The ongoing conflict in Syria is impacting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in numerous ways. Jordan tends to present an image of political stability and social cohesiveness in an otherwise turbulent region. 

In reality, the situation inside Jordan is far more complex. In many respects, Jordan’s alliance with the United States conceals a climate of political fragility, communal strains, and economic weakness. Led by King Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, Jordan is ruled by an authoritarian regime that presides over an increasingly agitated populace eager for political reform. 

The ruling monarchy has watched nervously as Arabs have taken to the streets to demand the freedom, democracy, and justice that have eluded them for so long – demands that are being vocalized by more and more Jordanians from all walks of life – while its erstwhile allies in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt were toppled by unprecedented displays of people power. 

Jordan: Challenges From Syria

Jordan is now being confronted with severe social, political, economic, and security challenges as a result of the ongoing tragedy in neighboring Syria. Consequently, the eruption of political unrest in Syria, followed by the ensuing militarization of the Syrian uprising that has plunged the country into a civil war, presages a period of extended uncertainty in Jordan.

In tangible terms, the crisis in Syria has presented Jordan with a major economic burden to its already weak economy. Jordan also faces a series of threats to domestic peace and stability stemming from the potential spillover of fighting into its territory. 

The dominant role being played by radical Islamist militants in the Syrian insurgency, and the notable increase of Jordanian militants fighting among the opposition, raises concerns about the potential for blowback within Jordan down the line. The rise of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusrah (The Support Front) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), among others, which have come at the expense of Free Syrian Army- (FSA) affiliated movements, is a case in point. 

Importantly, Jordan is located adjacent to Syria’s southwestern province of Dera'a, a locus of political and violent opposition to the ruling Ba’athist regime that is widely seen as the cradle of the Syrian uprising. 

Since the start of the armed uprising, violent insurgents, including radical Islamist militants, have been accused of using Jordanian territory just over the Syrian-Jordanian border to organize and launch operations inside Syria. 

Inconsistent Message on the Syrian Conflict

Jordan was also quickly ensnared in the conflict on the diplomatic stage. Throughout the duration of the conflict, Jordan has conveyed a confused and inconsistent message about its position. For example, Jordan has sought to portray itself as a neutral actor in the events in Syria, despite its history of acrimony with the Ba’athist regime. Officially, Jordan advocates a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 

While King Abdullah II was the first Arab leader to call on President Bashar al-Assad to relinquish power, he later offered to mediate talks between the Ba’athist regime and the rebels.  And during the anticipated US military strike on Syria during summer 2013, King Abdullah II announced that Jordan would not be used as a staging ground for US action.  

At the same time, Jordan has lent its support to political opposition bodies such as the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) that are themselves attached to numerous insurgent detachments. Jordan is also reported to be serving as a conduit for arms and other logistical supplies being provided to insurgents over the border by way of Saudi Arabia and other prominent backers of the opposition.  

From Syria’s perspective, Jordan’s close ties with fellow monarchy Saudi Arabia, a leading force behind the political and armed opposition in Syria and a vocal advocate for foreign military intervention to topple the Ba’athist regime, places the Hashemite regime firmly on the side of the opposition. 

Reports that American and other foreign intelligence services have also provided various levels of training and other support to insurgent groups in Jordan further complicate the Hashemite Kingdom’s position, especially its claim to neutrality.

A series of major battles between Syrian security forces and insurgents along the Syrian-Jordanian border since the start of the armed uprising places the region into its proper strategic perspective and sheds important light on Jordan’s vulnerabilities. Syrian security forces continue to make notable gains against the armed opposition in parts of northern and eastern Syria near the country's borders with Turkey and Iraq, respectively, as well as along the Syrian-Lebanese frontier in western Syria. 

Dera'a province, and other areas in southern Syria that extend to the Syrian-Jordanian border and that have since fallen under the control of the armed opposition, will most likely draw the attention of Syrian security forces in the weeks and months to come. By virtue of its geography, the disposition of Dera'a province greatly affects the security of Damascus and, by extension, the survivability of the Ba’athist regime. Given its proximity to Dera'a province and other critical areas in southern Syria and its role in facilitating – directly and indirectly – the armed insurrection, Syrian efforts to retain control of the critical southern front will likely be calibrated to shape Jordan’s behavior toward the conflict.

The Influx of Refugees

The influx of Syrian refugees has also contributed to a heightening of social tensions in Jordan. Jordan continues to contend with a significant population of Iraqi refugees who fled the conflict in their homeland and the longtime presence of Palestinian refugees. 

