Henry Mead /author/henry-mead/ Fact-based, well-reasoned perspectives from around the world Tue, 11 May 2021 19:23:41 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4 German Nationalism, From Revolution to Illiberalism /region/europe/henry-mead-history-german-nationalism-revolution-illiberalism-antisemitism-far-right-news-10825/ Fri, 23 Apr 2021 14:53:59 +0000 /?p=98343 It is often noted that 19th-century nationalism owed much to the rise of academic history. As historians have observed, studies in national development provided materials for later and cruder claims of fascist cultural supremacy. For instance, Leopold von Ranke and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel represented different versions of such narratives. The former traced a conceptual… Continue reading German Nationalism, From Revolution to Illiberalism

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It is often noted that 19th-century nationalism owed much to the rise of academic history. As historians have observed, studies in national development provided materials for later and cruder claims of fascist cultural supremacy. For instance, Leopold von Ranke and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel represented different versions of such narratives. The former traced a conceptual movement in large patterns of events; its ideological consequences were various, but one aspect was the justification of the Prussian state. The latter urged rigorous attention to historical evidence but suggested that in such detail a pattern of providence could be found.


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Ranke’s method, adopted by a generation of historians, was that of a conservative liberal of the Restoration period, envisaging a balance of European power. By mid-century, however, new historians had taken a Prussian-centered national narrative to a new level of conviction, combining elements of Hegel’s statist teleology with Ranke’s evidence-based method. In the German revolution of 1848, the rhetoric of liberty and nationhood was confused, and the goals of a constitutional monarchy and a united Germany seemed united under one banner.

Yet within a short time, the revolution failed, and a conservative mood descended. Subsequently, the liberal spirit of nationalism was replaced by a Bismarckian argument for nationalist militarism and expansionism. Academic writing was touched by this sequence of events.

A Historical Method

Prior to 1848, academic historians were already sketching accounts of providential German unification and expansion. The writers of the Prussian School of History were former students of Ranke and Hegel. They wrote at first in a liberal register. Johannes Gustav Droysen began his career as a classicist, coining the term “.” His 1833 life of launched his academic career. A popular volume, its account of the Macedonian marshaling of Greek culture into a powerful empire was read as a pattern for Prussia’s future role.

Droysen’s historical work became overtly political with his 1842-43 “Lectures on the Wars of Liberation,” a record of Prussian popular resistance against foreign invaders. A member of the Frankfurt parliament during the 1848 revolution, he witnessed the failure of its liberal and nationalist aspirations. The crisis came when members voted to fight for the regions of Schleswig-Holstein against the claims of Denmark. It was clear, on Prussia’s withdrawal of support, that the parliament was impotent without the northern state’s backing, and by 1849 Frederick William IV was secure enough to reject liberal proposals.

Since 1840, Droysen had taught at Keil University in the disputed region. His account, “The Policy of Denmark towards the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein,” lent support to nationalist calls for the defense of Germany’s territory. In a similar spirit, in 1851 he published a life of Count Yorck von Wartenburg, the general whose decision to change sides was a turning point in the war with Napoleon. The historical stage was set for a renewal of this national self-assertion. Otto von Bismarck, the prime minister of Prussia and the founder and first chancellor of the German Empire, no doubt saw the usefulness of such narratives when formulating his foreign policy in the early 1860s.

Droysen took pains with his lecture series on the historical method, hoping to provide a philosophical basis for the discipline. The lectures were published only in 1937, but in 1858, he circulated a , theGrundriss der Historik,” translated as “Outline of the Principles of History,” which describes history as theodicy, forming an organic pattern of growth. The method was Rankean, but drew explicitly on Hegel in its emphasis on the direction and progression of history. Going beyond Ranke’s hints at the runic import of recorded facts, Droysen pointed directly to signs of development, specifically toward a Prussian state.

This commitment was clear in his , “The History of Prussian Politics,” which he began having taken a chair at Jena in 1851. Through the period of the Prussian wars on Austria and France until his death in 1884, Droysen completed 14 volumes that traced the growth of the Prussian monarchy to the year 1756.     

