Is Europe Really Ready for Its Own Military Force?

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Defining Macron’s foreign policy style has to do with to what degree the French president recognizes himself in certain Gaullist impulses or movements. This is something that has been pointed out , after several occasions where Macron criticized the United Kingdom over Brexit, Italy over its populist government or, more recently, the United States for unilaterally imposing that would harm major US companies such as Amazon. Some commentators have seen this as a move to take the lead in Europe, at a moment when other European leaders are being weakened.

One Against All

Macron’s comments to The Economist reveal the discrepancy between his deepest aspirations — the need for ensuring peace and stability in Europe — and what he described as the return of the Great Powers competition, where the European Union seems unable and unwilling to act. The context in which the interview was recorded, just days after Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria, underlines the frustration of having to deal with some difficult allies.

Interestingly, the French leader took this opportunity to use forceful rhetoric by going back to what could be seen as a traditional French defiance vis-à-vis the alliance. Even after the full return of France within the integrated military command structures of NATO — which took place in 2009 — there were some debates on its necessity. Hubert Vedrine, an iconic minister of foreign affairs under President François Mitterrand, concluded that France had .

Yet since his election in 2017, Macron has decided to go it alone. In a speech at La Sorbonne in September 2017, the president of the French Republic unveiled his idea of an initiative that would facilitate the emergence of a European strategic culture and create the preconditions to conduct coordinated and jointly prepared future commitments. This is aimed at reinforcing the ability Europeans have to act together and to carry out all possible military operations on a whole spectrum of issues that could affect Europe’s security.

However, it took almost a year to start implementing this cooperation. The first nine ministers of defense signed the letter of intent in June 2018. And, despite all the potential benefits of such an initiative, there were some concerns about possible duplication with NATO or/and EU. Macron believed — and still does — that Europeans have to start moving from words to actions and to explain their commitment to European security by engaging in operations. This happened at a moment when US commitment in Europe was wary, with US President Donald Trump refusing to back Article 5, which caused some tension among those member states who have been under Soviet rule. Macron did not consider the particular situation of those countries for which US commitment to their defense has been essential.

By revealing, very loudly, that there were concerns, Macron has echoed Hans Christian Andersen’s tale by saying that, yes, the king was naked. By doing so just weeks before the celebrations of NATO’s 70^th anniversary in London, Macron has spoiled the expectations of the summit, which was supposed to celebrate unity and renewed cohesion.

Where Next?

Of course, no other European leaders agreed with the assessment. Angela Merkel was the first to condemn the Macron’s comments. As weeks passed by, the invectives went on, culminating with Erdogan asking if Macron was not brain dead himself, and even with Trump calling the French analysis “insulting.”

So, what purpose did these comments serve? First of all, France has taken credit for asking NATO to do more in the fight against terrorism, and by shifting the focus to the south and the complex security operations France leads in the Sahel — two directions aligned with . Second, it has forced NATO to accept the principle of a “to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation.” Third, it has created enough turmoil to wake up NATO, but also to force Europeans to think more for themselves.

Somehow, Macron has taken a bet that, in the long run, might benefit NATO, the EU and himself. In forcing the US to reinvest in the alliance, by making the Europeans aware that the US security guarantee might be coming to an end, and by again being at the center of attention — even if this center is of criticism — Macron might have played a better hand than he imagined.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In the early 1980s, Europe was vulnerable to military escalations due to tension between NATO and countries of the Warsaw Pact, a collective defense treaty signed by the Soviet Union and most of the other Eastern Bloc states in 1955. Several crises occurred during the Cold War but, for Europe, the 1970s and 1980s was a significant moment. For instance, the  exercise in 1983 — which saw NATO forces conduct a full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons — resulted in the forces of the Warsaw Pact being ready to launch an actual assault as they thought the drill was the first phase of an offensive, with Germany as the battlefield.

