The deal, which imposes limitations on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program, was agreed in July 2015 between the Iranians and the P5+1 group — China, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States — and implemented six months later. The deal was struck when the Obama administration was in the White House following years of negotiations. The JCPOA gave Iran relief from international economic sanctions in return for dismantling major parts of its nuclear program and giving access to its facilities for inspection.

Reworking US Policy in the Middle East and North Africa

READ MORE

Yet ever since Donald Trump was elected president of the United States in November 2016, the future of the JCPOA has hung in the balance. Trump made it a campaign promise to pull out of the Iran deal. He kept his word and officially withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, saying the deal is “” and did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program or its interference in the affairs of other countries in the Middle East.

Washington has since reinstated US sanctions on Iran and sought to penalize any nation doing trade with the Iranians, which has led to widespread criticism. In response, Iran has its uranium enrichment at the Fordow nuclear plant, which is banned under the JCPOA.

The events surrounding the Iran deal have seen their ups and downs, but one thing is for sure: The collapse of the JCPOA is in no one’s best interest.

A Rocky Year

Several incidents have marked 2020 as a critical year for Iran. In January, the US assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in an airstrike in Baghdad, which led to a further escalation in tensions. In response, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, , “Severe revenge awaits the criminals.” The Iranians later they would no longer comply with the limits set to uranium enrichment under the nuclear deal.

In July, a fire broke out in Natanz, Iran’s enrichment site. The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization claimed the explosion was the result of “,” and officials further stressed that the incident “could slow the development of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges.” Both the assassination of Soleimani and the explosion in Natanz have rocked the nuclear deal, which is standing on its last legs.

Making Promises and Breaking Them

The JCPOA is not the first international agreement the US has withdrawn from under the Trump administration. In August 2019, the US officially pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, an agreement signed by Washington and Moscow in 1987 that sought to eliminate the arsenals of short and intermediate-range missiles of both countries. Russia reciprocated and called the INF Treaty “.” Just months later, in May 2020, the US announced its decision to from the Open Skies Treaty, an accord that allows unarmed aerial surveillance flights over dozens of countries.

When it comes to bilateral agreements, the world has experienced challenges with enforcing arms control and nonproliferation agreements, particularly since Trump was elected. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) — which, despite its own , is the last remaining arms control pact between the US and Russia — is one clear example. The fact that Trump wants to strike a with Iran but is quick to pull the trigger at torpedoing international agreements — including the 2015 Paris Climate Accord — does not bode well for building trust with the Iranians.

Considering that US–Iran diplomatic relations are a nonstarter under the Trump administration, the result of the US presidential election on November 3 will be critical. President Trump has to reach a new deal with Iran “within four weeks” if he is reelected. If he wins, his administration would have to reshape its approach toward Iran in a constructive way to meet the timeline he has set. On the other hand, if Democratic nominee Joe Biden wins, his administration would likely rejoin the JCPOA, as well as seek additional concessions from Tehran. In a recent op-ed for CNN, Biden , “If Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.”

Biden served as the vice president under the previous Obama administration, which, together with the P5+1 group, negotiated the JCPOA back in 2015. Therefore, it is safe to say that the future of the nuclear deal might just rest on the outcome of the US election.

A Regional Arms Race

For now, however, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA has weakened the impact of the accord. More importantly, the near-collapse of the deal could have a direct impact on the next Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference in 2021, potentially drawing criticism from non-nuclear-weapon states that may wish to pursue civilian programs of their own.

The JCPOA is not only important for global nonproliferation efforts, but also for stability in the Middle East. The complete failure of the deal would have severe implications. It would make neighboring countries feel less secure. As a result, this would encourage not just states but potentially non-state actors — such as terrorist groups — to focus on developing nuclear weapons. This would lead to an arms race in the geostrategic Middle East.

Developing a civilian nuclear program is a long and expensive process that involves extensive oversight by international bodies. Therefore, while it may be an unlikely scenario, regional states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may think that nuclear weapons are essential for national security due to their rivalry with Iran and start building their own arsenal. The potential collapse of the JCPOA clearly has global ramifications that could be catastrophic for nuclear nonproliferation.

Sanctions on Iran

On August 20, France, Germany and the UK issued a saying they do not support the US request for the UN Security Council to initiate the “snapback mechanism” of the JCPOA, which would reimpose the international sanctions against Iran that were lifted in 2015. As the US is no longer a party to the JCPOA, it has limited influence over its enforcement. Therefore, the Security Council rejected the US move.

The Iranian economy was already fragile before President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, and US-enforced sanctions are further complicating the situation. High , a deep recession and plummeting oil exports are just the tip of the iceberg.

The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is seen as an important mechanism to organize trade between Germany, France and Britain on the one side, and Iran on the other. INSTEX allows European companies to do business with Iran and bypass US sanctions. On March 31, these three European countries that INSTEX had “successfully concluded its first transaction, facilitating the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran.”

Although INSTEX can be helpful for Iran, US sanctions have dealt a fatal blow to the country’s economy. According to the , Iran’s GDP “contracted by 7.6% in the first 9 months of 2019/20 (April-December 2019),” mostly due to a 37% drop in the oil sector.

