On March 15, a United Nations (UN) report confirmed that Israel’s policies in Palestine constitute an “” and supported the calls for boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) to end the status quo.

BDS is an international campaign calling for the implementation of economic, political, cultural and academic pressure on Israel to comply with international law and, more precisely, achieve three objectives: an end of the occupation and the colonization of Arab lands, complete equality for Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, and respect for Palestinian refugees’ right of return.

Such sanctions exerted on the international level by individuals, celebrities (such as ), associations, and political parties would aim at Israeli goods produced in occupied territory (such as ), a boycott of international companies present in Israel () and Israeli participation in .

According to the BDS objectives, two main conceptions exist: the end of occupation and the end, because of its intrinsic racism, of the Zionist project.

Polemics have arisen around the debate questioning the link between anti-Zionism or anti-Semitism on the basis of such actions. Concerns have also been expressed about the campaign’s final objective, which can lead not only to the de-legitimization of Israeli policies toward the occupation, but the de-legitimization of the entire . As the movement targets Israel as a whole — including institutions or companies that are not related to the occupation — this final aim of BDS is seen as anti-Semitic. It is notably based on the assumption that it is considered a crime in to be pro-BDS as it is an act “inciting hate or discrimination.”

Among the many institutions and sectors that BDS targets, one sensitive question remains about the relevance of ending the academic relationship. It seems to be a lose-lose situation to cut bridges between academia by impeding one of the few structures dedicated to dialogue for peace.

Academics and Society

In every role that an academic faces, he or she creates outcomes that impact their immediate community as well as the broader society. The different roles an academic has to play are not necessarily coherent and often lead to a conflict of loyalties between knowledge as an independent discipline or as a tool for state viability and survival.

Members of academic institutions are protected by the liberty of academic freedom, which is defined by  as the “liberty of educational institutions to decide courses and research, and of teachers to teach subjects, without outside coercion.” The right to academic freedom is recognized in order to enable faculty members and students to carry on with their roles while enjoying basic security against repression, job loss, imprisonment or financial sanctions.

When describing the basic requisites of academic ethics, Edward Said explains that an intellectual’s role, particularly when the state is in crisis, should be as a counter-power to the political class. This role is a source of “instability, disagreement, discomfort, and non acceptance of the current realities. He must offer a different perspective, an unwillingness to tolerate that everyone else perceives as necessary and permanent.”

Words and beliefs of intellectuals, particularly in periods of crisis, play a fundamental role in tilting the balance one way or another. Despite Said’s views, others like Martin Kramer, director of the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University, defend the idea that academics should be focusing on creating material useful to the state. The logic behind this is that because the state mostly provides funds for encouraging universities to train students, it is in a position to ask for something in return. The concept of academic “duty” to the state leads to the consideration that scholars could betray it by providing knowledge challenging the existing ground rules. The consequences of such betrayal possibly expose academics to sanctions extending further than just criticism.

No Longer Welcome

Between the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, hundreds of joint projects were held not only between Israel and Palestine, but also other neighboring Arab states. For instance, courses were taught by Palestinians at Israeli universities about Palestinian society, and Israeli lecturers visited areas under the authority of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to promote mutual understanding.

This optimistic period did not survive the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 — very few projects continued to operate, and some planned projects never got off the ground. Despite those examples of cooperation, the general context within both parties has been to avoid fostering relationships.

Internal factors such as peer pressure or self-censorship may explain the inclination of academics to follow an established consensus. Self-censorship that Israeli academics impose on themselves is also related to their dissociation from state policy matters. Israeli sociologist and critical theorist Yehuda Shenhav argues that the involvement of academics in fields that concern politics is a pure and simple act of usurpation exercised against the only legitimate power with authority to draft and negotiate a peace agreement with Palestinians: that is, the Israeli government.

This immunity toward criticism from the academia enjoyed by the Israeli government appears paradoxical. Indeed, it shows a limited conception of Israeli citizens’ political activity as well as of a restricted democracy.

As for the Palestinian side, and despite the fact that academic freedom is supposedly guaranteed by the Palestinian Basic Law, both internal and external factors restrict institutions and individuals from reaching real freedom. In the 1980s, the military governor of the West Bank and Gaza issued the Military Order 854 (MO854), a law subordinating Palestinian universities to regulations concerning student admissions, faculty recruitment, curricula, textbook control and .

Palestinian academic freedom, understood by the Israeli military as the breeding ground of Palestinian nationalism, issued MO854 for “Suppressing that genre of breed, or at least containing it.” The order, regarded as a primarily political imperative, constrained academic freedom from blooming into “a potentially existential threat” — the demand for an .

Academic Restrictions

Such obstacles are also established within and upon Palestinian society. The PA, controlled by the Fatah political party, notably acts to keep control over the sovereignty of the so-called Palestinian leadership through academic restrictions: Gazan students being restricted from reaching West Bank universities, with PA informers controlling teacher discourse.