From French Revolution to German Empire

Heinrich von Sybel made his name with a history of the first crusade written with Rankean documentary rigor. Yet he already had a political aim, undercutting romantic medievalism in his commitment to a liberal future. In 1848, he too attended the Frankfurt parliament, and similarly transferred his nationalist faith toward Prussian statism over time. Despite this allegiance to the “polar star” of the north, he took a chair at Munich on Ranke’s recommendation, leading Prince Maximilian’s new Bavarian Historical Commission and founding the Historische Zeitschrift (Historical Journal).

His debt to Ranke did not preclude a shift in tone. A celebrated 1856 on historiography demurred at the excessive pursuit of objectivity. His major work of these years, the “History of the French Revolution,” was a Burkean against the destructive effects of Jacobinism. Using archives in Paris, Sybel mounted a scholarly assault on France’s role in recent European history. He effectively downgraded the revolution to a by-product of historical providence centering on Prussia. The French historiographer Antoine Guillard it as “an attack not only on the Revolution but on the mind and history of France.”

In this view, the French Revolution indeed signaled the end of the old order, but it was merely one of three such events, the others being the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and the destruction of Poland. This wider break with feudalism and the rise of a modernity that would be encapsulated in a unified Germany under Prussia. French pride at the assertion of popular sovereignty and human rights was undercut and German nationhood celebrated.

Taking a chair in Bonn in 1861, the historian was now also a politician, sitting in the 1860s and 1870s in the Prussian Diet and the Constituent Reichstag of the North German Confederation. Bismarck saw Sybel’s value and made him director of Prussian archives in 1875, where he worked on his last , “The Founding of the German Empire by William I.” This overtly politicized work of history gave a Bismarckian slant to events leading up to 1871. Some, noting William I’s ambivalence about his chancellor’s maneuverings, the phrase “by” should have read “despite.”

The work lacked life and bore the weight of a propagandistic tome; later its political slant worked to its author’s disadvantage as the focus on Bismarck over William I offended the new kaiser, and Sybel was banished from the state archives in 1890. He died five years later, having completed his last volume. Sybel, though wary of democracy as a step toward Bonapartism and a believer in Prussia’s power, was also a believer in a Burkean pluralism, whereby power was best distributed among social groups under the protection of the state. Toward the end of the 19th century, a more virulent language of racial homogeneity and expansionism came to the fore.

Racial Theory

The boldest publicist of the Prussian School, whose messages most clearly herald the racialized nationalism of the 20th century, was Heinrich von Treitschke. Born in Saxony with Czech roots, Treitschke began his career as a Privatdozent in Leipzig, but his conviction in Berlin’s destiny to rule was out of place there, and he returned to take university posts in Prussia. His earliest publications included patriotic poems, while his 1859 dissertation on “the science of society” made a strong case for the state as necessary and primeval, without need for a contract with its citizens. Prussia provided a nucleus for a German state forming according to historical destiny.

Treitschke’s path exemplified the historians’ trajectory away from liberalism. As his writing gained influence, his distance from Ranke was clear. When sending a copy of his polemical essays to his father in 1865 he : “That bloodless objectivity which does not say on which side is the narrator’s heart is the exact opposite of the true historical sense. Judgment is free, even to the author.” His essays, often biographical studies or political arguments, grew more fervently nationalistic. The smaller German states should submit to annexation; colonial growth was a natural expression of a vital new power.

This set a tone for German expansionism from the 1860s onward. Treitschke too was politically active, sitting in the Reichstag in 1871 as a member of the new National Liberal party and welcoming the culture war against Catholics isolated in the new . In 1874, he was invited to take the chair in history in Berlin; Ranke was ushered from his post to make room for Treitschke, whom he deemed disapprovingly a publicist, not a historian. Yet student fraternities preferred their new teacher, the court made him official historiographer of Prussia in 1886, and his academic standing was reinforced by his editorship of Historische Zeitschrift after Sybel’s death in 1895.

