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On March 10, Dbeibeh presented his cabinet to members of parliament and won the confidence of 132 deputies out of the 133 who attended the session in Sirte. The internationally recognized national unity government based in Tobruk was subsequently in, but it faces many challenges. These include political, military, economic, and social and human rights issues.

Political Challenges

Dbeibeh is a businessman-turned-politician from Misrata, a port city that is around 200 kilometers to the east of Tripoli, the Libyan capital. During his time in business, he was involved in political circles as a trusted person of the ruling Arab Socialist Union. In 2007, Muammar Gaddafi, the ruler of Libya at the time, charged Dbeibeh with the task of running the state-owned Libyan Investment and Development Company (LIDCO). The firm was responsible for some of the country’s biggest public works projects. After the Libyan revolution of 2011, which led to the overthrow and subsequent death of Gaddafi, the Libya al-Mustakbal (Libya Future) movement was founded by Dbeibeh.

The prime minister has succeeded in forming a broad-based coalition government that has brought together representatives of most stakeholders from the political, regional and tribal scenes in Libya. Dbeibeh crystallized a state of relative consensus between the different parties that have lived during a state of dissonance and a raging power struggle. This culminated in Major General Khalifa Haftar’s of war on Tripoli in April 2019. Haftar’s heavy losses, his failed coup against civilian rule, the suffering of Libyans from war and their forced displacement pushed the bickering parties to negotiate and reach a political agreement. This deal was endorsed by the United Nations mission, under the pressure of countries such as the United States, Germany, Britain and Italy. The formation of the new Libyan government is based on a fragile consensus dictated by necessity. The sustainability of this is a challenge in itself, requiring a high degree of governmental harmony and solidarity.

Dbeibeh’s team now faces the challenge of bridging the gap between the various actors on Libya’s political scene and bringing them together under a single banner. This national project entails the extension of state sovereignty over the whole of Libyan territory and the consolidation of civil peace, taking into account public interest. The new government is also required to implement the drawn up by the LPDF. Most importantly, this includes the unification of sovereign institutions to elect new leaders to manage the transitional phase. It also involves creating conditions for organizing legislative and presidential elections at the end of the year.

The formation of the national unity government represented a historic moment that was the result of talks between the most prominent political actors in Libya. It served as a political solution to the Libyan crisis and a transition from a situation of war to one of peace.

Despite the peaceful transition of power from Fayez al-Sarraj, the prime minister under the Government of National Accord (GNA), to Dbeibeh, some political figures have not fully grasped the scope of change taking place in Libya. Instead, they have resisted the shifts in government to preserve their influence and personal and factional interests.

An example of this is the case of Aguila Saleh Issa, the speaker of parliament and president of the House of Representatives (HOR). Issa was expected to vacate his role, as decided by the forum, to allow a new figure from the south to be head of the legislative body. The aim is to create a balance between the different regions of Libya. Yet the speaker has clung on to his position.

Issa has a long history of obstructing the path for a peaceful settlement to the Libyan crisis. In 2016, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions against him. He was accused of being “complicit in, actions or policies that obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose a significant risk of obstructing, undermining, delaying, or impeding, the adoption of or political transition to the GNA.” In addition to this, parliament remained divided and suspended during his term and only met on rare occasions.

Military Challenges

On the military front, the UN Security Council has called on all parties to abide by the agreed in Geneva under the UN in October 2020. Yet in March this year, a UN report that the arms embargo in Libya is “totally ineffective.” The Geneva agreement a 90-day deadline for foreign mercenaries to leave the country. The stated period has since passed, but Libya is still teeming with local and international armed groups.

This complex situation poses a major challenge to the national unity government. Officials are primarily concerned with forcing all parties to respect the ceasefire and stop the imports of weapons by land, sea and air. In addition to this, millions of weapons — or stolen — are handled illegally in Libya.

The state needs to regain its authority and have a monopoly on the use of weapons. This requires forcing the armed brigades in the east and west to hand over their equipment to the Ministries of Defense and Interior. This approach calls for dissolving Libyan militias, draining their sources of funding, rehabilitating their members and reintegrating them into official security and defense structures. This includes institutions such as the police, army, civil protection or border control, which have specific laws and codes of conduct and a clear hierarchy subject to civilian leadership.