One famous case concerns , a professor at Birzeit University, who was accused of “insulting Islam” after hanging two cartoons on his office door. He was attacked by the Awareness Bloc, the student arm of the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir), which later demanded the teacher’s expulsion. The university did not show support and succumbed to Hizb al-Tahrir requests.

The PA’s will to annihilate alternative narratives in universities (and most notably the Hamas narrative) even reached material destruction when, in 2006, PA security officers destroyed the computer lab of the Hamas-affiliated Islamic University of Gaza.

Limits to Academic Freedom

Several points have arisen against the BDS of Israeli academic institutions. Among those points is the assumption that Israeli academics are the vanguard of Israeli society against the occupation. Israeli academia, as an independent opposition power enjoying full academic freedom, contributes to the mutual understanding and communication between both sides.

As Professor Izhak Schnell argues: “Research universities in Israel are public. The academic freedom is secured since the government has no control on the universities. We get permanent jobs in a way that our positions cannot be threatened … I believe that Israeli academia is the most critical academia in the world including Western ones.”

To ensure academic freedom, public money is given to an organization controlled by universities themselves: the VATAT. A Hebrew acronym for Planning and Budgeting Committee of the Council for Higher Education, VATAT’s governing body is an independent committee of seven members dedicated to ensuring academic freedom, meeting monthly to decide how to distribute funds to universities.

On the other hand, and even if government funding would mean academic freedom, numerous Israeli academic institutions are funded by private organizations. “In theory,” Professor Elie Podeh affirms, “the privatization of Israeli academia should lead to greater freedom, as these institutions are not being funded by the government.”

Many fail-safe measures are implemented to allow academic freedom in Israel. To that regard, universities are powerful tools for peace, understanding and communication between Israeli and Palestinian society. A boycott of such institutions would lower the odds for true peace and Palestinian self-determination, thus putting the legitimacy of BDS in doubt.

Privatization and Discrimination

Even though privatization diminishes the influence of the state on cultural institutions, it may still represent an obstacle to academic freedom. Indeed, two concepts of academic freedom are to be distinguished. On the one hand, education is a public good and academic freedom allows for the increase of access and production of knowledge for all. On the other hand is the neoliberal conception establishing knowledge as a commodity — education as a service to be privatized and academic freedom as the ability to market knowledge and educational services without government regulation.

There are two key points here.

First, privatization may affect the quality of education and control over academic decisions, as managers would be able to change academic standards. Textbooks may be imposed on faculties and curricula may change with profit-oriented considerations.

Second, privatization could threaten intellectual propriety and job security, as knowledge would become a commodity among a university’s many financial interests. This management of knowledge could lead to low morale among academics.

While Palestinian citizens of Israel constitute more than 20% of the country’s population, of BA students, 4.8% of MA students, 3.2% of PhD students and a mere 1% of the academic staff in Israeli academic institutions are Palestinians. Palestinian applicants are  more likely to be rejected by Israeli academic institutions than their Jewish counterparts. Such discrimination against Palestinians is rampant at Israel’s universities. In 2009, Carmel College caused an uproar when a recorded conversations between officials confirmed that an because too many Palestinian students had enlisted for study there.

Such actions against Palestinians and, on a broader spectrum, individuals that could at some point raise arguments challenging Israeli policies are relatively rare. Discrimination is usually perpetuated through more latent means.

Freedom of expression is recognized by Israeli academics but not necessarily implemented. Events on Israeli campuses betray the national feeling and sensibility over academic notions of universality. When MA graduate refused to sing the national anthem during a graduation ceremony at Technion University, he later received an official letter from the dean warning him not to attend the next ceremony. , a Palestinian citizen and head of the Hebrew University’s Arab Students, refused during the 2008 visit of Shimon Peres to shake the president’s hand and called him a “murderer of children.” Baher was apprehended and detained for more than three hours, his student card confiscated and he was sent to a disciplinary committee.

Militarization of the Academic Sphere

As a consequence of the occupation, jobs related to security domains — from restaurant security guards to large checkpoint supervisors — have tended to multiply among Israeli society as well as being increasingly privatized. This has led private universities to suppress entire fields of knowledge to only focus on training more security officers. On the other hand, the elite also has the opportunity, given its connections with Israeli security agencies, to attend university training for security in prestigious institutes, no matter their field of study.

For example, Tel Aviv University and Hebrew University are in charge of the academic side of Israel’s Army Command and Staff College (PUM), and Zefat College has an exclusive academic program for training members of the Israeli General Security Services. Wingate Institute, a fitness and sport establishment, acts as part of the army training facilities.

However, the relationship Israeli universities have with the military does not only represent an easy avenue for students to enter military institutions. This relationship between those two supposedly independent pillars of society is far more entangled with Israel’s military sharing partnerships, investments and, in some cases, directly controlling Israeli academic institutions.