The presence of large numbers of refugees in Jordan exacerbates longstanding social tensions that threaten to undermine already precarious interpretations of Jordanian national identity. While Palestinians make up the majority of Jordan’s population, the Hashemite monarchy has tended to derive much of its support and legitimacy from the local Bedouin (who are often referred to as "East Bankers") population. The influx of Iraqis also threatened Jordan’s delicate balance of social and cultural identities. With the exception of Lebanon, Jordan hosts more Syrian refugees than any other country.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), over 550,000 Syrian refugees have streamed into Jordan since March 2011. Jordanian officials place the figure above 1 million, as not all refugees have registered with the UNHCR.  

The majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan live near Jordanian-Syrian border in northern Jordan. In addition, 70% of the UNHCR-registered refugees are situated in the Aljun, Balqa, Irbid, Jarash, Mafraq, and Zarqa Governorates of northern Jordan.  

Approximately one-quarter of all Syrian refugees reside in the tent city of Zaatari, located eight miles south of the Syrian-Jordanian border. Since July 2012, Zaatari has been transformed from a barren desert village with a population of 12,000, into a three-square-mile tent city where over 140,000 Syrian refugees are estimated to dwell. Around 21,000 Syrian refugees in Zaatari are below the age of five. To date, Zaatari is Jordan’s fourth-largest population center and the world’s second largest refugee camp.

The influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan, with a population of fewer than 6.5 million, exerts significant pressure on the economy and exacerbates the resource-poor country’s energy challenges. The cost of operating services at Zaatari alone approaches $500,000 per day, and the daily water demand is 1.1 million gallons.  

Amman underscored its priorities during the beginning of June 2013 by ordering its military to seal off its border with Syria to stanch the flow of refugees. Jordan’s sluggish economy, energy shortages, and water crisis will compel Amman to make difficult decisions with respect to resource allocation in the coming years, if the refugee crisis causes Jordan’s population to continually grow at a rate which the economy cannot sustain. 

So far, the Syrian crisis has led to an 8% increase in Jordan’s population since March 2011. Relatedly, competition over disappearing jobs has increased as Jordanian employers tap into the large pool of Syrian labor that is willing to work for lower wages. 

Moreover, with a growing number of Syrian refugees migrating to the cities, the rental housing market has tightened, particularly in Amman and Mafraq. According to some estimates, rental rates for the cheapest apartments have increased upwards of 50-100% as more refugees move into basements and storage areas within apartments.

The Syrian crisis has underscored deep political and ideological rifts within Jordan, as different factions maintain diverse stances toward Amman’s role in the conflict. Such divisions were highlighted in August 2013, when hundreds of liberal and Arab nationalist groups held demonstrations in Amman to protest an anticipated US military strike against Syria.  

These political currents are inclined to view any Western military strike against Damascus within the context of imperialist efforts to undermine the Arab world and destroy Islam. In April 2013, demonstrators in Amman protested against the deployment of 200 US troops in Jordan along the Syrian-Jordanian border.

Risks

In the absence of an end to the conflict in Syria, Jordan faces a series of serious risks. In the immediate future, Jordan’s economy will continue to bear the brunt of the Middle East’s gravest refugee crisis since 1948, while existing social tensions over the influx hundreds of thousands of refugees continue to percolate across the country. 

In particular, the long-term of implications of permanent refugee camps residing on Jordanian soil threaten to unsettle the delicate demographic makeup that has allowed the Hashemite monarchy to retain control and survive over the years. 

As the influence of radical Islamist militants grows within the armed opposition, including groups that advocate hardline Salafist ideologies or otherwise associate with al-Qaeda, the threat of blowback will also increasingly be felt in Jordan as Jordanian fighters (and others militants) seek out new targets in the region.

[Note: This article, originally published with the title "," has been reproduced with the permission of . Copyright 2014 Helios Global, Inc.]

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The 2011 fall of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi and the subsequent breakdown in order in Libya, has been a major contributor to the instability plaguing large swaths of the Sahel region and Northwest Africa. In particular, the flow of weapons, such as a multitude of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and explosives, from liberated Libyan military stockpiles into the surrounding countries has galvanized existing political opposition currents, separatist movements, and transnational militant groups.

Much of the concern regarding the impact of weapons proliferation out of Libya emphasizes the potential threat of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) falling into the hands of radical Islamist militant groups, such as al-Qaeda or one of its regional or international affiliates. In light of the persistent threat of international terrorism as it relates to commercial air travel, such concerns remain valid. Yet it has been the residual impact of the proliferation of SALW and explosives on regional stability and security, that has posed the most immediate threats to what is an already precarious political and security environment.

