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Yet on March 17, US troops fighting the Islamic State (IS) group began their departure from the crucial al-Qaim base on the Iraqi-Syrian border. The withdrawal came amid the fall in oil prices — Iraq’s main source of income — and the COVID-19 pandemic. Two days later, the Qayyara West airfield in northern Iraq was handed over to the Iraqis by the US-led coalition. “The coalition will operate from fewer locations,” Brigadier General Vincent Barker , “but remains committed to supporting our partners in their fight against [IS].” A week after this, foreign forces departed from the K1 base in Kirkuk.

The decision by Washington to leave three of the eight bases in Iraq shows a dramatic shift in policy. Questions arise over whether the US has a long-term strategy for Iraq and the Middle East and, if so, of what kind.

Iraq’s Leadership Position

Regardless of the Iraqi parliament’s vote — which was won by a narrow majority — the government’s position on the presence of US troops in Iraq appears ambivalent. Iraq’s political establishment has been through a recent crisis amid mass protests in 2019. Added to this, the Iraqis cannot really walk away from foreign military aid. The country is also divided amongst various political factions that enjoy positive relations with different international players — namely the US and Iran — whose objectives and interests in the region vary considerably and are in conflict with each other.

This has repercussions for Iraq. Given the alliances that political factions have with different countries, Iraq is politically fragmented and incapable of moving forward. Moreover, protesters have taken to the streets since October 2019, and the Iraqi establishment has proved incapable of handling this challenge. Activists have called for economic reforms and an end to corruption and foreign meddling in Iraqi affairs. The only reason protests have temporarily stopped is due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In late November, after months of protests, Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi resigned. To date, three prime ministers have been designated: Mohammed Allawi was the first to withdraw, followed by Adnan al-Zurfi. Mustafa al-Kadhimi was finally by parliament as prime minister on May 6, potentially ending months of political instability. Domestic divisions over the US presence in Iraq had complicated the task of forming a new government. Zurfi, for instance, was a vocal of Iraq’s alliance with the US, and after being unable to obtain support from crucial political factions, he decided to resign.

The US in Iraq

The US, for its part, has withdrawn from Qayyara airfield, al-Qaim and Kirkuk, but it continues its fight against Iran and pro-Iran militias. It may sound counterintuitive, but both of these positions seem to follow the same logic, one that is arguably contributing to Iraq’s political crisis and regional instability. They reflect a rather immediate response to the failure of America’s confrontational posture.

Despite insisting that its “” policy on Iran is working, US troops in Iraq are not winning. Instead of facing that reality and developing strategies that would defend their interests, the Americans are escaping by leaving three crucial bases. Yet, at the same time, it is defending the policy of “maximum pressure” to the US public by staying in Iraq and fighting pro-Iran militias. If the US does not confront the actual reality — one that sees Iran-linked groups as becoming stronger and winning in its proxy conflict — and lead to it taking a different stance, Iraq will pay the consequences and the US position in the region will be further diminished.

The US strikes that killed Soleimani and Muhandis on January 3 were meant to “.” They did not. Quite the opposite, they opened up to a cycle of violence that does not seem to stop. In the past few months, Iran-linked groups have launched several attacks on US assets and personnel. On March 11, the Iraqi military base Camp Taji, which is just outside Baghdad, was the target of a hail of rockets. It killed two US servicemen and one British soldier. The day after, the US retaliated with against the Iran-backed paramilitary group Kataib Hezbollah.

The strike on Camp Taji was just one in a series of that did not begin after the assassination of General Soleimani and is not confined to Iraqi territory. In September 2019, an Iranian drone two major Saudi oil installations, proving that Iran is ready to push its adversaries to the extreme end of the confrontation. Such actions should be seen as a response to the US policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran’s , which the Trump administration announced in May 2018 to constrain Iran and its nuclear efforts.

Maximum Resistance

As analysts have , however, applying “maximum pressure” on Iran will only result in the Iranians responding with “maximum resistance.” The nature of Iran’s presence in the region — particularly the ties it has created with local political and military actors — makes its resistance hard to be fought. As a report by the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies says, “History has shown that only dialogue will work to constrain Iran.”

Iran’s conventional is not technologically advanced and would not be prepared for a head-on confrontation with its main adversaries, the US or Saudi Arabia. However, it has developed extensive asymmetrical warfare capabilities. Iran has nurtured regional parties and proxies, who have their own agenda and interests. Since 2003 and the fall of the Iraqi Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein, Iran has built an extensive network of economic, political and military ties in Iraq. These relations are not exclusively military or political, which is precisely why they are hard to be broken. Hitting such groups militarily will have implications on the political field. 