The government will likely face resistance from armed groups. The brigades loyal to General Haftar, who considers himself above the state and does not accept the command of civilian leadership, will present a particular challenge.

Mercenaries also pose a risk. There are an 20,000 foreign fighters in Libya, according to former UN Envoy Stephanie Williams. Most of them are stationed in the east of Libya and in the oil crescent, a coastal area that hosts most of the country’s oil export terminals. The fighters include Sudanese, Chadian, Syrian and nationals earning high salaries.

Their deportation presents a further challenge because the groups are part of a network of power relations other countries. Russia, Turkey, Egypt and France have used fighters and technical experts as bargaining chips to ensure their share of reconstruction projects and natural resources in Libya. The Libyan government needs to create a situation where locals reject the presence of mercenaries and put pressure on them to leave.

The support of the European Union, the United States and Britain is also important. Such global powers must intensify diplomatic and field efforts on these armed groups to surrender their positions and weapons to the Libyan government. If this can be achieved in a manner that guarantees the sustainability of peace and stability, foreign investors might view Libya as a safe country for commercial and economic activity.

Economic, Social and Human Rights Challenges

The Dbeibeh government has inherited an economy that has been weakened by war and financial and administrative corruption. The economy has been severely affected by the deliberate halting of oil production and export by and militias loyal to Haftar. It has also been impacted by depleted parallel institutions and informal trade as well as the smuggling of fuel and other basic materials. “Due to the closure of oil wells and restrictions put by pro-Haftar armed groups, the Libyan economy suffered a loss of $5 billion in January 2020,” Mucahit Aydemir . “From 2016-2019, the country has already lost more than $100 billion, as Ibrahim Cadran, an Haftar ally interrupted the oil excavation in the east of the country.”

It is assumed that the national unity government will set an audited public budget and liberate oil fields from foreign, tribal or militia domination. The interim leaders should also seek to restore the export of oil, the country’s primary source of income. Undertaking these urgent, necessary reforms will allow the provision of cash liquidity, secure salaries and help the Libyan dinar (LD) recover, if only relatively. According to the World Bank, the dinar “continues to suffer in the parallel market because of political uncertainties and macroeconomic instability. In the first two quarters of 2020, the LD in the parallel market lost 54 percent of its value.”

On the social and human rights front, it is imperative for the new government to provide citizens with essential services, such as clean water, electricity, gas, medicine and basic foodstuffs, and to fight the wastage of public money and increasing prices. In March, UN Special Envoy Jan Kubis said the “country is facing an acute electricity crisis this summer and there are risks to its water security as well.” He added that “UN agencies estimate that over 4 million people, including 1.5 million children, may face being denied access to clean water and sanitation if immediate solutions are not found and implemented.”

In addition, the coronavirus was confirmed to have spread to Libya on March 24, 2020, when the first case was reported in Tripoli. Libya is vulnerable to the effects of the pandemic due to the impact of the last civil war, which led to a dire humanitarian situation and the destruction of the country’s . In April, Libya launched its vaccination program against COVID-19, but, as with most countries in Africa, the supplies of doses remain low. At the time of publishing, the country had more than 195,000 infections and over 3,200 deaths.

In light of risks to the country’s health care, an effective strategy must be implemented to combat COVID-19. This must take into account sufficient steps to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, import the necessary number of vaccine doses and guarantee access to health services for those suffering from the COVID-19 disease.

It is also important for authorities to release political prisoners, deal with cases of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and end for those committing crimes. Those forcibly displaced during the civil war must also be allowed to return to their homes and resume their professional lives in a safe environment. The building blocks for a project of transitional justice as a prelude to a practical, inclusive and fair system of reconciliation must also be pursued.

