When this author spoke to Ambassador David Welch, who served as the Assistant US Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2005-2008, about the situation between and the Polisario, the ambassador said: “…we [the US] didn’t think the most constructive way to address the status of the Western was by the piecemeal use of resolutions of one sort or another, to accomplish the goal of a movement [the Polisario] that we – laugh – we didn’t agree with, and with whose policies we had some difficulties.”

After further probing about what the disagreement with the Polisario – the Sahrawi leadership – involved, the ambassador stated that “we think the future of the Western Sahara lies within Morocco.” While the US still endorses the self-determination of the Sahrawis, that endorsement really includes anything short of independence. However, this has not always been the case. As Congressman Edward R. Royce in a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2007: “Once, the UN and US position was, frankly, to back a free and fair referendum on independence. Our position is now to back an autonomy plan.” This shift in the US position appears to coincide with a major effort by Morocco. The most significant impact can be seen in the push by some members of the US Congress to not only undermine the procedural component of self-determination – a referendum resulting in independence, autonomy or integration – but also to take the step of  further alienating the Polisario.

Former Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, for example, before retiring from Congress in 2011, the Polisario’s ambition as one aimed at setting up a “fake, illusory microstate that is financed by and propped up by Castro.” After retiring from Congress, Balart maintained his relationship with Moroccan lobbyists and has set up his own lobbying firm called Western Hemisphere Strategies. The firm was hired by a Moroccan NGO called the Moroccan American Cultural Center, which has circulated aimed at connecting the Polisario with Cuba and – a claim Balart has endorsed.

By successfully spreading the image of ties between the Polisario, Cuba and al-Qaeda, Morocco is able to leverage those alleged ties to its advantage. It can portray itself as fighting terrorists, and this has resulted in the wavering regarding the expansion of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara () mandate to include the observance of the human rights situation. The mandate of the mission, which was established in 1991, was extended in April 2014 for another year, but despite the Polisario’s efforts a human rights monitoring mechanism was not included in the mission’s mandate. MINURSO remains one of only two UN peacekeeping operations in the world without a human rights monitoring mechanism.

At present, there is no United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution calling the Moroccan presence in the Western Sahara illegal and demanding a withdrawal. The closest to such a measure, UNSC resolution , was passed on November 6, 1975, the day the Green March into the Western Sahara occurred – the resolution called on the Moroccan king to withdraw all participants from the march, which saw approximately 350,000 Moroccans and 20,000 troops advance into the Western Sahara. On the Moroccan side, the aim of the march was to the territory colonized by . Subsequent resolutions and agreements have emphasized the rights of the Sahrawis to self-determination and the need for holding a referendum, with the substantive issues not explicitly addressed.

Third Party Investments In The Status Quo

One of the means at the disposal of the occupier to continue the occupation is by having other states invest in the status quo. When this author asked about the implications of having US hydro carbon exploration companies operate off the shore of the Western Sahara, Ambassador Welch stated: “I think that Rabat would consider that Moroccan territory […and] those companies that are operating there, I presume have accommodated themselves to that.” The ambassador further explained that foreign investments in the Sahara could benefit the Sahrawis. From the outset, some third party states were willing to invest in the Sahara’s resources while under Moroccan control.

When Spain decided to cede the Sahara to Morocco, for example, it did so in exchange for fishery rights and shares in the phosphate mining industry in the Western Sahara. These shares were by the Spanish state. The phosphate mine Spain owned shares in is Bou-Craa, the largest in the Western Sahara.  owned 35% of the industry’s shares. This situation is comparable to the Australian position regarding their exploitation of oil resources in the East Timor gap, which was mentioned above.

The limits of self-determination within the colonial context depend on the success of the occupying power in legitimating the occupation, getting other states to invest in the status quo and quelling the people’s effective control over the territory through the use of force.

With the absence of a UN Security Council resolution calling for divestment from the Sahara, private companies have teetered. , a US based energy company, has engaged in offshore oil exploration since 2001, but decided in 2005 to not renew its contract for drilling and exploring rights due to the piling on the corporation. In the meantime, Kosmos Energy, another American oil and gas exploration , has picked up where Kerr-McGee left off.

Use Of Force

Another means at the disposal of the occupier to maintain the status quo is the use of force. In addition to making it difficult for the Polisario fighters to cross the , Omeima Abdeslam, the Polisario representative to the UN and Switzerland, kept mentioning the overwhelming and disproportionate use of measures by the Moroccans to maintain control of the territory. She expressed her frustration with the Moroccan success in presenting itself as a fighter against terrorism, and explained that in reality Morocco is more of a police state. In her words: “they created this image of themselves as this perfect democracy in North Africa which is not true. I invite you Abdulaziz, you can go to Morocco and you can see for yourself how the Moroccans are suffering from their own policies, from their own “mekhzan” – “mekhzan” is some kind of very archaic way of security who has in its lines more than two million people who are paid just to supervise and to see and to maintain the situation which is not good for neither the Moroccans or the Sahrawis.”

