Although Booker undoubtedly took this stance to separate himself from the other candidates, he also enjoyed the distinction of being correct. Leaving the JCPOA was a costly miscalculation that changed Washington’s global relations. But, rather than clinging to the past, the US is best served by considering alternatives to the JCPOA in the future.

In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 powers — the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members, US, France, UK, China and Russia, plus Germany — agreed to enter the . Under the agreement, Iran was required to reduce its number of centrifuges by two-thirds, restrict its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98% and limit uranium enrichment to 3.67%. Moreover, the deal required Iran to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its nuclear facilities and to implement the — a voluntary agreement that provides the IAEA expanded access in the select countries that choose to implement it.

Put simply, the deal limited Iran’s nuclear program to civilian uses by restricting technology, enrichment and potential uranium stockpiles while also subjecting the country to the international community’s most comprehensive nuclear inspection regime. In return, the P5+1 lifted a number of economic sanctions against Tehran.

Changed Context

Although the , many in Washington criticized the JCPOA, believing it to be too soft. Critics identified a number of flaws, such as the so-called and the utter lack of language in the deal pertaining to ballistic missile technology or Iran’s . Due to these criticisms, the JCPOA was enacted as a rather than a legally binding treaty or executive agreement because the Obama administration lacked the votes to ensure congressional approval.

The JCPOA was admittedly imperfect but, when it was negotiated, it was the best possible solution for constraining Iranian nuclear power and normalizing US-Iran relations. However, by leaving the agreement in 2018, the Trump administration significantly changed that context.

Since the US withdrew from the deal and , straining the country’s economy, the Islamic Republic has reportedly in the Strait of Hormuz, an unmanned US drone and began with the JCPOA. In turn, the US has moved of troops and equipment to the region and launched against Iranian intelligence groups. Both Tehran and Washington are playing a game of brinkmanship in which it is entirely possible to misidentify the adversary’s red line.

Accordingly, the two countries are now than they have been in years. If this situation continues to escalate, a negotiated diplomatic solution will be necessary. Yet such a solution will not resemble the JCPOA, which — while designed to reduce tensions — was never intended to be a peace treaty. Even if the United States and Iran are able to avoid unchecked escalation, the JCPOA will still not be the best solution to addressing US security concerns when it comes to Iran.

Different Objectives

This time, the calculus on both sides is different. By leaving the JCPOA, the Trump administration set the stage for renegotiation by potentially changing one profound factor: Iran’s objective. In 2015, Iran wanted sanctions relief. In 2019, it is logical to assume that Iran desires sanctions relief that cannot be taken away at the whim of the White House. In other words, while Iran would prefer a multilateral agreement ensuring sanctions relief under already negotiated stipulations, the country is likely to prioritize a deal that is legally binding for the US, unlike the JCPOA.

A legally binding agreement could materialize : a treaty ratified by two-thirds of the US Senate, or a congressional-executive agreement requiring approval by a simple majority in both houses of Congress. While a treaty ratified by two-thirds of the Senate would be the most desirable in terms of , a congressional-executive agreement is more realistic. This is because a simple majority in both houses is easier to politically achieve than a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Even this agreement is likely to require a bipartisan vote, which means that at least some of the primary opponents of the JCPOA — the Republicans — will need to support the agreement.

Iran’s potentially shifting objective, and the corresponding necessity for US bipartisanship, gives future US negotiators an edge that the negotiators in 2015 did not have. If Iran’s objective has truly shifted to assured sanctions relief, then its leaders must be willing to accept more rigorous restrictions, as these restrictions are the only way of securing Republican support. Although Iran will still refuse the , it may be more amenable to addressing some of the criticisms leveled in 2015.

Republicans, meanwhile, will have an incentive to work with Iran. If a stronger, more restrictive deal can be crafted as a result of the White House leaving the JCPOA, their party wins a major communications victory and helps deescalate the situation in the Middle East. It is Republicans could be convinced to vote in favor of a restrictive, but also legally binding, nuclear deal in the future.

The situations addressed above are hypothetical and may never come to pass. In some future context, the JCPOA may be the best deal, in others it is irrelevant, and in others still it may serve as a foundation for a new and better deal. Regardless, promising reentry into the JCPOA now is a mistake. In fact, clinging to the best deal of the past could very well jeopardize the best deal of the future.