The Ben Gurion University of Negev (BGU), for instance, actively collaborates with the military establishment of Israel and, therefore, it can be implicated in the occupation and apartheid practices related to .

The silence of Israeli academics on the Palestinian issue translates into reducing democracy to its absolute minimum: periodic representative elections.

BGU is partly founded by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for its Research and Development Authority. After , which resulted in over 1,400 Palestinian deaths in 2008-09 through acts defined by Judge Richard Goldstone as war crimes, BGU offered scholarships and extra tuition to students who served in active combat units. It also offered a special grant for each day of service to students who went on reserve duty, in addition to other benefits.

Along with rewarding Israeli citizens identified as fighters, BGU conducts technological research and development on vehicles and autonomous robotic systems classified with “.” The transfer of knowledge between BGU and the military goes beyond robots and vehicles destined for rescue and transport missions.

Ben Gurion University has an ongoing partnership wi�ٳ���Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., an Israeli company that develops and produces state-of-the-art armaments for the IDF and Israel’s defense system. This partnership involves sharing research projects and technology as well as engaging in .

Finally, this military impact and influence is translated into much more than facilities used for security courses. The Israeli mainstream’s refusal to face the legal and moral aspects of the wars and Palestinian subjugation has led to the belief that high-ranking officers have a moral high ground.

Numerous Israeli universities, therefore, accept those officers in their ranks without any regard for the structural and moral issues it creates. For example, Carmis Gillons, vice president for external affairs at the Hebrew University, served as director of the General Security Services — an organization notorious for being accused by several human rights organizations of committing war crimes.

BDS in Academia

When arguing over the legitimacy of BDS toward the Israeli academic sphere, it is true that some academics have, notably during the intermediary Oslo agreement but also still today, acted upon their commitment to serve and promote knowledge and narratives regardless of the political situation. They have contributed to a reconciliation path potentially leading to an improvement of the situation for both Palestinian and Israeli societies.

The main argument against the boycott of Israeli academia is the assumption that the former is independent from the ruling power. The truth is that the shadow of militarization — and therefore occupation — of Palestinian land spreads far beyond the Israeli army institutions. As it reaches academia, one of the most vital institutions allowing a vivid democratic society is corrupted. Controlled by the military, the academic precaution against totalitarianism has been twisted so as to impede critical voices other than the ruling ones to be heard in the public space.

Academic institutions are not fulfilling the fundamental role of countering, when necessary, the political elite’s legitimacy narratives. On the contrary, such institutions are actually deepening, under the mask of independence, the influence of the army within Israeli society.

BDS against academics is a reaction to an already-implemented boycott by the Israeli ruling authorities. The only difference here is that the domestic boycott is latent and aimed at continuing the annexation and occupation of Palestinian land. It is fundamental to tackle this nationalistic machine that will continue to foster the aversion and alienation toward the Palestinian people, thus providing justification for their destruction.

The academic sphere is a fundamental opposition challenging the government’s ability to manipulate public opinion. The role of academics and intellectuals is to provide individuals with new perspectives aimed at improving the society in which they live, even if those general improvements stand against the particular interests of the political leadership.

The silence of Israeli academics on the Palestinian issue translates into reducing democracy to its absolute minimum: periodic representative elections.

Never should partial freedom be considered as freedom. As a pillar of any democratic state, academic freedom can only exist if guaranteed to all and any subject. Otherwise it does not actually exist.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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With 42% of people below the , Nicaragua has the weakest social indicators in Latin America. The country’s economic situation is mainly a result of the US embargo following the 1980s Sandinista Revolution. Nicaragua also lacks diversification in its economy and infrastructure, and it has an unskilled workforce.

In July 2013, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega  with Chinese businessman Wang Jing, president of the startup investment firm Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development (HKND), to create a transoceanic channel. Competing with the smaller Panama Canal, this Gran Canal initiative includes many sub-projects such as a port on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, an international airport, free trade areas and an oil pipeline. It would also represent a firm push toward progress, economic growth and social welfare.

Enter China…

Even though the economic and social boost that Nicaraguans could see from with this transoceanic channel, many related issues appear to be underestimated if not concealed, despite warnings from local experts.

The transoceanic channel will extend to 278 kilometers, and its area of influence will affect many protected areas such as natural reserves, wetlands, archipelagos, islands and Lake Cocibolca, in particular. Due to its low depth, the lake will be drained to reach a minimal depth of 30 meters throughout the 105 kilometers of the canal route to allow safe passage for containers up to 500-meters-long. The drenching operation will result in over 1 billion tons of waste—the destination of which remains unknown.