The PMF — the paramilitary groups that gathered in 2015 to fight the Islamic State — are usually referred to as “Iranian-linked groups.” However, many of these groups are militia wings of Iraqi parties and reflect crucial ideological trends of the Iraqi political scene. Such groups push the nationalist ideology of resistance against foreign powers. They may coordinate their actions with Iranian officials but, besides the assistance they receive from Iran, they do not lack motivation or capabilities to act on their own.

That is why provoking Iran on Iraqi soil could be dangerous. Not only will US troops be the target of retaliatory attacks, but US-Iraqi political relations will be severely damaged. Iraqi politics is highly fragmented. Aside from the Iran-aligned factions, there are others that are wary of Iran and are keen to collaborate with the US-led coalition. The assassination of Soleimani and Muhandis, however, offered a huge opportunity for Iraqi “resistance” fighters to come forward.

The fact that Muhandis, a crucial Iran-backed figure, was also killed is significant. He was the PMF deputy chief and one of the most influential Iraqi leaders of the “resistance” factions. Moreover, the decision to kill both Soleimani and Muhandis on Iraqi soil was taken unilaterally, without consulting Iraqi officials. That is the behavior of an occupying force, not that of a collaborating partner.

Broken Trust

It should come as no surprise if the trust that was built throughout the years with Iraqi partners is now severely damaged. The possibility of expelling US troops from Iraq had been before but failed. That changed on January 5. Iraqi President Barham Salih, who is usually in favor of good relations with the US, recently criticized the Trump administration, the “foreign bombing.”

Leaving three of the most crucial bases in Iraq, where the US deployed its forces against IS, should not be misunderstood as an act of recognition of Iraq’s military capabilities. The latter may be considered capable of confronting jihadist groups, only if one acknowledges that the PMF are not exclusively “Iranian-linked” militias. In fact, many of them are supported by Iran. But, as mentioned earlier, they cannot be dismissed as Iranian-proxies that are entirely alien to the Iraqi defense apparatus. Rather, they actually constitute Iraq’s defense.

In December 2018, one of Kataib Hezbollah’s commanders, talking about al-Qaim, the BBC, “We will make them leave if they don’t want to leave.” He was right. Departing from such bases is the actual acknowledgment of Iran’s role in the fight against IS and of Iran’s capability in controlling the area.

As have pointed out, the Iraqi-Syrian border around al-Qaim and the neighboring Bukamal will be vulnerable to the return of IS-affiliated groups for many years to come. “Any weakening of the Iranian-allied militias may provide an opportunity for the Islamic State to revive itself,” write Harith Hasan and Kheder Khaddour. This means that for better or for worse, Iraqi and Syrian leaders will be compelled to accommodate Iran’s will to some extent. The US departure is proof of Iran’s victory in the region.

While the “maximum pressure” policy is praised by the Trump administration to the American public, it seems that its negative repercussions are becoming apparent. Giving up the Iraqi-Syrian border to the Iranians and the “tit-for-tat” cycle of violence in Iraq may be seen as two sides of the same coin: the failure of the US policy against Iran and its proxies. As Maria Fantappie and Sam Heller have cogently , “there is a better way for the United States, albeit one with its own risks: restraint.”

If the Americans bite their lip and do not respond to Iran’s provocations, putting an end to this vicious cycle, this may lead to better relations with Iraq and its new government under Kadhimi. And if the US interacts with the Iraqis as equal partners, it may build closer ties with Iraqi leaders who have a problem with Iranian influence in Iraq.

*[ is a partner institution of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Departing From Iraq Would Mean appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, much speculation has unsurprisingly spread among analysts and observers on social media. Due to an overall state of instability in Basra, this southern part of Iraq has captured attention. Looking ahead, both domestic unrest and external interventions in the area pose major threats to Basra and its residents who find themselves in the crosshairs of complicated and sensitive regional dynamics.

Basra hosts the largest Iraqi oil fields and produces over three-quarters of the country’s oil. Nonetheless, it is plagued with unemployment, nonexistent (or poor) services, water shortage and water contamination. These factors are all drivers of domestic unrest, and climate change has also contributed to the exacerbation of many environmental, economic, political, security and social problems in southern Iraq.

Protests in Summer 2018

As temperatures rise, locals are forced to survive the extreme climate conditions with electricity shortages, drought and contaminated water. In July 2018, amid one of the strongest waves of recent protests in Basra, Iran cut off its electricity supply to Iraq, leaving Iraqis with only a few hours of electricity each day.

Protests in the summer of 2018 were perhaps the most violent ever witnessed in southern Iraq. In unprecedented scenes, offices of political parties were and burned down. Frustrated with Iranian interference in Iraqi politics, the Iranian Consulate in Basra was stormed and torched. Following the attacks, militiamen were reported shooting on the crowd.