*[Young Professionals in Foreign Policy is a of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Leaving the JCPOA May Have Been a Mistake, But So Is Reentering It appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Moreover, there is no commonly accepted international definition of terrorism. For example, in the United States an act is deemed terrorism if its intent is to influence policy, citizens or the US government through coercion, whereas in France the intent must simply be to disrupt law and order deliberately and to a . Due to this ambiguity, many people do not understand the multifaceted and sometimes mercurial definition of the term “terrorism.”

Yet, while living with a vague definition of terrorism seems irrational and certainly has practical downsides, this ambiguity is currently the world’s best option for preventing the misuse of the term.

Societal Conceptions

The lack of an authoritative definition has led to a societal characterization of terrorism — even if only on a subconscious or emotional level — as being explicitly tied to Islam. For instance, when the prime minister of Sri Lanka, Ranil Wickremesinghe, on churches by radical Islamists in April 2019 as terrorism, the rest of the world did not bat an eye. However, New Zealand’s prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, for making the exact same announcement about a white nationalist’s live-streamed attack on two Christchurch mosques one month earlier.

A major problem with conceptualizing terrorism as being inherently linked to radical Islam is that it widens an ever-present — and ever-growing — societal division. When an Islamist and a white nationalist commit similar attacks against the public with only the Islamist labeled a terrorist, a societal conception begins to form: If only Islamists can be terrorists, then Islam, and by extension all Muslims, should be feared.

This alienation of Muslims encourages discrimination and attacks against their community, which then becomes another contributing factor in . Moreover, by not characterizing the white nationalist attacks as terrorism, our society focuses on condemning the individual rather than the . This allows white nationalist ideas to become increasingly mainstream.

Additionally, the ambiguous definition of terrorism, and the lack of an international definition, allows for government overreach. In 2018 alone, the , accusing many of them of supporting or being affiliated with terrorist groups. However, an examination of many of these cases has lead to the conclusion that the only crime committed by these journalists was criticizing the government or on the enemies of the state, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party and the Gulen movement. Led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, the Turkish government has interpreted its , which includes any acts done by members of an organization with the intent of “changing the characteristics of the Republic,” to suit its own means.

However, this interpretation has been heavily criticized by the international community, with Turkey being increasingly viewed as an authoritarian state by both foreign governments and civil society. Moreover, multiple countries, including and the , have refused to extradite individuals charged with terrorism offenses by Ankara. These examples prove that sometimes the ambiguous definition can be beneficial.

Potential Abuse

The complexity of terrorism necessitates a , as an incredibly specific interpretation would inevitably be too narrow to address the entire spectrum of the phenomena. However, a broad definition would allow for the potential over-designation of groups or individuals as terrorist. The difference between the potential abuse of power and what Turkey is already doing is that such a characterization, regardless of how prejudiced, would be justifiable. Governments could silence, or at the very least mitigate, criticism by pointing to the justification of the definition, thereby allowing governments more control in shaping public perception.

Additionally, an international definition of terrorism would have legal implications, making it potentially more difficult for countries to refuse extradition requests that fall under the purview of the definition.

The potential misuse of an international definition to justify government actions, harness public opinion and obligate the international community is particularly problematic because citizens around the world have ceded immense powers to their governments for the purpose of dealing with terrorist threats. The , , , the and all possess expansive counterterrorism legislation. These laws allow, among other things, , and even for the executive branch to use all “” against terrorist groups that meet a certain criteria.

This is an immense level of power with few constraints, one of which is the international community and civil society’s ability to offer government oversight through criticism and opposition to unfounded terrorism designations. Rather than enabling this oversight, however, an international definition of terrorism would encourage government overreach and facilitate possible abuse of power. A broad definition creates the potential for mischaracterization and manipulation while simultaneously allowing governments the privilege of justification. By any measurement, this is an ominous pairing.

While leaving terrorism undefined contributes to misunderstanding and hate, it also allows for dialogue and dissent. A more concrete understanding of terrorism is undoubtedly desirable. Yet when the letter of the law will inevitably be manipulated, it is safer to trust in ambiguity.

*[Young Professionals in Foreign Policy is a of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post We May Be Better Off Without a Clear Definition of Terrorism appeared first on 51�Թ�.