This secret police , sometimes in plain clothes, tried to break up peaceful protests by the Sahrawis in the past. As for Morocco’s own campaign to gain the favor of the Sahrawis in order to have their pursuit of independence wane, Abdeslam explained that the Moroccan state has “… tried to buy Sahrawi loyalty from all over the world. They have tried – that’s why there are some divisions within the Polisario Front, [some Sahrawis] have gone back to Morocco [for] the money. Morocco has resources and they use it to buy whatever they find in their way.”

Still, she maintained that the referendum should be pursued, and that those who have defected and acquiesced to Moroccan incentives would join in the move for independence.

The limits of self-determination within the colonial context depend on the success of the occupying power in legitimating the occupation, getting other states to invest in the status quo and quelling the people’s effective control over the territory through the use of force. Morocco’s occupation of the territory appears to have succeeded, and the prospects for Sahrawis to include independence as an option on the referendum look dim. What this leaves the Polisario with is either latching on to the formalism of self-determination, and insisting “independence” be included as an option on the referendum; or they could leverage the Morocco Initiative and gain autonomy in the Western Sahara.

Autonomy means more self-government for the Sahrawis short of having the economic, political and legal decision-making authority a fully independent state would have. Given Morocco’s success in maintaining the occupation, with no visible signs of any change in the future, this author believes the Polisario should work with Morocco and pursue the autonomy of the Sahara.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.
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In 1963, the General Assembly listed the Western , at the time a Spanish colony, as a non-self-governing territory. , the administrator of the territory, was supposed to “develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions.” More than 50 years have passed since then, during which the Sahrawi leadership proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in 1976. Yet the people’s rights are still pending because , which occupied the territory from 1975 on, has resisted the Sahrawi political aspirations, namely their pursuit of independence. As a result, Morocco has exploited the resources in the Sahara while the Sahrawis lacked a political voice in the territory’s administration.

A key issue here is the self-determination of peoples, the watchword during the decolonization period. Self-determination outside of the colonial framework is contentious because it could be and has been interpreted by nationalist groups and other minorities as a right to secession. For this reason, this author addresses the situation in the Western Sahara within the colonial context since the rights in such a context are clear and uncontroversial. The rights in such a context are made up of a procedural right – a referendum resulting in independence, autonomy or integration – and a substantive right, which would include control over the resources in the territory. Although “colonialism” may evoke an image of imperial Europe exploiting other countries’ resources, colonialism is also applicable to this current issue.

To fully understand the situation, it is important recognize the basis of the Sahrawi claims for independence. Moreover, it is necessary to address the occupier’s methods for maintaining a favorable image of the occupation. Such means include legitimizing the occupation by alienating the independence movement – an example is ’s success in portraying the Palestinian Liberation Organization () as either terrorists or a wannabe government; encouraging third-party investment in the occupied territory; and maintaining a strong military relative to the occupied people. These methods can threaten a people’s right to self-determination. For the occupied people, this can result in a negotiated settlement that overlooks either the substantive or the procedural content of their rights or both.

To avoid the loss of all their rights, the Sahrawi leadership needs to compromise on the procedural component. This means being willing to have “independence” taken off the referendum and accept the Moroccan allowing for Sahrawi autonomy. In practical terms, autonomy means more self-government for the Sahrawis short of having the economic, political and legal decision-making authority a fully independent state would have. If the Sahrawi leadership does not accept the initiative, they could risk the continued exploitation of their mineral resources by Morocco. They could also risk becoming an increasingly marginalized group recognized by a dwindling number of states, with a significant refugee situation on their hands.

The Right To Self-Determination

A colonized people’s pursuit of self-determination can rely on a combination of nonviolent resistance, a war of independence or assimilation of the occupiers with the local population. It is important to consider whether the colonialists are only exploiting resources in the territory, or whether they regard the territory as living space in which their own people can settle. This distinction becomes clear when comparing French Algeria with British India; the latter is an example of orthodox colonialism which mainly exploited resources and cheap labor, while the former also used the colonized territory as living space for its own people.

With the practice of granting independence to colonized territories, coupled with a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris), self-determination emerged as customary international law.

In the case of the Western Sahara, the incentives for Moroccans to work and settle there are strong. According to the US State Department, Moroccans working in the Western Sahara 85% more than their counterparts outside the territory. They are not expected to pay an income or value-added tax, and receive subsidies on many goods and services. In response to this Moroccan settlement policy, the Sahrawis pursued violent resistance as the Algerians did against the French, hoping the settlers, which today dwarf the native Sahrawi population in the Western Sahara by three to one, would flee back to Morocco proper. However, this violent resistance failed, and now the Sahrawi leadership and a sizable portion of the Sahrawi people are living in refugee camps in .

