Is Bosnia-Herzegovina Next on ��ܲ�������’s Radar?

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“All experts,” the avowed Erdogan supporter continued, agreed that Washington was escalating the crisis to solidify its dominance in Western Europe. With that, Barlas also echoed the general mood in Turkey. It is fortunate, he said, that ��ܲ�������’s president is much more reasonable and wiser than his American counterpart, Joe Biden.

The Bond Between Erdogan and Putin

This positive image of Putin and Erdogan’s familiarity with the Kremlin leader is no accident. Particularly since the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, Erdogan has, with Putin’s help, been able to position himself independently of — and sometimes even against — the United States and Europe on key foreign policy issues.

In Syria and Azerbaijan, Ankara and Moscow succeeded in marginalizing Western actors. In Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey acts as a competitor or even adversary to member states of the European Union.

Turkey’s flirtation with Moscow led to concerns that Ankara might turn away from Europe altogether. That contributed to the EU’s kid-glove approach to Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. It also resulted in Washington’s belated reaction to Turkey’s acquisition of ��ܲ�������’s S-400 missile defense system with sanctions. It is true that Turkey has experience with Putin as a cool strategist and ruthless power politician in conflicts such as the one in Syria. But Erdogan has always seemed to succeed in avoiding escalation.

Despite all of Ankara’s tension with Moscow, Erdogan’s rapprochement with Russia has brought him much closer to his goal of strategic autonomy for his country from the West. Turkey skillfully maneuvered between the fronts of global rivalry and was able to considerably expand its scope and influence in just a few years.

In this seesaw policy, however, Turkey is behaving much more confrontationally toward Western states than toward Russia. For years, the government press has painted a positive picture of Russia and a negative one of the United States and Europe. This is not without effect on Turkish public opinion. Around a month before Russia attacked Ukraine, in a poll carried out by a renowned opinion research institute, a narrow relative majority of 39% of respondents favored foreign policy cooperation with Russia and China instead of Europe and the United States.

In the first days after ��ܲ�������’s invasion, Ankara’s policy followed exactly the aforementioned pattern. Turkey condemned the attack, but it is not participating in sanctions against Russia. In the vote on suspending ��ܲ�������’s representation rights in the Council of Europe, Turkey was the only NATO state to abstain and, as such, is keeping its airspace open to Russian aircraft.

The West is paying particular attention to whether and how Turkey implements the Treaty of Montreux. The 1936 treaty regulates the passage of warships through Turkey’s Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits into the Black Sea. It limits the number, tonnage and duration of stay of ships from non-littoral states in the Black Sea. In the event of war, the convention stipulates that the waterways must be closed to ships of the parties to the conflict, and it entrusts Ankara with the application of the treaty’s regulations

Ankara Swings Around

It took Turkey four days to classify the Russian invasion as “war.” However, Ankara is still reluctant to officially close the waterways — as the treaty stipulates — to ships of parties to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine. Instead, Ankara is “all countries, Black Sea riparian or not,” against sending warships through the straits.

In the literal sense, this step is not directed unilaterally against Moscow, but it also makes it more difficult for NATO ships to sail into the Black Sea. According to the treaty, however, the waterways may only be closed to warships of all countries if Ankara considers itself directly threatened by war. Consciously creating ambiguity, Turkey has triangulated between the West and Russia.

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Almost imperceptibly at first, however, a reversal has now set in. There are four reasons for this. First, the West is showing unity and resolve unseen since the Cold War, and its sanctions are undermining ��ܲ�������’s standing in the world. Second, Putin is losing his charisma as a successful statesman and reliable partner. Third, Ankara realizes that Putin’s vision of a great Russian empire could provoke more wars. Fourth, the ranks of the adversaries are closing and it is becoming more difficult for Turkey to continue its seesaw policy.

Thus, strongly pro-Western tones have emerged from Ankara in recent weeks. Turkey will continue to support Ukraine in consultation with the West, according to the president’s spokesman. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu now claims to have contradicted ��ܲ�������’s wishes for the passage of warships through the Bosporus “in all friendship.” President Erdogan is also in of admitting Ukraine to the European Union and Kosovo to NATO.

Moreover, Ankara is not contradicting reports by Ukrainian diplomats that Turkey is supplying more armed drones and training pilots to fly drones. On March 2, Turkey joined the vast majority of states in the UN General Assembly’s condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that Russia to “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces.” Two days later, during the extraordinary meeting of NATO’s foreign ministers, Turkey supported the deployment of NATO’s Response Force to NATO countries neighboring Ukraine.