The time available to the Dbeibeh government is limited and the challenges it faces are plenty. But this should not prevent the interim administration from being able to introduce changes and pave the way for political, economic and human rights reform. However, this will be possible only if officials are united and cooperate to serve the public and if international support continues for the national unity government. Most importantly, to succeed, the government will need the support of Libyans themselves.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Libyan Government Faces Numerous Challenges appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Tunisia commemorated the 10^th anniversary of the revolution with violent youth alongside peaceful demonstrations in major cities like Tunis, Sousse and Nabeul, and inland cities of Siliana, Kasserine and Kairouan. The protesters employment and comprehensive development. They expressed their discontent with high prices, monopolies and the deterioration of the purchasing power of citizens. There was also consternation about the increasing number of and the mishandling of the pandemic.

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The reality is that the demands for employment are stagnating, ending the isolation of marginalized areas is still a distant dream, and achieving transitional justice is at a stalemate. While the population of Tunisia suffers, many members of the former regime who opposed the revolutionary struggle are still there at the forefront of the media, clinging to impunity.

The Youth Unemployment Problem

Tunisia has not yet succeeded in developing effective solutions to the unemployment problem that first sparked protests in December 2010. According to the , the unemployment rate in the country during the third quarter of 2020 was 16.2% of the total active population, translating to approximately 6,766,000 people. This figure includes no fewer than 225,000 university graduates, with the rate rising to between 30% and 40% in several inland governorates.

The youth population in Tunisia is the most vulnerable to joblessness. The latest field survey on employment by the National Institute of Statistics showed that around 70% of all those unemployed are below 30 years of age. Unemployment is effectively marginalizing youth in Tunisia and is among the main reasons behind both the 2010 revolution and the current protests. The continuing absence of employment opportunities for young people, the spread of favoritism among government and business elites, the rampant administrative and financial and nepotism resulted in a perception of injustice that fueled discontent among many of those who have been unemployed for a long time.

While some impacted by the unemployment crisis attend sit-ins or demonstrate, others risk death on the high seas in search of work that guarantees dignity. In 2020, nearly 10,000 Tunisians in Europe illegally. According to Romdhane Ben Amor, spokesman for the Tunisian Economic and Social Rights Forum, between 150 and 200 families have left Tunisia to Europe clandestinely over the last year, evading the Tunisian coast guard.

A report by the forum that “most of the illegal immigrants, aged between 18 and 30, share a fundamental characteristic as they lived the ‘school failure experience’ through early drop-out. They refer such drop-out to several reasons ranging from economic difficulties, and reluctance to continue to study, because the school, in their view, is no longer useful in light of the high unemployment of high-ranking people.” In addition, many who give up hope either take the path of or get involved with international .

There is an urgent need to develop aimed at empowering youth in the labor market. This is possible through the development of educational programs, vocational services and training courses to enhance the social investment role of the state by creating new productive projects directed at the domestic or foreign consumer market that would create jobs for the young.

Marginalized Regions Remain Isolated

A decade after the revolution, the inland and remote governorates have not yet gotten their share of comprehensive development. Rather, they are still suffering from marginalization, the ravages of high rates of illiteracy, poverty, unemployment and school dropouts. They lack basic facilities such as infrastructure, health services and educational institutions even though the new constitution stipulates the necessity of implementing a policy of positive discrimination concerning these underprivileged areas. It is not known where the financial allocations and in-kind assistance that the successive governments, the European Union and the Gulf states have to those governorates have gone.

It is worth noting that, to the European Commission, “Since 2011, EU assistance to Tunisia has amounted to almost €3 billion (over €2 billion in grants and €800 million in macro-financial assistance).” With an average of €300 million ($360 million) per year between 2017 and 2020, these funds go toward the “Promoting good governance and the rule of law,” “stimulating a sustainable economic growth generating employment” and “Reinforcing social cohesion between generations and regions.” It is likely that these marginalized areas suffer locally from financial corruption and administrative misbehavior and are dominated by bureaucratic lobbies. Such underprivileged areas are often exploited politically by party and trade union elements to serve as a reservoir of popular protest against government policies.

Likewise, ruling parties only pay attention to these marginalized regions during election campaigns. This has made the residents suffer the brunt of inequality and injustice. It leaves them with a difficult choice: to continue staying in neglected regions despite dire conditions or to leave their lands for major cities or to board migration boats to Europe. There is a definite need to the living conditions of the inhabitants of these regions, to provide them with resources for a decent living, to encourage greater investment in these regions and to revive the spirit of citizenship that will help regain confidence in the state.

