The Islamic State (IS) group claimed responsibility for the Easter Sunday across Sri Lanka. This raises many questions about the existence of IS affiliates in the country, the rapid radicalization of young Muslims, and the threat that extremist Islamic groups pose to the island nation.

Suicide bombings have a long history in Sri Lanka. In their separatist war, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) conducted suicide attacks from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s. However, the bombings of April 21 are a new phenomenon that has not only rocked the country, but also shocked the whole world.

A HISTORY OF PERSECUTION

Commonly referred as the , Sri Lankan Muslims are the third-largest ethnic group after the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Muslims comprise nearly 10% of the total population of 21 million. Most of them earn livelihoods through trade and business. Sri Lankan Muslims claim separate ethnicity from both the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Most trace their ancestry to the eighth-century Arab traders who settled in Sri Lanka. The majority of Sri Lankan Muslims are Sunni Shafiis who speak Tamil, Sinhala and Arabic. Some of them are Malay Muslims and have their own language.

Muslims are widely across Sri Lanka, with two-thirds living in the Sinhala Buddhist-majority region of Central, Southern and Western provinces, and the remaining one-third living in the Tamil-dominated coastal areas of north and east. Substantial Muslim live in Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital. The Muslim political leadership comes from the Western province. The reason is simple. This province is home to the Muslim mercantile class and its educated elite, while the Eastern province is inhabited by Muslims who are primarily farmers, fishermen and, to some extent, small traders.

In Sri Lanka as a whole, Muslims suffer from low literacy rates and . As a result, only few Muslim politicians have managed to secure ministerial jobs or diplomatic positions. During the 26-year Sri Lankan Civil War, the was “the target of discrimination, political violence, massacres and ethnic cleansing” by the rebel Tamil Tigers and the government-backed Sinhalese nationalists.

On , LTTE gunmen the Meera Jumma mosque of the Muslim-majority town of Kattankudy, “locked the doors to prevent escape and began firing into the crowd” of 300 worshippers. Using automatic weapons, they killed more than 100 people. Additionally, the Tamil human rights group reported on the LTTE’s massacring of Eravur town, near Batticaloa, in which 120 were killed. The most shocking part of this attack was the “cutting of a pregnant lady’s stomach [and the] baby is said to have been pulled out and stabbed.”

During the 1990s and 2000s, the LTTE 1,050 Muslims and forced 120,000 of them to leave their homes, lands, businesses and possessions behind in the north. The government has largely the internally displaced Muslims, and there “has been no government inquiry into the LTTE’s massacres and expulsions of Muslims or meaningful apology.”

Sri Lankan Muslims also suffered from periodic attacks by government-backed Sinhalese mobs in the 1990s and 2000s. In February 1999, a Sinhalese mob attacked the Bairaha outlet, threw grenades at Muslim houses and burned down their shops. A member of parliament from the local ruling party, , instructed the police not to be present in the area on that night. In another similar incident in , two Muslims died and hundreds of houses, shops and vehicles were destroyed by Sinhalese mobs. The clash began when some 2,000 Sinhalese attacked Muslims who were protesting against police inaction after three Sinhalese men assaulted a Muslim shopkeeper.

Riots have a long history in Sri Lanka. In 1915, fierce between Muslims and Sinhalese broke out over a Buddhist procession passing by a mosque. More recently, riots broke out in and . These violent episodes over the years are not widely known to the outside world. Muslims claim they find it difficult to live and carry out their business in Sinhalese-dominated areas of south and western Sri Lanka. It is ��fair to say that many feel persecuted.

FROM PERSECUTION TO RADICALIZATION��

Following the increase in attacks on Muslims during the civil war of the 1990s, security became a top priority for the community. They began to arm and protect themselves from both the LTTE and the Sinhalese mobs. They got some from security forces and purchased other armaments from the Karuna faction after its split with the Tamil Tigers.

The acquisition of weapons did not help much, though. Informal Muslim groups were ineffective in defending the community from Tamil Tigers or Sinhalese mobs. In fact, radical Muslim groups who acquired weapons engaged mostly in “” disputes. They declared the Ahmadiyya sect as “un-Islamic” and opposed Sufi Muslims, who represent a more spiritual and ascetic form of Islam.

From the 1990s, Sufis have been undermined by the growth of Tablighi Jamaat, who began sending groups of preachers to mosques and other places of worship. They encouraged Muslims to observe religious rituals rigidly and act more devoutly. These radical Muslims insisted on strict dress codes for women by importing the use of the niqab (face veil), abaya (a long dress that covers the entire body of a woman) and jubba (a long flowing garment worn by Muslim men), which were to ordinary Sri Lankans before the civil war.

After the defeat of the Tamil Tigers by the government in 2009, Sri Lankan Muslims gained some respite. However, they gradually replaced their indigenous Islamic practices with Middle Eastern ones. In doing so, Sri Lankan Muslims moved to more ultra-orthodox forms of Islam.