To support the expected battle, both the Soviet Union and the United States deployed ground-launched missiles (SS20 vs Pershing II) with nuclear heads on German soil, which resulted in people demonstrating against a potential Armageddon. Known as the , the situation came to an end due to US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The Americans and the Soviets agreed to destroy ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that could travel between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. As it was accompanied by intrusive verification procedures, the INF Treaty was highly effective, with a of 2,692 short and intermediate-range missiles and 149 sites destroyed by 1991.

INF Withdrawal

Today, things have dramatically changed, and the decision by the Trump administration to withdraw from the INF is by no means a surprise, nor is Moscow’s in doing the same. Tensions initially rose in the early 2000s when the US withdrew unilaterally from the , which was seen by President George W. Bush as a The demise of this treaty was met largely with silence, especially at a time where US-Russia relations were warming up. It was also a moment when the was established, advancing the relationship between the alliance and the Kremlin.

Yet the issue of nuclear warheads and missiles — rebranded under the concept of missile defense — resurfaced in the follow-up to the 2010 Lisbon Treaty. NATO allies had called for a comprehensive ballistic missile defense architecture since the Bucharest Summit of 2008. What was at stake was the protection of NATO members against missiles that could be fired from rogue states, with Iran seen as a potential threat.

In 2009, the Obama administration replaced an earlier missile defense system with the (EPAA), which was part of a US contribution to NATO. This was meant to rebuild cohesion with the Europeans after a decade of engagement in Afghanistan, which had led to operational fatigue. Missile defense was perceived as a way of strengthening ties between the allies and helping maintain the commitment to collective defense, a fundamental principle of NATO.

At the Chicago Summit of 2012, the first steps and technical developments to implement the ballistic missile defense (BMD) system were announced. This the ability “to defend the populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack.” Russia was not pleased. Despite official NATO speeches stating that the latest shield was not directed against Russia, the BMD was a .

In 2014, the situation worsened after Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea and the hybrid warfare campaign waged in Eastern Ukraine. At the Wales Summit in September of the same year, NATO condemned and took a series of measures. This included the decision to freeze every practical element of cooperation between NATO and Russia if Moscow continued to break international law.

In 2015 and throughout 2016, Russia tested and deployed its ground-based missile called (NATO codename, SS-26 Stone) in Kaliningrad, the enclave between the Baltic States and Poland, from where its 500 kilometer-range nuclear-capable system could threaten US assets as well as capital cities of some NATO members. In support of the Assad regime in Syria, Moscow also announced the deployment of S-400 Triumf batteries, an advanced anti-missile and anti-aerial defense system.

NATO’s Response

The choice to deploy these systems had both military and political implications for NATO countries. Analysts debated the reality of the Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, a combination of layered defenses that would challenge the ability of NATO forces to support allies if they were under attack, as a proved. Despite some new initiatives launched to great fanfare at the Wales Summit in 2014 and Warsaw Summit in 2016 — which were based on reassuring allies by deploying a forward presence in the Baltic States and by creating a battle-ready joint taskforce — NATO struggled to answer in a timely manner.

The culprit is not the fact that the Russian arms industry has developed — at least since 2002 — and has been fielding a new set of ground-to-ground cruise missiles that appeared to exceed the range set in the INF Treaty. The issue is that Russia has deliberately chosen to seize every occasion to challenge the West and NATO by undermining the alliance’s credibility and unity.

One blatant example is Turkey and its deal to the Russian S-400 Air-defense system. Agreed in December 2017, the move has raised concerns in Washington due to the fact that Ankara was also on the list of countries waiting to acquire the F-35 fighter jets from the US. The delivery of the first batch of missiles to Turkey in July 2019 has NATO, in light of the mandatory interoperability of the armed forces that is to the alliance. For NATO, the issue is less about the compatibility of the systems and more about the risk of seeing highly-classified information on stealth fighter jets being transferred to Russia.