Treitschke’s “History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century” was a colorful and lively ; keyed into the public mood, it impressed foreign readers including the British historian G.P. Gooch, who it to Macaulay’s “History of England” in style and vigor. “Both vibrate with their authors’ personality,” Gooch wrote in 1913, not seeing the full legacy of the Prussian School. As Treitschke gained influence in polemical attacks on socialists and Jews, his arguments converged with forms of social Darwinism and a racialized politics. In 1879, a long in the Preussische Jahrbucher, the right-wing journal he edited from 1866 to 1889, concluded with an anti-Semitic polemic. He that fundamental differences between Jews and Christians in Germany could not be resolved, and that the Jews had “assumed too large a space in our life.”

These passages were later republished in the , “A Word About Our Jews,” which reached a wider audience and sparked the , a two-year spate of protest and violence against the Jewish population. Treitschke’s anti-Semitic pronouncements coincided with those of Adolf Stöcker, then a court preacher to William I, who created the Christian Social Workers’ Party in 1878 to draw laborers away from socialism. Between them, Treitschke and Stöcker gave a new clerical, political and academic respectability to anti-Semitism from the 1880s onward.

Such theories were not far removed from the biological variants of similar ideas, for example in Ernst Haeckel’s monism of the same period, suggestive of an ethnic and eugenic, as much as an Idealist or Christian, idea of providence. It was Treitschke who coined the “The Jews are our misfortune,” repeated ad nauseam in the Nazi period, and most recently as “Israel is our misfortune” by the far-right party Die Rechte (The Right) in the European Parliament elections of 2019. The tradition of German nationalism had come a long way from the liberal rhetoric of freedom during the revolutionary period.

*[Research for this article was supported by a European Research Council Starting Grant (TAU17149) “Between the Times: Embattled Temporalities and Political Imagination in Interwar Europe.”]

*[51Թ is a  partner of the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.

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The Death of Liberalism Has Been Proclaimed Before /region/europe/crisis-liberalism-political-philosophy-history-guild-socialism-totalitarianism-uk-news-14317-2/ Mon, 15 Jul 2019 10:24:38 +0000 /?p=79251 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent designation of liberal values as “obsolete” may sound familiar. This is not the first time the death of liberalism has been announced. As George Dangerfield’s classic study put it, the early years of the 20th century saw the “strange death” of liberal values in England, and this reflected a pattern… Continue reading The Death of Liberalism Has Been Proclaimed Before

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent designation of liberal values as “” may sound familiar. This is not the first time the death of liberalism has been announced. As George Dangerfield’s put it, the early years of the 20th century saw the “strange death” of liberal values in England, and this reflected a pattern of disillusion across Europe.

Unsurprisingly, the current wave of populism calls to mind the mood of those years and its consequences. The First World War intensified a sense of historical crisis, a feeling that modernity marked a point of division and loss, heralding the birth of fascist ideology as some insisted that authoritarian assertions, fueled by popular passion, were desirable solutions for an enervated West. Expanding electorates, newly but imperfectly literate and vocal, led some observers to denigrate the principles of freedom reified for example in the British liberal tradition as it developed from its Whig roots toward a modern faith in history as moving, enmeshed with human reason, to the best possible outcome.

Loosely borrowing from Darwinian and , early 20th-century liberals evinced a sense of inexorable progress, expressed in various forms: sometimes gradual, sometimes revolutionary, some prioritizing the “negative” freedom of capitalism’s “invisible hand,” others calling for state guidance in the “New Liberal” tradition.

An alternative narrative of Europe, traceable to continental romanticism, was more complicated, asserting the uniqueness of cultural formations, looking to the growth of distinctive national character . This tradition remained optimistic, essentially, in seeing God at work in the destinies of peoples, but in seeing these forces as specific to locality and circumstance, ruling out abstract generalization about their progress, but always looking to their roots, to the specifics of their being in nuce and their becoming over time.

This was the root of a nationalist historiography. From Johann Gottfried Herder through to the this line of thought was at work in forming a sense of the incommensurability of national character and destiny to any general pattern. Such attempts to relocate value in local conditions, circumstances and peoples were radicalized in early 20th century attacks on liberal abstraction. Rather than atomized units of humanity playing a role in a vast system, the new spirit dealt with persons, unique and special.

