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Bangladesh is the newest frontier in apparel manufacturing. Even cheaper than China, even less restrictions on work conditions. Pretty much every large label produces there by now. One of the world’s poorest countries has become a major textile manufacturing destination. Just check your clothing’s labels, you may be surprised where it’s from. And it doesn’t matter if you wear inexpensive apparel or high-end fashion. All the major players are there, driven by the permanent search for ever lower unit costs. Never at the expense of labor standards, though. That’s what they claim.

Here are the facts: Nearly 500 garment workers have been burned to death in factory fires in Bangladesh in the last five years. They weren’t just working for unknown exploitive discounters but for major Western corporations as well. One that looks up those accused of some kind of involvement will come across many of the big names. Public uproar however has been limited thus far.

The trend we’ve seen over the last years was to increasingly buy ‘organic,’ which very often is associated with socially responsible. But while eco-friendly production standards certainly make a difference, sustainability is a broader concept. You can very well have workers sew clothing in sweatshop conditions while using organic cotton. This certainly isn’t what’s happening everywhere, but we hear of more and more stories where this is the case. 

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Everything has to do with politics. Every country is governed by politicians, and every economy is based on political decisions. In short, our own future is defined by the choices of those leaders we have elected. The crisis that Greece is experiencing today is ultimately a political one rather than a purely financial one. It's a crisis of political credibility, a crisis of political effectiveness, a crisis of breached confidence between people and politicians. Basically, it's a crisis endangering the stability of Greece’s democracy. 

But let's be honest; there are no easy solutions. However, there are solutions driven by common logic — solutions that will never emerge unless we are adamant in pushing them forward. In Greece at this moment, the people have forced the political system to accept such a solution. It's the solution of political collaboration, cooperation, and consensus among the political parties within the country, one in which there is an unprecedented coalition government in Greece, comprised of the two major parties of the country. This historical political achievement not only signifies a new era in Greek politics, but also, creates high expectations for all of us. Expectations that come from abroad, including those from European partners, international media, and financial markets, all of which believe that it's time for Greece to demonstrate political solidarity.

Most importantly, it creates even higher expectations for the majority of Greek people who are looking forward to a new era within which the sterile political clashes, the ideological prejudice, and the partisan tactics no longer have a role. This development is actually a positive step forward. Nevertheless, it's not enough. There is much more to be accomplished. Although a new chapter in the recent political history of Greece is now open, it's just the beginning. There are many more steps to be taken, and action must be quick and immediate.  The reason is obvious: the country is currently under a real threat, facing the danger of a new national catastrophe as a result of its potential uncontrolled default, departure from the euro zone, and isolation in the European and international stage for many decades ahead. 

When trying to figure out the political problem in Greece, I would not refer simply to those unpunished politicians who stole or mismanaged public assets. In my opinion, the political problem in Greece is deeper and even more complicated. One issue is the lack of political collaboration and consensus on the major problems. What the political parties and politicians in Greece did not realize on time is that "the future will not be the same, as they had predicted". We live in an era of change where political parties alone are not as effective at fulfilling the needs of the society as they once were. In such an era of rapid economic, political and social evolution, the new challenges differ from those faced in the past. If in the past the ways to resolve problems were prompted by right or left ideologies, by the ideologies of socialism or neoliberalism, nowadays resolving complicated challenges requires complicated solutions. It is essential that we have politicians with open minds instead of dogmatic views — politicians determined to sacrifice their own personal or partisan interest in favor of national interest. This is a transition that unfortunately has not happened in Greece over the last couple of decades. 

A second fundamental issue associated with the political crisis in Greece is the nepotism in which Greek political life is trapped. As a result, many young and capable individuals are discouraged from getting involved in politics. They realize that the Greek political system is like a private club, accessible only to those who come from families with prior political involvement. It is not a coincidence that for the last three decades, Greece has been governed by leaders who come from two or three political families. Some others believe that becoming involving in politics is a vehicle to gaining wealth. If the political parties in Greece are not ready or willing to modernize and open their doors to socially competent individuals rather than partisan elites, the political system in the country will plummet. 

Let’s take a look at the broader picture. This crisis is occurring not only on a national level in Greece, but also on a European and international level. The current financial turmoil sparks even larger social reactions with unpredictable outcomes. Examples of these social reactions have already developed not only in Greece, but also in many other European countries and even in the United States with the "Occupy Wall Street" movement. Even though their demands are disparate, one thing is certain: the citizens, from one side of the Atlantic to the other, feel that they are underrepresented and that political leaders of modern Democracies around the world are not accountable to the people but, rather, to those who have the economic power in their hands. What we must do is redefine the functions of our modern democracy and fix the problems created by the lack of transparency and the divide between those who make decisions and those who are affected by them. 