Within the alliance itself, there has also been growing tension since 2016 amid the unexpected events of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Ever since he entered office, Trump has expressed his opinion about an “” NATO. The summits of 2017 and 2018 saw several clashes, with the US president criticizing some members of the alliance for on their defense and not formally committing to article 5 of the NATO charter about the reciprocity in collective defense. Whilst Jim Mattis, the US defense secretary at the time, tried to do , other NATO members were profoundly shaken by Trump’s comments.

Therefore, when the US administration gave evidence in December 2018 that Russia was in material of its INF obligations, NATO called on Moscow to urgently return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty. And so goes the story: On February 1, 2019, the US to suspend its obligations under Article XV of the INF Treaty and terminate it within six months, on August 2.

From a , the support provided to the United States was both a political and military necessity. To quote Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary-general, the Russian decision made the INF useless by having only one party bound to the treaty whilst the other was not ready to comply. This can be understood as a will by NATO members not to confront the White House on a sensitive matter and create additional tension when there should be none. Militarily speaking, it also makes sense to upgrade systems without entering a “new arms race,” whilst at the same time remaining prudent and responding in a “measured and responsible way” with a “balanced, coordinated and defensive package of measures,” ensuring credible and effective deterrence and defense.

Grand Powers

The problem is that NATO is in a dire situation for three reasons. First, as many commentators have noted, the of strategic instability between Russia and the US does have implications for Europe. If one reads this issue from the US administration’s perspective, it seems that China — not Russia — is the reason Trump to scrap the INF Treaty. The rising competition in the Asia Pacific between Washington and Beijing leaves Europe to itself, while NATO does not appear to be high on the list of the Trump administration’s priorities.

Second, when it comes to its perceived security, the US advances at a rapid pace that European allies cannot match. The gap between the US defense budget and those of the allies is enormous. In an alliance of 29 countries, the US budget represents more than 50% of global spending of the other member states. This has a host of implications, with the US being the only ally without shortfalls in its military capabilities. A case in point was in 2011 when Washington was forced to support other NATO allies in the Libyan War where it had to cruise missiles because the stockpiles of France and Britain were running low.

Third, the strategic assessment done throughout NATO capitals does not consider the INF crisis as a game-changer. It certainly is a significant development in the security of the alliance, but it only reaffirms what has been done covertly and overtly by the Kremlin since Vladimir Putin has been in charge.

What is now at stake for NATO is to identify how to best counter Russian capabilities. Should it be only through a resumption of the arms control process? Or should it be by bolstering its defensive and offensive capabilities by upgrading its existing missile systems, at the risk of being accused of violating its own when the alliance says it is not directed against Russia?

Again, one answer might lie in NATO’s history and the established to combine the political and military approach and avoid the arms race of the 1970s. Whereas the political approach focused on a détente, the military side of the alliance believed that deterrence was still needed with a credible defense.

This recipe might still be effective, yet things have changed. First, none of the existing superpowers (the US, China or Russia) has any interest in legally-binding limits, which undermines any possibility of new arms control mechanisms. Second, NATO as an alliance must define its new role: Will it be a global security provider? Does it need to refocus on its core business — collective defense — or does it still want to address the other key tasks (cooperative security and crisis management) defined in the ? Should it modify its decision-making process to be more responsive?

These discussions have plagued the alliance since 2014 when Russia reemerged as a major threat. Tensions exist for member states in the east with the danger coming from Moscow, as well as states in the south due to illegal migration and terrorism. The risk of a regionalized, fragmented NATO with some allies looking to the east and others to the south will be the most challenging issue in the long run.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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As the NATO summit in Brussels started its second day in disarray, what used to be an eventless and business-as-usual reconfirmation of unity and strength of the Atlantic alliance has turned into a power play between US President Donald Trump and NATO’s European members. Can the crisis still be avoided?