Mali, which has experienced severe unrest since January 2012 – including ethnic Tuareg-led insurrections, radical Islamist insurgency, and a military-led coup d’état – has been the most dramatic example of the region’s post-Qaddafi volatility; Chad and Niger have also been forced to deal with fallout from the Libyan revolt. Algeria has experienced a noticeable uptick of violence, including the January 2013 attack against the Tigantourine natural gas facility in Amenas in eastern Algeria along the Algerian-Libyan border. The attack at Amenas was orchestrated by militants associated with an offshoot of al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), known as al-Mulathameen (The Masked Ones). Nigeria believes that radical Islamist militants affiliated with Boko Haram have also been emboldened by their access to Libyan arms. While lying outside of the geographic space that is the subject of this analysis, the increase in violence in Egypt’s Sinai region is also being partially attributed to the influx of smuggled Libyan arms into Egyptian territory.

To date, the proliferation of Libyan weapons has further militarized numerous existing political opposition and radical movements and afforded opportunities for other violent and irregular actors to pursue their own objectives. Qaddafi’s fall was followed by a troubled political transition that remains marred by violence between rival factions and militias, resulting in a power vacuum in one of the region’s most militarized states. As Libya struggles to consolidate its domestic political institutions and establish some semblance of law and order, SALW and explosives proliferation stemming from within its borders will continue unabated. Consequently, the countries lying within the Sahel and Northwest Africa will continue to have their security undermined by developments in Libya. 

Libyan Weapons: Galvanizing Violence

Despite the concerns surrounding the disposition of Libya’s arsenal of MANPADS, there is no concrete evidence that any militants present in the region – radical Islamist or otherwise – have procured the weapons systems. Nevertheless, the potential threats associated with MANPADS continue to attract much of the attention in regards to proliferation. These worries were exacerbated by documents discovered in Libya in September 2011, indicating that Russia had provided Qaddafi with several hundred advanced – and unaccounted for – SA-24 “Grinch” surface-to-air missiles. In March 2011, Chad’s President Idriss Deby claimed that Libyan MANPADS had entered Chad and Niger. Malian officials echoed Deby’s claims. A number of unconfirmed reports circulated in regional media outlets claimed that various North African regional militant groups had acquired MANPADS in 2012 and 2013. Algerian officials reported in February 2013 that they confiscated numerous Russian surface-to-air missile systems in Algeria’s southern regions.

But it is the proliferation of more prosaic weapons systems – essentially a diverse array of SALW and explosives – that have most actively contributed to the recent wave of unrest and instability in the Sahel and Northwest Africa. An assortment of Libyan weapons started entering neighboring countries soon after the outbreak of civil war in Libya. In early 2011, assault rifles, ammunition, mortars, mines, and plastic explosives began crossing Libya’s borders into Algeria, Egypt, Niger, and Mali. In April 2011, regional media reports claimed that pickup trucks carrying arms, ammunition, and explosives from eastern Libya had crossed into Mali via Chad and Niger.

Since 2011, concerned officials have repeatedly claimed that Libyan weapons and stockpiles of plastic explosives are being distributed to militants in Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, and elsewhere. Established organized criminal and illicit trafficking networks traversing the Sahel’s ancient East-West trade routes, and associated networks that link the north to the south, are facilitating this trend. The porous borders throughout the territories in question also help ensure that the relative free flow of illicit trade continues unimpeded. The increasing availability of arms has also provided aspiring militants with the opportunity to establish their own fringe factions. Weapons traffickers are also benefiting from the additional sources of supply and increasingly diverse selections of arms.

Mali, Chad, and Niger

This is most evident in Mali. The political leadership in Bamako has long disenfranchised Mali’s Tuaregs, a nomadic population that is related to the indigenous Berber peoples of North Africa and the Sahel region. Qaddafi employed thousands of Tuareg mercenaries from Mail, Niger, and Chad to bolster the Libyan military while fortifying his own power base within the Libyan security apparatus. Following the collapse of his regime, the repatriation of these generally well trained, heavily armed, often battle hardened, and politicized Tuaregs remains a major challenge. In January 2012, a separatist Tuareg rebellion broke out in northern Mali. In March 2012, Malian military officers launched a coup against the government of President Amadou Toumani, in response to what they claimed was the mismanagement of the military with the rebellion. By April 2012, Tuareg rebels, allied with a variety of Islamist militants, had gained control of most of northern Mali, prompting a joint French-Malian military campaign to recapture the north in January 2013.

Despite French and Malian efforts, northern Mali remains a militant stronghold. Tuareg separatist groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), and the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) exist alongside – and increasingly clash with – regional Islamist extremist groups such as AQIM, the AQIM-affiliated Movement of Jihad and Oneness in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar al-Dine (AAD), among others. For instance, MIA is a splinter group of AAD. The MIA broke from AAD in January 2013 and subsequently renounced its tactics and ties to AQIM. Similarly, MAA was formed as a secular alternative to the more Islamist-oriented MNLA. These groups – all of whom have benefitted from the influx of weapons from liberated Libyan caches – have created an atmosphere of ongoing violence in Mali, complicating the region’s prospects for stability.