No Truth or Dignity

In another context, the demand for justice for the that the revolutionaries called for back in 2010 has not yet been fulfilled in an atmosphere where the transitional justice process is still stumbling. This includes the many obstacles that the Truth and Dignity Commission, which carries the mandate of investigating human rights abuses by the state, has faced — a lack of cooperation from state agencies and executive institutions being one of them. Observers have noticed that the perpetrators of violations did not attend the hearings and did not respond to lawsuits by judicial departments.

This failure reinforces the culture of impunity and intensifies the suffering of the victims of the of President Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987) and his successor, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011). The state must make use of its to bring to justice the perpetrators, apologize to the victims and authorize reparations for their material and mental suffering so that they can resume their lives as part of the Second Republic.

It is true that the revolution has, to some extent, removed the fear of the government and led to a decline in repression and the power of the president, the censors and the police. Critics were also released, the culture of protest spread, politics became a public affair and governance an ordinary exercise in which competing parties maintained an atmosphere of peace and democracy, with no single party having a monopoly.

However, it is evident that some of the revolution’s goals have not been implemented. What is required is to make those goals not just promises and slogans, but a reality. The need of the hour for Tunisia is to further reform the judicial and government systems, ensure decentralization and comprehensive development to win citizens’ trust in the state, the revolution and the project of democratization.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Tunisia: The Pending Goals of the Revolution appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The proliferation of terrorist attacks like the Bardo Museum incident in March have put pressure on  authorities. Terrorism has moved from the mountains and border zones to urban areas. Instead of targeting security forces and the military, these attacks now focus on politicians and .

With this radical shift in terrorist strategy, a host of intellectuals, journalists and security specialists, along with many Tunisian nationals, have called for a prompt of the Anti-Terrorism Law, which was previously introduced by the regime of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in 2003. The heated over this law, which Ben Ali exploited to liquidate and crush political opponents, was sparked shortly after the tragic attack on the Bardo National Museum, which caused 22 deaths.

There have been relatively minor amendments to the law after the 2011 revolution. Observers expect the law in its latest version to be presented in front of parliament for ratification, having been approved by the council of ministers on April 8.

Supporters of the Counter-Terrorism Act consider the new legislation to be a guarantee for enforcing the authority of the state and affirming its determination to fight terrorism. They believe this law can remarkably reduce the number of Tunisians affiliated with extremist , as it consists of harsh punitive sanctions that leave anyone suspected of terrorism with no leeway to escape punishment.

Key sections of the law include Chapter 11: “Whoever intentionally disrupts in any manner whatsoever the normal operations and the smooth running of military institutions and establishments shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three years and a fine of 15,000 dinars.” Another important section is enshrined in Chapter 14: “Whoever participates, among unarmed assemblies, in any attack on the institutions and establishments of the armed forces shall be punished by imprisonment for ten years and a fine of 50,000 dinars. The penalty is doubled for whoever carries a hidden or a wholly or partially visible weapon.”

Supporters also see the Counter-Terrorism Act as a way to enable security officers to take the initiative in tracking, chasing and gunning down suspects in case of non-compliance with the orders of the police and armed forces. It will allow authorities to confiscate money and property of individuals, groups, associations, charitable organizations or citizens who are suspected of having any affiliation with groups labeled as extremist.

During the term of former acting-Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, and during the reign of incumbent Prime Minister Habib Essid, a large number of nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private educational institutions, Islamic kindergartens and media outlets were dissolved on the grounds that they incited terrorism, contributed to the dissemination of extremist ideas or provided logistical support to terrorists. Their funds and assets were seized not following a decision announced by an official court, but according to the provisions of a issued by a “crisis cell” composed of Prime Minister Essid and the ministers of interior, defense, foreign affairs and justice.