Back in May 2017, during Trump’s first visit to meet his NATO allies, even though things went relatively smoothly, a sentiment of frustration emerged. Allies had been expecting a formal commitment to Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty —��the central tenet of which postulates that an attack against one alliance member is an attack on all — yet Trump remained silent. It was left to Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to damage-control, underscoring that, words aside, America’s NATO commitment is clearly demonstrated by its actions.

A year later the situation has worsened. President Trump has been busy deconstructing President Barack Obama’s legacy, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, shaking hands with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un and — in just a few days’ time — meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In every domain, Trump challenges traditional US foreign policy and its establishment. He prefers direct tweets to the soft and cautious wording of diplomatic communiqués and believes that his instinct and personal engagement with other world leaders can best serve his vision of America’s future. The end of the G7 summit last month in Canada was a first glimpse of what NATO allies have feared and, indeed, had already experienced.

Trump landed in Europe for a week-long series of meetings, convinced that America’s NATO allies have to do more, spend more on defense and, if not, they should be ready to face the consequences. America’s traditional support for Europe in the case of an armed attack is no more unconditional. What Trump says is not new, and the lament of European allies being free-riders and not spending enough on their own defense was the core message delivered by President Obama’s Secretary of Defense Robert Gates when he left office in 2011.

Yet Trump goes one step further by recalling the defense pledge made at the Newport Summit in September 2014, where allies agreed to increase their defense spending to 2% of their GDP. Just this morning, at an called after Trump’s renewed pressure on the alliance, he allegedly there may be “’grave consequences’” if allies do not immediately meet higher spending targets,” during his press conference.

Last month, Trump wrote a to the leaders of NATO member states (including Norway, Canada and Germany) urging them to do better as it would become “increasingly difficult��to justify to Americans citizens why some countries fail to meet our shared collective security commitment.” And no later than at the moment before boarding his flight to Europe, he said that would be easier than facing the NATO allies who “.”

Happy Anniversary��

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is due to celebrate its 70th anniversary next year, it appears to be in better shape than a few years ago. Gone are the doubts that overshadowed its commitment in Afghanistan and . NATO has started doing its homework and got its act together. Back in 2014, only three of the 29 allies were spending 2% of their GDP on defense. In 2018, they are now five, and there may be eight by the end of the year.

There is a way to go still, but this shows good will and seriousness, with allies promising to reach the 2% mark by 2024. In less than four years, the allies have increased their defense spending by $45 billion, a number that demonstrates a willingness to contribute more. Of course, the crisis in Ukraine as well as other threats and risks at the margins of Europe have called for increasing up capabilities, but the trend has been upward.

From a military standpoint, NATO is also moving in the right direction. After two decades of crisis management operations, territorial defense and deterrence are back on the agenda. Military exercises, both in their training and diplomatic functions, have grown in number in response to Russia’s aggression. This fall, NATO plans to hold a military exercise —��Trident Juncture 18 — in Norway, that would bring together more than 40,000 soldiers, something unheard of since the end of the Cold War. In the meantime, NATO Response Force has been upgraded to include a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, acting as a “spearhead” and deployable within five days. Multinational battalions rotate in the Baltic States, protecting the east flank, whilst NATO air force scans the skies.

The alliance has also gone through a process of reorganizing its command structure, incorporating in its doctrine new elements dealing with hybrid and cyber threats whilst rethinking its partnership policy with other countries and organizations.

Not only will new headquarters be launched to deal with logistics and readiness issues, but the plan��for the “” has been agreed upon, whereby allies commit to provide 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 ships under 30 days, in case of a major crisis. None of this cautions the idea of an “obsolete” organization, but instead reinforces the idea of a rejuvenated alliance.��

What About Europe?

In addition, similarly to what happened at the Warsaw summit in 2016, NATO and the EU could sign a new joint declaration, insisting on getting the two organizations to cooperate better. The European Commission, which has for a long period of time only considered itself as a civilian actor, has recently launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation framework which has its roots in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty but hasn’t been enforced since then. The European Intervention Initiative, championed by French President Emmanuel Macron, insists on the necessary strategic autonomy of Europe, something that even post-Brexit United Kingdom supports.