The specter of anti-government violence also haunts Chad. The Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) threatened in March to renew its militant campaign against the Deby regime despite having agreed to lay down its arms in 2010. There has been speculation that arms from Libya have encouraged the UFR’s saber rattling, and Deby – who has survived multiple coups, including an alleged attempt by two generals and two legislators to take over the country this past May – has accused Libya of harboring UFR rebels.

Niger also faces an uncertain future in the wake of the Libyan collapse. In May, MUJAO militants launched a suicide bombing – the first attack of its kind in Niger – against a Nigerien army base and French uranium mine operated by Areva in northern Niger. The group claimed that the operation was designed to punish Niamey for deploying a contingent of peacekeepers to Mali. The attacks, which Niger claimed were launched from Libya, raised concerns in both Niger and Europe about the safety of Niger’s uranium deposits; France, which derives the majority of its electricity from nuclear power, receives about 40 percent of its uranium from Niger. Niger is also reported to possess significant oil deposits, and has a history of rebel-led violence directed at its uranium and oil sector. Since 2007, the Tuareg-based Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) has threatened to attack oil and uranium operations in the country, unless Niamey provides the MNJ with a greater share of national energy revenues. MNJ has kidnapped Chinese and French workers at oil and uranium facilities, and many fear that the instability in Libya will provide the MNJ with additional resources and an increased operational capacity.

Organized Crime and Regional Smuggling Networks

As the number of militant groups in the region grows, the demand for weapons increases, bolstering the illicit trade networks that have existed alongside legitimate trade relationships in the region for years. The Sahel and Northwest Africa are focal points of arms trafficking since the 1990s, and since the early 2000s, narcotics trafficking – especially of cocaine and cannabis resin – has been on the rise. The region in question is widely touted as a global hub of narcotics trafficking that encompasses links to Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe. Organized criminal networks, which often incorporate networks of underpaid and corrupt government officials and regional security personnel, have exploited the growing instability to expand their operations, assisted by the flood of Libyan weapons into the region.

Risks

The current Tuareg separatist and radical Islamist-led violence in the Sahel and Northwest Africa is unlikely to recede in the near-term. The desperate poverty of the region, where drought and expanding desertification have ravaged the agrarian economy and frequent kidnappings have decimated the foreign tourist trade, provides few legitimate and viable employment opportunities to Tuareg mercenaries returning from years of service – and employment – in Libya. These populations have been ignored and marginalized by their governments for decades, resulting in extreme resentment and a steady process of politicization.

Qaddafi was in power for over 40 years, and his absence is being felt on many levels. Despite his government’s isolation from the larger Arab and Western worlds, the former Libyan army colonel actively cultivated close ties with his African neighbors to the south, using Libya’s considerable oil wealth to promote infrastructure development projects, broker peace deals, and provide employment to impoverished and disenfranchised minority groups. Libya’s new provisional government is unlikely – and largely unable – to continue Qaddafi’s policies towards Libya’s African neighbors, policies on which many of those neighbors had come to depend economically, politically, and socially. This, combined with the influx of Libyan SALW and explosives into the region and the subsequent strengthening of numerous anti-government and separatist militant groups, clouds the security, political, and economic outlook for the Sahel and Northwest Africa.

*[This article, originally published with the title, "," has been reproduced with the permission of .  Copyright 2013 Helios Global, Inc.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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With the conflict in Syria now well into its third year, it is important to take stock of some of the broader trends that are being driven by this unfolding tragedy in the Middle East. An informed understanding of the situation in Syria is critical toward mitigating a range of risks – political, economic, or security – for investors, decision-makers, and analysts alike.

The conflict in Syria has already confirmed fears of its potential to engulf Syria’s immediate neighbors. To different degrees, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel have all been impacted directly (and indirectly) by the popular uprising and subsequent outbreak of a full-blown civil war in Syria. In many respects, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel are all part of the broader social, political, ideological, and kinetic battlespace that is being leveraged by a resilient and emboldened Ba’athist regime headed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his supporters, as well as the numerous armed opposition factions seeking al-Assad’s ouster. The web of domestic and foreign interests that underlie Syria’s civil war are also being directly shaped by (or are themselves a product of) the peculiarities – social, political, demographic, economic, and geopolitical – unique to the Levant’s societies and politics.