Chorus of Populisms

In terms of politics, the focus on the local would come out in what seems familiar to us now as a rejection of globalized marketplace, of the movement of peoples and a celebration of rootedness, of specificity, of community. This could result in a politics of earth and blood, no doubt. One countervailing influence lay in the old schism across Europe between temporal and spiritual power — a battle the outcome of which has never been clear.

Forms of subsidiarity — the distribution of power back to individuals — were reimagined in the early 20th century as a response to this crisis of liberalism; to reassure communities and families that their special circumstances would be recognized, celebrated and granted an autonomy unavailable under the liberal state. And yet paradoxically, in many cases, this conceptual process by steps revised the goal of pluralism, proffering a recognition of local, ethnic feeling in emotive, irrational form while disguising what was an unprecedented centralization of such power, ultimately demanding total loyalty and subordination of persons and families to state control.

Against this we might note the resistance put up against an excess temporal power by those keeping in mind the older tradition of European Christendom, and indeed “totalitarianism” was first defined and criticized by Christian commentators.

The same impulse that generated radical new proposals for power distribution as a replacement for both classic and statist liberalism is at work again in forms of post-liberalism on the left as much as the right.

Just as a chorus of populisms swells again across Europe and the United States, the negligent, abstracting habits of liberal progressivism have been identified and attacked, conceded and regretted by commentators across the political spectrum. The same impulse that generated radical new proposals for power distribution as a replacement for both classic and statist liberalism is at work again in forms of post-liberalism on the left as much as the right.

The question remains whether critics of liberalism can find the delicate balance that permits a genuine reorientation of government, an invigorating new pluralism, without falling for the emotive, irrational romance of national and ethnic identity and thus the confidence trick that renders the “left behind” merely pawns moved by insidious top-down forces, gradually reinstalled by a new populist elite.

One notable precedent in the earlier crisis of liberalism of the early century was the British school of , identified with the work of George Douglas Howard Cole, represented an “undeveloped history,” as Cole put it. The idea was first developed in the radical periodical, New Age, a testing ground for heterodoxies of the left — and to some extent of the right — edited between 1907 and 1922 by Alfred Richard Orage. The journal was also the venue for many modernist writers establishing the theoretical grounds of that movement in the arts. Perhaps, as , we should taxonomize such simultaneous ideological and artistic ventures as forms of “political” and “cultural” modernism.

Marriage of Old and New

The guild idea, recurring in British historiography as a distinctive feature of the often-romanticized Middle Ages, was promoted from the 1860s, notably by John Ruskin. In essence, it eulogized and sought a return to the small guild structures of the Middle Ages, whereby networks of self-regulating producers — guilds based around a variety of crafts, arts and trades — would achieve ownership over their own labor. Ruskin advocated such a system, notably in his 1860 work “Unto This Last” and in “Fors Clavigera,” his letters to workmen and laborers written between 1871 and 1884.

In 1871 he established the Guild of St. George to support work in crafts. His advocacy and similar arguments proposed by William Morris and Edward Carpenter were key sources when the guild idea attained a new lease of life in the early 20th century through the concerted efforts of a group of heterodox socialist thinkers based in Leeds and later London.

Arthur Penty’s 1906 “Restoration of the Gild System” is a key text. Penty, an architect, remembered a decisive moment when he learned that the competition to choose a building design for the new London School of Economics had been evaluated purely on the calculation of maximum classroom space. This reminder of the utilitarian equations —the so-called statistical method — favored by the (led by Sydney and Beatrice Webb) over aesthetic or spiritual values, repelled him from its practices.

He wrote his short 1906 book —its title spelt “gild” significantly to distinguish his idea from other versions — after much discussion with his Leeds friend Orage, a leader of the Leeds Art Club, a group of radical intellectuals that exemplifies, as , the provincial Northern avant-garde. The two men had by this time moved to London where they were attempting to instill their ideas in the Society network in the capital. Penty and Orage differed greatly in their worldviews. Penty’s uncompromising pursuit of a medieval guild idea generated a resolute hostility to modern industry; he sought a militant rejection of mass production and a reversion to pre-industrial arts and crafts.