The longstanding debate between transatlanticism and Europeanism no longer makes sense, as the discussions focus on the possibility of having both organizations share their know-how and experience in domains such as responses to hybrid threats or the need to bridge the gap in identified shortfalls.

The Brussels summit will surely surprise us, in a positive or a negative way. Whatever Donald Trump will do or say, it will not be the end of NATO, even in the (very unlikely) case of US withdrawal — a Gaullist posturing. One could say that Trump has already achieved what his predecessors aimed to do — namely, Europe playing an active part in its own defense. Isn’t that ironic?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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“A refreshed alliance for troubled times,”����of one of Britain’s most prominent newspapers after the completion of the Warsaw Summit in July. Readers might have deduced that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been able to overcome all of its difficulties. Even for some defense and security affairs pundits, the summit met their expectations and more. This was perhaps a surprise since the summit opened in the wake of ,��which shook one of NATO’s most capable allies, eliciting questions on how it could affect the overall alliance.

However, the summit’s outcomes were soon overshadowed by a tragic summer, with the Islamic State-claimed terror attacks in France and Germany, and the failed coup in Turkey. In addition, the harsh����by Republican��presidential candidate Donald Trump on pre-conditions for the United States’ defense of its major allies provoked some fear and anger, not just in the US but in Europe, as this could be seen as a major breach of the collective defense principle for which NATO stands.

Fit for the Job

As the dust settles two months after the summit, the time is ripe to discuss what was achieved in Warsaw. Where does the alliance stand at a moment when tensions are on the rise again in Ukraine, and while the Islamic State (IS) is still a major concern, thousands of migrants cross the Mediterranean Sea, and Libya continues to find no exit from its chaotic situation? Is NATO fit for the job and still relevant in today’s security environment? What can NATO do, and what does membership provide to its allies that is so precious that aspirant countries, such as Georgia, Macedonia and Ukraine, keep knocking at its door? Two words: Article 5.

Article 5 guarantees mutual assistance and commitment in case of an armed attack on one of the contracting parties and, therefore, remains the main task that holds member nations together as it safeguards their security and protects their sovereignty. Despite all the����made about NATO—a complex bureaucracy and����process based on consensus—the organization survived the Cold War, permanently adapting and reinventing itself throughout recent history. Its����remain fundamentally unchanged—the same values the West calls a “community of freedom, peace, security … including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.”

Indeed, the collective defense principle was bracketed at a time when NATO nations favored out-of-area and peace support operations in the 1990s and 2000s. In order to focus more on cooperation with partners, the alliance came up with a����unveiled at Lisbon in 2010 that described NATO’s three tasks: collective defense, the core purpose of the alliance; crisis management; and cooperative security.

This happened at a moment when the so-called “” had led to a drastic overhaul of the military within the alliance, in some cases relegating the notion of����to a non-essential status. NATO member states began focusing on expeditionary capabilities and deploying troops beyond their borders to defend allies’ interests, and projecting stability or engaging in dialogue through newly established fora and initiatives, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. NATO campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya were thus not always well understood—and maybe not very well explained—and this led to some nations deciding not to support missions, mainly for domestic political reasons and personal agendas.

Wake-Up Call

Then came the Ukraine crisis. Calling it a wake-up call sheds light on how NATO considered its geopolitical environment until 2014. Russia’s aggressiveness and saber-rattling posture surprised the allies, as they believed they could do business with Russia. President Barack Obama’s reset strategy for US-Russia relations, France’s deal with the sell of��Mistral-class ships to the Russian Navy, or Germany’s��Rheinmetall��company proposal to establish a simulation and training complex in Russia were all suspended or cancelled.