In the weeks ahead, Helios Global’s World Trends Watch is offering readers a snapshot of some of the most pressing risks stemming from the conflict in Syria today, specifically as they relate to regional stability in the Levant. Our first installment examines some of the factors impacting stability in Lebanon as a result of the conflict in Syria. Subsequent analyses will examine the situations in analogous contexts in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, and the numerous Palestinian refugee camps situated throughout the region.

The Incremental Destabilization of Lebanon

To date, the heightened state of tensions in Lebanon represents the clearest example of the potential risks to neighboring countries resulting from Syria’s implosion. In comparative terms, Lebanon has borne the brunt of the regional pressures and stresses emanating from the conflict in Syria. Initial social and economic pressures are giving way to heated political fights between rival factions that are playing themselves out through outbursts of violence. So long as the conflict in Syria persists, the incremental destabilization of Lebanon will continue.

Due to its geographic proximity to Syria, Lebanon has become overwhelmed with Syrian refugees streaming into the country in order to flee the fighting at home. Lebanon is reported to officially host around 550,000 Syrian refugees, the most of any of Syria’s neighbors. Yet, Lebanese and other international observers claim the actual figure to be much higher, as most official estimates fail to account for the number of refugees who have not registered with the United Nations (UN) or Lebanese government bodies. Some estimates suggest that up to 1,000,000 Syrian refugees may have in fact entered Lebanon.

Politics aside, the toll of this refugee flood into a country of around 4.3 million people has left Lebanon in a very dire position. The massive influx of Syrians has taxed Lebanon’s already meager humanitarian and infrastructure capacity to the breaking point. International commitments to help Lebanese authorities cope with the wave of refugees have fallen well short of delivering the scale of relief required to alleviate the situation. Persistent shortages of adequate housing for the most desperate refugees, as well as access to sufficient food and proper medical care, are among the most pressing immediate concerns.

A host of longer-term worries stemming from Lebanon’s inadequate institutional and infrastructure capacity are also presenting a host of burdens. Syrian children are having trouble enrolling into Lebanese schools. As foreigners, the prospects for Syrian refugees finding stable employment in Lebanon outside of what is often a highly exploitative and insecure informal labor sector are also grim in an already weak economic climate. Popular resentment toward the Syrian presence in Lebanon is also growing, even in communities that are generally sympathetic to the refugees’ plight and aligned politically and ideologically with the Ba’athist regime. This is the case despite the fact that many Lebanese share close cultural and familial ties with Syrians, and Syrian guest workers already figure prominently in the Lebanese labor sector. These problems are exacerbated by Lebanon’s dire economic situation. Inflation is rampant and the costs of fuel, food, and other vital consumer goods continue to rise for Lebanese consumers. The conflict in Syria has also decimated Lebanon’s lucrative tourism sector. Lebanon’s vital trade relations with Syria and its neighbors have also taken a major hit due to the conflict.

On the domestic political front, a climate of hostilities between Lebanese opponents of Syria’s Ba’athist regime – led by the March 14 bloc of political parties and associations headed by former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri’s Future Movement and its hardline Salafist affiliates – and Syria’s Lebanese allies – namely, the March 8 bloc of political parties and associations that includes Hezbollah – is increasingly translating into violence. This period of tensions contributed to Najib Mikati’s decision to resign as prime minister in March, a move that escalated tensions in the country even further.

Fractured and Divided Polity

Due to its social, political, economic, cultural, demographic, and geographic conditions, Lebanon is especially sensitive to the current circumstances in Syria. Lebanon remains a fractured and divided polity riven by political and sectarian factions that were themselves shaped by years of civil war. In many respects, the fault lines that have emerged in Syria since the start of the anti-Ba’ath uprising are very much apparent in Lebanon.

The March 14 bloc and its allies, which includes adherents of Lebanon’s growing radical Sunni Salafist current, have been among the most vocal in terms of lending support to the political and armed opposition in Syria. For these factions, the civil war in Syria has provided them with an opportunity to challenge their local rivals, namely, the March 8 bloc led by Shi’a Hezbollah. Lebanese militants have figured prominently among the armed opposition in Syria. Towns and villages that tend to sympathize with the armed opposition, such as the northern town of Arsal, which lies just inside Lebanon along the Lebanese-Syrian border in the Bekaa Valley and hosts a largely Sunni population, are serving as logistical and operational hubs for the armed opposition in Syria. As a result, Syrian forces have launched a series of attacks against suspected insurgent positions located in and around Arsal in recent months. 

Skirmishes between armed opposition factions and Syrian security forces are increasingly being fought inside Lebanese territory. Radical ideologues based in the traditional bastions of hardline Salafist influence in Lebanon, including the cities of Tripoli in the north and Sidon in the south, are increasingly challenging al-Assad’s allies in the country through open and often violent confrontations, while simultaneously imploring their followers to travel to Syria and take up arms alongside the armed opposition.