To make this project feasible despite the protected areas, Nicaraguan authorities handed the HKND a land concession of 100 years and approved Law 840, a measure that allows the Nicaraguan constitution to be bypassed, as well as other directives protecting both the national ecological resources and the rights of the inhabitants living in those areas. Among those rights codified in the Nicaraguan constitution is an  granting the inhabitants cultural, economic and property rights, and requiring that any “concessions and contracts of rational exploitation of the natural resources granted by the State in the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast must have the approval of the corresponding .”

According to Telemaco Telavera, the Canal Commission spokesman, the commission did not choose “the route that costs less economically but the one with the lowest environmental and social impact … We have chosen the route with the lowest population density.”

As no serious official reports or risk analysis have been provided by the Nicaraguan state, many experts are warning about the dramatic and irreversible impact this project would have on the ecosystem, as the drenching and maintenance of the channel would endanger the wildlife and fragile biodiversity of the lake. Among those specialists, Franklin Briceňo, an ecologist and member of , argues that unless the project is canceled, “Nicaragua would face an ecocide.”

While the Nicaraguan government and the HKND have assured people that anyone displaced by the project will be fairly compensated,  groups and locals have cried foul, and many demonstrations have sprung up around the country protesting the anticipated forced removal in exchange for financial compensation. They claim that not only does the failure to consult violate the terms of the Nicaraguan constitution, but that it also violates their internationally recognized rights. The people marching have been brutally reprimanded, and anti-canal militants are often sent to prison on exaggerated charges.

Despite this local concern, the general population remains indifferent or in favor of the channel as not only will the HKND have to pay $100 million for the land concession, but also because this project is upheld by the promise of 25,000 new jobs in a country severely hurt by hunger and poverty.

As no actual proof was provided, some observers consider these allegations to be exaggerated and manipulated. Lopez Baltodano  that the price the HKND paid is ridiculously cheap, as $100 million represents only two months-worth of remittances for Nicaraguans working abroad. From that point of view, the HKND is actually paying a symbolic price to enjoy a century of rights over the most valuable natural resources of Nicaragua: forests, protected areas and Lake Cocibolca—which, as the main source of water for human consumption in Central America, has a value that is impossible to relate strictly in economic terms.

As for the expected creation of 25,000 jobs for locals, the initial promise was originally four times greater but slowly decreased over time. Even if its number was correct, Briceňo argues that most Nicaraguans do not match the basic skill requirements to be hired on the construction project.

Therefore, despite the ecological, social and democratic threat the canal represents, even the proper utility of the channel remains highly doubtful. Indeed, , and specialists are identifying a new transoceanic natural route in North America due to melting glaciers.

Despite asserting no connections with the Chinese government, Wang Jing appears to be a proxy for  as the HKND is backed by China Railway Construction Corporation, a huge government-owned enterprise that displays a mural of various Chinese military weapons.

The Dragon in Latin America

The US focus on other regions such as the Middle East and Asia for most of the last decade has created an opportunity for to gain a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Facing local controversy and having been conceived without pertinent economic justifications, the canal construction project has already been postponed to late 2016 (originally scheduled for December 2014) and may even never be completed. In light of those considerations, the Gran Canal may be an alibi for China to obtain the 100-year lease to control and operate in the area. By doing so, China would steadily increase trade and investment in Central America, in order to obtain access to markets and make new political allies along the way.

More than business and trading opportunities, it would give Beijing influence in the region as a key commercial route and maritime asset. This would require military policing activities in the region surrounding Nicaragua, therefore, creating the ability for the Chinese navy to move warships into the Caribbean and the Atlantic. It is also not beyond the realm of possibility that a Chinese-controlled canal—located in an openly hostile nation like Nicaragua—could be used to facilitate staging for unfriendly naval or military forces.

In 1913, the Panama Canal gave the US influence over the Americas, allowing it to enshrine its control over an international route. This led to Washington expanding its influence through infrastructural development projects in other  countries, but also in . China is taking advantage of such areas that world powers did not let to fully develop.

The Beijing-controlled area in Nicaragua, therefore, represents a challenge not only to the weakened Western primacy, but truly the advent of a new dynamic in the distribution of world power.

*[Martina Rose assisted with research for this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On October 4, Fadi Aloon, 19, was chased by orthodox Jews. While offering no resistance, he was shot dead by an Israeli police officer just outside East Jerusalem. Police later revealed he stabbed a Jewish teenager.

The incident rocked an already tense moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with each side arguing over the legitimacy or disproportionate response of the Israeli officer. (A subsequently surfaced in what appears to be a public execution.)

This dramatic episode reveals the complexity of everyday life in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. Moreover, given the emotional reactions it created on both sides, many observers have sought to understand what led Aloon to commit this seemingly impetuous act.

While grieving Palestinians now refer to him as a hero fighting the occupation, Israelis say the 19-year-old only serves as further proof of Palestinian terrorism. Once detached from those extremes, a deeper explanation can be found in the everyday lives of Palestinian youth—an untold, calculated system of Israeli-inflicted pressure and psychological harassment.