The seizure of Crimea was a game changer that deeply transformed the security architecture of Europe. The alliance realized internationally recognized borders could still be violated. Crimea opened many eyes as it revealed the nature of Russia’s oligarchy and its views of geopolitics. It also provided evidence that the Russian elite still viewed power through a 19^th-century lens—imposing its��hegemony��by force or persuasion—whilst NATO members had shifted into a postmodern approach of��.

For NATO, this led to a new security dilemma: How could the alliance stand firm on its principles while not shifting back to a Cold War posture or antagonizing Russia? To��quote��: “NATO doesn’t seek confrontation, we don’t want a new Cold War. The Cold War is history, and it should remain history. But we have to be able also in a more challenging security environment to defend and protect all our Allies.”

Addressing two aims that do not seem easily reconcilable was the main task of the Newport Summit in September 2014 and has been the main objective ever since. The allies reprioritized collective defense but without losing sight of the need to adapt to a host of new threats and risks, such as IS or the massive flow of migrants in the Aegean Sea.

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The allies’ response can be summed up in two words: assurance (or reassurance) and adaptation. The first concept belongs to the vocabulary of deterrence and aims at preventing an action by persuading the actor concerned that the cost of such an action will outweigh any resulting benefits. Implicitly, it means also that if the adversary does nothing, no action will be undertaken against him. Recently, reassurance has been used by the US in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001, yet applied more generally to all scenarios, conveying the message first and foremost to allies that the United States will be there for them if needed.

It is, therefore, no surprise that the US was the first country to provide reassurance to the Baltic States and beyond, as early as June 2014, with the setting up of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) to enhance the security of European NATO allies alongside the rapid deployment of forces. At the end of April 2014, the paratroopers of the��173^rd Airborne Brigade��Combat Team based in Vicenza, Italy, took part in����with four companies deployed to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In the south, the US Marines contributed to the Black Sea Rotational Force, training with Romanian, Bulgarian, Macedonian and Bosnian forces.

What made this possible was that the units concerned were either already garrisoned in Europe, or were scheduled for assignment to joint exercises, which were promptly renamed to convey a message. In the meantime, the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Philip Breedlove, made a����where he admitted that NATO had “increased [its] activity in the air, on the sea and on the land; as well, demonstrating [its] capability but also [its] unity in our unshakeable commitment to … common defense.”

Readiness Action Plan

This commitment was not just delimitating a red line that should not be crossed. It also constituted a pledge to European security that NATO allies endorsed at Newport. The decisions taken were twofold. The most discussed and commented outcome was the����that entails measures to “address both the continuing need for assurance of Allies and the adaptation of the Alliance’s military strategic posture [by] continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. They will provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.”

The centerpiece of the RAP is the Very High-Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a brigade-size force with air, special operations forces (SOF) and maritime support that can be deployed virtually anywhere within 72 hours to conduct a wide array of missions and stabilize a nascent crisis. Its visibility grants the VJTF a true political dimension that also reinforces the purely military reassurance measures. But the second outcome was in a way far more significant, as it took the form of a 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) defense spending pledge (including 20% for replacing matériel) to guarantee credible defense.

Thus, the Ukraine crisis seems, at least at first sight, to have slowed down or even practically halted the three-decade-long erosion of financial and human resources in most of the European members of NATO. This possibly marks the start of a renewed emphasis on military spending despite the obvious awareness of how����that is going to be.

From Newport to Warsaw

The road from Newport to Warsaw has been paved with the will to fully implement the decisions taken by heads of state and government. The challenge has been about moving on from political statements to practical application. The objective has been to prove that the allies are determined in their commitments, by military and other means, to defend and protect the alliance’s territory and populations, and that collective defence is a reality. Important steps have been taken to shift from pure reassurance measures to a real deterrence posture, which starts with greater awareness and determination.

The VJTF concept, for instance, has been tested and trained through exercises, across not only the whole NATO command structure, but also throughout numerous military headquarters and units. Sure, these tests happened under political pressure, as it was mandatory to demonstrate that the VJTF would be operationally capable before the Warsaw summit. Yet the challenge was passed with flying colors, as the VJTF was declared in May 2016.