Orage was open to an adaptation of the guild idea to technological realities, and this led him toward speculations on new forms of industrial guilds — a that led to intriguing proximities to Sorelian syndicalism as well as the Janus-faced experiments of the London avant-garde.

The other incompatibility between the two men lay in Orage’s spiritual thinking. His guild idea was linked intrinsically to spiritualist or occult tendencies, which linked the investment of spirit in labor to the fruition of the individual on a spiritual plane, an idea he expanded on in lectures to the Theosophical Society in these years, resulting in his 1907 book “Consciousness, Animal, Human and Superman,” written while he and Penty shared a flat for a year in Hammersmith. While Orage’s investment in Penty’s economic mission is clear from his article for Past and Present in 1907, championing a return to the guild idea, his book and regular pieces for The Theosophical Review would suggest that these flatmates made a somewhat odd couple: As regards religion, Penty’s medievalism inclined him toward an integration of Catholicism as the unifying force to bring together the small networks of producers.

A third figure in this network was Samuel George Hobson, an Irish-born socialist who imbibed similar Ruskinian ideas to Orage and Penty, and added insights of his own deriving from managerial experience in various business enterprises. He too felt himself at odds with his colleagues’ ideas, immediately with Penty’s refutation of industry and, over time, with Orage’s monetary theories. Yet as the main author of a series of influential articles on guild economics that appeared in New Age from 1912, he was a decisive contributor to the development of the idea. Later he would espouse what he called a “Functional Socialism” that combined aspects of Orage’s thinking with those of the Spanish intellectual Ramiro de Maeztu, whose Catholicism colored his belief in a society shaped by conservative ethical principle.

has usefully dissected this field of guild socialisms to show how a genus of ideas can host numerous species, with potential developments in multiple directions. What one might identify as the distinguishing feature is the attitude to temporality: These writers shared a sense of modernity as having created a division, a break between a unified older society and a new world in which both the economic and the internal life of man was divided from itself. This prefigures the notable medievalist streak that runs through British modernism in work by T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound and William Butler Yeats, among many others.

Yet fractures run through the movement separating proximate writers’ work in myriad small ways. Penty’s idea is clearly emphatic in its description of a fall, but also envisions a “restoration.” Orage wrote of the significance of man’s fallen condition, but also posited the . Cole’s version, by maintaining a sense of individual worth, indicates a sense of promise in history that was compatible with mainstream Labour and liberal thought. What is noticeable about the guild idea is that it sees history as having suffered a fundamental moment of division in the rise of modernity, and proposes a return to a prelapsarian state.

Factionalization of the Guild Idea

Over time, the guild movement . Cole’s circle distanced itself from the journal, preferring to work under the aegis of the Fabian Research Department. The National Guilds League, founded by Cole in 1915, struggled to gain traction within a Labour Party concerned primarily with parliamentary representation. Meanwhile, the Russian Revolution of 1917 created a split within the National Guilds League between those who admired and feared Bolshevik theories and methods. Members of both factions left, some, like Reckett, to refine a Christian version of the guild idea, others to join the new Communist Party of Great Britain.

Stripped of much of its membership, the league was wound up in 1923. However, current refer back to the and seek to resurrect an Edwardian ideology they see as prematurely discarded and denied its true fruition in practice.

The legacy of Orage’s closer circle can be traced in more detail. Some members of the guild socialist circle were attracted to Italian fascism, undoubtedly. The Italian guild socialist Odon Por and the American emigré Ezra Pound were two prominent cases. These former New Age contributors to transfer elements of the idea into an Italian fascist context. The Spanish journalist considered himself to be a guild socialist and was proud of his place in the history of that movement. Others, however, saw his position as fascist; indeed, he was a founding member of the nationalist group Acción Española and was shot dead by Republicans in the lead up to the Spanish Civil War.

Many of Maeztu’s friends in Britain continued to identify themselves with the guild tradition, distancing themselves from fascism, although their thinking was sometimes perceived as tinted with authoritarianism. These writers included , Orage’s biographer Philip Mairet and the Anglican clergyman Vigo Demant — central figures in the s known as the Christendom Group founded 1921, and the Chandos Group, named after an informal gathering at the Chandos restaurant in St. Martin’s Lane, around 1931.