On February 1, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that, due to the Russian development of an intermediate-range cruise missile system, the United States was immediately suspending its obligations to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, planning a full withdrawal from the agreement within six months. This move has been widely opposed, most recently by the House Appropriations Committee. The committee released a budget on May 20, stating its intent not to fund any research or development systems that would violate the restrictions of the INF Treaty.

However, this opposition may be misplaced, as the Trump administration’s choice to withdraw from the treaty was justified. What is concerning, however, is how they did it.

The INF Treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 1987, eliminated both countries’ arsenals of short and intermediate-range missiles, highlighting its importance as key bilateral agreement between the biggest nuclear powers. Due to the treaty’s importance, many critics of the withdrawal contend that the United States is actively endangering global nuclear stability and arms control efforts. However, these critics are disregarding one fact: Russia has been cheating.

The United States has known that Russia was developing intermediate-range missiles prohibited by the INF Treaty since 2013. The Obama administration actively pursued diplomatic means to return Russia to compliance, including a 2014 public that Russia was in violation of the INF Treaty. These diplomatic efforts continued through 2018, to no avail.

While the United States was motivated to pull out of the agreement because of Russia’s noncompliance, it should also be noted that the INF Treaty had significant flaws. As the treaty was bilateral, it only addressed Russian and American intermediate-range land missiles, but had no authority over other nuclear powers. While China was happy with that arrangement, the rest of the world had every reason not to be.

Yet even in the context of this flaw and Russia’s noncompliance, critics still contend that a broken treaty is better than no treaty, which is simply not true. By allowing Russia to remain party to a treaty that it was blatantly disregarding, the United States was implicitly suggesting that signing the correct agreements is more important than following those agreements. Such a message jeopardizes international stability far more than the withdrawal from an individual treaty.

For instance, the United States and Russia are party to the New START treaty, which limits the number of deployed strategic warheads held by either country. Prior to the United States pulling out of the INF Treaty, it was plausible that Russia believed it could also violate the New START treaty without suffering repercussions. Unfortunately, the opportunity to communicate this narrative was not seized upon by the Trump administration.

As Brookings’ author Frank A. Rose recently , when the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty, its ultimate objective should have been to place the blame for the failed treaty firmly on Russia. A strategic approach, similar to the US denouncement of Russian violations in 2014, should have preceded any talk of withdrawing from the treaty. This messaging would have focused the attention of the international community on Russian violations, ultimately making the withdrawal announcement a seemingly rational final step.

Moreover, the United States’ allies should have been at the very least informed of the administration’s intentions before any announcement was made. Not only is that a common courtesy, but it would also have provided those allies the opportunity to prepare unified statements denouncing Russian actions. Instead, President Donald Trump, after a campaign rally in Nevada in October 2018, publicly about his plan to withdraw from the INF Treaty without first notifying America’s allies. International attention then immediately focused on how the United States was going to end the treaty rather than why it was going to end.

By not laying the proper groundwork, the United States lost control of the narrative. To many, controlling the narrative may seem inconsequential given that the treaty was between the United States and Russia. Russia now understands that violating a treaty with the United States has consequences. But despite this understanding, the perspective of the international community matters.

In the 21st century, interstate competition is most commonly found in the gray zone between diplomatic interactions and direct military conflict. According to US Navy Captain (ret) Philip Kapusta’s white paper, “,” this competition is characterized by challenges that are aggressive, ambiguous and perspective-dependent. Due to these characteristics, effective operations in the gray zone often require actors to construct favorable narratives. The stronger the narrative, the greater the ability to dictate international and local support, direct public outrage and define the very conflict itself.

Controlling the narrative not only applies to the nuclear political paradigm, but it has also become equally as important as the decision-making pertaining to the treaties themselves. Inherent in the ability to construct new treaties and maneuver other nuclear powers into entering those treaties is the ability to control international opinion. If the United States wants to continue providing the benchmark for global nuclear stability, then it must embrace two points of understanding — namely, that there exist repercussions for not only violating treaties, but also for not controlling the narrative.

*[Young Professionals in Foreign Policy is a partner institution of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Leaving the INF Treaty Wasn’t the Problem — It’s How We Did It appeared first on 51�Թ�.