During this time, then-President Mahinda Rajapakse began to stoke Sinhala Buddhist triumphalism to increase his power. For him, Sinhala ethno-nationalism was a strategy to consolidate the majority voter base. His move further marginalized the Muslim community that as a new enemy, creating fertile grounds for radicalization.

The 2014 Sinhala-Muslim riots increased the division between the two communities to its highest level. On June 12, 2014, due to confrontation between Muslims and Buddhist monks during a Buddhist cultural celebration, four Muslims were killed, 80 were injured and 8,000 Muslims were displaced. The attacks by Sinhalese mobs led to the emergence of the Islamic State group in Sri Lanka. It provided a perfect opportunity for radical Muslim clerics to disseminate the rhetoric of the persecution of Muslims in Sri Lanka and in other parts of the world. These clerics started encouraging their followers to and “kill them in the name of religion.” These speeches came from groups such as the National Thawheed Jamaat, Sri Lankan Thawheed Jamaat and other local Islamist outfits.

From late 2014 and early 2015, radical Islamists like Salafi groups from the Middle East became more visible. They promoted religious education, segregated spaces for the two genders, restricted women from public life and adopted a more rigid interpretation of Islam that was unknown to the history of indigenous Muslims in Sri Lanka. In 2016, four men were arrested for punishing a woman who was found guilty of having an affair with a man. The sentence of guilt was declared at a mosque instead of a court. Such practice violated Sri Lankan Muslim family law and imposed a narrow interpretation of Islam for the first time in the country.

Sri Lankan Muslims, once a peaceful and tolerant community, are now widely susceptible to religious extremism and radicalism. Even as the talk of “espousing jihadi practices” at home continued, Mohamed Muhsin Sharfaz Nilam became the first Sri Lankan Muslim to die in Syria in July 2015, putting in stark view the Islamic State’s outreach in this island nation.

ASKING QUESTIONS

Following the Easter Sunday attacks, Sri Lankan authorities have been for at least 140 people linked with IS. Zahran Hashim, the suspect leader of the attacks, is said to have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Hashim was known to Sri Lankan intelligence for disseminating hatred and giving inflammatory speeches over the last few years. While Hashim is in the news for being the mastermind of the attacks, Sri Lanka faces more important questions.

How can the country prevent the rise of homegrown Islamic terrorism? How can it stop the expansion of ultra-orthodox Islamic ideology among young Muslims? How can it stop communal division not only between Muslims and Sinhalese or Tamils, but also Muslims and Christians?

So far, the government has banned the niqab, expelled 200 Islamic preachers from the country, and launched a transnational investigation with the support of . Even as it takes such actions, the government must protect innocent Muslims from the of Buddhist nationalist groups. Their backlash will only give further fuel to radical Islamists and hurt the cause of peace in a once idyllic island nation.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Sri Lanka’s Persecuted Muslims Are Turning Radical appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Afghan government has been calling for peace talks for many years, yet only in November 2018 did the Taliban agree to meet face-to-face with the US envoys for finding a peaceful solution to nearly 18 years of bloodshed. So far, US officials and the Taliban have had five rounds of peace talks in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. During the fifth round in March, both parties “” that the US would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, with the Taliban promising to ensure that the country will not be used by foreign militant groups that pose an international security threat.

The sixth round of talks, which was supposed to take place in Doha on April 20, was cancelled due to “,” leading to the intra-Afghan talks between the Kabul government and the Taliban to also be postponed.

Since 2011, the United States has been formally engaged in peace talks with the Taliban. With President Barack Obama the preliminary discussions in June 2011, the United Nations Security Council first split the sanctions list between members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and then against 14 key Taliban members. To facilitate the reconciliation process, the US and Afghan governments opened a political office for the Taliban in Qatar’s capital, Doha.

In 2013, the Taliban officially opened its own office in Doha and flew its flag above the sign designating the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan’s then-president, Hamid Karzai, immediately reacted and insisted on closing the Doha office on the basis that the Taliban was trying to present itself as a government in exile. Following the assassination of the Afghan chief negotiator, Burhanuddin Rabbani, in September 2013, Karzai suspended the peace talks. In reaction, the Taliban increased its violent campaign across the country. The in Kabul in February, the in March and the in July made 2014 a deadly year not only for Afghans, but also many foreigners and UN staff.

Part of the Process

In 2017, President Donald Trump outlined an intention to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan, depending on the conditions on the ground rather than according to a fixed timeline. Trump insisted on “” in Afghanistan to “prevent the emergence of a vacuum for terrorists.” In retaliation, the Taliban carried out a in Kabul and other provinces that killed hundreds of people. The Afghan government, with the support of US forces, increased air strikes against the Taliban, targeting its in an attempt to sever the group’s financial lifeline. Besides, the Trump administration worth billions of dollars to Pakistan for its “deceit” in harboring Taliban militants.