For the US, sanctions are a strategic way to deter Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Yet they can also be counterproductive. Iran is aware of the strategic benefit the JCPOA has for other states. This includes global and regional security. In this regard, the joint statement on upholding the nuclear deal during the recent meeting in Vienna came as no surprise. But if multilateral sanctions are reimposed, that could be the final straw for Iran. This may lead the Iranians to walk away from the JCPOA and up the game with its nuclear program.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

With all of this in mind, it is vital that the remaining parties to the JCPOA continue with constructive dialogue to try to uphold the agreement. Everyone benefits from the deal, and its success depends on each side’s fulfillment of their responsibilities and commitments, particularly Iran’s full compliance.

Most importantly, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is necessary for the future of nuclear nonproliferation. If the deal collapses, then the world enters uncharted territory.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Turkey’s Rationale

From Turkey’s perspective, the procurement of the S-400 is necessary for its air defense and national security due to the country’s location in a volatile region. Ever since the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, coupled with the cross-border fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union and the US — Ankara has set its sights on improving its aerial defense.

In 2013, Turkey wanted to purchase the air and missile defense system from the US, but “negotiations were repeatedly scuttled” under the . As a result, Turkey opened a bidding process for countries to pitch their own missile systems. China was quick to snap this up before Ankara canceled the deal in November 2015 over from NATO allies. Instead, Turkey said it was exploring the option of developing the system domestically before it began negotiating with Russia. In 2017, Turkey agreed to purchase the S-400 defense system in a deal $2.5 billion. Despite Washington’s warnings over a NATO member obtaining arms from Russia, on the grounds that the S-400 is to shoot down US aircraft like the F-35, Ankara’s decision was final.

In April, the US announced that it was of F-35 stealth aircraft equipment to Turkey, which followed a 2018 Senate bill to of Lockheed Martin F-35 jets to Ankara due to its detention of US citizen and the purchase of the S-400 system. Brunson, a pastor, was detained for two years over alleged links to the Gülen movement (FETÖ), which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, after the failed coup attempt in 2016.

The US has not hesitated in saying that there will be consequences to the S-400 deal. In April, a group of senators Turkey with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) if it continued with its purchase of the Russian system. The CAATSA was passed in 2017 to impose sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia.

Buying From Russia

Turkey views the S-400 as being essential for the protection of its airspace. But the installment of a Russian defense system in a NATO member state gives Moscow a strategic advantage. Turkey’s dependency on a Russian-supplied air defense system could serve as a reference for Moscow in its negotiations with other countries. Hence, the S-400 deal is more important than simply another sale.

Ever since the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and the alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, relations between Washington and Moscow have been strained. As a result, this has led to harsh economic sanctions against Russia and the termination of the historic Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Now, Turkey finds itself between a rock and a hard place.

On July 3, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Mike Andrews, the Pentagon spokesman,  Reuters that the “S-400 air and missile defense system is incompatible with the F-35 program.” For the US, there is fear that Russian intelligence equipment based in Turkey could be used to gather data from the F-35 aircraft. Despite Turkey’s insistence that the S-400 system would not present a problem, the US has not changed its position.

Avoiding Sanctions

US sanctions are not the best interest of Turkey. In 2018, Turkey-US relations were affected after the detention of Pastor Brunson, which resulted in US sanctions on two Turkish ministries. Diplomatic ties improved following Brunson’s release in October that year and the lifting of sanctions, but the Turkish economy has experienced economic difficulties since the last year. Considering the situation, implementing policies to shore up the country’s overall economy is necessary.

The S-400 deal was discussed by Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the recent G-20 Summit in Osaka, Japan. On June 29, President Trump , “Turkey is a NATO member and was not treated fairly,” in reference to the Obama administration’s stance over Patriot missiles in 2013. Regarding the possibility of sanctions, President Erdoğan , “We have heard from him [Trump] personally that this would not happen.”

Despite Turkey’s optimism with the US, the situation has not gone according to plan. In a statement issued on July 17 by the press secretary, the White House that “Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible. The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.” Furthermore, the Pentagon Turkey “will no longer receive more than $9 billion in projected work share related to the F-35 over the life of the program.”

The US reaction has gone beyond what Turkey expected, but it seems unlikely that Ankara will scrap the S-400 deal. On the one hand, President Trump’s statement at the G-20 created a mood of optimism. Yet indicate a possibility of US sanctions on Turkey. If Trump decides on imposing modest sanctions, this would not be far from what Ankara expects.

Currently, foreign investors are waiting to see what might happen in Turkey-US relations after the delivery of the S-400 is completed in April 2020. While the decision over F-35 aircraft is worrying for Turkey considering the fact that it has invested in the US fighter jet program, the key concern is whether the US will apply CAATSA sanctions or not. At the moment, the removal of Turkey from the F-35 program has not impacted the economy or the value of the lira.

NATO Allies

If President Trump decides to implement sanctions, the level of severity is what really matters. As a result, the current situation might lead to Turkey and Russia becoming even closer. If the US enforces sanctions, the relationship between Ankara and Washington will experience further days in the shade. The move could also lead to problems not only for Turkey and the US, but also with Europe in terms of security.

Yet as a member of NATO, Turkey is pivotal for the US due to its location as a bridge between Europe and Asia. The White House has to the “strategic relationship with Turkey … [that] is multi-layered, and not solely focused on the F-35.” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has reiterated this by that “Turkey as a NATO member is much more than the S-400.”

In light of these series of events, Turkey and the US will need to work hard to find a constructive solution to their impasse.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey-US Rift Over S-400 Could Escalate appeared first on 51�Թ�.