As Afghanistan gears up for the second round of its presidential election, one can confidently put forward two assessments. First, this political transition — the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan — is more crucial for purposes of state legitimacy for most Afghans than anything else. Second, amid the drawdown of military and civilian engagement in the country, the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad is increasingly salient to the future of Afghanistan.
As Afghanistan gears up for the second round of its of Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan and the origins of the oft-cited rationale for Islamabad’s quest of “strategic depth” in the country, as well as the implications for its future.

A Brief History of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations

When Sir Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, drew a 2,640 kilometer line between Afghanistan and British India in 1893, his aim was to create a state between imperial Britain’s territory and Czarist Russia. The border, popularly referred to as the Durand Line,‎ was established after an was forged between Durand and the Emir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, to fix the limit of their respective spheres of influence. The deal sanctified Britain’s control over its Pashtun possessions by dividing Pashtun tribal areas and the Balochistan region. In the process, the Durand Line politically divided ethnic Pashtuns and Baloch who lived on both sides of the border.

Although recognized internationally as the western border of Pakistan, the Durand Line is by Afghanistan as a “geopolitical myth” since it divides the Pashtuns. It is on these grounds that Afghanistan, an independent state for longer than Pakistan, the latter’s creation and entry into the United Nations. However, Afghanistan’s relative small size, lack of access to the sea, and absence of geopolitical clout denied it the means to force a redrawing of the border.

While Afghanistan has sought to reintegrate the Pashtuns, Pakistan has come up with various arguments to justify a “fusion” of the two states. Pakistan argues that the Durand Line is a settled matter and Afghan reluctance to accept the border is the cause of many problems between the two states. Pakistani strategists often quote British historian Fraser Tytler who , shortly after Pakistan was created, that: “History suggests that fusion will take place, if not peacefully, then by force.”

The Doctrine of Strategic Depth in Afghanistan

Several methods have been used to force this fusion. The first attempt saw a suggestion to create an Afghanistan-Pakistan federation. In the 1950s, Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler, argued for a federation of the two states based on religion. He later expanded the argument, calling for a grand confederation of like-minded and territorially contiguous Muslim countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Khan’s argument was that such a confederation would help Pakistan stand up to India, as it would provide resources and strength in numbers to match its larger foe. Later, during the Soviet Union’s (USSR) intervention in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military’s support for the mujahideen was justified as seeking to prevent encirclement by India and a Soviet-backed Afghanistan.

The Pakistani military doctrine behind the concept of strategic depth suggests transforming Afghanistan into a client or subservient state that is beholden to the Pakistani security establishment.Ěý

The case that has been most often , especially since the late 1980s, is the Pakistani need for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. In military terms, this broadly refers to the distances between the front lines and a country’s industrial nucleus, population centers, heartlands and locations of its military industry. The argument that underscores this concept is that a military commander must consider the vulnerability of its assets to an offensive, and consider whether it can withdraw into its own territory, absorb an initial thrust and regroup. Strategic depth is thus, essentially, a trade-off between space and time.

The concept was said to have been first articulated in the 1980s. It then became a policy to be pursued in order to respond to a potential military strike by India. Since then, the Pakistani military establishment has used this policy to justify manipulating the politics of Afghanistan, by using violence and terror as state instruments of control. In pursuit of this strategic depth, the military exploited the material-needs and nationalistic fervor of specific mujahideen leaders who sought support to fight the USSR,religious extremist groups and, more recently, the Taliban, in a bid to subdue, marginalize and decapitate the Afghan state.

After Pakistan went nuclear, the raison d’ĂŞtre of strategic depth diminished in relevance. The concept was reworked and, in early 2010, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani that Pakistan wanted “strategic depth in Afghanistan but [did] not want to control it.” He added that a “peaceful, friendly and stable” relationship with Afghanistan would ensure that Pakistan is not threatened with security problems on its western border. Kayani went further and asserted that Afghan state institutions, including the army and police, should be kept in check so they do not pose a threat to Pakistan’s “strategic interests.”

The Challenges

There are several inherent challenges in the concept of strategic depth. First, it seems militarily bankrupt since it implies that, in the event of an attack from India, the Pakistani army would retreat to Afghanistan — a near impossible feat — to regroup and launch a counterattack. The concept accords little consideration, if any, to the fate of the 180 million Pakistani civilians that the military would leave behind, Ěýa politically impossible feat, to pursue this “depth.”

Second, what makes the concept unfeasible is the fact that Afghanistan has not diluted its claims to the Pashtun parts of Pakistan. No Afghan leader has accepted the Durand Line. It has been argued that even the Taliban, beholden to Pakistan for its very existence, could not do so.

However, there is an equally compelling argument that Afghan claims over the Pashtuns actually works to Pakistan’s advantage, as it gives them a rationale to continue meddling in Afghan affairs. Article 2 in the Durand Line agreement was, in fact, formulated to prevent this: “The Government of India [Pakistan] will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan.” However, it should be noted that Pakistan’s record of adherence to bilateral agreements has been anything but consistent.

Implications for Afghanistan

The Pakistani military doctrine behind the concept of strategic depth suggests transforming Afghanistan into a client or subservient state that is beholden to the Pakistani security establishment. Unchallenged pursuit of this policy could potentially widen the area of military conflict and drag Afghanistan into the Indo-Pak equation.

With the West increasingly wary of committing any further forces to Afghanistan, Pakistan seems to have won at least partial acceptance of its argument (to the West) that stabilizing Afghanistan is not possible without addressing Islamabad’s concerns. Senior US officials have privately argued that Pakistan, its nukes, and the public face of extremism permeating its society are a collective global challenge. Afghanistan is merely a “side show” when compared to the concern that Pakistan poses for the US and the West.