This article is not about the climate of tension that has resulted from Israeli demonstrations of force and violence stemming from the occupation, including night raids, house demolitions, clashes and murders. Nor is it about the harsh conditions implemented by Israel’s colonial policies cemented in law, which afflict Palestinian housing, education, health, hygiene, employment and even family unity.

Rather, it sheds light on the numerous “soft” acts of Israeli pressure that occur on a daily basis. Taken one-by-one, these actions do not seem dramatic to an outsider, especially when compared to the more direct examples of violence mentioned above. However, when they are perceived as a whole, the situation reveals that a tactical system exists, aimed at giving Israeli forces moral legitimacy when removing local populations, and therefore, when occupying more Palestinian land.

The situation in Silwan

Situated on the outskirts of the Old City of Jerusalem, the Silwan neighborhood is gradually disappearing as Jewish settlers are violently taking over the area.

Saber Abbassi, an employee of the , gives concrete examples of this underlying oppression. For her, provocations against Arab residents of Silwan are omnipresent and particularly target young, fragile members of the community.

Abbassi recounts a story that occurred just a few months ago, when a police car was hit by a stone. The police subsequently searched the area and arrested a 13-year-old boy, solely on the basis that he was in the vicinity.

“This kid was retained in the police station for nine hours, forbidden to contact his parents, to use the bathroom and to have water or food,” she says. “He was threatened with imprisonment, to be separated from his family and also to be responsible for his father losing his job unless he admitted having thrown the stone.”

In another incident, Abbassi notes, a Silwan resident, after being arrested by the Israelis, was kept in an isolation compound for 20 days. At the time of his release, he was mentally unstable and had stopped eating and sleeping. “He had lost something there,” she says.

Beyond that, numerous families in the area have complained about police cars following children on their way to school. This begs the question: How can children going to school represent a threat to Israeli security, especially when no settlements or Israeli buildings are in the area?

Seemingly absurd sanctions are carried out to push individuals to their limits, Abbassi explains: “When one is put [in] jail for no reason, the feeling of frustration and anger is such that he or she will think, ‘Next time I would rather actually do something if I’m going to jail anyway.’”

It is here where the outcome of the Israeli pressure strategy appears.

Blurred victims

“We are a social and psychological center here, everyone has problems, and wherever you dig there is a story,” Abbassi says. She goes on to state that by traumatizing young spirits, and by implementing and intensifying a climate characterized by frustration and anger that leads to rash acts, Israeli officials are able to righteously call upon “necessary” defense and security measures in order to close schools or even evict Palestinian people from their homes.

If police cars continue to follow the children, Abbassi argues, “at some point a child will launch a stone and the Israeli authorities would shut the school for two months.”

Even if such Israeli measures are only perceived as small acts of pressure, their implementation is tactical, tending to increase during days or periods of symbolical value for Palestinians. On May 17, for example, Palestinian locals were driven away by Israeli police from Damascus Gate—the Israeli-annexed main entrance to the Old City of Jerusalem—in order to allow Israelis to celebrate the 1967 occupation of East Jerusalem.

Another example is the targeting of al-Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan, wherein measures such as to the Haram al-Sharif, or the compound under the protection of Israeli special police units. On September 15, Israeli forces eventually the mosque.

Abbassi asks, “Why are they targeting al-Aqsa? It is something special for us; it is hope for us that we will liberate Palestine. By taking al-Aqsa, what is left?”

Such Israeli “security” measures act like a noose, suffocating the Silwan youth, who are already traumatized from an early age and are left feeling as though there is no solution to their situation. Distraught in the face of what appears to be absurd, pointless cruelty, the youth undertake ill-advised actions: throwing stones or, in the worst cases, assaulting soldiers.

By creating this environment, Israeli security forces operate as though they are simply reacting to violence perpetrated against them first, while in fact they are the ones triggering the violence they punish in the end. By doing so, the Israelis legitimize their state crimes in front of local and international audiences.

Evading Media Attention

This “soft approach” of oppression, blurring the lines between victim and perpetrator, remains unspoken of in the media because acts of violence, when looking at them individually, often lack historical context.

Indeed, when reviewing an article, newspapers have to evaluate the attractiveness of a story according to their editorial guidelines, audience and context. The Palestinian situation and its never-ending series of dramatic events takes precedence over the underlying actions explained here. Not concrete enough for headlines, these acts of oppression are not only neglected by mainstream media, but also those outlets specializing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, the issue of soft oppression does not reach the public or policymakers.

As the underlying context of pressure on Palestinian people is almost impossible to relay to interested individuals, the information published by the media is often incomplete and leads the public, with their preconceived perceptions, to draw wrong conclusions.