The recent exploits of the radical Salafist cleric Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir in Abra, a suburb of Sidon, are illustrative of the scale of the crisis confronting Lebanon. Al-Assir’s loyalists attacked Lebanese security forces in the area. The clashes left 12 Lebanese soldiers dead and scores injured. Al-Assir’s reliance on sectarian invective targeting Hezbollah, Shi’a Muslims in general, and Iran is raising fears of further destabilization and even civil war.

Hezbollah's Involvement

Growing evidence of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict in places such as al-Qusayr in Homs Province, a stronghold of the Syrian opposition that has since fallen to Damascus, and towns and villages in its immediate vicinity, ostensibly on the side of the Ba’athist regime, has also exacerbated tensions in Lebanon. Al-Qusayr and its surrounding areas are strategically important because they lie between Damascus and Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Hezbollah justified its actions by claiming to protect a network of towns and villages located around al-Qusayr whose diverse collection of inhabitants – including Shi’a, Sunnis, Christians, and Alawites – assert Lebanese nationality in a heavily contested area located along the Lebanese-Syrian frontier. Hezbollah’s growing profile in Syria, combined with the Ba’athist regime’s continued resilience, likely portends a steady intensification of Sunni-Shi’a hostilities in Lebanon in the weeks and months ahead.

As Syria’s Ba’athist regime endures, Salafist-dominated armed opposition elements (and their foreign benefactors, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar) are likely to direct their attention toward destabilizing Lebanon by attacking pro-Syrian factions inside the country. For Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the destabilization of Lebanon would put Hezbollah on the defensive, diminishing its ability to operate in Syria. Armed opposition elements struggling against the Ba’athist regime are also issuing threats against Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon due to their involvement in Syria. 

In light of the numerous gains secured by Syrian security forces on the battlefield in recent weeks in regions once regarded as insurgent strongholds, growing threats issued by the Syrian armed opposition against Hezbollah in Lebanon may reflect a sign of weakness on their part. As armed opposition factions fail to make gains against Syrian security forces, some groups may choose to expand their area of operations by striking the Ba’athist regime’s Lebanese allies. This strategy also signals an attempt to weaken Iran, a key supporter of the Ba’athist regime and Hezbollah. 

For example, Dahiyah, the southern suburb of Beirut whose inhabitants are largely Shi’a and sympathetic to Hezbollah, was targeted in a rocket attack in late May. As a result, sectarian clashes and displays of popular unrest are becoming more frequent across Lebanon. In the context of wider regional developments, incendiary incidents such as these have the potential to explode quickly and without notice, leaving Lebanon increasingly unstable and insecure for its residents, as well as visitors and investors.

Risks

The ongoing conflict in Syria will continue to threaten to destabilize Lebanon in the weeks and months ahead. The potential risks affecting Lebanon encompass social, political, economic, as well as security arenas. Just as important, the prospect of what appears to be an increasingly emboldened and resilient Ba’athist regime in Syria raises the level of risk associated with visiting and operating in Lebanon. Armed opposition factions (and their foreign supporters) are more likely to attempt to target Syria’s allies in Lebanon in order to compensate for their inability to achieve substantive victories on Syrian soil.

*[This article, originally published with the title, "," has been reproduced with the permission of .  Copyright 2013 Helios Global, Inc.”]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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Long regarded as one of the world’s most reclusive and authoritarian states, the southeastern Asian nation of Myanmar (also known as Burma) is witnessing a period of cautious political and economic liberalization. Rich in oil and natural gas and an array of minerals vital to the world economy, Myanmar’s steady opening is attracting growing interest from foreign investors and trading partners eager to gain a foothold in one of Asia’s most isolated societies. The ruling regime’s decisions to release longtime democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 2010 and allow for her opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) party to contest the April 2012 elections, were also seen as signs of imminent change in Myanmar.

US President Barack Obama’s landmark state visit to Myanmar in November 2012 – the first visit by a sitting US president to the country – serves as a testament to the growing strategic importance of Myanmar to the United States and the international community. Obama’s trip followed a December 2011 visit by then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton’s visit represented the first by a senior US official to Myanmar in 50 years. The United States has also moved to soften the economic sanctions restricting American investment in Myanmar. The United States implemented a series of economic sanctions on Myanmar beginning in 1988 in response to a violent crackdown by the ruling military junta against opposition demonstrators and related concerns over human rights. The European Union (EU) and a host of other countries imposed their own economic sanctions on Myanmar. Following in the footsteps of the United States, the EU announced on April 22 that it would be lifting all economic sanctions on Myanmar. In response to the overtures from Brussels, Naypyidaw subsequently released dozens of political prisoners on April 23.