Questions to Ponder

Western and Pakistani narratives suggest the proxy war is a new variant of the Great Game, now being fought between India and Pakistan. However, the question that one should ask is this: Do Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan constitute a barely disguised land grab or are they an extension of the Great Game? Added to this, can the policies that originate from Pakistan’s imagined fear of encirclement by India be pursued at the cost of sovereignty of an independent nation? And is Pakistan simply seeking to splinter Afghanistan on ethnic lines and, in the process, enlarge its size, secure its elusive “strategic depth” and quell Pashtun nationalism?

The sooner policymakers in Delhi examine these issues, the more likely they willĚýbe to prioritizing their approach to post-2014 Afghanistan.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In just over a decade, what started as the War on Terror instead morphed into a badly delayed and compromised exercise in nation-building in Afghanistan.

This failure, based on an inadequate appreciation of ground realities, is now being compounded by the West’s desperation to get out of the country. The consequences of this hurried exit are likely to be catastrophic. Afghanistan will again be thrown to the wolves, while Pakistan, once more, would earn a driver’s seat in its neighbor’s future.

Unsurprisingly, there is a belief among Afghans that the Americans, even if they remain engaged in post-2014 Afghanistan, will “cherry pick” who to take on — their proposed deployment levels simply do not inspire confidence that they would be enough of a deterrent to insurgents and their patrons in Pakistan.

Washington’s proposed deployment levels also seem symbolic at best, suggesting a reluctance to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism used by the Taliban, preferring instead to leave such responsibility to the poorly provisioned Afghan National Security Forces and to accept a Pakistani presence across the Durand Line as a fait accompli.

This approach could very likely invite global and regional terrorist outfits back in Afghanistan. The West, China, Russia and the central Asian republics should all have a serious cause for concern with the foreseeable implications of this vacuum left from the drawdown of US and NATO forces.

The Region’s Terrorist Groups

Most notably, as Pakistan seeks to assert itself after the withdrawal US forces, there are worrying prospects of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) being inducted in aid of their Taliban brethren.

LeT is one of the most active terrorist outfits in South Asia. It operates from Pakistan and is widely considered as a tool used by the country’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to launch terrorist attacks in India and foment unrest. Despite being officially “banned” in Pakistan, the leadership of LeT enjoys unceasing support from organs of the state. The focus of LeT has largely been the Indian-administered Kashmir, but they have also been associated with other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and the Taliban.

After launching the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, LeT proved they had special forces-like prowess: an impressive intelligence gathering capability; recruits like David Colman Headley, who could be many things to many people; and a clandestine presence in various parts of the world.

Inevitably, if LeT operates in a foreign land as a mercenary force, ISI restraints would wither. LeT could potentially break away. The temptation to join other causes, for ideology or money, as Islamist warriors would be far too compelling for them. Their Wahhabi inclination would make their involvement in Sunni causes, of which there are many, easier to countenance. This Wahhabi link could also potentially lead to LeT making common cause with al-Qaeda, transforming their ideological convergence into strong operational links, and aiding their return to Afghanistan.

This is, unfortunately, not the end of the story. Other terrorist groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), seduced by the turn of events, could also resurface and relocate to Afghanistan. IMU shares long-standing fraternal relations with LeT, forged by a common vision of a pan-Islamic entity that would stretch from Central to South Asia. The terrorist group, whose aim is to overthrow the Uzbek president, is alsoĚý.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), consisting largely of Uyghur Muslims from China, is another group that hasĚýĚýfrom al-Qaeda. As recent as March 14, its leader declared China as theĚý.

The neat compartmentalizing of aims between al-Qaeda and these outfits is more by design than chance. For instance, al-Qaeda’s targets are Muslim countries and the Arab world, whereas LeT’s avowed aim is to establish a caliphate, extending in a Mughal-era like arc from South Asia to Central Asia.

However, LeT, often likened to a virtual B team of al-Qaeda, also has global ambitions and has vowed to plant the “flag of Islam” in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi. It has a network in South and Southeast Asia, extensive links in Central Asia, and sleeper cells in the US, Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia.

Similarly, while IMU and ETIM were movements that originally aimed at specific objectives and comprised primarily of single ethnic groups as their members, they have expanded their aims as well as membership. BothĚýorganizations have members from multiple ethnic groups and these groups ally with any regional or global terrorist outfit that would help them sustain their aims. It does not take much for such groups, who share ideological beliefs with other radical Islamists like al-Qaeda, to forge operational and financial ties, combine training and logistics, and broaden their agenda.

Planning a Retreat

This is a worrying prospect, not just in theory. The first signs of heightened LeT activity all along the Durand Line, in areas that Pakistan considers crucial to its interests, are already there. Earlier, there had been reports of LeT being involved in raids across the Durand Line to counter Mullah Fazlullah. They are also known to be working closely along with the Haqqani network. Many ETIM terrorists also have a sanctuary in the highly volatile Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan.

The transitions in Afghanistan for 2014 have thus been badly planned and the West has failed to learn from history. It would have been more apposite if the West had given a year or two for a new Afghan president to consolidate before planning their retreat. It is Afghanistan’s neighbors and the region that will have to pay the price for this hasty withdrawal. Of course, there is still time for the international community to work on a dialogue involving regional powers to put together a security mechanism.

The manner in which the US handles its Afghan policy will impact on the perception of its role as the sole superpower. That will, in turn, have an impact on the floundering global War on Terror. It is perhaps still not too late to revert back to the original objective: of dismantling the safe havens for terrorists, destroying their infrastructure, and diminishing the possibility of Afghanistan being held hostage again by radical extremist elements.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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