So far, only the Taliban has benefited from the peace talks. Just recently, the United Nations had on further 14 key Taliban members, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Anas Haqqani, Abbas Stanikzai and other members of the group’s political office in Qatar. The , receiving passports and immunity to travel, as well as having lavish homes with access to Afghan consulate services in Qatar are being enjoyed by the Taliban as part of the peace process.

On the other hand, the Taliban has not made any evident commitment either to the US or the Afghan government. Despite the US peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, having recently announced that the Taliban had agreed in principle to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a “platform for international terrorist groups or individuals,” the group is keeping up its campaign of violence. The Taliban had recently launched its (Victory) offensive to increase its areas of control.

A that the Taliban will not let Afghanistan be used as a base to threaten other countries was made by the group in 2010, but the country turned into ground zero for who support the Taliban and embrace the its campaign of violence and bloodshed. For example, the Haqqani Network joined the Taliban in 1995 and has since carried out many in Afghanistan, including the January 2008 storming of the Serena hotel, the June 2011 attack on the Intercontinental hotel and the September 2011 attack on the US Embassy in Kabul.

Peace Initiative

The peace initiative rests firmly in the hands of the Afghan government. In February 2018, at the Second Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, President Ashraf Ghani offered unconditional peace talks to the Taliban and asked the group to renounce violence, accept the rule of law and enter into peace negotiations. President Ghani’s offer to the Taliban also included the release of Taliban prisoners, granting passports and visas to family members and a removal of sanctions imposed on the group’s leaders. Although these offers fulfilled the Taliban’s previous preconditions for peace talks, the group did not respond.

Receiving no response from the Taliban, the Afghan government threatened it with the closure of its political office in Doha. While discussion over the measure continued in Kabul, the Taliban unexpectedly called for direct talks with the US by publishing a 10-page “” and “peace-loving congressmen” to pressure the Trump administration into a “peace dialogue.”

In June 2018, a ceasefire initiated by the Afghan government for the duration of the Eid al-Fitr holiday increased the momentum for peace talks. A month later, Taliban officials led by Abbas Stanikzai secretly met with a senior US diplomat, Alice Wells, of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, for a preliminary discussion in Doha to set up a channel between the US officials and the Taliban ahead of future face-to-face talks.

In November 2018, the US envoy held three-days talks with the Taliban officials in Qatar to discuss the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan and pave the way for intra-Afghan talks. Since then, four more rounds of talks were held, with the last meeting lasting 16 days between the US team led by Khalilzad and the Taliban officials led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.

Two Phases��

The Taliban will not enter into intra-Afghan talks until it reaches an agreement with the US. Following the release of an open letter in February of last year, Taliban officials based in Qatar announced that the group will initiate the talks in two phases. In the first phase, which has already begun, the Taliban will be meeting with US diplomats to set up a timetable for the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan. The Taliban believes that only the US has the power to decide and implement a decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.

The Taliban considers Afghanistan an occupied country and has not shown a willingness to talk with the Afghan government without entering into an agreement with the US first. Once the Taliban reaches a preliminary decision with the United States, the group will start the second phase of talks with the Afghan government to discuss other domestic issues, such as how to implement the peace deal, enter a power-sharing agreement and form a new government in Afghanistan.

A long-lasting peace agreement will have to����all warring parties, society (including ethnic minorities, women and youth) and major regional and international stakeholders. Having learned from the 1988 , which excluded the mujahedeen groups from direct participation in the peace talks, the of 1992, which excluded the northern militias and reserved “a modest share in power for the Shia Mujahidin of Hizb-e Wahdat” in the new government, and the 2001 Bonn Agreement that excluded the Taliban from participation and formation of the post-2001 government, the current peace talks must provide sufficient space for the participation and involvement of all warring parties, the wider Afghan society and major regional and international powers.

On April 29, President Ashraf Ghani opened the four-day Loya Jirga, or grand assembly. Notably from it are the country’s chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah, the chairman of the Afghan High Peace Council, Karim Khalili, as well as many other high-ranking officials such as former President Hamid Karzai and former national security adviser Hanif Atmar. The Jirga is the last attempt by the Afghan government to find common ground on how to approach the Taliban and obtain the support of tribal elders to strengthen Kabul’s position during the peace talks. However, the Taliban has already dismissed the Jirga’s outcome, knowing that it is just a consultative assembly with .

It is clear that the last five rounds of talks have , but the prospect of a peaceful Afghanistan is only realistic if the Taliban breaks ties with other terrorist groups and sponsors of terrorism, agrees to a ceasefire and joins the intra-Afghan peace talks. As the Taliban and Afghan government forces actively fight for control over more territory in order to gain leverage in the peace talks, all eyes are on the conclusion of the Loya Jirga to establish a peace map for talks between the government in Kabul and the Taliban.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Afghan Peace Process: Two Phases of the Taliban appeared first on 51�Թ�.