It looks like Putin is not only bringing long-lost unity to the EU, but he is also reminding Turkey of the benefits of its Western ties. Western states should realize that only more unity among themselves and more determination will make Turkey reengage with the West.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post On Ukraine, Turkey Is Moving Cautiously Toward the West appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Even the supporters of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are disappointed with the results from Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy. Only 53 percent of AKP voters agree with his Syria policy; in total, 56 percent of Turks are opposed to it. However, not only with regards to Syria, Turkey’s overall foreign policy has hit the brick wall. There has only been very little progress in other areas as well: whether it is Cyprus, Greece, or Armenia – none of Turkey’s “old” problems with its non-Muslim neighbors have been resolved.

Moreover, relations with Muslim neighbors Iran and Iraq – with the exception of Kurdish northern Iraq – as well as Egypt are tense. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the AKP has lost its past influence over the involved parties. Neither Israel, nor the PLO or Hamas look to Ankara anymore. Little is left from Turkey’s stance as a regional power.

Even in the US, which until recently saw Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Davutoglu as almost equal partners, Ankara is a factor of secondary importance. One would rather avoid talking about the relations with the European Union (EU).

Nevertheless, there are almost no signs of self-criticism coming from officials in Ankara. In the eyes of Prime Minister Erdogan and his chief foreign policy advisor, Ibrahim Kalin, Turkey today is a lone voice which holds up the principle of democracy in the foreign policy realm. Erdogan accuses the West of doublespeak and Kalin says: “.”

Erdogan and Kalin claim that the Turkish government’s unconditional solidarity with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the push for a military strike to topple Bashar al-Assad, are directly related to its commitment for democratic values. Because Turkey is quite isolated in both cases, Kalin now speaks of a “worthy solitude” which draws its value also from the fact that it ultimately shows the right way. Is this only misapprehension or delusion?

Ideological Musings in the Way of Realizing Political Realities

This false sense of security/righteousness stems, to a large extent, from the fact that the AKP’s leadership has viewed global political shifts through an ideologically tinted lens, and thus perceived them only one-sidedly.��For example, the economic and political weakening of Europe and the US’ waning influence in the Middle East were seen by the AKP as a new chance to establish Turkey as an influential player in the region.

The calculation was that Turkey, as an actor anchored in the Middle East, could effortlessly build on the traditions of the Ottoman Empire. For long, the AKP leadership believed they were chosen to give Turkey’s history a new, ideal direction. The fact that the dissolution of the old order, especially in the Middle East, also carries certain dangers with it – which could make Ankara’s even closer cooperation with Europe and the US necessary – was neglected.

Another example is the global weakening of the nation state. Six months ago, Foreign Minister Davutoglu welcomed overcoming this model in the Middle East. According to him, it was now finally possible to revise the order imposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement from 1916, which drew Middle Eastern borders conforming with the interests of European imperialists. Ankara felt that it was acting in accordance with the tide of world history and was about projecting strength in the region which was derived from a romantic conception of history.

What these musings completely overlooked, however, were the enormous conflicts which emerge during the disintegration of a state and its institutions. The catastrophes on the territory of former Yugoslavia and the horrible situation in Iraq would have served as solid basis for a sober assessment of the situation and its inherent dangers.

A last example concerns the AKP’s enthusiasm for reviving and strengthening traditional identities. In this situation as well, the ruling party sees itself as acting in accordance with the trend of the time, witnessing an invigoration of indigenous and religious identities at the cost of western and secular orientations everywhere, from China to Africa. In its own country, the AKP has enacted a lot of initiatives to ensure that pious Muslims in Turkey are no longer culturally, economically, and politically marginalized.

However, the struggle against the marginalization of the pious has turned into an open favoritism and privileging of religious identity and morality by the government. The AKP still does not, or does not want to, acknowledge that such policies simultaneously push other groups, especially Kurds and Alevites but also secular forces, to focus on their own culture and thus automatically on the divisive aspects in society. Thus far, the Turkish government has not found the answer to how privileging certain religious and ethnic identities can go together with political equality.

Concerning the weakening of Europe, the crisis of the modern nation state and the revival of indigenous identities, the AKP only saw the upside of things and believed itself to be in unison with global developments. This explains why Ankara saw itself for so long as a regional power and did not react to signals suggesting the opposite – and why it still champions the idea of the “worthy solitude” despite contradicting realities.

However, the government will not insist on the “worthy solitude“ for long. As a matter of fact, Turkey is already carefully backpedaling. It wants to reconnect with Tehran. In another development, Washington’s request to end support for radical groups in Syria did not fall on deaf Turkish ears anymore. Cooperation with Turkey on foreign policy matters could become easier in the future.

*[This article was originally published by��, and translated from German to English by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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