Among Palestinians in Silwan who endure this soft oppression, some will fall into the clutches of this strategy and commit rash acts. However, those actions, being devoid of any tactical approach or strategic thinking over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, should not and cannot be considered terrorism. Rather, such actions must be evaluated, while also taking into account those Israeli acts of pressure within an Israeli-implemented state of terror.

If peace negotiations were set on bringing about a solution to the conflict, this would mean concessions on the Israeli side. If, on the other hand, Israel wants to build its future at the expense of Palestinians, it will face local and international resistance. In light of this, the Israeli strategy of planned acts of pressure appears to be the policy best-suited to its interests.

As Saber Abbassi notes, “With all that they [the Israelis] are doing, those children being arrested without any reasons, they are creating an enemy.”

By establishing itself in a position of defense, Israel has all the false legitimacy it requires to undertake its expansion over Palestinian territories.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On April 15, the Israeli Supreme Court affirmed the application of the Absentee Property Law in Occupied East Jerusalem, therefore, allowing the unlawful confiscation of property and assets in the area from their Palestinian owners in the or .

The confirmation of this law, issued in 1950 and used as a legal tool for the perpetuation of what Palestinians refer to as the Nakba (“catastrophe,” the forced displacement of Palestinians that led to the establishment of Israel), represents only a fraction of the struggle that Arab populations face in the tourist-friendly city of Jerusalem, where at the same time basic human rights are violated on a daily basis.

For this population, the right to housing, education, health, employment or a unified family is considered a privilege. Such violations, enforced by Israeli rule or allowed by turning a blind eye to violations committed by Israeli citizens, aim to uproot the Arab population from the holy city. Forced to leave what is, under international law, their rightful home, the only resort for those deprived communities is within the very same institutions that acted against them.

The Israeli policies toward Jerusalemites affect issues such as infrastructure and planning policies, displacement of populations, land confiscation and settlement establishment in order to separate West Bank Palestinians from their capital: .

B’tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, states in a on infrastructure in Palestinian neighborhoods that there are 26 libraries in non-Palestinian areas, while Palestinian areas have only two. For 531 sport facilities in non-Palestinian areas, Palestinian areas only have 33. Construction permits within Palestinian communities are continually refused despite their population growing four-fold since 1967. Those restrictions relate to playgrounds, schools, sidewalks and sewage pipes.

Jerusalem was once the cultural, political and economical center of the Palestinians. However, this has radically changed. Since 2002, Israeli authorities put in place more restrictions for Palestinians’ freedom of movement, resulting in only a few farmers from the surrounding area still being able to sell their merchandise in the holy city. Almost 5,000 shops have closed since then, East Jerusalem’s economy has practically collapsed and about 75% of the Palestinian population live below the poverty .

Palestinian families suffering from those harsh conditions often have no other choice but to leave, thus further cementing a Jewish majority in Jerusalem. Several aspects may be used to give legitimacy to these restrictions: security measures in the context of the Palestinian intifadas, sanction measures, archaeological purpose or even environmental protection. The ecofriendly metro line on the actual line of demarcation between Israel and the West Bank and the Green Belt, a natural reserve impeding any Palestinian construction development, are examples of the latter.

Among the reasons behind the restrictions, however, lies the fundamental will to bring Jerusalem back to its former, supposedly pure, Jewish character. It is, therefore, on a historical basis that the future of Jerusalem is set.

The base of legitimacy

Fundamentalism is to consider a golden period, crystallizing an imaginative identity, and to be willing to come back to that context so as to reach higher purity. But to achieve a faith statement on a historic basis is a chimera. Indeed, the communities and the political structures that govern them are ever evolving entities, and therefore, the determination of a “moment zero” in a country allowing an affirmation of purity is impossible—and so too is its “pure” identity.

From the analysis of the Bible by historian Karen Armstrong, even in the patriarchal narrative of the search for a homeland, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob remain highly aware of their alien status in Canaan (roughly the area of the Levant during the Phoenician era). In the history of Jerusalem and the Holy Land, Jews, Christians and Muslims all found other people in possession of the city. All of them had to cope with the fact that the city and the land were and still are sacred to other people as well. Even when Israel was divided among the 12 tribes of the Bible, the holy book states that “the sons of Judah could not drive out the Jebusites who lived in Jerusalem.”

Still, anteriority became a supreme base of legitimacy—who stood there first has legitimacy over the place. In this quest for anteriority, became something no longer related to history, but as a political tool of supposed proof for claiming one people’s prevalence. Israelis and Palestinians alike played this game and, while drowning any possible solutions into the depths of millennial times, actual human dramas were and are still legitimated upon those theories.

If Jerusalem cannot be detached from its history, it is vital to pay attention to another historical period that is particularly interesting for its peaceful outcome—a past that is barely over a century old: Jerusalem under the .

Historian, poet and UNESCO Ambassador for Palestine Elias Sanbar told this author that when it comes to Jerusalem’s identity, to be the depositary people of the Holy Land is a heavy burden. Indeed, since the time of the pharaoh to what we know today as Jerusalem, it has always been a targeted land.

