In Brazil, the Rousseff administration has lost its signs of life. It cannot pass anything in Congress, and it doesn’t do much to stop the crisis it creates. It is a paralyzed government. Politically, however, President Dilma Rousseff is not giving up. With fellow members of the Workers’ Party, she talks with a level of aggressiveness that exposes how wounded she and her government actually are.

These actions, , give us a glance into what the reaction of her allies would be to a hypothetical removal from office. But everyone realizes, even within the government, that the time bomb is already ticking.

“Dilma Rousseff’s government is like an ice cream cone under the sun—its meltdown is only a matter of time,” says José Eduardo Faria, a professor at the University of São Paulo.

Rousseff, the Workers’ Party and its biggest leader, former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, are trying to create a narrative to save themselves. They call the impeachment process an illegal coup by the elites and the media, something upon which even historical allies have disagreed (on the merit and tone they’ve employed). History will decide which version of the facts is more consistent. But the truth is that public opinion doesn’t seem to care about Rousseff’s side. The streets, the polls and the majority are all anti-government. Congressmen are, of course, sensitive to that.

We cannot yet predict what a hypothetical post-Rousseff era would look like because it’s too soon. But the current scenario agitates the citizens, pundits, politicians and investors who want to anticipate the future.

Enter the VP

If the president is impeached by Congress, then her vice president, Michel Temer, gets the nod. And then what? Would this move turn the storm into a clear blue sky? Would the crisis end and the economy get back on track?

In politics, trying to predict the future is an effort as uncertain as it is potentially useless. But there are some things we can speculate upon. Temer would take office against his administration, the entire Workers’ Party apparatus—unions, social movements and corporations that flourished under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. The new president would have an opposition capable of mobilization, with deep knowledge of public administration and the quid pro quos of politics. At the very least, they would be a big nuisance.

Besides, Temer would start his government under the deep influence of Operation Car Wash. It is not likely that Federal Judge Sérgio Moro and the federal prosecutors involved in this investigation would tread lightly with the new government. The investigators seem to be acting strategically, adapting their efforts to the current political reality, but that doesn’t mean they would become less strict. A gesture of amnesty is not in the style of these agents. It would demoralize the entire investigation and the careers of each individual involved.

Dilma Rousseff © Shutterstock

We can be as critical of the Workers’ Party as we want, but it would be naive, ignorant or even flat-out dishonest to imagine that a substitution for Temer’s Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) would moralize our political establishment in any way. Both parties are proof of a deeper problem: The existence of an “illegal and illegitimate system of campaign funding,” according to a statement from Odebrecht, a company involved in the car wash scandal. Odebrecht knows what it is talking about, because a .

It does not seem at all probable that the people who took to the streets on March 13 asking for Rousseff’s impeachment would do the same to go against the Workers’ Party opposition to Temer. Even less because Temer would have to kick off his government with deep austerity measures—something that would cause an even worse short-term recession and be highly unpopular with the public.

These factors indicate that there might be no solution for Temer either. The current crisis could grow worse and be dragged out longer, and a way out of this labyrinth has yet to be pointed out. But there is a window of opportunity for Temer: the economy.

If the PMDB brings no moral relief compared to the Workers’ Party, it is true that the party is more gifted at making the public machine run smoothly. The party can easily operate in Congress, especially after an impeachment, which would give them a myriad of state-run companies to offer in exchange of parliamentary support. Profiting from the opportunism of his allies, Temer could approve a minimal agenda to awaken the optimism of the markets: new taxes, pension reforms, austerity measures.

It would be a “shock of expectations,” which would rapidly increase the value of Brazilian companies and the Brazilian real, the country’s currency. A feel-good sensation would be there, even if it is artificial. A few long-term projects to create a better business environment, attack infrastructure problems and productivity issues could also create euphoria. With this logic, we can anticipate a wide plan of privatization.

Is This Enough?

All of this (or only this) may not be enough. Controlling inflation, increasing the average revenue of people and especially decreasing the unemployment rate are all more vital and urgent problems than the stock market. Social assistance, our health system, public safety and education are also more important. But there is no fiscal space for these issues. And that means that the new government would be tested not only on its ability to run a massive state, but to negotiate with different sectors and convince them to accept inevitable losses. Communication and persuasion will be more necessary than ever.

However, this all depends on a Congress that is just not willing to take political hits. That is especially true during an election year like 2016, since every party will try to capture as many mayoral offices as possible. Also, two of Temer’s allies, House Speaker Eduardo Cunha and Senate President Renan Calheiros, may not be in office due to corruption charges. With the political system we have, it is hard to create the economy we need.

The fall of the Workers’ Party may give some breathing room to our political establishment. But its dysfunctions are evident and apparently irredeemable. To be able to run an economy adapted to Brazil’s needs, Temer will have to do exactly what Dilma Rousseff has refused to: battle the establishment and push for political reform.

Temer is a master of this system—and a result of it. Will he have the grandeur, will and courage to do that? He would kick off his administration with the opposition of everyone who supports the current government, but if he refuses to change the system himself, he may face the fury of the millions who asked for the head of President Rousseff—who might be even more infuriated by the .