A host of restrictions governing American and European interactions with Myanmar, however, including sanctions and embargoes governing arms sales, remain in place. Concerns over Myanmar’s human rights record have not dissipated. Myanmar continues to be the subject of severe international criticism over the circumstances surrounding the treatment of its ethnic Rohingya community. Inhabiting Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, the predominantly Muslim Rohingya population, which shares ethnic and cultural links to the peoples of India and Bangladesh, has been the target of repeated attacks by ethnic Rakhine nationalists, who are predominantly Buddhist. Sectarian and ethnic animosities sparked a series of violent riots in 2012. An apparently organized campaign of violence and pogroms targeting the Rohingya population has led to hundreds of dead and tens of thousands of refugees. At the same time, most indications suggest that the steady normalization of relations between Myanmar and the West will proceed. Once considered as a mainstay friend of China and North Korea and a pariah state by much of the West over its human rights record, incremental social, political, and economic change in Myanmar represents an important geopolitical trend that warrants closer attention. Equally important, the US engagement of Myanmar is very much reflective of the much touted “pivot to Asia” declared by the Obama administration that involves the refocusing of US foreign policy toward Asia.

Outlook

Myanmar’s incremental normalization with the international community is already having a profound impact on the southeastern Asian strategic landscape.  Myanmar’s significant reserves of crude oil and natural gas are attracting the attention of global blue chip energy majors eager to exploit these resources amid sustained international demand for hydrocarbons. Naypyidaw announced in April that it plans to auction off the rights to 30 offshore oil and natural gas exploration blocks to foreign companies. Equally important, Myanmar has also committed to offering the opportunity for foreign companies to gain full access to a limited number of exploration blocks. This decision represents a departure from previous policy that required foreign energy interests to forge partnerships with the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE).

Myanmar is also rich in other key natural resources, including copper, zinc, coal, uranium, and timber, as well as precious stones such as jade, ruby, and sapphire. It is also endowed with ample potential for hydropower and establishing deep-water seaports along one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors. All of these attributes are attracting the attention of investors keen to expand their presence in southeastern Asia. Due to its borders with China, Thailand, India, Laos, and Bangladesh, Myanmar’s geographic placement alongside busy trade and communication routes is also raising its geopolitical profile. The United States and India are increasingly viewing better relations with Myanmar as a means in which to check Chinese influence in southeastern Asia. Consequently, Myanmar’s geopolitical standing is certain to rise in the years ahead.

Risks

Despite the notable political and economic changes in Myanmar, years of entrenched authoritarianism, corruption, institutional weakness, and underdevelopment pose significant obstacles for foreign investors attempting to break into the local market. At the same time, Myanmar has set out to mitigate some of the concerns related to corruption by signing on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Based in Norway, the EITI is a voluntary framework that focuses on encouraging good governance, financial transparency, and environmental responsibility.

Even as Myanmar moves to broaden its foreign relations, Chinese influence will remain strong for the foreseeable future. Chinese influence is particularly apparent in the economy. China is responsible for about half of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Myanmar’s economy, and over a quarter of its overall foreign trade relations. China is not likely to stand idly by as a host of foreign interests challenge its preeminent position in Myanmar’s economy.

As the crisis in Rakhine State escalates amid growing international humanitarian concerns related to the Rohingya population’s plight, companies operating in Myanmar face a series of reputational risks. Myanmar’s domestic security situation also remains a concern in parts of the country. In addition to the simmering ethnic and sectarian conflict in Rakhine State, Myanmar is also beset by numerous insurgencies led by an array of political opponents of the military regime and advocates for various other ethnic and sectarian causes.

Opportunities

The political and economic pitfalls of breaking into Myanmar are clear and reflective of many of the problems that confront investors who are seeking to expand into emerging markets. At the same time, Myanmar’s cautious political and economic opening promises to yield a wealth of potentially lucrative investment opportunities down the road. Myanmar’s rising geopolitical profile, especially in the eyes of the United States and Europe, will help propel this trend.

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Nicholas Maduro’s narrow electoral triumph over opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski in Venezuela’s April 14 elections — to serve out the remainder of the late president Hugo Chavez’s current presidential term — signifies a turning point in Venezuelan politics. Maduro’s victory has also reverberated beyond Venezuela’s borders. Due to its role as a major source of oil, the course of political events in Venezuela also has important implications for the world economy. The death of Chavez has also raised concerns about the prospects of social, political, and economic stability in Venezuela. The victory of Chavez’s heir apparent – Chavez and his supporters went to great lengths to ensure the survival of the Bolivarian Revolution launched by Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (known by its Spanish acronym PSUV) – in a politically charged and polarized climate has already resulted in unrest and violence between Maduro’s supporters and his opponents. Venezuela’s increasingly dire economic predicament has further exacerbated tensions across the country.