When a territory is targeted for centuries, the population living there tends to identify with the land and are unified as a targeted people—together as a community. But wasn’t the population of Jerusalem massacred as a whole during the First Crusade? Jews, Christians and Muslim alike were slaughtered by the crusaders, who could not distinguish between Christians and their neighbors.

In this context, the question of religious affiliation became optional. Individually, they were Jews, Christians or Muslims, but because of this unique place on earth, the inhabitants of Jerusalem considered themselves all as receptacles of events linked to the city.

This community has concrete manifestations. The idea of the division of the Old City into quarters is both less old and less rigid than it is often represented. According to historian : “In early Ottoman times there were no separate quarters for Christians and Jews. The names ‘Christian quarter’ or ‘Jewish quarter’ do not appear in Ottomans registers before the 19^{�ٳ���}century.” Christians and Jews lived together in the same quarters. There was generally a great degree of heterogeneity of the population in most parts of the city. Even when the number of Jews grew extensively in the Old City in the 19^th century, just before they moved to a new, exclusive Jewish quarter in 1870, the people lived intermingled with their Arab neighbors in the areas adjoining the Jewish quarter.

Jerusalemite identity as a way forward?

On May 11, the last Jerusalem day displayed a new demonstration of segregation and hatred between the two most represented religions of the city. Under the reassuring name of “unification of Jerusalem” and under a two-millennium-old legitimacy, Israel is implementing maneuvers of expropriations of private property and coercive removals of the Arab population to achieve irreversible changes in the city’s character.

Opposing this legitimacy narrative, H.J. Franken says: “Myths often contain useful information about the past, but unfortunately it is the nature of myth that history is heavily concealed by it.” Even in the old city of Jerusalem, where the layer of stones may not have changed, the sentiments and meaning attached to them are constantly being reworked over the centuries by all three religions.

History is made of vectors that people travel along during their lives, therefore, it lies in the possibility to be identifiable, not immutable. Under Ottoman rule, Muslims were Muslims, but because of this shared land, they remained particularly concerned by anything else that was happening to Christians or Jews in Jerusalem. Herein lies an essential aspect of the Jerusalemite identity, an aspect that today’s fundamentalism tends to suppress.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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When states are created without the correspondence of a crystallized nation, the outcome of nationalism can be linked to community tensions and, to some extent, the development of terrorist organizations like the Islamic State (IS).

The current context in illustrates the roots and outcomes of this peculiar situation. Mashreq states—in this case limited to Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon—were created in a short space of time in the wake of World War I without a stable nation composing them.

Consequently, Arab nationalism developed in a particular way, characterized by two main branches: qawmiyya and wataniyya. Qawmiyya is a nationalism determined by the adhesion of the individual toward Arab nations as a whole; it is the practical translation of pan-Arabism.

This project includes and also stands in opposition to the other nationalist trend that is wataniyya, which is defined as the adhesion to a specific Arab country. Wataniyya nationalism is fundamental to understanding the strength of dynamics that currently shake Lebanon’s fragile equilibrium.

The Case of Lebanon

As political power in Lebanon is shared on a confessional basis—the nation being composed of Sunnis, Shiites and Christians—the country appears to be threatened by its diverse range of identities within one political entity.

The fracture between Shiites and Sunnis is no less political than spiritual. It is linked to the succession of Prophet Muhammad, and therefore, a mix of political and spiritual power and legitimacy concerns lead to community tensions. Over the last century, the Shiite community has often been oppressed or used as scapegoats by Sunnis in times of crisis or community tensions. This dynamic, although observable throughout the Middle East, has been particularly apparent in Lebanon.

In the 1980s, approximately 300,000 people from the southern Lebanese population, mainly Shiite, were restricted by the Lebanese army from taking shelter in the north amid Israeli attacks. Left abandoned and marginalized, they organized themselves in a militia, resulting in the Amal movement.

Presently, there are two main actors expanding Shiite transnational influence in the Middle East: Hezbollah, since its involvement in the Syrian Civil War; and Iran, through its financial, operative and ideological support to various Shiite populations and movements. This support notably concerns the education of the Lebanese religious elite; the financing of infrastructures projects such as hospitals; and the promotion of Iranian culture through the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO). According to The Washington Post, ��������’s to Hezbollah is up to $200 million annually.

On the other side of the divide, there is no Sunni Muslim unity, as three main actors share the regional power without putting in common their actions in support of the Lebanese Sunni community: Turkey, which is not an Arab country; the Wahhabi Saudi Arabia; and the young but growing power of Qatar.

