists’ ideology with religious features. Thus, this demonstrates the universality of liberal law, as discussed by Scruton. In a philosophical sense, his interpretation could be called an absolutist imperative.

This example illustrates an important principle in Scruton’s interpretation of liberalism — the principle of historical , which states that some concepts have universal application. Law is committed to protecting religious communities from the dictates of activists’ ideology, just as it once historically protected society from the dictates of religion. And herein lies the paradoxical power of liberalism: its impartial universalism becomes an imperative, safeguarding the freedom even of those against whom it was historically directed.

How did it all end in Ukraine?

Since the conflict gained public attention, the university’s rectorate issued an , attributing the blame to communication failures regarding the conflict:

We wish to express our regret that the right words and appropriate steps to find an optimal solution and the method of communicating it were not found. The result was disappointment and bitterness for a talented young individual who had been admitted to the cultural studies program and whom we wanted to see as a student at UCU. We apologize — we sincerely apologize.

Here, we enter a broader and more debatable topic: the role of communication in classical liberal law. The liberal principle of universalism is not automatic; this is its main flaw. When human pride dismisses the heartfelt calls to understand the other side, reason begins to rationalize its position, creating an illusion of the only correct stance. Then the conflict spills into social media and the press, and the aggrieved party’s emotional tension increasingly collides with pride, making rational resolution nearly impossible, as it would require personal moral courage.

The resolution of the dormitory and UCU values case demonstrates the transparency of this situation — the filmmaker’s daughter withdrew her documents and declined admission.

The role of communication in classical liberal law

Classical liberal law was shaped and began its struggle within the frameworks of personal interaction and public discourse. But the world of social networks added another dimension — an online platform of validation. Conflicts like the one described above function as a form of strict social selection, which accelerates their path to public awareness.

Internet users choosing a stance “for LGBTQ” or “for UCU” gain not only recognition from supporters and a sense of community against the opposing group, but also an illusion of creation — publishing their group’s thoughts in their own words, often contributing nothing fundamentally new. 

While the first two issues — advocacy and belonging — often engage ordinary users, the problem of creation concerns influencers more. Often, this is simply a joke about the situation or a weak argument for one’s own group. These factors are key to the problem of a rational approach and dialogue between parties, often pushing the conflict toward a political form.

Once a conflict acquires a political dimension, it becomes difficult to resolve within the framework of official law. It goes beyond legal boundaries and becomes a discussion about values. Those supporting the LGBTQ community demand state punishment for the university. 

However, under Ukrainian law, the conflict does not qualify as a case of discrimination. Supporters of the filmmaker’s position aim to deliberately politicize the conflict, appealing to the values of democracy. They seek to insert LGBTQ issues into antidiscrimination legislation, thus threatening classical liberal law with the overlay of personal self-identification by nontraditional communities.

Modern liberalism, in the conservative view, still protects society’s values. But a grateful society must fulfill its duty — to safeguard it from the reactionary haste of the modern world. Developing analytical thinking helps people escape the trap of superficial judgments and become less dependent on rapidly forming group opinions. 

While it is impossible to eliminate these problems completely, strengthening critical thinking and conscious choice will protect the law from politicization and preserve the depth of democracy.

“The idea that we must be modern while defending the past, and creative while defending traditions, had a profound influence on me and over time shaped my political views…”

— Sir Roger Scruton,

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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