Despite a contentious bilateral relationship, Venezuela remains the fourth-largest supplier of imported oil to the United States. Given the peculiarities of its oil, namely, the category of relatively low quality heavy crude oil that represents the bulk of its oil capacity, Venezuela relies heavily on US refineries located in the Gulf of Mexico that were designed to refine oil from Venezuela (and Mexico). Roughly 40 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports are delivered to the United States. Consequently, the United States is Venezuela’s top trade partner. This is the case even as US imports of Venezuelan oil have steadily declined in recent years. In 1997, the United States imported about 1.7 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Venezuela. In contrast, only about one million bpd of Venezuelan oil makes its way to the United States today. Venezuela also boasts major natural gas reserves, possibly the second-largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, Venezuela’s oil production capacity continues to deteriorate due to mismanagement, corruption, and antiquated infrastructure.

With its emphasis on South-South cooperation, Latin American integration, and opposition to what it refers to as US imperialism, Venezuela’s foreign policy has largely reflected its Bolivarian Revolutionary principles. Even as it has continued to serve as a major source of crude oil to the United States, Venezuela has also devoted significant diplomatic and economic resources toward checking US influence in the Americas. Initiatives such as its Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA) have served to expand Venezuela’s influence across the region. This support has come in the form of diplomatic and, especially, economic assistance to governments led by leftist political parties and movements that are often enmeshed in their own disputes with the United States, including Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Venezuela has also supported a number of militant groups in the region, most notably, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym FARC) in neighboring Colombia. Venezuela has also engaged closely with other left-leaning governments across the region, including Brazil — a rising regional and geopolitical power in its own right that is slowly emerging as a challenger to the United States.

Outlook

Chavez’s appointment of Maduro, a trusted loyalist, as vice president was emblematic of efforts by the incumbent regime to ensure ideological and political continuity in any post-Chavez scenario. At the same time, despite its popularity among a sizable segment of the Venezuelan populace, it is unclear whether the PSUV will be able to retain its dominant role in Venezuelan politics without Chavez in the long-term. Maduro’s narrow victory in the recent elections – Maduro is reported to have defeated his opponent by less than 2 percent of the total vote – reflects a shift in Venezuelan public sentiment.

The removal of Chavez from the political equation will also have an important geopolitical impact that will be felt beyond Venezuela’s borders. Venezuela remains an important supplier of discounted oil for its regional partners and a source of other vital economic support. On the surface, Maduro’s decision to travel to Cuba for his first foreign trip in late April reflects his determination to continue the populist and activist foreign policy forged by his late predecessor. Venezuelan largesse in the form of discounted oil and other benefits has helped sustain Cuba’s Communist Party. Yet, it appears that Maduro is operating under a weaker popular mandate. This raises important questions about his ability to maintain his late predecessor’s approach to foreign affairs, especially given the presence of an increasingly organized and emboldened opposition.

Risks

Operating under a weaker popular mandate, and in a politically charged and polarized climate, raises the specter of widespread disturbances in Venezuela. Capriles announced on April 25 that his movement plans to boycott an official audit of the election results due to concerns relating to voter registration irregularities. He has also called for a new presidential vote. Capriles and his supporters seem determined to step up pressure on the fledgling Maduro presidency.

Countries that depend on Venezuelan largesse to support their economies through the receipt of subsidized oil and preferential trade access to the Venezuelan market, including Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, among others, stand to lose a great deal should Maduro choose to shift Venezuelan foreign policy, however slightly, from the Bolivarian Revolutionary ideals enshrined during Chavez’s rule. Having to contend with their own economic troubles, the loss of subsidized oil or other benefits provided by Venezuela, for example, can destabilize fragile polities, impoverishing millions in the process. This raises the potential of social, political, and economic instability throughout the region.

Opportunities

Despite his declared commitment to toe his predecessor’s ideological line, the gravity of the economic problems affecting Venezuela may force Maduro to depart from some of Chavez’s policies, especially those governing foreign direct investment (FDI) in Venezuela. Maduro may elect to liberalize certain sectors of the Venezuelan economy and institute other economic reforms in a possible bid to cater to his more moderate opponents, undercutting segments of the opposition and bolstering his own credentials in the process.

The potential loss of a Venezuelan benefactor will also present new opportunities in countries previously dependent on Caracas. Eager to adapt to an evolving geopolitical order, countries previously reliant on Venezuela will seek out new partners and, potentially, sources of FDI.

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