Further adding to the ambiguity of the Anti-Terrorism Law are paradoxical declarations by Tunisian officials. Minister of Justice Mohammed Salah Ben Aissa told ����-����������������-��������� on March 14 that the “anti-terrorism law safeguards freedoms” and is consistent with the protection of . However, Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi after the bloody terrorist attack on the Bardo Museum that “freedom ends when terrorism begins.”

Such an assertion has raised concern among observers and human rights activists. Analysts argue that President Essebsi’s speech the endeavor of Tunisia’s ruling regime to limit freedoms in its fight against terrorism, thus giving precedence to security over human rights in this difficult transitional phase. Justifiably, fears are heightened when one recognizes the implications of the new Anti-Terrorism Law.

The draft law provides victims of  with guarantees of compensation, thereby entitling them to free health care. However, it also includes a number of gaps and flaws. It enables the government to crack down on public and personal freedoms—such as freedom of belief, opinion and expression through, among other things, censorship on Facebook and bank accounts—while disregarding the requirements for fair trials of suspects. The new law, by giving priority to security measures, legitimizes tightening control over the personal data of Tunisian citizens through strategies such as wire-tapping, surveillance of electronic correspondence and monitoring online social networks. One of its other aims is to prevent access to terrorist-related websites on cellphones.

The draft of the new law does not include sufficient judicial control procedures that enable the judiciary to check and counterbalance the executive branch and its security agencies through supervision. It seems the government’s agenda is to expand the powers of security officers in dealing with the problem of terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism Law, as it stands, gives judges exceptionally broad powers, enabling them to order non-public trials, restrict the presence of lawyers and bar the presence of the media or human rights organizations.

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Lack of Definition

The crux of the in the draft of the Anti-Terrorism Law lies in the fact that it does not supply a specific and conceptually clear definition of “terrorism.” Its definition of terrorism as “each individual or collective project that aims, by its very nature or context, to spread terror” is broad. It serves to legitimize strict state control over the public sphere, making it possible for the government to crack down on the right to protest.

Particularly worrying is that Article 13 of the law considers “damaging public and private property or public facilities and disrupting transportation” to be terrorist offenses. This provision redefines, albeit indirectly, any popular protest action such as demonstrations. Sit-ins in public squares, streets and roads—as forms of protest against the country’s economic or social policies—become instances of terrorist acts endangering public good and threats to social peace and national security. In this draft law, it is viable to find the seeds of future power abuse that will culminate in cracking down on the freedom of assembly and protest, and in the containment of citizens in public life.

In this critical period of Tunisia’s from a dictatorship to a democracy, the Anti-Terrorism Law draws legitimacy from a variety of factors. The security of the country and regional concerns in North Africa—due to the in Libya, the rising tension at the border with Algeria and fear of the Islamic State’s in Tunisia—explain the siren call for the ratification of the Counter-Terrorism Act.

But the law in its entirety must be to the new developments that have changed the status of human rights in Tunisia since the 2011 . To defend the argument of “safety and security” to the exclusion of the fundamental rights of citizens is dangerous, because it may lead to a new conflict between the state and citizens and to a strained relationship between citizens, the police and security officers.

The ratification of the Counter-Terrorism Act, without introducing crucial revisions, may lead Tunisians to live once again under the tightened grip of a repressive police state. It is true that counterterrorism is essential in order to ensure public safety. But in order to succeed, it requires awareness-raising over the dangers of extremism, a reform of security policy, the education and training of police officers and a restructuring of the armed forces.

Extremism cannot be completely eradicated by simply enacting punitive laws. Successful counterterrorism measures also entail a diagnosis of the reasons behind extremism. Fundamentally, such initiatives should involve the adoption of cultural, psychological, educational, social and economic policies to effectively deal with extremists.

The main concern for Tunisia is how to guarantee security while avoiding any attempt to jeopardize the country’s newly gained civil liberties. Therefore, in reviewing the articles of the law,  must give the fight against terrorism the importance it is due, but without violating human rights.

The Tunisian citizen of today is what we might call a parody of the Cartesian argument: “I think, therefore I am.” Unlike 2010, Tunisians of 2015 are more likely to hold a placard that states: “I am a citizen, therefore I am free. I am free, therefore, I am.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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