The vice president is already acting like a future incumbent. Will he be able to unify the country and act against the very system that put him in his current position? Only history will tell.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner institution of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In , two cars drive on a highway in opposite directions. When crossing each other, one of the drivers frantically flashes the headlights. This is a scenario that nearly every will understand: It means that police are ahead. The message is something along the lines of: “In the next few minutes, it is imperative that you do not exceed the speed limit.” The general feeling is that the police are not there to ensure everyone’s safety, but rather serve as a nuisance.

On social media, I interact with roughly 6,000 friends and followers—whatever that means. It’s a way for me to observe the variety of social archetypes in the world. Intolerance and fury are abundant. Social media users serve as virtual watchdogs, monitoring the scandals of the current government. In principle, such harshness toward corruption is a good thing. But I try to invite them to reflect on their own behavior. Do they flash their headlights on the highway?

There is also a group of people who argue that if other governments and parties have done their share of wrong, then everything done by the current administration should be pardoned. If nobody was punished before, why start now? They want the same harshness—or lack thereof—but they forget that time doesn’t go backward. Their line of reasoning makes no sense either. One cannot justify a murder, for example, because Jack the Ripper came before them. In this profound relativism of wrongdoing lies an undeniable confession of guilt.

Where Does Corruption Stem From?

In the first document produced in Brazil, Pêro Vaz de Caminha, a Portuguese knight, announced to King Manuel I of Portugal the discovery of new land. He seized the opportunity to address the monarch and asked for a pardon of his son-in-law, who had been banished to Africa. Political patronage was present from the very beginning of Brazilian history. It came from the colonizing country. There was also strong corporatism, giving more participation in decision-making to certain interest groups than to others.

But historic fatalism cannot explain or justify the levels of corruption we see in Brazil. Unfortunately, corruption has become a much more complex phenomenon, and public indignation could grow. It is also much less acceptable than moral relativists would like everyone to believe. There are, of course, cultural roots that help explain corruption in Brazil. However, nowadays these reasons are mixed with deep structural issues.

© Shutterstock

First, it is necessary to understand the vicious cycle that rules our society: People do not trust Brazilian institutions, and without that trust, institutions match citizens’ worst expectations. There is nothing to improve when there is no hope of improvement. Cruel intentions and general inefficiency become the rule rather than the exception.

In his book, , Norwegian social and political theorist Jon Elster once said: “Institutions keep society from falling apart, provided that there is something to keep institutions from falling apart.” In Brazil, there is little to keep institutions from falling apart.

On the highway, one driver warns another about the police because he doesn’t trust law enforcement, and there are legitimate reasons not to. Facing the inevitable interaction with the policemen ahead, the other driver has already internalized the strong possibility of having to bribe the officers. It is as natural as perverse. Corruption becomes an element of daily life, and nobody seems to realize how it contributes to broader problems.

Although not a general rule, corruption on an individual level is generally more tolerated even when people despise corruption in others. It’s as if those corruption cases reported by media were the only kind to exist, but they’re not. As for the policeman, why would he act in another way if the “system” is already like that—especially if he’s labeled a corrupt officer anyway? And if the people above him do the same thing, then why are his actions so bad?

In a way, this is what has happened to our political system. Of course, there are honorable people who work in Brazilian politics. But as time has gone by, political patronage has become a natural part of it. When the special assembly wrote a new constitution in the 1980s, politicians established what we refer to as the “Saint Francis logic”—for it is giving that we receive. The relationship between the government and congress became just that.

In every political system, it is admitted that the use of some “grease” is needed to lubricate the engines of power. But in Brazil, the system has a destructive appetite. And the excess of that “grease” threatens to make the system completely collapse. The incorporation of political patronage gave birth to a perverse order where clientelism is the rule and all kinds of schemes are admitted, affecting Brazilian society as a whole.

The Ruling Party

To accept that “it has always been like this” is ultimately admitting that “it will always be like this.” It is a mistake to share that atavistic belief, because believing this defines how politics works and how the economy is managed. Over the past decade, this is exactly what has happened in Brazil.

The Worker’s Party did not invent corruption, but it has incorporated it in some aspects of governance. It is regrettable that party members have built on corruption to the point of perfection. The distribution of executive jobs in state-owned companies and the corruption of public bid processes were treated as natural. There is no ideological program anymore, if there ever was one. Realpolitik has become natural.

But there is a limit to everything. After all, the excessive use of a product can damage it. We cannot say with precision what really happened in terms of corruption in past administrations. When it’s carried out well, corruption is not particularly noticeable. But it does beg the question: Why did the Worker’s Party not investigate and punish the crimes its predecessors committed? After 14 years in office, the ruling party has exhausted both itself and the system. It has not done anything to reinforce the limits of what we can call “acceptable”—it has actually surpassed them.

The biggest mistake the party made was letting itself become engulfed by the idea that corruption is a natural nuisance. It did not push for much-needed reforms that could have led to the cultural transformation the party always called for. If the Worker’s Party was once the moralist of Brazilian politics, it now claims to be a victim of false moralists. The whip its leaders once held now seems too harsh to endure.

The removal of President Dilma Rousseff and her party from office would not put an end to corruption in Brazil. We must stop looking at corruption as something natural. That deafening demand becomes harder and harder to ignore. Neither radicalization, nor relativism can contribute to cultural change. We must have new, reformist leaders. The problem is that those leaders have not yet appeared. But maybe they’re out there, not knowing why other drivers are flashing their headlights.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner institution of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: ��/ ��/

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your  is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a .

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