The Hezbollah Power Demonstration

The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon’s frontiers had direct repercussions on its divided society. Tension and violence ensued, as the Sunni community mainly supported the insurrection, while Shiites mainly backed the Syrian regime. The confrontation between these factions first set aflame the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, but subsequently to Beirut and then southern Lebanon. Between May 2012 and January 2015, violent political incidents have resulted in over 700 fatalities and 2,600 injuries, while the threat of a new civil war remains.

In addition, Hezbollah, which was originally created for the resistance against Israel, turned its back on its main objective and involved Lebanon as a whole in the Syrian war, sending over 5,000 fighters to fight against the rebellion.

The Lebanese Sunni population saw this act as abusive and illegitimate, and reacted through marches in support of the Syrian insurrection and against Hezbollah and the Lebanese Shiite community. For Shiites, however, Hezbollah is acting within its original mandate aimed at the destruction of Israel.

Indeed, the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s involvement in —a�� by its secretary-general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah—is a maneuver of defensive jihad and rests on the fact that the crisis in Syria is the result of Western terrorists intent on the country’s destruction and the abolition of the anti-Zionist resistance protecting Lebanon.

Popular Sunni religious figures such as Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir, who is openly opposed to Hezbollah and Iran, reacted to these developments and mobilized the Sunni community to take drastic measures against what he calls the “Sunni humiliation.” He created the first Sunni militia to intervene in Syria: the Free Resistance Brigades (Kataib al-Muqawama al-Hurr). Due to the failure of transnational Sunni solidarity—with a lack of political, financial or even ideological support from Turkey or Saudi Arabia—parts of the Lebanese Sunni population turned to religious extremism.

The Islamic State

In a context of Hezbollah and ��������’s illegitimate and abusive domination over Lebanon’s security, social and political sphere, the ’s actions and objectives appear as a seductive alternative for the humiliated and deprived Sunni Lebanese population. This community, particularly brutalized by the Shiite oppression, has entered into a state of compliance and appeal for the use of violence as a means to achieve political goals. Yet to speak of religious extremism today is to speak about the Islamic State.

Extracting its legitimacy from the considered “true borders” prior to the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution by the Sykes-Picot agreement, IS’ expanding state uses a narrative of revenge on both Western and Shiite powers for its violence and intrusion against the Sunni Lebanese existence.

While IS remains supported only by a minority in Lebanon—a�� this terrorist organization also symbolizes the Sunni empowerment and revenge against Shiite powers—it seduces frustrated and brutalized Sunni Lebanese onto the path of violent political Islam. This part of the population, facing deprivation and an absence of political alternatives, reacts through extreme political stands and, therefore, is more likely to take the path of jihad.

In this context, traumatic experiences are often the determinant event defining a movement or a population. If it was the abandoning of the southern Shiite Lebanese by their own government in the 1980s that led to the establishment of the Amal movement, its equivalent for the Lebanese Sunni population is ’s involvement in Syria—an involvement without any national consent of the Sunni Lebanese population, into a conflict they did not support and that triggered this extreme political movement.

From Oppressed to New Oppressor?

The Shiite-Sunni relationship appears, especially in Lebanon, unbalanced and stuck in a situation in which one pole is dominating the other.

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Paulo Freire’s analysis that the oppressor-oppressed relationship tends to create an oppressed entity identifying oneself by the oppressor is applicable here. If to be oppressed is to be a sub-human, to free oneself of the submission is to reach manhood. The issue is that the conceptions of the oppressed have been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential actions by which they are shaped. In this context, Lebanese Sunnis adopt an attitude of adhesion to Shiite maneuvers, even though they are against them, and therefore, Sunni empowerment will be reached once this population becomes the oppressor.

The problem in this regard is that the liberation of the oppressed can only happen by the end of the oppressor-oppressed existential scheme. Here, the contradiction between the poles leads not to real liberation, but to identification with the opposite pole: a vicious circle of never-ending violence where the power repeatedly fluctuates from Lebanese Sunnis to Shiites.

In Lebanon’s case, the diversity of a national rationale—such as religious identities, leading to social and political consequences both in a domestic and international context—leads the two main communities to reject each other and to enter into the vicious circle of liberation in switching the oppressed status with the oppressor one.

Alexis de Toqueville affirms that only religion or nationalism can create a long-term community; they combine and strengthen one another in most nation-states. However, notably in the case of Lebanon, those two creative matrices remain in rivalry to each other and thus prevent the establishment of a non-oppressive community.

The weakness of a national sentiment in the Middle East gave—if not legitimacy—a fertile ground to transnational movements and violent schemes. The frustration escalated from the individual to an international context, as the tensions inside Lebanon recreated themselves on a larger scheme and eventually reached international movements.

Hezbollah and ��������’s policies are influenced by the sentiment of the Shiite oppression by the Sunnis, therefore, implying a need for a defensive jihad. Those actors seen as oppressors by Sunnis triggered counteractions and movements. The Islamic State, because of a lack of political and international solidarity solutions, has become the most dramatic manifestation of these counteractions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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