In one his speeches, American President John F. Kennedy stated, "the future is not a gift, but, rather, an achievement." I would say that achieving an ideal future is not possible simply by waiting or hoping for it: it is necessary to do something more. For Greece, this “something more” cannot be achieved by those who contemplate the past. We should understand that becoming the agents for change in our country is not just an obligation but also a responsibility that we must endure.

It is necessary for the youth of Greece, both within the country and abroad, to take action as a unified group with new ideas and beliefs in order to give Greece the know-how and prospects to create a new beginning. 

We are capable of broadcasting the message that although Greece has financially defaulted, it is a not politically deteriorated country.  It is our duty to help Greece turn the page in its history. We can make it. Greece can make it. And as the poet Odyssea Elitis wrote in one of his poems: if you break Greece apart into small pieces you will see that what is left is one olive tree, a vineyard, and a fishing boat, which means that with these three items Greece can be rebuilt.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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End and Beginning of an Era

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey was seen as a prickly power in a tough neighborhood, one that included two major zones of instability, the Balkans and the Middle East. On three separate occasions, Turkey came to the brink of war with its neighbors: Armenia in 1992, Greece in 1996 and Syria in 1998. Regular military incursions were launched into Northern Iraq; in the Aegean, continuous tactical military provocations between the Greek and Turkish air force took place. Little movement was evident with regard to Cyprus and at one point Turkey even threatened to annex the northern part of the island.  Relations with post-Cold War Russia were tentative and burdened by a long history of tension and conflict.  Relations with Iran were soured by the Kurdish conflict and political Islam. Turkey’s overall approach to its neighbors was characterized by confrontation, mistrust, and the use of threats and force. Yet, despite tensions over domestic issues such as human rights, widespread use of torture, and the situation of the Kurdish minority, Turkey remained a strong transatlantic partner.

The contrast with the current environment is striking. Relations with Greece have improved since the beginning of rapprochement in 1999 with the earthquake diplomacy to the point that Prime Ministers ErdoÄŸan and Papandreou routinely headline events together as they did most recently at the World Student Games and Turkish Ambassador Summit. In 2004, the Turkish government reversed its position on Cyprus to support the Annan plan for reunification. Turkey is now not only at peace with Syria, but is engaged in close political and economic cooperation with Damascus through a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC). A similar approach and HLSCC toward Iraq culminated in the first ever visit of a Turkish Head of State to Baghdad and official relations with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. Turkey has also begun a process of reconciliation with Armenia aimed at reopening the border–closed since 1993–establishing full diplomatic relations, and jointly investigating historical events that burden contemporary relations. Gains from trade and recognition of common interests have substantially improved relations with both Iran and Russia. Turkey’s active foreign policy aimed at “zero problems” with its neighbors, which first aimed at improving bilateral relations and regional cooperation in the Balkans and among former Soviet states, has now been extended to the Middle East, the Gulf, and North Africa as well.

Accounting for these developments on the domestic, historical, and international level is critical in order to understand Turkey’s foreign policy orientation, marked by the concepts of “zero problems” and “Strategic Depth,” elaborated upon by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs and a former Professor of International Relations Dr. Ahmet DavutoÄŸlu. “Strategic Depth”seeks to reposition Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the center as an actor sitting at the intersection of multiple regions just like the Ottomans did for six centuries. It does so by courting different alliances in order to maintain optimal regional and global independence and influence, by specifically taking on a larger role in its former Ottoman territories, and by prioritizing “dialogue and cooperation” over “coercion and confrontation.” This approach has gained favor with business and civil society, who favor closer ties with neighbors in both economic and social realms. In other words, the doctrine of Strategic Depth provides a normative chapeau to the plethora of state and non-state interests, which concomitantly push Turkey to develop deeper and stronger ties to its neighbors. It also conceptualizes a foreign policy trend which has been in the making since the days of former Turkish Prime Minister and President Türgüt Özal in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem in the late 1990s.

The emergence of the AKP in 2002 as a political force has turned Turkish foreign policy on its head by drawing strength from its common heritage and history with its neighbors rather than considering it a handicap. Turkish foreign policy under the AKP has come to articulate a vision for improving relations with all its neighbors, particularly by privileging its former Muslim space in the Middle East, such as Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and Syria where agreements are being signed for a free-trade zone and an eventual Middle Eastern Union. As a result, the debate over Turkey’s historic roots and its legacy as a successor state to the Ottoman Empire have been rekindled and been put on the political agenda again. As a result of its Islamic roots and Muslim outlook, the AKP has focused on the unifying character of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim values inherited by the Turkish Republic. Articulating a new vision for Turkey that is not dependent upon the West while actively seeking ways to balance its relationships and alliances, the AKP harkens back to the days of the Ottoman Empire, and more importantly of a self-confident regional power. Some scholars have labeled this “Neo-Ottomanism”,much to the chagrin of the AKP, which emphasizes that Turkey can be part of both Europe and the Middle East in a non-zero sum world.