At the peak of the protests, demonstrators targeted crucial operations at key energy sector facilities. On July 8, up to 1,000 demonstrators in Bahla (in northern Basra) to block the road to West Qurna 1 and Rumaila oil fields to the south. The whole political class was blamed for the lack of services, unemployment and preference of foreign workers in the energy sector (only 4% of the Iraqi workforce is employed in the energy sector and almost exclusively for basic roles, such as security guards and drivers).

Notwithstanding all the political challenges facing Iraq’s leadership, the current situation in Basra is, as some experts have , milder than last summer. This summer, there have been next to no protests in the Basra area. Yet in late May, there were three sets of small-scale demonstrations near the Zubair oil field, yet they dispersed quickly.

It appears that the reason for this year’s tensions being milder in Basra compared to last summer is twofold. First, there has been some improvement of local services, mainly electricity with Iran becoming more cooperative in the interest of thwarting further instability from breaking out in southern Iraq. Second, after the events of summer 2018, which entailed protesters attacking Iranian-sponsored Shia militias’ offices and storming the Iranian Consulate, the public understands that such militias remain present in the country and will not allow any riots.

Thus, for the time being, the threat posed to security in Basra by domestic violence is somewhat neutralized, at least for the short term. However, in the long term, the presence of Iranian-backed Shia militias that are determined to contain the unrest can prove problematic, given the extent to which the US and Israel are determined to counter such actors. That raises questions about how Basra fits into a wider conflict between Washington and Tel Aviv on one side (along with some Gulf Arab states too) and Tehran on the other.

Israeli-Iranian Confrontation

The recent attacks on Iraqi territory suggest quite clearly that Iraq has been a theater for Israeli-Iranian confrontation. On August 14, a weapons depot belonging to the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), which comprises numerous Iranian-backed Shia militias, was blown up. Evidence that Israel was behind it, although Tel Aviv has not claimed responsibility. In fact, ImageSat International, an Israeli satellite imaging company, has photos that suggest Israeli aircraft carried out the attack.

Two other attacks against the PMU were blamed on Israel in July. Iran has accused Israel of fighting the Islamic Republic’s partners (often referred to as “proxies”) on Iraqi territory. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a spokesman for the PMU, he had intelligence that showed the US had brought in four Israeli drones earlier this year to target Iranian militias. The Iraqi government, for its part, has not officially blamed Israel. On Twitter, however, Baha al-Araji, former Iraqi deputy prime minister, of the attack as being committed by an “oppressive colonial state.”

Caught into a wider struggle that plays on a number of fronts, the Iraqi government has not proved to be sufficiently decisive and effective in its political actions, nor capable to resist and confront foreign interference. On July 1, Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi issued a decree ordering the factions of the PMU to integrate fully into the state security forces. For , such a step represents a clear attempt to contain Iranian interference.

On August 26, a meeting between the Iraqi government and PMU leaders was held to discuss the Israeli attacks on weapons’ depots. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry announced that it will take all necessary steps to protect Iraq’s sovereignty. Analysts, however, are : Iranian Shia militias have been crucial in the fight against the Islamic State (IS) group, and its presence in Iraq is still widespread. Observers are concerned that, even within the lines of the Iraqi security forces, Iranian-backed militias will continue an agenda that is not necessarily aligned with that of the Iraqi government.

Smoke and Mirrors

What is occurring in Basra is far from clear, with smoke and mirrors making it difficult to accurately assess the situation. From the US administration’s perspective, Iran is behind attacks such as the Katyusha rocket strike against a compound housing ExxonMobil, Shell, and Eni in early June, as well as numerous attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED). Washington maintains that Tehran is using its Iraqi proxies to target Western interests, but analysts are . Unquestionably, some Iranian-linked actors are behind some of the violence, but it is far from clear if they are acting on their own or if they are taking orders from the Islamic Republic, as US officials assert.

Shia militias in Iraq have maintained influence roles and become powerful since Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003. Such actors are extremely embedded in the local economy. Their attacks on foreign companies are about sending a message to Western firms about how Shia militias have the means to make their situation in southern Iraq difficult. Where the Iranian government fits into this picture is an open question.

There is no doubt that the different actors with clout in oil-rich Basra have their own interests and are demonstrating their willingness and ability to wage attacks to achieve political objectives. Regardless of the Tehran regime’s role in such violence in southern Iraq, Basra has clearly become a major hot spot against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s so-called “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.

Unless Washington and Tehran can come to the table to begin negotiations, not only on the Iranian nuclear file but also a host of regional issues, southern Iraq will remain extremely vulnerable to the growing tensions felt across the region since the US pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — the Iran nuclear deal — in 2018.

*[ is a partner institution of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Unrest Heats Up in Iraq appeared first on 51�Թ�.