Military exercises became more frequent and there was an increase in numbers involved. For instance, between September and December 2014, there were over 40 multinational exercises involving larger contingents. And for 2015, 240 battalion-size exercises were planned and conducted despite some specialists criticizing the still important between NATO and Russia.

Having high-readiness forces will be of no use if nations have low risk-taking politicians. The recent summit revealed a rift within the alliance.��Statements��on Russia, for instance, revealed that behind the veneer of external consensus, there is some internal dissent that reflects the current state of the alliance.

What is clear is that the flag had to be waved, if possible with a major show of force. This was the purpose of the NATO multinational exercise��Trident Juncture��in 2015, involving 36,000 soldiers from Portugal, Spain and Italy, becoming NATO’s largest joint services multinational exercise since the end of the Cold War and rightfully analyzed as such by��.

Of course, the Warsaw summit was an occasion to showcase the allies’ common will to go beyond their previous commitment. Reenergizing NATO’s readiness could also be seen in the revamping of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of six—soon to be eight—NATO Forces Integration Units (NFIU) in six countries on the Eastern flank. Additionally, the Multinational Corps Northeast at Szczecin was upgraded to a High Readiness Force Headquarters, with responsibility for the planning of collective defense in northeastern Europe.

New Threat Environment

All these innovations are presented as concrete proof that the alliance is fully aware of the new threat environment, and that its command structure has the capacity to respond accordingly. Eventually, the last brick in this new wall—the deployment of four battalion-sized multinational battle groups in the Baltic States and Poland—was announced for January 2017, thus providing a firm response in case of a Russian invasion.

This “enhanced forward presence,” however, highlights the continuous difficulty of NATO member states’ ability to surge; the generation of two battalions by NATO European allies has proven more difficult than expected. Despite these limitations, one can emphasize that these events mark a changed mindset. Stoltenberg was not wrong when he said in Warsaw that this commitment is an open-ended one that will last “as long as necessary.”

This��tour d’horizon��would not be sufficient if one was not to assess or discuss some issues that pose additional risks for NATO’s ability to deliver on its commitments. Stating that the alliance is determined is one thing, but the deliverables have to follow and there are some questions that will keep NATO member states busy in the future.

Problems for the foreseeable future include: Afghanistan and the eventual end of the��Resolute Support��mission there—it seems everybody has forgotten about this war, yet the stability of the country is far from settled; relations between NATO and the European Union, despite the highly significant strategic partnership between the two organizations; Brexit and its impact on NATO, if any; and the multiple elections and polls that might call for a strategic pause—the US presidential election this fall, the 2017 presidential elections in France and the future of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany.

However, what is really at stake is not just NATO having the power or resources to act in different domains, but it is first and foremost about whether NATO nations have the will to act decisively. General Denis Mercier, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)—one of the two strategic commands of the NATO command structure, the other being Allied Command Operations at SHAPE, under SACEUR—��in August that “high responsiveness relies on two points. On the military side, it relies on the ability to operate very quickly. But it also relies on responsiveness in political decisions.”

Having high-readiness forces will be of no use if nations have low risk-taking politicians. The recent summit revealed a rift within the alliance.����on Russia, for instance, revealed that behind the veneer of external consensus, there is some internal dissent that reflects the current state of the alliance.

In a nutshell, what is at stake is not only whether NATO as an alliance is able to deliver, but whether NATO is a credible alliance.

The success in setting up assurance and adaptation measures is only a first step in a long process of transforming NATO and keeping it relevant to facing today’s threats. Of course, adjustments can be made and solutions do not all have to be political in nature. In certain cases, there can be technical or administrative arrangements. What is key, nonetheless, is NATO’s ability to be flexible and adaptive enough to confront an increasingly complex environment of adversaries and threats.

*[Note:��The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of NATO or the NATO Defense College.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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