Understanding the Shifts

The shift in Turkey’s policies towards its neighborhood is stark and can be explained by a confluence of international, regional and domestic factors. At the international and regional levels, these factors range from the power vacuum left by the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 war on Iraq, to the changing dynamics in the Kurdish question and the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza during 2008 and 2009. They include the waning influence which the EU now has on Turkish foreign policy, as well as the U.S., by first aggravating Turkey’s sensitivities on the Kurdish question in 2003-2007 and then diffusing them by cooperating with Turkey in the fight against the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK.)

Presenting Turkey as a “soft power”in the Middle East was made possible by Turkey’s broader democratization since the end of the Cold War and in particular since September 11, 2001. There seems to be a relationship between greater democratization and Eastern oriented foreign policy initiatives throughout Turkish political history. The three longest serving prime ministers (Adnan Menderes, Türgüt Özal, and Recep ErdoÄŸan) have all implemented at least one Eastern oriented initiative (Baghdad Pact 1955, Central Asian Initiative 1991, and “Strategic Depth” 2004) along with their domestic democratization efforts. These same prime ministers commanded the largest percentage of the parliament and were among the most responsive to public opinion, which led often to tenuous relationships with Turkey’s traditional purveyors of foreign policy, the military. There is something electorally attractive about Eastern initiatives even if they are less institutional or formalized in the same way than Western initiatives have tended to be (NATO 1952, EC Application 1987, and EU candidate status 2004). Within the democratizing Turkey of the last decade civilian leaders cannot as easily ignore public opinion on critical foreign policy questions in the same way as military leaders who previously dominated Turkish foreign policy decision-making.

The role of history and imperial memories has further facilitated the transformation in Turkey’s outlook on the Middle East. Turkey’s “rediscovery”of the Middle East has been greatly initiated by the AKP’s historical memory and ideas about Turkey’s “rightful” place as the heir to the Ottoman Empire both in and outside the region. The rise of the AKP has subsequently meant a de-emphasis of the “othering” and “Islamic threat” in Turkey’s view of the region. Closer Middle Eastern relations are not seen as being dichotomous or detrimental to Turkey’s western orientation, at home or abroad, as they had been seen under military rule in the 1980s. Hence, a more “Islam-friendly” approach that focuses on economic opportunities and shared heritage has come to permeate Turkey’s policy towards the region.

Alongside this, Turkey’s economic growth has also helped develop closer ties to its neighbors, building economic interdependence with formerly hostile countries like Syria and Iraq, while drawing others closer into Ankara’s orbit. Rather than seeing Iran, Iraq or Syria as former enemies or “others,” Turkey increasingly sees its eastern neighbors as potential markets for their goods and partners in a neighborhood that can benefit from an actively engaged regional stabilizer. A growing Turkish economic interest in Middle Eastern neighbors in turn has led to a growing influence of business and civil society actors in foreign-policy-making, these non-state actors in turn press the government and bureaucracy to develop cooperative ties to further their interests. Growing commercial interests in the region have raised Turkish stakes in a peaceful and stable Middle East, consolidating Turkish foreign policy objectives to promote peace and regional integration in the Middle East.

The change in Turkish foreign policy hinges on Turkey’s domestic transformation and democratization, kick-started, inter alia, by its EU accession process, and is propelled by the rise of the ruling AKP under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan. Turkish foreign policy has traditionally been the exclusive domain of the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the course of the last decade, not only have these institutions been transformed, but others have also acquired a growing role in foreign policy making as a result of Turkey’s increasing democratization. These include state bodies such as the ministries of energy, environment, interior and transportation and the under-secretariat for foreign trade. In addition, civil society, and in particular businesses associations such as the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD), the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), the Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB), the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), constantly lobby the government on foreign policy questions. It would be hard to make sense of Turkish foreign policy towards countries such as Russia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Syria without taking into consideration these economic interests. Similarly, economic interests have played an important role in efforts to improve relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government as well as Armenia. These factors all push toward the same direction of greater regional integration and cooperation.

The upshot and irony of this increasingly democratic Turkey is a growing readiness to diverge and say “no” to the U.S. or the EU when the latter’s policies have been perceived as countering Turkish interests. Unlike during and the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when Turkish army generals and diplomats could be counted on to support the West even when policies harmed Turkey’s national interest, Turkish leaders are now being held accountable for their foreign policy decisions by their people and at times give-in to populism. In other words, like any other democracy, Turkey today responds to the public, including its nationalist and religious segments, as well as to powerful business interests. Turkey’s new self-awareness as a regional power means that rather than simply being able to rely on Turkey as an instrument of Western power projection in the Middle East, the West is now facing a stronger and more assertive Turkey that can and will disagree on key foreign policy issues.

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