Eliot met Reckitt at the 1933 Anglo-Catholic Summer School held at Keble College, Oxford, and gave Reckitt’s “Christian Sociology for Today” a favorable review in The Criterion in July 1934. Eliot praised Demant’s works in his Criterion commentaries of January 1932 and January 1934 and acknowledges a debt to his work in “The Idea of a Christian Society.”

These interwar groups explored the possibility of a . Reckitt and Demant had become acquainted with Orage and other guild socialists as contributors to the New Age. They wrote for Orage again when he returned to London in 1934 as editor of the New English Weekly. Both had a notable link to a brand of Anglican thinking that preceded the New Age debate. As has shown, the Edwardian network of Christian pluralists laid the foundations for interwar discussions regarding the guild idea. Influenced by John Neville Figgis, Reckitt and Demant were prior to their contact with Orage, Hobson and Cole at the New Age.

Figgis was a key figure in Christian social thinking who, influenced by Lord Acton (his tutor at Cambridge) and the German thinker Otto von Gierke, advanced a kind of pluralism, emphasizing the role of faith communities in balancing the power of the state. Attentive to modern thought, notably the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, his work reacted against weak forms of liberal theology. Intellectually advanced, he was at the same time drawn to a traditional austerity, leading him to join the Community of the Resurrection at Mirfield, an Anglican monastic order and seminary that remains influential to this day. Reckitt and Demant both from long conversations with Figgis toward the end of his life, as did the left-leaning Church historian Alec Vidler.

Political Religion

Figgis, like contemporaries across Europe, rejected the liberal “boneless Christ” of the 19th century. An accomplished preacher who was invited to prominent churches in London between the wars, he that the idea of historical “progress with a capital P” has been “torpedoed by the man who sunk the Lusitania,” strangely foreshadowing his later experience as a passenger on a ship sunk by U-boats, an incident that shortened his life. This mood of dissatisfaction with a complacent progressivism that blurs history and theology echoes themes in the cultural modernism of T. E. Hulme and T. S. Eliot, who knew and shared ideas with guild socialist intellectuals.

Tangentially, Figgis’s ideas appear also to echo the turning away from liberal theology apparent in the work of Karl Barth, whose 1919 commentary “The Epistle to the Romans,” in its withdrawal from the liberal German tradition of Schleiermacher, had a profound impact. As the theologian Karl Adams put it in another , “the bomb that fell on the playground of the theologians.” The martial metaphors interestingly recall the impact of cultural modernism at the same moment: the “” of post-impressionism of 1910, and imaginings of the new art as a revolution or moment of anarchy.

For Figgis, the interwoven fabrics of communities, families, guilds and faiths provide a form of protection against a centralizing hubris and the worst forms of political religion. His case for a form of subsidiarity that distributed power among multiple communities, thus thwarting the accumulation of state authority on one side and the ill effects of liberal atomism on the other is powerfully resonant today. This English writer echoes the attack on “totalitarianism” — a word coined by Catholic critics of the fascist, Nazi and Soviet regimes of the interwar period. An between Jacques Maritain and Carl Schmitt is representative of this debate, Maritain leading the charge against totalitarianism having distanced himself from Action française’s similar tendency to centralized authority.

Figgis can be seen as part of this collision of ideas across Europe. This brief sketch merely introduces some past ideas that stood in reaction against totalitarianism, with a view to how current attacks on liberalism might be addressed through the renewal of lost, alternative political systems, even those short-lived experiments that fell foul to the perils of emotive nationalism in an earlier age. One must seek the momentary element, the fragile dream of reinvesting in persons within a community, neither negligently abstract nor poisonously emotive in clannish union. The guild idea, however brief its earlier expression, might contain useful aspects in its glimpsed, prelapsarian state, as it was before some catalyst turned it to an uglier alloy.

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Research for this article was supported by a European Research Council Starting Grant (TAU17149) “Between the Times: Embattled Temporalities and Political Imagination in Interwar Europe.”]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51Թ’s editorial policy.

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