The Sahrawi demands are nothing unexpected – merely the self-determination of their people. The self-determination of peoples is clearly recognized as a principle in the United Nations (UN) . There is on whether the original scope of self-determination in article 1(2) of the charter is legally binding, or whether it is “a statement of a political aim [which does not necessarily] create legal obligations.” Malcolm N. Shaw : “It is disputed whether the reference to the principle in these very general terms was sufficient to entail its recognition as a binding right, but the majority view is against this.” Regardless of the principle’s original scope in the charter self-determination today has evolved as a right of peoples, as opposed to a general principle, in both treaty and customary law.

The emergence of self-determination as a right is attributable to the UN Charter itself, which, according to Antonio Cassese,  the “driving force behind the emergence of growing opinion about the importance of self-determination.” Such an opinion was initially expressed through UN General Assembly (UNGA) declarations. UNGA resolution , entitled “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” stated that “All peoples have a right to self-determination,” and that by virtue of this right, peoples are entitled to “freely determine their political status.”

Only a day after the passing of resolution 1514, the General Assembly passed resolution , which identified non-self-governing territories as having attained full self-government if they emerged as a sovereign independent state, became associated with an independent state or were integrated into an independent state. Two treaties were subsequently formulated by the UN Commission on Human Rights, which referred to the self-determination of peoples as a right. With the practice of granting independence to colonized territories, coupled with a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris), self-determination emerged as customary international law.

In addition, self-determination encompasses a right to the territory’s material resources. This point was highlighted in one International Court of Justice () case. In response to the Australian contention that Australian exploitation of oil resources in the Timor Gap did not impede the East Timorese from their procedural rights, Judge Rosalyn Higgins characterized this argument as “legal deconstructionism” that would “empty the right of self-determination of any meaningful content.”

The Sahrawis

In 1991, a ceasefire was reached between the Sahrawi leadership, known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamraand Río de Oro (Polisario), and Morocco. After 16 years of fighting, the two sides agreed upon a settlement plan for the self-determination of the Sahrawis. The Polisario only exercised effective control over one-third of the territory they claimed when the ceasefire was reached. Despite the settlement plan which agreed on the holding of a referendum, the Moroccan government and the Polisario have been unable to agree on who can vote in the referendum determining the status of the Western Sahara as either autonomous, independent or integrated with Morocco. While Morocco wants to include the non-Sahrawis in the territory, the Polisario wants to include only the 74,000 Sahrawis and their descendants.

Essentially, the Sahrawis need to waive part of their procedural rights – a referendum entailing independence, autonomy or integration – in exchange for securing their substantive rights – the administration of the territory and their resources.

Furthermore, the two parties have been unable to agree on the nature of self-determination. While King Hassan II of Morocco appeared to be receptive to the notion of self-determination entailing autonomy, integration or independence of the Sahrawis, the independence option died with him in 1999. His successor, King Mohammed VI, rejected independence as a possibility and replaced it with the less explicit “self-determination.” This was by the Moroccan Initiative in the Western Sahara, which was prepared by the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) in 2006, and is essentially an autonomy plan for the Sahrawis. According to the initiative:

“The autonomous government would control local administration, local police, education, cultural development, economic development, regional planning, tourism, investment, trade, public works and transportation, housing, health, sports and social welfare. It would have taxing authorities to support these functions and would continue to receive funding from the central budget as well. It would be able to establish foreign regional trade relations offices and would have consultative rights on other sovereign foreign agreements affecting the region.”

The Polisario, however, rejected the initiative and has maintained that independence must be included as an option on the referendum. Today the Polisario remain the administrators of several refugee camps located in Algeria. According to the UN Refugee Agency (), some 90,000 Sahrawis live in these refugee camps. By rejecting the autonomy plan, the Polisario would concede the immediate return of those refugees to their land and the administration of the territory. They would concede the revenue from exploited mineral and fishery resources to Morocco.

So the question here is whether the Polisario should reconsider their situation and agree to the autonomy plan. As of now, there are several reasons why they should accept it:

(1)   The fighting has ended, and with the of the sand berm and a desert laden with , it is difficult to think of a scenario similar to French Algeria. Instead, the model of South Africa is more feasible. Whereas Algerians pursued the expulsion of the settlers, South Africans sought a one-state solution that included the settlers.

(2)   Unlike the situation in , in which Israel is seeking to maintain a “Jewish state,” Morocco must accommodate different peoples within its borders. In fact, if there were a case for ethnic preferences, it would be for the Arabic language and peoples over the majority Amazigh, which is due to the king’s own background. This means that the identity of the citizen that Morocco would want the people to have is relatively inclusive of the Sahrawis and their linguistic preference.

(3)   Following the precedent of a culturally heterogeneous state, Morocco has encouraged the Sahrawi refugees to return.

(4)   With the immediate return and development of the autonomous region, the Sahrawis can ensure that their identity is preserved. This means preventing the assimilation of the Sahrawi people into the broader Moroccan identity.

Essentially, the Sahrawis need to waive part of their procedural rights – a referendum entailing independence, autonomy or integration – in exchange for securing their substantive rights – the administration of the territory and their resources.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.
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